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Angela Romano and Federico Romero 
This book offers an unprecedented historical investigation into the strategies, 
expectations and predicaments of the European socialist regimes in the context of the 
opening up of a space for pan-European cooperation in the “long 1970s”. It is the 
result of the five-year PanEur1970s research project, which has received funding 
from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 
research and innovation programme (Grant Agreement no. 669194). The project 
brought together a team of historians with different yet complementary fields of 
specialisation. Their coordinated research has resulted in a re-conceptualisation 
of trans-European exchanges and cooperation against a background of Cold War 
constraints, global economic change and processes of regional integration. It 
sheds new light on the thinking and agency of the socialist regimes. 
Over the last decade, Cold War historiography has revealed a complex pat-
tern of intra-European détente embodied in a deepening web of contacts, interactions,
exchanges and mutual obligations across the “Iron Curtain”.1 Within this con-
text, some historians of European integration have re-examined the emergence
of the European Economic Community (EEC) as an influential international
actor, particularly through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, and have appraised the EEC’s reach and allure regarding the socialist
countries.2 
It is now evident that from the late 1960s, Europe’s Cold War geopolitical and 
ideological divide cohabited with an emerging continental space for growing 
exchanges, trade and collaboration, which was often expected to foster convergence 
and interdependence. On the one hand, these trans-European connections offered 
the socialist countries much-needed patterns of exchange and potential regional 
integration. On the other hand, they opened up a less protected and self-enclosed 
environment that presented significant challenges to the stability, political control 
and ideological self-legitimisation of the regimes. 
We explore these tensions by analysing the changing mindset of the European 
socialist elites, in particular their assumptions on the international division of 
labour and cooperation with Western Europe, their attempts at dealing with the 
commercial giant next door (i.e. the EEC) and the predicaments they faced when 
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State of the art and research questions 
Scholars of Russia and Eastern Europe and/or communism have brought to the 
fore the economic rationales for the socialist countries’ policy of peaceful coex-
istence and cooperation with the West. By the mid-1960s, the rapid growth of 
their economies based on planning and intense industrialisation had reached its 
limits. As their economies could not adjust rapidly enough to the requirements 
of the unfolding technological revolution, the socialist governments recognised 
that foreign trade was an important factor in socialist growth and began to follow a 
long-term policy aimed at extending their trade with the developed market econo-
mies.3 Improved commercial relations with the West were expected to provide 
their enterprises with better access to Western technology and their citizens with 
a diversified range of consumer goods, thus enhancing socialist modernisation. 
Economic growth had become a conditio sine qua non for political stability in 
Eastern Europe since the late 1950s, as improving living standards appeared cru-
cial for government legitimacy. Their importance grew even further after the sup-
pression of the Prague Spring in 1968 wiped out the option of profound political 
reforms. 
It is common knowledge that the socialist countries’ strategies failed, some-
times in a spectacular way. We know that increased trade with the West did not 
bring the expected improvement in productivity and that the bloc’s overall eco-
nomic performance fell well short of Western capitalist achievements. Their 
attempts at opening up and reform turned out to be flawed, mostly amounting to 
an increasingly ineffective ‘muddling through’. 4 Trade with the global South did 
not balance increasing deficits with the West. Some tried to bridge the gap with 
foreign credits and eventually walked into a debt trap: Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
the GDR. Romania would eventually repay its debts at the expense of depressing 
its domestic economy to unbearable levels. Czechoslovakia avoided indebtedness 
and just managed to stagnate. Ultimately, instead of a modernised socialism, these 
countries received a fatal ‘kiss of debt’.5 Therefore, the socialist governments 
‘faced two alternatives, either retreat to a conservative stagnation or proceed down 
the road of gradual capitalist restoration’.6 As Valerie Bunce put it, the choice had 
narrowed to two unpalatable options: liberalise and thereby destroy the system or 
put off reforms and purchase short-term stability but long-term doom. 7 The appar-
ent consolidation of the regimes by means of improved consumption turned out 
to be short-lived, while their public legitimacy was eroded by the unsustainable 
comparison with Western standards that increased East-West exchanges had put 
on full display. As the regimes’ main claims to legitimacy – safety, full employ-
ment and rapid growth – were undermined, even the ruling elites lost their self-
confidence, opening the way for the 1989 collapse.8 
Our knowledge is now considerably richer than twenty or even ten years ago, 
yet important gaps still exist. To start with, most of the literature focuses on the 
domestic determinants of economic reforms, neglecting the impact of external
factors, with the exception of those emanating from the Soviet Union. However, 




























shocks with serious repercussions on its stability. In several countries, this led 
to a second wave of (cautious) reforms under the pressure of deepening external 
imbalances. Several scholars have started to investigate the socialist countries’
problematic relationship with globalisation and technological change, and their 
haphazard attempts at deepening relationships with world markets.9 Nevertheless, 
research on exogenous economic influences on transformations in the region is 
still in its infancy. 
Even more glaring is the gap in our knowledge of the changing mindset and
outlook of the European socialist elites, particularly their expectations in the
evolving rapprochement with Western Europe and their reading of its integration
process and its impact. The history of individual socialist countries’ relations
with the EEC during the Cold War has been largely overlooked or summarily
dealt with under the rubric of their post–Cold War “return to Europe” in the
context of EU enlargement. 10 While a few historians have explored the Soviet
Union’s attitude and policy towards the EEC, studies on the other socialist coun-
tries’ approaches to it are still scarce. 11 This lack of historical analysis is star-
tling. By the early 1970s, Yugoslavia was deeply dependent on economic and
financial cooperation with the EEC. The EEC had also become the single largest
importing and exporting market after the CMEA for the Central and Eastern
European socialist countries. Therefore, the EEC’s protectionist policies on agri-
cultural products and quantitative restrictions on industrial goods affected the
socialist economies to an important and growing extent. The EEC also affected
the socialist regimes’ attempts at integrating in the world economy, for example
by asking them to pay an “admission ticket” to the GATT in commercial rather
than political terms. The paucity of historiographical work on these matters is
largely the result of the Cold War era legacy of separate studies on Eastern and
Western Europe. So far, although historians working on the two sides of what
used to be a divided Europe have had considerable contacts, they have usually
operated with largely separate agendas and networks. In addition, the historiog-
raphy on European integration has long developed in self-insulation within the
geopolitical, institutional and conceptual boundaries of the Western European
communities.
Our research specifically aimed to break down these traditional divides and to 
bring “Eastern” insights into the wider evolution of the European economies and 
institutions. It also crosses the traditional demarcations among diverse fields of 
historiography (namely the Cold War, contemporary Europe, communism, Euro-
pean integration and international economic history). We intertwine international, 
political and economic history perspectives in order to offer a dynamic portrait of 
the socialist elites’ paradigms, constraints and goals in pursuing policies of coop-
eration with Western Europe and the EEC. 
We assess the complex influence of European and global processes of transfor-
mation on the socialist elites’ reading of the international political and economic 
environment and their consequent decisions. We then track the rise, inconsistencies 
and fall of the national expectations at the basis of their strategies. In so doing, 
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socialist regimes’ concepts and policies and is able to assess the development of 
the EEC from the (rather unhappy) perspective of these outsiders. 
Our research has revolved around four main research questions: 
• What were the European socialist regimes’ expectations concerning East-
West trade and pan-European cooperation in the 1970s? Their views and
analyses shaped the premises on which they assessed the desirability or neces-
sity of opening up to international exchanges and prioritised specific policy 
goals. This appraisal was not only rooted in economic terms but was also 
strongly concerned with foreign policy issues. As Europe was morphing into 
a locus of potential rapprochement, recombination and convergence, most of 
the socialist countries viewed connections with Western Europe as levers for 
a cautious but determined reconfiguration of hierarchies within the socialist 
bloc. Soviet dominance could not be contested but deliberate attempts were 
made, and many more were conceived, at diluting it within a larger pan-
European web of contacts that enhanced each nation’s own agency. In the 
case of Yugoslavia, closer relations with Western Europe had to be reconciled 
with the country’s non-alignment policy. 
• How did European socialist regimes assess the impact of the EEC on their 
economies and decide how to deal with it? We investigate their debates and 
policy solutions with specific attention to the complex interplay between 
national and CMEA options, and to the tensions between socialist integration 
and growing trans-European interdependence. 
• Who in the political and economic elites advocated or opposed higher levels 
of East-West economic exchange? Party and government officials often had 
conflicting concerns about opening up to the West. On the one hand, Western 
technology could stimulate economic growth and Western consumer goods 
could assuage domestic pressures on the regime. On the other hand, increased 
economic and financial relations with the West could undermine the regime’s 
stability or constrain its options. In addition, relationships with Moscow had 
to be factored in, as international economic relations affected each country’s 
degree of dependence on the Soviet Union (for the CMEA member states) or 
its room for manoeuvre (Yugoslavia). We assume each national elite was a 
heterogeneous group featuring different opinions ranging from reformist to 
conservative, and in which positions might well have changed over time. 
• Which factors explain the eventual failure of these national strategies? We 
explore the economic and institutional predicaments the socialist regimes had 
to face and try to assess the interactions between the domestic constraints of 
a rigid planning system and the multiple, rapid and often unpredictable trans-
formations in the international context. These transformations changed the 
rules of the game, and the very playing field, in many ways that were hard to 
gauge or even imagine at the beginning of the decade, thus altering the whole 
set of equations at the basis of the socialist strategies. As we progressed in 
this work, we realised that finding out why the strategies failed also entailed 






wrong, what (if anything) could be adapted on the go, and what could not 
be salvaged. In short, a new question arose about when and how it became 
evident that the strategy was failing. 
Methodology 
The basic assumption at the root of our project is that there was an emergence of 
a space for pan-European cooperation that transcended, yet did not obliterate, the 
Cold War partition. Therefore, our analysis is not of the socialist bloc as such. On 
the contrary, we aimed precisely at appraising the individual experiences of the 
socialist regimes in Europe when they were re-conceptualising and re-negotiating 
their roles in the changing international and continental scenario, their relation-
ships with the Soviet Union and their national senses of being “European”. We 
considered all the European socialist countries except Albania, devoting a chapter 
to each: the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, which was not a member of the CMEA or 
the Warsaw Pact. By the same logic, we excluded the Soviet Union as the role, 
self-perception, predicaments and interests of the superpower were quite different 
from those of the smaller European socialist regimes. Of course, Soviet views 
and policies do feature in our analysis as key factors affecting national debates, 
cooperation strategies with the West and ultimately each country’s perception of 
its room for manoeuvre. 
We were also dissatisfied with the narrow view of socialist regimes as party-ruled 
monolithic entities. We intended to open the socialist regimes’ “black box” to 
reveal the more complex and multi-faceted debates that took place within, between 
and across the elites most involved in the national analysis and decision-making 
processes. Therefore, we moved beyond a narrow focus on the communist parties’
top political leaderships to also analyse the contributions of state machineries, 
central and investment banks, trade managers, economic experts and academics. 
In the government apparatus, we specifically considered the ministries and agen-
cies most concerned with relations with the West, usually the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Within their ranks, the staff dispatched 
abroad (diplomats, trade attachés, ad hoc advisers) also appeared to be particu-
larly active and relevant in the debate. We also focused on those branches of the 
state that were more directly responsible for the national economic strategy, such 
as the Central Planning Commission, the Economic Ministry and the Economic 
Committee of the Council of Ministers. We considered the managerial elite level 
to be particularly interesting. The officials at the national central banks and invest-
ment banks, which are usually overlooked, had an increasing say in the debate 
as imports from the West fuelled external debt. On their part, the managers of the 
socialist foreign trade enterprises had a direct stake in the growth of relations with 
Western Europe and the EEC. We were interested in investigating and appraising 
the approaches of these agents who negotiated, organised and staffed most of 
the trans-European exchanges, and their views on the multiple spaces they tried 
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universities were key agents in the circulation of ideas among and within socialist 
states (and beyond). They often had crucial analytical, cognitive and discursive 
roles, the differentiated impact of which on political elites deserves full appraisal. 
Of course, the exact composition and weight of the elites involved in the debate 
varied from country to country, as the country-specific chapters make clear. These 
variations are also part of the comparative assessment presented in Chapter 10 . 
We identified the years between 1969 and the early 1980s as the crucial chron-
ological span due to three interrelated processes that had profound influences on
the matter under scrutiny: long-lasting détente in East-West relations, the social-
ist countries’ inclination to cautiously integrate into the world economy, and
the EEC’s enlargement, deepening and self-assertion as an international actor.
Therefore, 1969 is the starting point for all the chapters, due to three fundamental 
settings that emerged at the time. First, the Warsaw Pact countries’ military
suppression of the Prague Spring reform (with the sole opposition of Romania)
set the limits that the Soviets would tolerate in terms of (political) reforms in
any of these countries. The lesson of the invasion would be omnipresent in the
considerations of most of the European socialist regimes, including non-aligned
Yugoslavia, affecting their policies towards Western Europe and the EEC in
various ways. It induced varying degrees of restraint but it also stimulated more
autonomous and nationalistic attitudes (most noticeably in Romania) or openly
strengthened the urge to reach out to the West (Yugoslavia). Second, in 1969
détente with the East became a mainstream Western policy, as the US under
President Richard Nixon and the Federal Republic of Germany led by Chancel-
lor Willy Brandt fully embraced a relaxation of tensions and cooperation with
the Soviet Union and its allies. While trade relations had already existed in
previous years, West Germany’s new Ostpolitik allowed for a systematic devel-
opment of economic exchanges, opening a wide avenue for the modernisation
efforts of the socialist economies. Third, at the 1969 EEC summit at The Hague,
the six member states agreed to proceed with the completion and deepening of
their integration process and with negotiations for the accession of Ireland, Den-
mark and, most importantly, the UK. These decisions signalled to the socialist
countries that far from being in crisis the EEC was actually growing stronger
and larger, taking on an economic role and a weight that could no longer be
disregarded.
By contrast, identifying a precise common endpoint year for our national cases 
would have been artificial. We did not intend to go beyond the mid-1980s, since 
the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev with his radical views on international relations 
heralded the full acceptance of a pan-European space for cooperation and rapidly 
diminished the political constraints of the USSR on its allies, thus inaugurating 
profoundly different dynamics. The main benchmark for our research goal was 
the moment when it became apparent to the socialist regime elites that their strat-
egy of import-led growth and integration in the world economy was failing, and 
that their agency in shaping relations with the West, the EEC and global markets 
was very limited. This took place at different moments in the early 1980s, and 
each chapter details these national specificities. 
 






Finally, a word about terminology. We refer to the countries under scrutiny as 
socialist rather than communist. Our guiding principle has been to respect the 
definition the historical actors themselves adopted at the time according to their 
Marxist-Leninist lexicon. Communism was conceived as the final stage of the 
path that these regimes had embarked upon, yet they collapsed way before reach-
ing the promised land. In the 1970s, they described their stages of progress on 
the path to communism with varying terms: advanced socialism, developing 
socialism (in the case of Romania) or self-management socialism (in the unique 
instance of Yugoslavia). In a research project that foregrounds these regimes’
agency and self-understanding and which is focused on their economies, the term 
‘communist’ – inevitably also loaded with Western Cold War connotations – is 
appropriately used when referring to the party and its ideology. We also trust our 
readers not to be perplexed or misled by the formula ‘European socialist coun-
tries’ since their difference and distance from the social-democratic regimes of 
Western Europe (like Sweden) is all too apparent. 
Organisation of the book 
Our research effort was closely coordinated and collective, and this book tries to 
achieve coherence and thematic unity by means of shared research questions and 
a shared format and structure. Two overview chapters explore the overall context, 
the shared settings and the historiographical debates in which the country-specific 
analyses are embedded. Chapter 1 provides a critical overview of the international 
economic transformations and turning points, such as the two ‘oil shocks’ that 
altered the trading, financial and conceptual context within which the socialist 
strategies rose and fell. It contextualises the dynamics of East-West cooperation 
within the changing paradigms that replaced Keynesian management with global 
market competition. Chapter 2 focuses on the emerging pan-European space for 
cooperation. It considers political and economic interactions at the bilateral and 
multilateral levels (including the CSCE process), the patterns of integration in 
both the West and the East (EEC and CMEA) together with their interplay, and 
the impact of the European Economic Community’s policies on the socialist 
countries. 
The national case contributions ( Chapters 3 to 9) follow a common format in 
order to allow the single cases to speak to one another effectively and facilitate the 
identification and discussion of both common patterns and national specificities. 
Each chapter illustrates and contextualises the origins, development and results 
of the country’s national economic strategy with regard to East-West cooperation 
and relations with the EEC. More specifically, each chapter presents the coun-
try’s economic specificities, its international commercial and financial strategy, 
the goals, assumptions and expectations of its elites, and the latter’s assessment 
of the EEC’s impact on the economy. Thus, each chapter brings to the fore the 
actors and internal dynamics in the decision-making process, with insights into 
the representation of the strategy to the domestic public. Particular attention is 
given to the elites’ appraisals of the strategies of the other socialist countries, their 
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relations with CMEA politics and policies and their perceptions of the country’s 
room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. To varying degrees, the chapters 
examine the implementation of the strategy, its shortcomings and its adjustments 
in response to domestic and international factors. Each chapter concludes with an 
overall assessment of the outcomes of the strategy and a brief comparison of the 
national trajectory with the other socialist experiments. 
Chapter 10 presents the overall results of the project in relation to its research 
questions, outlines the main comparative findings and highlights this study’s con-
tribution to a diverse range of historiographical debates. 
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 1 Socialism Between Détente 
and Globalisation 
 Federico Romero 
Historians have increasingly connected the demise of Europe’s socialist regimes 
with late twentieth-century global economic transformations. Several interpreta-
tions of 1989 focus on the undermining effects globalisation had on the late socialist 
economies and, more crucially, on its ‘ideological erosion’ of the regimes’ solid-
ity, legitimacy and self-confidence. 1 
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system and the 1973 oil crisis, 
growing trade competition and market liberalisation redesigned international 
commercial and financial flows. Multinational corporations connected by new 
communication and information technologies reshaped productive and distribu-
tive networks. The explosive growth of global finance – with international lend-
ing rising more than tenfold between 1970 and 1980 – fuelled these processes and 
built new dynamics of wealth and power. 2 
With goods and capital moving worldwide in unprecedented amounts and at an 
increasing pace, the landscape in which socialist economies operated was trans-
formed more quickly and unpredictably than socialist officials could fathom or 
cope with. Their efforts to make their economies more productive by expanding 
trade with, and technology transfers from, the West turned sour by the late 1970s, 
and ever-increasing financial imbalances constrained their options, in a few cases 
to the point of suffocation. By the 1980s they had fallen victim to ‘the kiss of 
debt’, and poor economic performance called into question the very rationale 
upon which their strategies had been built: ‘if socialism was merely aiming at pla-
cating consumers just like capitalism, only not as well, was socialism’s existence 
even justified?’3 
Of course, economic dynamics were linked to ideological and cultural factors 
that deepened socialism’s predicament, hindering its residual rationale and hol-
lowing out its core meaning. While socialist modernisers were trying to temper 
the rigidities of planning with limited simulated market mechanisms, the Keynes-
ian consensus was fast unravelling in the West. Rather than the presumed conver-
gence of ‘market socialism’ and Keynesian mixed economies towards rationally 
planned industrial societies, the 1970s ushered in a free market ideology that 
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Individual competition rooted in a market concept was hailed as the foundation 
of freedom and contrasted with the state as the source of authoritarianism. In this 
starkly binary logic, “freedom of choice” rose from being a consumerist slogan 
to an overarching paradigm of pervasive influence.5 Soon dubbed “neo-liberal”, 
this paradigm of market individualism in a context of deepening global intercon-
nectedness not only sustained a fierce criticism of communism but also struck at 
the core of any planning and redistributive policy, disabling social-democratic and 
Keynesian frameworks, which relied primarily on national policy tools. Tighter 
interdependence and capital mobility forced adjustments at any level – regional 
and national, between sectors and within firms. 
This major systemic transition was deeply upsetting everywhere and the West-
ern economies underwent difficult, often painful changes. However, they adapted 
better than those of Eastern Europe. After comparable achievements in the two 
post-war decades, economic performances diverged markedly. Between 1973 
and 1989, the planned economies of Eastern Europe grew 0.7% a year, against 
2% for Western Europe. Per-capita income in socialist economies dropped from 
49% to 37% of Western European levels. 6 State socialism proved to be ‘a blunt 
instrument, more suitable for rapid industrialisation . . . than for progressing to a 
sophisticated consumer economy’.7 
These fast-changing conditions made the national economic strategies analysed 
in this book far more difficult to implement and ultimately unsuccessful. It was 
not merely an economic failure to improve productivity and upgrade technol-
ogy, although this was crucial. The demise of strategies depending on deeper 
exchanges with the West meant the socialist regimes of central-eastern Europe 
lost their attempt at overcoming the key long-term dependencies that hampered 
them and to a large extent defined them. 
They were struggling, first, with their historically sedimented condition of 
“peripheral” economies subordinated to Europe’s north-western industrial core. 
Even though Stalinist industrialisation had transformed their domestic economic 
agrarian structures, their actual and potential trading relations with the advanced 
industrialised economies of the West remained disproportionally dependent on 
exporting primary products and low-tech goods. For Poland, Hungary and Yugo-
slavia, and even more so for Bulgaria and Romania, catching up with the most 
advanced economies was a long-term national goal no less than a key imperative 
of socialist ideology. 8 Its pursuit might have appeared long and difficult but far 
from unthinkable in the 1960s and early 1970s, but within a decade it turned out 
to be an untenable delusion. 
Historical “backwardness” was compounded with the relative isolation imposed 
by the early Cold War partition of Europe in opposite and largely separate camps. 
Ever since the launch of the Marshall Plan in 1947, Western management of the 
international economy also aimed to isolate the socialist economies. The insti-
tutions, rules and practices of post-war multilateralism ensured they remained 
fenced in a closed sphere with minimal interchanges with Western capital and 
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an insulated self-blockaded socialist camp – which operated in paradoxical syn-
ergy with Western decisions. 
Historical scholarship has debunked, or at the very least seriously qualified, the 
Cold War myth of an impermeable dour socialist autarky. Excluded from the post-war 
international economy framed by Western multilateralism, the socialist countries 
strived to build up trade amongst themselves and a planned division of labour 
through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Although this 
seemingly complemented the bloc’s military and ideological cohesion, it neither 
functioned efficiently for economic integration nor satisfied the participants’ key 
economic ambitions. The Soviet Union gained little economically and soon had 
to provide its partners with support, while they resisted plans for intra-regional 
specialisation, strived to maximise their individual shares of Soviet subsidies and 
usually pursued their own national goals.9 
This system was not particularly efficient and certainly unsatisfactory, not least 
for the central-eastern European socialist countries mired in a ‘dual dependency’10 
on the region’s dominant imperial power and the core economies of the capitalist 
world, yet it embodied and to a certain extent sustained the post-Stalinist effort to 
deepen socialism’s transnationalism, connect with the world and build networks 
of global exchange. 
Recent studies investigate the multiple deep expanding connections the social-
ist world built within its own boundaries and with other societies, particularly 
in post-colonial settings but also in the West. They make a strong case for a far 
more plural reading of the various internationalist projects and frameworks that 
not only competed but often overlapped and got intertwined in the complex trans-
formations from the 1960s onwards.11 They challenge the teleological view of a 
single inescapable neo-liberal globalisation and replace it with proper historical 
questions on the goals, pressures and specific terms under which different states 
decided to open up their economies.12 Above all, they reassess the place and role 
of socialism in global history, its contribution to a culture of global change in the 
second half of the twentieth century and its practices to connect with the “third 
world” in projects of alternative internationalisation.13 
Of course, assessing socialism’s contribution to globalisation, or conceptualising 
an alternative path to globalisation, is a challenging endeavour, not least because 
the communists purposely ‘wrote themselves out of the story of globalisation’
with their language of national independence and antagonistic blocs.14 Still, the 
challenge to global capitalist hegemony inspired socialist views and policies from 
the mid-1950s onwards, and was sufficiently serious to raise considerable con-
cerns in Western capitals. At least until the mid-1970s, the potential for an emerging 
compact between socialism and the global South seemed real enough to stoke 
hopes or fears of an alternative international order. 15 
This did not come to pass. Instead, a compelling market globalisation under
Western hegemony came to define the closing decades of the twentieth century. The
transition from the former prospect to the latter reality defined the mutable environ-
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Socialist transformation or stabilisation? 
The Stalinist model of heavy industrialisation had changed the socialist coun-
tries’ economies, with intense resource utilisation that fuelled their rapid post-war 
growth. However, their leaders – and particularly Nikita Khrushchev – looked at 
Western advanced capitalism as their reference point. The aspiration of catching 
up with the West oriented their compasses for strategic, ideological and material 
reasons. It was, of course, a Cold War imperative dictated by the need to sustain 
the antagonism and possibly surpass and outshine the adversary. Furthermore, it 
was an ideological tenet rooted in Marxist-Leninist views of class struggle and 
historical progress. However, by the early 1960s it was also increasingly a thrust 
grounded in more pragmatic goals and implications. 
Under Khrushchev, the Soviet leadership embraced notions of accelerated eco-
nomic growth premised on a shift towards light industry for increased production 
of a larger range of consumer goods and on expanded trade within the socialist 
sphere but also with the new post-colonial nations and the West. Above all, it 
pinned its hopes on a scientific and technological revolution not only to propel the 
USSR to the role of global superpower but also to project socialism as an alterna-
tive superior form of modernity. This entailed a strong emphasis on technological 
innovation necessitating not only research but also exchanges between East and 
West – tasks entrusted to a State Committee of Science and Technology created in 
1958.16 In 1961, the Communist Party of the USSR published a new programme 
that associated communism with material abundance and promised socialist con-
sumption policies that betrayed a cultural fascination with Western ideas of soci-
etal wellbeing and progress, if not an internalisation of Western superiority. 17 
This shift of emphasis was shared, albeit unevenly, by the other European 
socialist regimes (but harshly criticised by the Chinese), and there, as in the Soviet 
Union, it brought both desired transformations and unintended consequences 
and tensions. Investment priorities were at least partially rearranged. In order to 
tackle key problems of productivity and incentives, a variety of reform experi-
ments were attempted, usually with ‘market mechanisms . . . simulated within 
the framework of the planned economy without introducing the fundamentals of 
a market economy’.18 
However, the reorientation of priorities towards satisfying socio-economic 
needs, and the introduction of even limited market mechanisms, did not sit 
smoothly with a planning system that had been created to maximise investment 
in heavy industry and ensure top-down discipline. Frictions soon emerged both in 
practical terms, as innovations were stifled and productivity gains seriously lim-
ited by the inbuilt strength and inertia of the planning mechanism; and in political 
terms, as the push for incremental changes raised the spectre of a fundamental 
reshaping of the socialist model, with the possibility of uncontrolled power strug-
gles and systemic destabilisation.19 
These tensions played out with different features and timing in the various 
national contexts, producing multiple threads of Marxist reform thinking and 
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an abrupt head in summer 1968 when the Warsaw Pact armies suppressed the 
Prague Spring, the most ambitious and far-reaching experiment in socialist 
reform. Driven by the strategic need to preserve the cohesion of the socialist bloc, 
the Soviet-led intervention made clear, once and for all, that political stability 
overrode any attempt at reforming the socialist economic model. Therefore, it 
designed a very narrow perimeter of admissible social and economic change. 
With reforming or defending socialism now alternative options, radical transfor-
mations of the planned economy were ruled out. This had two key consequences. 
First, socialist reform thinking withered – with its advocates either repressed or 
withdrawn to the safer sphere of technical advice – and it was eventually eclipsed 
by criticism centred on civil rights rather than ideas of social and economic trans-
formation. Second, acceptable change was redefined ‘exclusively in terms of a 
gradual improvement of the existing order, as expressed by Leonid Brezhnev’s 
ideology of stabilisation’.21 
With reform policies and politics forcibly shelved, socialist elites concentrated 
on strategies for growth that would not engender uncontrolled change and risk 
instability. Alarmed by popular pressure for economic betterment, particularly 
evident after the December 1970 strikes in Poland, they came to focus on invest-
ment and trade solutions geared to ‘pacify the workers while securing their own 
power’. 22 Public welfare and consumption therefore acquired greater priority, and 
one of the ways to achieve them came to be seen in increased imports of technol-
ogy and consumer goods from the West, a strategy shared by the entire bloc (with 
the exception of Czechoslovakia in the early years of its ‘normalisation’) and 
pursued most intensely by the GDR, Hungary and Poland. Socialism would not be 
reformed but it could be modernised (so the new doctrine predicted) by enhancing 
its ability to incorporate the technical achievements of the Western economies. 
The pursuit of this rationale was facilitated by another transformation that the 
1960s had brought to the socialist sphere. The push for accelerated economic 
growth, technological exchange and increased trade had expanded the role and 
reach of CMEA. Spurred also by a genuine, albeit apprehensive, interest in the 
ongoing dynamics of integration among Western economies, the notion that 
deeper interdependence should be pursued and organised flourished in socialist 
capitals. CMEA could develop complementarities and strive for deeper integra-
tion and specialisation to enhance growth and strengthen the socialist world. At 
the height of decolonisation, it was also seen as a tool to elaborate a coherent 
socialist model to offer to some of the newly independent countries of the global 
South, aiming to shape a larger socialist sphere encompassing both developed and 
developing countries and affecting the visible growth of global interconnected-
ness in original alternative ways. 
However, initial projects to coordinate national plans and pursue a bloc-wide 
division of labour were resisted (or openly rejected, in the case of Romania) by 
the interplay of divergent national ambitions and interests. The intergovernmen-
tal nature of CMEA facilitated processes of national identification and limited 
Moscow’s ability to direct and control institutional dynamics, especially at a time 
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movement at the party level substantially less solid. As a consequence, diver-
sity rather than homogeneity increased across the Eastern bloc, with each country 
pushing for competitive advantage, using the bloc’s multilateral structures to 
carve out space for its own trade deals, enhance its national autonomy and pur-
sue key national goals (the GDR and Poland, for instance, thwarted deals with 
West Germany until their own bilateral issues – recognition and border settlement 
respectively – had been solved). A similar dynamic also took hold in relations 
with the global South. Early attempts at coordinated bloc initiatives with strategic 
relevance were gradually abandoned and replaced with separate national engage-
ments aimed at trade advantages in a logic of national, rather than bloc-wide, 
economic improvement.23 
At the beginning of the 1970s, the developmental discourse steeped in anti-
imperial solidarity remained dominant, but in actual terms it was being super-
seded by national strategies with a hard-nosed focus on mutual trade benefits. 
Among these, the supply of raw materials stood out, but equally crucial was the 
socialist economies’ overarching need to gain hard currency via export, in order to 
sustain their purchases of investment and consumer goods from the West. Rather 
than an anti-imperial north-south axis, socialist economic strategies were now pri-
oritising an east-west interchange as the key to a more productive, technologically 
advanced, consumption-oriented socialism. 
Opportunities and expectations of détente 
These economic strategies were inextricably intertwined with détente. The two 
processes were mutually reinforcing, and usually expected – in the East even 
more widely than in the West – to succeed together. In Warsaw and Budapest, 
but also in Bucharest and Sofia, the rising tide of East-West détente spelled an 
unprecedented moment of opportunity and confidence. 
The US-Soviet dialogue on strategic arms control, which had brought the 1968 
Non-proliferation Treaty and eventually resulted in the 1972 SALT agreement, 
was meant to diminish the risk of war and stabilise relations between Moscow 
and Washington but also to buttress their hierarchical control over their respective 
blocs. However, unintended consequences abounded, as détente opened up a far 
wider and mutable political space. Within it, several venues of East-West coopera-
tion could now be explored by a variety of protagonists, whose priorities did not 
always coincide with those of the two hegemons.24 
Two crucial factors paved the way to a dynamic multi-level multilateral détente 
between Eastern and Western Europe. Socialist leaders interpreted the armament 
agreements as a result of Soviet strategic strength. Regulated nuclear parity for 
them spelled a safer system of mutual deterrence replacing the previous threat 
inherent in Western superiority and epitomised the rise of socialist world influ-
ence.25 Even more pivotal, Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik deflated the fear of German 
“revanchism,” inaugurated a language of cooperation that did not threaten social-
ist stability and indicated the possibility of mutually beneficial exchanges. In par-
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removed the main legal and historical obstacles to cooperation. They designed a 
new landscape that seemed to consign the Cold War to history while promising a 
future of peaceful competition between socio-economic systems.26 
Thus the economic strategies for faster socialist growth based on technological 
exchanges, credit from the West and an expansion of consumption found their 
most promising environment in the policies of détente pursued at the diplomatic 
level. Intensified cooperation would promote trade and partnership deals, thus 
feeding the ambitious economic goals set in Warsaw or Budapest, while extended 
exchanges (not only with West Germany, but also with the rest of Western Europe) 
would in turn provide robust foundations for a durable détente. Socialist leaders 
saw in this virtuous circle the prospect of self-consolidation with faster economic 
growth, a possibility for the cautious pursuit of national goals and the best option 
to ‘make detente irreversible’.27 
These views converged with those of most Western European governments 
(including the neutral ones), which saw détente not just as an interstate process 
but rather as a new horizon of cooperative security rooted in growing interdepen-
dence among economies, societies and peoples. Increasing trade and exchanges 
with Eastern Europe could be seen primarily as a political tool, as the US did, with 
the goal of rewarding and stimulating each government’s relative autonomy from 
Moscow. 28 However, they could also be imagined as tools for ambitious long-term 
transformations. This had been one of the original tenets of Ostpolitik and was 
fast becoming a shared grammar not only within Western European governments 
and the European Community but also among religious and civic associations, 
political parties, transnational activists and even business circles. If intensified 
trade, credit and technological cooperation could go together with increased con-
tacts, ease of travel and tourism, and societal and cultural exchanges, the ensuing 
interdependence would foster mutual confidence, shared interests and (possibly) 
an easing of the East-West divide. Confident in their superior economic strength 
and democratic legitimacy, Western European actors trusted the attractiveness of 
their social model to gradually open up socialist societies, temper their rigidities 
and perhaps in the long run erode their regimes’ authoritarian nature and hostile 
postures.29 
The main overarching venue in which these strategies and expectations con-
verged was the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 
which in Helsinki in 1975 produced a broad accord on East-West relations, contacts 
and exchanges. It enshrined the twin pillars of intra-European détente, the double 
notion that states would respect each other’s sovereignty and borders but would 
also facilitate mutual trade, travel and transnational societal interactions.30 This 
was the high point of détente and was seen in the socialist sphere as the crowning 
of its effort to obtain international legitimacy and stability. At the same time, it 
opened up new areas of competition and potential tensions, particularly on human 
rights, that would eventually challenge the socialist regimes’ domestic discipline 
and control.31 
Among socialist officials, concerns about capitalist encroachments, dependence 










18 Federico Romero 
culture could have on social discipline and cohesion were far from absent. Such 
fears were outweighed, though, by new expectations of safety, stability and 
prosperity. These hypothetical risks – including those related to human rights – 
appeared manageable and seemed more than balanced by Helsinki’s substantial 
results and promises.32 Stable and durable détente was the key strategic pros-
pect for peace and stability. Moreover, as economic strategies were pivoted on 
expanded trade and cooperation with the West, multilateral détente offered impor-
tant opportunities for national improvement and even some degree of autonomy. 
In the mid-1970s, socialist governments could still look at their prospects and 
predicaments with considerable confidence, not least because the West was not 
faring very well as it was mired in its major post-war crisis. 
The demise of the Bretton Woods monetary system had brought instability and 
uncertainty coupled with transatlantic frictions and mutual recriminations. For-
eign policy divergences – first on Vietnam, then on the management of détente 
and finally on the Middle East – intersected with economic issues, opening up 
a considerable gap between Washington and its European allies. The European 
Community was openly searching for a foreign policy role of its own and try-
ing to assert its economic power. Socialist leaders resurrected the notion of an 
impending crisis of capitalism and mused on Western Europe’s potential emanci-
pation from US hegemony. There was, of course, an element of wishful thinking 
in all this, but they were neither alone nor daydreaming, as many in the West 
also looked with trepidation at the implications of trans-Atlantic frictions and 
rivalry. 33 
Then the oil crisis added a shocking existential dimension to the sense of 
impending crisis. The rise in oil prices signalled to Western societies that their 
long post-war boom was over and that their dominance of the international terms 
of trade was challenged, by OPEC in a direct way and more broadly by a large 
coalition of developing countries that demanded a new, more equitable interna-
tional economic order. 34 
With the ensuing recession, unemployment resurfaced in the West and inflation 
took off. The post-war winning combination of growth and democratic stability 
suddenly appeared shaky. Economic policymaking and business plans had to be 
rearranged in a fractious landscape that exasperated national and trans-Atlantic 
divergences. Preserving the West’s multilateral system required new tools and 
institutions for the management of interdependence.35 As a result of this crisis, a 
complex multi-level reshaping of the world economy got under way. Under new 
paradigms of market competition and financial liberalisation, Keynesian demand 
management was replaced with policies of privatisation, deregulation and fiscal 
austerity, ushering in the dynamics and concept of globalisation that would even-
tually triumph after 1989.36 
At first, though, no one anticipated this deep successful restructuring of West-
ern dominance. The crisis was so multi-dimensional and severe (at least between 
1973 and 1976) that it evoked spectres of Western decline. For a short moment, 
predictions of a crisis of capitalism appeared no more fanciful than expectations 
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Therefore, socialist leaders saw far more opportunity than risk. The oil crisis 
raised demand for (and returns on) Soviet oil, coal and other raw materials. Western 
European corporations were eager to find new export markets. Multination-
als were reorganising production networks worldwide. The spectacular rise of 
Japan’s industrial and trading power appeared as an enticing example of catching-
up achieved through integration in the international market. Even more crucially, 
the recycling of OPEC oil revenue provided Western banks with abundant capital 
for loans that inflation would make cheaper to repay. Thus, socialist planners 
with a modernising attitude ‘saw . . . a unique set of opportunities for upgrading 
the path of socialist economic development’.37 It seemed a favourable moment to 
engage economically with the West. 
Systemic inadequacy and external constraints 
National strategies based on imports and credit from the West initially achieved 
remarkable results. Between 1971 and 1975, economic growth was intense, 
exceptionally so in Poland and Romania. Consumption rose to unprecedented lev-
els, as it did in the GDR. Exports to OECD countries also grew. Hungary launched 
many cooperation agreements in light industry, as did Romania and Yugoslavia 
with several joint ventures. 
However, this opening of (relatively) closed economies made the socialist 
countries vulnerable to the shocks and tensions of a globalising world economy 
and exposed their planning systems to strains and competitive pressures. In a 
few years, problems piled up, uncovering serious shortcomings and vulnerabili-
ties, and key indicators became almost unsustainable. The trade deficit of the six 
central-eastern European countries grew from 1.2 billion US dollars in 1972 to 6.6 
billion US dollars in 1978, and their debt to the West from 4.9 billion US dollars 
in 1971 to 48.5 billion US dollars in 1979 (almost half of which was Poland’s). 38 
There were several intertwined root causes of this cycle. As the chapters in this 
book demonstrate, the elements of flexibility introduced in the system to make it 
more responsive to international trade were far from sufficient. Even though there 
were large variations among countries, firms and enterprise associations were usu-
ally given more autonomy and foreign trade authority was partially decentralised. 
However, the inherent inefficiencies of the planning system remained entrenched 
and they hampered the overall effort for a technological and productivity upgrade. 
Even the firms more directly affected by new equipment imported from the West 
and those involved in the export drive to gain hard currency were often held back 
by bottlenecks and poor quality suppliers. This limited their efficiency gains, their 
output of new products and their export opportunities. The impact of new tech-
nologies and processes was also constrained by the nature of socialist enterprises, 
which could not restructure – in particular, replace workers with machines – with 
the rapidity and suppleness of capitalist firms. Additionally, much new invest-
ment went to traditional heavy-industry sectors like steel, coal and refineries due 
to their superior lobbying power entrenched within the party-state apparatus and 
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broad terms, a planning structure designed for mass production of standardised 
goods fared poorly when confronted with the needs to become flexible and inno-
vative, to diversify its products and to adapt to the increasing relevance of ser-
vices. Therefore, even though some productivity gains were achieved – especially 
in Poland, Hungary and the GDR – systemic inefficiencies reduced the potential 
impact and expected benefits of the new strategies. 
A second set of difficulties concerned export opportunities, which turned out 
to be less ample than expected. Low-end sectors in which the Eastern European 
economies could be competitive, like textile and agricultural goods, were often 
protected in Western markets, and particularly so in the most crucial neighbouring 
EEC. In the mid-level technology range, industrial products – even the new ones 
that were being developed with imported Western equipment and licenses – had 
to compete not only with Western rivals but with the rising prowess of the East 
Asian industrialising economies, which pursued coherent export drives and were 
rapidly conquering markets worldwide. As a result, inefficiencies and poor reli-
ability on the domestic side interacted with increasingly competitive dynamics 
abroad to make socialist exports too often costly, unappealing or simply outper-
formed by their Western and Asian rivals. Several socialist governments even 
tried to use international institutions to position themselves as developing econo-
mies (in marked contrast with socialism’s own self-representation) so as to obtain 
preferential access to the richer markets, particularly the EEC. In this endeav-
our, they emulated Yugoslavia’s established policy and stance. However, unlike 
Yugoslavia, they obtained scarce results. 39 Gaining substantial permanent export 
shares in the West and the developing economies of the global South proved to 
be quite difficult. Even though international trade as a proportion of global GDP
rose spectacularly throughout the 1970s, the socialist economies intercepted only 
a small quota of it. Too small, that is, to balance the growing volume of imports 
that they had to pay for with hard currency. Thus the productivity gains and wel-
fare improvements that the new economic strategies initially achieved soon ran 
against increasing external constraints.40 
The key measure of these growing difficulties – and the noose that would even-
tually doom the new strategies – was the fast-expanding foreign debt with West-
ern banks and governments. Several factors contributed to its rapid growth. The 
prediction that rising energy prices would help the socialist economies soon went 
into reverse. Oil sales brought more revenue to the Soviet Union but a new CMEA
price formula – designed to reduce the differential with world prices – meant 
that energy costs for the central-eastern European countries started to rise from 
1975. The prices of other raw materials and intermediate goods that sustained the 
new productions also rose. Thus, foreign expenditure grew faster than revenue 
from exports. Moreover, no small amount of foreign credit was used to finance 
consumption (in accordance with the new policy’s welfare rationale) rather than 
productivity-enhancing investment. 
Rising foreign debt was initially seen as temporary, and therefore inher-
ently manageable. As exports were expected to grow and bring hard currency, 
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mechanism never came close to its anticipated balance. Even when good, export 
performances were not sufficient to offset the growing trade and finance imbal-
ance. Several new investments turned out to require constant additional imports 
of raw and intermediate materials, thus further stretching debt creation into the 
future. The devolution of authority reduced the planning system’s internal con-
sistency and empowered regional, sectoral and company managers to lobby for 
their own interests, over-invest and increase the debt’s growth. There were other 
domestic imbalances. In the most extreme case of Poland, real wages grew faster 
than productivity, sucking in more imports. In 1976 the government intervened 
with a highly unpopular food price rise and diversion of exportable goods to the 
domestic market, making the debt problem even less manageable and stimulating 
radical opposition.41 
However, for a while the lenders were not seriously concerned. Western states 
and businesses heavily invested in deepening détente and expanding East-West 
exchanges. Even though some Western banks and government officials already 
began to feel concerned in 1977, the overall assumption was that the socialist 
states (and ultimately the USSR) could guarantee repayment. Maintaining a high 
(and possibly growing) level of East-West trade remained a paramount goal for 
both political and commercial reasons.42 
Therefore, credits were extended and renewed until the moment of reckoning, 
which came in 1979 when the US Federal Reserve reacted to growing inflation 
and a new oil price rise with a restrictive monetary policy. The sharp increases 
in the cost of energy and interest rates radically altered the international financial 
landscape. Debt servicing became far more expensive, and the ensuing recession 
further reduced the debtors’ ability to export. Highly indebted countries – both in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America – entered an era of severe economic hardship. 43 
The already apparent flaws in the socialists’ strategies based on Western 
imports and credits became serious vulnerabilities, as the very interconnectedness 
with world markets that they had pursued (as a path to prosperity and stabilisa-
tion) now turned into a suffocating constraint. The debts grew more expensive. 
Oil and many raw material prices rose. Exports declined as a result of the global 
recessionary trend and collapsed towards “third world” countries whose own debt 
burden was fast becoming untenable.44 
With a debt trap looming large (see Appendix , Table A.5 ), the classical response 
would have been domestic deflation to cut imports and eventually restore equi-
librium. However, this went against the grain of the strategy pursued thus far and 
belied the rhetoric of prosperous modernising socialism. Above all, it carried con-
siderable dangers. When in July 1980 the Polish government announced hefty 
food-price increases, workers’ strikes swept the country with such strength that 
they forced the recognition of an independent trade union, Solidarnosc, which soon 
became the backbone of a massive opposition movement.45 With Poland enter-
ing a profound crisis that threatened the regime’s survival (and depressed exports 
even further), policies decreasing consumption appeared too dangerous across the 
socialist bloc. Instead, import reduction was primarily pursued with cuts in invest-
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As a result, the debt crisis rapidly intensified. In 1981, Poland negotiated 
rescheduling agreements but its financial position deteriorated even further after 
the imposition of martial law, which brought US sanctions and a tightening of 
Western credit. In rapid succession, all the indebted countries of the socialist bloc 
and Yugoslavia had to adopt emergency measures. Hungary decided to stabilise 
its finances by applying to the International Monetary Fund, and it was admitted 
in 1982 (Poland also applied, but its entry, which only took place in 1986, was 
made conditional on ending martial law). The GDR turned to West Germany, 
whose massive credit allowed it to restructure its debt in 1983. Romania priori-
tised repayment of foreign debt and so imposed draconian domestic austerity. 46 
Within a few years external liabilities were lessened, but the socialist economies 
suffered badly with reduced capacity, anaemic growth, lower levels of income and 
consumption, and an even larger productivity gap vis-à-vis the West. East-West 
exchanges were reduced, but there was no going back to semi-autarky. Despite 
substantial national variations, dependence on Western finance and technology 
had become ingrained. The West itself did not cut economic ties in the years of 
renewed bipolar tensions that followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 
martial law in Poland. The US adopted a punitive strategy of sanctions and a 
trade embargo, but Western Europe resisted this approach and strove (rather suc-
cessfully) to preserve the key elements of European détente. As Helmut Schmidt 
stated at the Venice G-7 summit in 1980, economic exchanges were not simply 
‘a mere matter of trade’ but ‘a moral and historical necessity to reach a better 
understanding with the East, and especially Poland’.47 Thus crucial East-West 
commercial and financial links were maintained throughout the 1980s, the US 
hard-line strategy proved ineffective and was eventually forsaken, and Western 
European financial clout came increasingly to be used to negotiate political goals 
too (like the mellowing and ending of martial law in Poland or support for reforms 
in Hungary).48 
However, the 1970s import-based socialist strategies were in tatters, and the 
sharp contrast between failed promises and renewed hardship undermined the 
regimes’ residual domestic authority, credibility and solidity. By the mid-1980s, 
Western capitalism was triumphantly redefining itself in neo-liberal terms and 
China was embracing a capitalist economy. The future of socialism in a rapidly glo-
balising world economy appeared unfathomable. Even the socialist elite seemed 
to have lost confidence and any vision for the future. When the 1989 revolutions 
brought down their regimes, the leaders and technocrats were confusedly explor-
ing ways to transition to a market economy. 
Conclusion 
The import-led socialist strategies of engagement with the market economies were 
inaugurated under seemingly favourable conditions in the early 1970s. Détente 
and Ostpolitik offered a reassuring enticing context. With the Keynesian frame-
work still prevalent, the mixed economies of the West appeared steeped in capital 
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notion of East-West convergence might have been far-fetched, but the expecta-
tions of mutual advantages deriving from state-regulated exchanges were not. 
Some of these conditions, though, started to shift by the middle of the decade, 
with large capital movements nurturing a more competitive environment of increas-
ingly global scope. The spread of post-Fordist practices, based on more flexible 
technologies and procedures, amplified the relevance of market dynamics and the
consumerist ethos, moving the goalposts towards a harsher all-encompassing mar-
ket environment. This magnified the ‘structural dilemma’ of the socialist econo-
mies, which ‘required more imports and thus more borrowing’ but ‘were not able 
to sell their products on the Western markets to a sufficient degree’. 49 Some of 
them soon became hostage to a deepening debt trap. However, the different case of
Czechoslovakia – which followed a more cautious path of financial prudence and
limited exposure to the global economy – shows that their comparative disadvan-
tage ran very deep, and their impediments were rooted in the structure of planned 
economies.50 Where reforms were introduced to adapt to the new demands emanat-
ing from the harsh confrontation with capitalist markets, they proved ineffectual 
or insufficient and fostered a ‘relatively slow . . . disintegration of the planning 
regime’.51 
Thus strategies meant to harness market mechanisms to the prosperity and stabil-
ity of socialist regimes brought unintended – and largely opposite – consequences. 
Rather than a more confident socialism on an upward trajectory of modernisation, 
the heightened confrontation with globalising markets delivered uneven, deterio-
rating and ultimately unsustainable economic performances. Dependence on the 
West grew deeper in material terms and inescapable in its symbolic meanings. Not
only was the world not going the socialist way, but socialism grew increasingly 
mired in the uncomfortable role (and image) of a subaltern system whose degree 
of autonomy and self-determination was rapidly dwindling.52 The bloc itself grew 
more dissimilar and fractious as trade intensification with the West exasperated 
divergencies among national paths and policy options, fostered a search for sepa-
rate deals and solutions, and made the bloc’s cohesion not only more difficult to 
manage – as Moscow could not take on the burden of its allies’ debt – but also less
valuable as a shared resource.53 
The 1970s promise of increasing welfare and consumption might have stabi-
lised the regimes in the short term, but it also shifted the ground of their domestic 
legitimisation towards capitalist values of individualised consumption in the private 
sphere. It was a metric that socialism could not successfully sustain since it was 
outcompeted in terms of productivity, quality and variety, and that fostered pro-
cesses of identification with Western notions of personal freedom and wellbeing. 54 
Intertwined with the emerging politics of human rights and the financial depen-
dence on Western credit, the rise in consumerist expectations brought the West 
deep within. The possibilities for the regimes to shield their societies from their 
adversary’s influence and allure were ever more limited. 55 
Therefore, interpretations of 1989 centred on security and geopolitical factors, 
and particularly on Gorbachev’s withdrawal of the Soviet guarantee to the social-
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Gorbachev’s choices were obviously crucial in dispelling notions (already quite 
fanciful at that point) that help for the regimes could come from Moscow. How-
ever, these interpretations do not account for too many key factors: the regimes’
long forsaken economic dynamism; their all too manifest failure in the socio-
cultural competition with the West; the long-term unravelling of their viability 
and coherence; their citizenry’s deep and widespread alienation, well beyond 
the perimeter of structured opposition; and the vanishing of any confidence that 
socialism had a promising future. Without these factors, one cannot explain the 
‘elites’ sense of exhaustion with their own project’, 57 the crucial loss of will and 
confidence that eventually gripped officialdom all the way up. This was the most 
decisive feature in 1989. 
Two decades of deepening East-West interaction, with increasing exposure to 
the material pressures and socio-cultural influences of market globalisation, had 
made the regimes more brittle and ineffective. They had exposed their structural 
weaknesses, magnified their inbuilt dependencies, blown their residual rationale 
and, ultimately, emptied socialism out. The extended processes that this book 
explores and compares in their national settings were key determinants of the pro-
tracted demise and then sudden collapse of socialism. At the same time, they set 
some of the foundations on which the transition would take place, with legacies 
of trans-nationalisation that would mould the new democratic republics’ paths to 
their turn-of-the-century Europeanisation and globalisation.58
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 2  Pan-Europe 
A continental space for cooperation(s) 
 Angela Romano 
With its military, economic and cultural blocs, Europe was the epitome of Cold War
systemic antagonism, ideological confrontation and society separation. The fact 
that the historiography of post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe offers a nar-
rative of these countries’ “return to Europe” and considers the forty-year socialist 
experience an interlude in an otherwise all-European or pan-European history 
only strengthens the image of a divided Cold War Europe. In the past decade, 
however, a flourishing historiography focusing on Europeans’ agency is deeply 
changing our understanding of the continent as a realm of confrontation and 
separation. 
In particular, studies on détente have revealed that European governments on 
the one hand and the superpowers on the other held different views on its mean-
ing, scope and aim. The US-Soviet détente was a decade-long period of bilateral 
agreements aiming to consolidate bipolarity and lower the costs (and risks) of mil-
itary confrontation. In contrast, ‘European détente’ had a transformative intent, as 
it aimed to overcome the Cold War partition of the continent through a gradual 
process of expanding contacts and interdependence between Western and Eastern 
Europe.1 
Several historians have also shown that European détente, with its multi-layered 
patterns, became a key feature of the continent from the mid-1960s until the end 
of the Cold War, thanks to the efforts of European countries, including the neutral 
ones, as opposed to the US, to preserve cooperation. By the mid-1970s, Euro-
pean states and citizens were connected through an expanding web of political, 
economic and cultural exchanges. This area of pan-European cooperation, which 
coexisted with Cold War military alliances, border fences and the Berlin Wall, 
nourished interdependence between the capitalist (which includes neutral) and 
socialist European countries. Historians Oliver Bange and Poul Villaume have 
recently defined this long détente as ‘antagonistic cooperation’ with strong ele-
ments of a ‘trans-bloc, trans-societal and trans-ideological framework’ and with 
European actors at its centre.2 
It is now evident that European détente also enhanced continental multilateral 
cooperation. This was epitomised by the Helsinki Conference on Security and 
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now recognises as having favoured a more autonomous role for the European 
states, be they Western, Eastern or neutral and non-aligned. 3 
This opening pan-European space also prompted the action of actors that were 
previously passive, such as the European Economic Community (EEC). Ludlow 
has debunked the myth of a Community insulated from Cold War dynamics in the 
1960s, while research on the 1970s has identified the emergence of the EEC as 
an influential actor in the CSCE context, and its transformative influence on the 
Soviet Union and its allies and on Yugoslavia. 4 It is becoming clear that from the 
early 1970s onwards the enlarged, strengthened and politically active EEC had a 
leading role in the promotion of new European relations. 
To reveal the complexity and interconnectedness of this emerging pan-European 
space for cooperation, this chapter considers political and economic interactions 
at the bilateral and multilateral levels, the main forms of integration between East 
and West and the impact of EEC policies on the socialist countries, including the 
question of recognition. 
Bilateral détente and cooperation 
With the onset of the Cold War, the West’s containment and embargo policies and 
the creation of separate economic organisations severely reduced trade across the 
continent. Already after Stalin’s death in 1953, however, most Western European 
governments saw the possibility of beginning to normalise exchanges. Denmark 
and the UK were pioneers in the field. In the 1950s, Danish politicians, civil 
servants and business milieus perceived the economic importance of trade with 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and engaged in its development.5 In the 
UK, Winston Churchill intended to renew politico-diplomatic contacts and pro-
mote as many commercial, social and cultural contacts as possible across the Iron 
Curtain.6 As socialist regimes broke away from autarchy and Western countries 
granted long-term credits (1957) and liberalising measures (1963), East-West 
trade increased. 
It was between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, however, that these attitudes 
became mainstream. Most Western European governments deliberately used 
trade, economic, financial and cultural cooperation to foster dialogue with social-
ist bloc countries, with the political aim of overcoming the continental divide in 
the long term.7 The first articulated vision of this kind was expressed by French 
President Charles de Gaulle, who in 1965 launched a policy of ‘détente, entente 
and cooperation’ with the Soviet Union and its allies. In his opinion, this was the 
only road to peace in Europe and to the solution of its main problem, the Ger-
man question. France signed a relevant commercial treaty with the USSR, and 
economic and cultural cooperation agreements with the other socialist countries.8 
Italy too was very active in the mid-1960s, increasing its trade with the CMEA
area and securing one of the biggest slices of the Soviet market for industrial 
orders.9 Among the smaller states, Belgium was particularly dynamic. In 1966, 
Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel started a lively policy of contacts with the East 















obstacle to common initiatives and that economic détente was the road to and 
the pre-condition for political détente.10 In the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG), businessmen started to penetrate socialist markets ahead of diplomatic 
improvements.11 Then, between 1966 and 1969 the Grosse Koalition government 
revoked the Hallstein Doctrine, according to which no relations should exist with 
the GDR and those states that had recognised it (with the exception of the Soviet 
Union). When Willy Brandt became chancellor in 1969, the FRG moved to fully 
implementing the Neue Ostpolitik, which was based on the concept that change 
(and eventually reunification) would only come after recognition of the existing 
realities and rapprochement with the East.12 Thanks to re-established diplomatic 
relations and fundamental treaties signed with the Soviet Union (1970), Poland 
(1970) and Czechoslovakia (1973) and agreements with the GDR (1972), the 
FRG shortly became the most important Western economic partner for all the 
socialist countries. The economic prosperity that Western Europe had achieved 
by the mid-1960s was ‘the foundation for the self-confidence required to pursue 
a policy of open borders and open competition’.13 Likewise, European neutral 
countries enhanced trade and cooperation with the socialist economies.14 
Nevertheless, the détente policies of Western and neutral European states 
would have not gone far had they not met a new attitude on the part of the socialist 
regimes. Nikita Khrushchev, secretary-general of the Soviet Communist Party 
from 1956, promoted a policy of peaceful coexistence which called for a coop-
erative/competitive relationship with the West. 15 Besides strategic considerations, 
economic reasons gave impetus to expanding relations with developed market 
economies in the mid-1960s. As the socialist economies could not adjust rapidly 
enough to the unfolding technological revolution, the ruling parties ideologically 
recognised foreign trade as an important factor in socialist development and mod-
ernisation with an eye to improving living standards, which had become crucial 
for the regimes’ political stability. 16 
Economic and financial relations markedly increased between the two halves 
of Europe, unhalted even by the repression of the Prague Spring in August 1968. 
The most important relations developed bilaterally at the state-to-state level in the 
field of trade and financial loans, followed by industrial cooperation. However, 
the Western governments often used trade agreements to allow or regulate rela-
tions initiated and conducted by private enterprises. On their side, the socialist 
regimes in the 1960s introduced decentralisation and increased the capacity of 
enterprises to develop relations with foreign operators, provided they acted within 
the context of the economic plan.17 Bilateral cooperation thus also developed 
at the firm-to-firm level, adding multiple threads to the web of trans-European 
relations.18 These were not confined to economic relations; cultural exchanges 
and tourism were also important, and a diversified range of non-governmental 
actors was key in effecting trans-European contacts. 19 The Iron Curtain that parted 
Europe was becoming increasingly porous. 
This European détente did not grind to a halt in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a 
period that some scholars focusing on the superpowers still label the “second Cold 
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Afghanistan in 1979 and the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981, actions 
across the Atlantic differed. US policy shifted first to sanctions under Jimmy 
Carter, and then to economic warfare with Moscow during Ronald Reagan’s first 
mandate. In contrast, the Western European governments continued to pursue 
détente.20 In addition to confrontation, Cold War Europe experienced growing 
East-West interdependence nourished by a multi-layered and lasting network of 
exchanges and treaty obligations. 
The multilateralisation of détente 
Another peculiarity of European détente was that it had an additional multilateral 
component. Already in 1966, the UK government tabled a proposal to NATO for 
a code of good behaviour in East-West relations in Europe that would expand 
bilateral and collective cooperation in several fields.21 Although the proposal did 
not spur a NATO initiative, the Western Europeans’ penchant for a more construc-
tive approach towards the socialist bloc entered the ‘Report on the Future Tasks of 
the Alliance’ (Harmel Report), which was approved in 1967 and which assigned 
NATO the double aim of guaranteeing deterrence while promoting détente. 22 The 
first step in this new pattern was the 1968 NATO appeal to the Warsaw Pact for 
negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction in Europe (MBFR).23 The 
proposal only entered the diplomatic scene in connection with the CSCE. 
On 17 March 1969, the Warsaw Pact issued the Budapest appeal, which re-launched 
an old proposal for a pan-European security conference enriched with an economic 
cooperation component. It soon became evident that in the Western camp Euro-
pean governments favoured the proposal to various degrees, while the lukewarm 
US administration only agreed in order to preserve bloc unity. 24 In December 
1969 the NATO Council declared the conference a feasible option within the general 
East-West dialogue but conditioned acceptance on a successful outcome of nego-
tiations on Ostpolitik treaties, Berlin and German-German relations, as well as the 
opening of the MBFR talks.25 
These talks started in Vienna in October 1973, and continued intermittently 
with little progress until early 1990, when the forum was replaced with talks on 
conventional forces in Europe. The CSCE, by contrast, became a permanent feature 
of European life, turning into a proper organisation in the post–Cold War era: 
OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). Its success is 
likely to have been due to its being a pan-European forum for discussion of a 
wide range of matters rather than a bloc-to-bloc negotiation, where conflict was 
the default setting. 
From 22 November 1972 to 8 June 1973 the diplomatic delegations of thirty-five 
countries – the US, Canada, the Soviet Union and all the European states except 
Albania – gathered in Helsinki to set the rules, format and agenda for the CSCE 
negotiations. The negotiations started on 18 September 1973 and concluded 
twenty-two months later. The CSCE produced the Final Act, a non-legally bind-










The Final Act called for balanced progress in three subject areas, informally 
called “baskets”: questions of security in Europe, including principles guiding 
relations among participating states and confidence-building measures (Basket 
I); cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environ-
ment (Basket II); and cooperation in humanitarian and other fields (Basket III). 
Rather than permanently selling off Eastern Europe to the Soviets in exchange for 
empty declarations of goodwill, as vocal detractors of the CSCE decried at the 
time, the Final Act established a pattern of changing the status quo. 26 First, while 
recognising existing frontiers, it explicitly admitted their peaceful change accord-
ing to international agreements, thus legitimising the possibility of future German 
reunification. Second, the wording of the Final Act clearly rejected the Brezhnev 
doctrine and upheld the rights inherent in sovereignty irrespective of a country’s 
belonging to a group or alliance. Finally, it endorsed the liberal concepts of human 
rights and the centrality of individuals, giving Western governments and Eastern 
European dissidents the locus standi to legitimately request the modification of 
certain rules and practices in the socialist regimes.27 
The nature of the CSCE constituted per se a step towards overcoming the Cold 
War blocs, for its procedures guaranteed all countries the right to table and debate 
proposals on an equal basis. This gave neutral and non-aligned states an unprece-
dented room for manoeuvre and also made it more difficult for the Soviets to force 
alignment on its allies.28 All accounts of the CSCE report that the delegations 
teamed up in three major caucuses – NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the neutrals and 
non-aligned group. However, recent historiography reveals a much more complex 
reality: the actual CSCE dichotomy was between countries interested in stabilis-
ing the situation in Europe – the superpowers, and the GDR to a great extent – and 
states promoting its overcoming. Among the latter, the true makers of the Final 
Act were the nine states of the EEC speaking as one, the neutral and non-aligned 
countries and Romania. The EEC Nine introduced Basket III and shaped most 
of the Final Act according to their shared vision of détente as a transformative 
process prioritising citizens’ rights and conditions. The neutral and non-aligned 
countries were key in securing the rule that all states would participate on an 
equal basis and in effecting the agreement on the follow-up to the Helsinki confer-
ence. Excluded from East-West negotiations on crucial security issues, they were 
determined to guarantee the continuity of the CSCE, where they could have a say 
on these matters. Although it was a member of the Warsaw Pact, Romania fully 
shared this view that security should be debated by all states outside of the blocs, 
and even called for a collective security system substituting the existing military 
alliances. Moreover, the Romanian delegation constantly stressed the relevance 
of principles that openly denied legitimacy to the Brezhnev doctrine, which the 
Bucharest authorities had always opposed.29 
The Final Act of the CSCE prefigured a general shift to a new system that 
would supersede the bipolar order and create a pan-European space for bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation. This was confirmed by the CSCE becoming a pro-
cess through follow-up conferences in Belgrade (1977–78), Madrid (1980–83) 
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of the CSCE. Whereas the superpowers used meetings as a battlefield for their 
renewed confrontation, the European participants preserved the CSCE as a forum 
for cooperation.30 However, the CSCE provisions, in particular those in Basket 
III, also represented a formidable challenge to the stability and legitimacy of the 
socialist regimes.31 Opening up to the West entailed perils, which the European 
socialist regimes assessed and addressed in various manners, as the chapters in 
this book illustrate. 
The CSCE also promoted multilateralism through a revival of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). This organisation was estab-
lished in 1947 in Geneva to help with post-war reconstruction, but its activity had 
slowed down during the height of the Cold War. After Stalin’s death, cooperation 
restarted in the fields of statistics, trade, agriculture, science and technology. 32 
From the early 1960s onwards, the ECE Secretariat established informal rela-
tions with the OECD, the Council of Europe, CMEA and the EEC. The year 1967 
saw an important political declaration re-launching the role of the ECE, which 
was issued at the special ministerial meeting celebrating the twentieth anniversary 
of the organisation. The declaration recognised the ECE as the most important 
framework for East-West dialogue on all-European economic and technological 
cooperation. In 1969, the ECE agreed on four priority areas for future coopera-
tion: trade development; scientific and technological cooperation; long-term eco-
nomic projections and planning; and environmental problems.33  Light structures, 
a pragmatic approach and consensus decision-making made the ECE the only 
organisation to which the CSCE Final Act assigned a role in the implementation 
of its provisions . The ECE Executive Secretary and his staff immediately started 
to prepare proposals linked to the Final Act mandate with a view to presenting 
some results to the first CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade in 1977.34 
Integration processes and their interrelations 
The image of a Cold War Europe divided in two opposing blocs is also due to 
the existence of two major economic organisations East and West (the Coun-
cil for Mutual Economic Assistance [CMEA] and the EEC), which had no offi-
cial relations until 1988 and to the persistence of the socialist official policy of 
non-recognition of the EEC until the same date. This situation would seem to 
be in sharp contrast with the emergence of the pan-European cooperation space 
described previously. However, close scrutiny of developments behind official 
policies reveals actual connections and exchanges. 
Western Europe’s integration process developed in the cocoon of stability and 
security that US post-war policy had established, including the Bretton Woods 
international monetary system and NATO’s military umbrella. France, Italy, the 
FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg first agreed to create the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community (1951), and then they moved on to the bolder 
step of establishing, through the Treaties of Rome signed on 25 March 1957, Eur-
atom and the EEC. Common to the three communities was the choice to transfer 













institutions. The EEC Treaty called for the creation of a customs union, a common 
market and common policies. In its first decade, the integration process proved 
very effective, thanks to the fact that it was based on the harmonisation of econo-
mies that had been closely interdependent in the past, free from the presence of 
a hegemon within and unencumbered by Cold War concerns, which were dealt 
with within the Atlantic Alliance. 35 Because of the latter, EEC institutions did not 
really pay attention to the East in the first decade. 
By contrast, the East followed Western Europe’s economic integration closely. 
To begin with, the CMEA was born in reaction to the Marshall Plan and the for-
mation of Western institutions that organised economic and financial relations 
among the capitalist countries while openly excluding socialist states.36 Cold War 
concerns and the ideological mindset also informed the view that the socialist 
regimes held of the European communities since their inception. Stalin’s capital-
ist encirclement phobia led to identifying the ECSC as a mere means to revitalise 
German industrial power in favour of the anti-Soviet policy of the imperialist 
West. Constrained by ideology, expert analyses confirmed the forecast of an inev-
itable conflict among capitalist economies rather than appreciating the novelty 
of supranational integration.37 Reality soon falsified this dogmatic interpretation. 
The ECSC proved a major success by contributing to the economic resurrection 
of West Germany and linking it to the other Western European economies. The 
creation of the EEC and then the achievements of the customs union and the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy (CAP) further proved that capitalism could organise in 
positive-sum interactions. 
In order to compete with the West, Khrushchev reformed the relations with 
the Soviet allies in a more economically rational and fair way and launched the 
first attempt at socialist integration. In 1959, the CMEA, which until then only 
existed on paper, acquired a structure and a statute. 38 New economic theories 
supported specialisation across the socialist world. In 1961, the CMEA Council 
approved the fundamental principles of the socialist division of labour, according 
to which socialist economies would gradually integrate through the coordination 
of national plans.39 Moreover, in 1964 the International Bank for Economic Coop-
eration was established to ease and regulate intra-CMEA payments by means of 
the ‘convertible rouble’. 
Socialist propaganda continued to depict the EEC as a Cold War economic 
instrument, a means to strengthen revanchist Germany, a despicable imperial-
ist tool and a source of discrimination in international trade.40 However, social-
ist economic experts started to elaborate a more sophisticated analysis. In 1962, 
the Institute for International Economy and Politics in Prague convened the first 
international conference on the problems of Western European integration. 41 The 
successful development of the EEC and the remarkable growth of its members’
economies led experts to acknowledge the unprecedented features of the EEC 
experiment. Soviet intellectual evolution was first visible in August 1962, when 
the Academy of Sciences’ Institute of World Economy and International Relations 
(IMEMO) published its thirty-two theses ‘On the imperialist integration in West-
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integration.42 In December 1962, Khrushchev recognised the capacity of Western 
European capitalist states to overcome their natural antagonism and forge some 
positive alliances.43 
By contrast, the division of labour in the socialist community met with the 
resistance of several member states, most vocally Romania, whose political 
authorities refused to see the country relegated to the role of agricultural provider. 
Many economists in Eastern Europe considered that the coordination of national 
plans at the CMEA level would reproduce and even amplify most of the national 
malfunctioning and rigidities, and that the needs of the colossal Soviet economy 
would inevitably prevail over those of the smaller European economies.44 As for-
eign trade (outside the CMEA) was acknowledged as a major factor in economic 
growth in the mid-1960s, Hungary was the first CMEA member to recognise the 
‘objective reality’ of the EEC and the necessity to adopt a correspondingly realis-
tic attitude to the matter of developing contacts with it.45 
The EEC’s Hague Summit in December 1969 decisively attracted the attention 
of socialist analysts. The EEC member states agreed to complete the Common 
Market, to deepen integration via the adoption of other common policies and to 
open the negotiations for the accession of the UK, Denmark, Ireland and Norway. 
Moreover, they posited that the enlarged EEC should have a prominent interna-
tional political role, and hence called for a mechanism for political coordination. 
The first meeting of the brand-new European Political Cooperation took place 
less than a year later, on 19 November 1970. The EEC member states lively dis-
cussed East-West relations, especially the socialist proposal for a pan-European 
conference, and decided to elaborate a collective approach to the CSCE distinct 
from NATO coordination. 
The bold steps taken by the EEC gave a new impulse to socialist debate on 
integration, which had been hitherto described as a capitalist feature and hence 
rejected as an option for the socialist states. Now, prompted by the scientific-
technological revolution and the deep changes in the way production and the divi-
sion of labour were organised, integration was recognised as a global trend of 
an objective nature.46 Therefore, between 1969 and 1971 the CMEA members 
discussed how to promote socialist integration. According to Soviet proposals, 
the gradual integration of the socialist economies should be achieved through 
joint planning at the CMEA level, coordination of national economic policies, the 
creation of supranational institutions and the elaboration of a coordinated foreign 
trade policy towards non-socialist countries. The Soviet attempt at organising 
a supranational CMEA was driven by the political rationale of preserving bloc 
cohesion – what has been described as the economic component of the Brezhnev 
doctrine.47 However, the CMEA European members had a say on how integra-
tion should be organised and they obstructed any step towards supranationality, 
which would have severely limited their autonomy and given Moscow maximum 
leverage.48 For all the ruling elites, autonomy over national economic planning 
was key to preserving their legitimacy and power. However, it was the Roma-
nian leadership that took the responsibility to kill supranational initiatives. The 
























states’ sovereignty, which entailed the right to formulate national economic policy 
according to national interests and socio-economic conditions. Accordingly, each 
country was also free to conduct trade relations with third countries without the 
constraints of a CMEA policy. 49 Thanks to the unfaltering stance of the Roma-
nians, the ‘Comprehensive Programme for the further deepening and perfection 
of the collaboration and developing of the socialist economic integration of the 
CMEA member states’ approved in 1971 contained no supranational features and, 
more importantly, no common foreign trade policy. 50 
Socialist academic experts animatedly discussed the scope and consequences 
of Western European integration. The EEC was increasingly seen as a specific 
centre of power within the capitalist world, able to successfully compete with the 
economies of Japan and the US.51 Socialist experts interpreted the creation of the 
monetary ‘snake’ and then of the European Monetary System as a defence against 
the end of the Bretton Woods system and the now free-floating US dollar. 52 In the 
eyes of the socialists, Western Europe was coming out of the American cocoon to 
become an independent entity. At the beginning of 1972, a series of articles in the 
Soviet newspaper Pravda highlighted the polycentrism of the capitalist system 
and the importance of Western Europe as a third pole between Washington and 
Moscow in positive tones.53 From the economic point of view, the idea gained 
acceptance that the EEC was a reality to reckon with. Nevertheless, how exactly 
to do so proved a less straightforward question. 
A major discussion started within the CMEA, where the GDR and the Soviet 
Union demanded a bloc response to the “EEC question”. The Soviets did not lose 
time to indicate the road. In December 1972, a Brezhnev public speech explic-
itly called for EEC-CMEA negotiations. In 1974, in a clear move to re-establish 
Soviet leadership of the bloc, Brezhnev informed the CMEA partners that he had 
decided to open such negotiations.54 
The two organisations established contact and then opened negotiations in the
spring of 1978. Talks dragged on, broke off in 1980, resumed in 1984 and only
ended up successfully in 1988. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, many experts
on both sides of Europe discussed possible mechanisms for collaboration between
the two organisations. 55 The main problem with EEC-CMEA relations lay in the
nature of the socialist organisation which, unlike the EEC, had no competence to
sign trade agreements on behalf of its member states. This point was constantly
reiterated by the EEC representatives, who proposed cooperation on subjects such
as statistics and research in science and technology. Besides legal and technical con-
cerns, however, there was a strong political rationale. In 1973, the EEC members
had formally agreed not to treat the socialist countries as a bloc, their priority goal
being to establish bilateral contacts between the EEC and each socialist country.
The EEC’s impact on the socialist countries and the question 
of recognition 
If the EEC experience influenced the socialist countries’ attempts at integrating, 
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for discussion and strategy definition at the CMEA and national levels alike. The 
policy of non-recognition, although still in place, lost substance as one by one all 
the socialist regimes developed relations with the EEC. 
The first framework in which the socialist countries de facto acknowledged the 
existence and competence of the EEC was that of the international fora in which 
it participated. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was the first 
case in point. Czechoslovakia was a founding member (although not actively par-
ticipating); Poland was admitted in 1967, Romania in 1971 and Hungary in 1973. 
The EEC had competence to negotiate in the GATT and had a say in the admission 
of new members. In this multilateral context, the attitude of the socialist countries 
was pragmatically similar to that of other GATT members that had officially rec-
ognised the EEC.56 
The CSCE was the other multilateral forum in which socialist countries, includ-
ing the Soviet Union, were eventually compelled to de facto recognise the EEC. 
In this case, the result came out of assertive action orchestrated on purpose by 
the EEC Commission and the member states. While the EEC was a pillar of the 
GATT when a few socialist states joined, the CSCE was a diplomatic gathering 
convened among states and springing from an initiative of the socialist bloc. One 
of the fundamental rationales behind their proposition to discuss economic coop-
eration at the multilateral level was precisely to eliminate discriminatory practices 
in continental trade. Quite evident between the lines was reference to the EEC, 
the protectionist policies of which the socialist regimes had long denounced. 
Convinced that the Soviets intended to use the CSCE to hamper the progress of 
Western integration and dilute the EEC into a pan-European system, the EEC 
member states collectively prepared for a hard fight. They agreed that the best 
way to preserve the EEC was to make it take part in the CSCE negotiations. The 
tactic was simple: as states had the right to compose their delegations as they saw 
fit, Commission representatives joined the CSCE delegation of the member state 
holding the EEC presidency and, more importantly, intervened in the negotiations 
by officially expressing the viewpoint of the Community to the extent required 
by its competence. Initially, the socialist delegates uttered some protests. After 
a while, as the negotiations proceeded quite smoothly in Basket II, the socialist 
delegates showed acquiescence and a business-like attitude. The most significant 
step, however, was adding the EEC to the signatories of the Final Act, which 
the EEC member states had categorically established as a non-negotiable condi-
tion for their assent to closing the CSCE at the summit level. The Soviets gave 
in because Brezhnev had linked his name to the CSCE initiative and could not 
risk its failure. Hence, Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro signed the Final Act 
in his capacity as president of the EEC Council and declared that the phrasing 
‘participating States’ would apply to the EEC in accordance with its competence 
and rules. That signature engaged the EEC in the CSCE process just like the par-
ticipating states.57 
However, the socialist regimes’ acquiescence in multilateral fora neither meant 
revoking the non-recognition policy nor did it entail the development of bilat-










consequences that the actual and potential deepening and enlargement of the
EEC had for the socialist economies.58 The first time that progress in Western 
European integration compelled the socialist economies to deviate from the strict 
non-recognition policy was in the mid-1960s, when the development of the CAP
entailed heavily preferential measures in favour of EEC agriculture produce 
against that coming from third countries. The protectionist CAP had a severe 
impact on the exports of the socialist European economies. Between 1964 and 
1968, the governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania infor-
mally approached the EEC Commission and negotiated specific deals that could 
mitigate the charges and quotas imposed on agricultural imports by the EEC. The 
CAP spurred Yugoslavia’s first official exploratory talks with the EEC Commis-
sion in 1965, which were followed by an official request for the conclusion of a 
trade agreement with the Community. 59 The neat growth in trade flows across the 
Iron Curtain between the mid-1960s and early 1970s inevitably aggravated the 
exposure of the CMEA socialist economies to the consequences of EEC evolution. 
The prospect of the EEC enlarging to the UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway 60 
constituted a major threat. These new members’ production could replace some 
goods imported from Eastern Europe, and more importantly their imports from 
socialist countries would drop significantly when they began operating accord-
ing to the internal rules of the Common Market. An additional EEC development 
that worsened the prospects of socialist exports was the imminent adoption of 
the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), according to which the member states 
surrendered their right to negotiate and sign trade agreements with third countries 
to the EEC Commission, which would negotiate for the whole Community. The 
bilateral trade agreements between EEC member states and socialist countries 
would remain in force until their expiry, which was 1975 at the latest. 
The combination of the CCP and the EEC’s forthcoming enlargement spurred 
the CMEA debate on recognition. Moscow maintained that relations with Western 
Europe should continue bilaterally between states and be accompanied by rela-
tions between the two economic organisations, which would negotiate overall 
trade agreements. The Soviet leadership opposed the establishment of relations 
between the EEC and individual CMEA countries, which would obviously loosen 
the cohesion of the socialist bloc and ease Western influence in Eastern Europe. 
Most of the Eastern European countries were not fully averse to establishing EEC-
CMEA relations, as they acknowledged that negotiating as a group could enhance 
their chances of striking a good deal with the largest trade power in the world. In 
this vein, Hungary initially supported the idea of relations with the EEC within 
a CMEA common approach. 61 By contrast, Romania remained adamant that a 
CMEA-EEC agreement could not prevent the member states from having rela-
tions on their own with the EEC and pursuing their specific commercial interests.62 
Overall, export-oriented economies like Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
were more interested in direct contacts with the EEC. Due to their adopted strate-
gies of import-led growth, they needed to increase exports to the West in order 
to be able to pay for imports and loans. The USSR had the luxury of not needing 
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consisted of oil, natural gas and other raw materials, to which the EEC applied no 
tariffs or quotas. 63 By contrast, the exports of the CMEA European countries to the 
EEC market consisted of foodstuffs for a quarter, materials for another quarter, and 
manufactured goods for the remaining half. Agricultural products, textiles, foot-
wear, chinaware and steel faced the EEC’s highest protectionist measures, for these 
economic sectors were struggling the most at the time. Moreover, the socialist 
European regimes could hardly reduce their imports from the EEC states because a 
large amount of them went to those industries meant to push economic growth. In 
deciding their approach, the Eastern European regimes also probably considered 
the example of Yugoslavia, which had recognised the EEC in 1968 and signed its 
first trade agreement with it on 19 March 1970. The accord had met many Yugo-
slav requests, particularly in the agricultural field, and set up a joint commission 
that would allow Yugoslav interests to be appraised over time. 64 The Romanian 
government, which opposed the CMEA attempts at elaborating a common policy 
towards the EEC, formally applied for beneficiary status in the Community’s Gen-
eralized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) on 31 January 1972 and obtained it as of 
1 January 1974. In August 1974, with the implementation of the CCP towards the 
socialist country due in six months, Polish representatives approached the EEC 
Commission to explore the possibility of trade talks. 
The EEC and its member states had on many occasions made clear that there 
was no interest in an EEC-CMEA trade agreement, and that their priority was the 
establishment of relations between the Community and each socialist country. To 
make things adamantly clear and to press the case for recognition, in November 
1974 the EEC Commission sent all the socialist governments a letter explaining that as 
of 1 January member states would no longer sign or renew bilateral trade agree-
ments, and competence would pass to the Commission. Contextually, the Com-
mission invited the recipients to open all-areas negotiations, for which it attached 
a draft agreement. The draft addressed most of the concerns of the socialist econo-
mies, namely import quotas, most favoured nation treatment, safeguard mech-
anisms and payment problems. Pending the replies, the EEC Council adopted 
unilateral import arrangements, which it would revise unilaterally every year. 
The letter was sent to all the socialist countries that had not yet recognised the 
EEC, including the People’s Republic of China. China was the only one to reply, 
and positively so. Within three years it recognised the EEC and signed a major 
trade and cooperation agreement with it.65 In the subsequent years, the EEC’s 
expanding competence affected the socialist economies sector by sector. In Janu-
ary 1977 the Common Fisheries Policy entered into effect, and the governments 
of Poland, the GDR and the Soviet Union each received an EEC letter request-
ing that they either negotiate fishing quotas with the Commission or withdraw 
their fleets from EEC common waters. The three governments agreed to enter 
talks (which eventually broke off) in order to protect their economic and strategic 
interests. In December 1977, the EEC Council decided to apply the CCP to textile 
and steel imports from state-trading countries. To avoid severe reductions in their 
exports, Poland and Hungary negotiated five-year textile agreements with the 








Czechoslovakia was the first CMEA country to conclude a steel arrangement with 
the Community in mid-1978, and was imitated by Hungary, Romania and Poland 
shortly afterwards, and by Bulgaria in January 1979. The previous year, Sofia 
had applied to join the Community’s GSP, partly due to concerns over negative 
repercussions of Greece’s entry in the EEC, which was then under negotiation. 66 
Overall, facing the severe economic impact of actual and potential EEC policies, 
and confronted with a politically assertive EEC, most of the socialist regimes 
decided (or resigned themselves) to have direct relations with the Community, 
irrespective of the formal non-recognition policy and the stalling EEC-CMEA
talks. The national case studies presented in the following chapters offer detailed 
analyses of their policymaking and actions. 
Conclusions 
Since the early 2000s, several historians have successfully challenged and quali-
fied the long-lived understanding of Cold War Europe as a space of confrontation 
and separation. This historiography focused on European actors and relations has 
revealed the emergence and consolidation of a multi-layered space for coopera-
tion which coexisted with opposing military blocs, separated economic organisa-
tions and ideological competition. 
While the first signs were already visible in the aftermath of Stalin’s death, it 
was from the mid-1960s that European actions to challenge the Cold War divide 
rapidly multiplied. Cooperation developed in a multitude of exchanges at the gov-
ernmental and society levels in diverse fields and carried on through bilateral and 
multilateral relations and accords. Multilateralism became a visible aspect of con-
tinental relations from the 1970s onwards, particularly thanks to the CSCE and its 
ensuing process, which greatly contributed to forging true pan-European thinking. 
However, for the socialist regimes this web of cooperative threads also entailed 
perils and challenges. To start with, most of the Western European détente poli-
cies aimed in the long run to not only overcome the Cold War but also to favour 
the liberalisation of the socialist regimes, and hence posed an existential threat 
to them. The same applied to the CSCE, which adopted the Western Europeans’
view of détente and their intention to give more room for manoeuvre to citizens. 
Second, their adopted import-led growth strategy made the socialist economies 
more exposed to European capitalist countries’ fortunes and actions. In particular, 
the development of the Western European integration process, and notably the 
EEC’s enlargements and common policies, had direct negative impacts on the 
socialist economies and socialist bloc integration. The questions of recognition 
of and relations with the Community deepened existing fractures in the CMEA. 
Likewise, the search for deals with the EEC that would mitigate the impact of its 
protectionist policies worsened the competition between the socialist countries. 
Within the socialist regimes, the debate on the “EEC question” exposed differ-
ent views among the ruling elites and factions within them. Beyond its economic 
impact, or through it, the EEC posed an existential challenge to the socialist 
regimes, adding to the intrinsic risks of pan-European cooperation. 
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The following chapters of this book reveal the internal debates and bargaining 
that the socialist ruling elites went through in order to elaborate a strategy that 
would allow them to address national economic needs while facing the impact 
of Western Europe’s deepening integration, comply with CMEA solidarity and 
handle Soviet pressures for bloc discipline. 
Notes 
1 Loth, Overcoming the Cold War; Romano, From détente in Europe; Villaume and Wes-
tad, Perforating the Iron Curtain; Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1969–1975”; Bozo, 
Rey, Ludlow and Rother,  Overcoming the Iron Curtain. 
2 Bange and Villaume, The long détente , 1–15. 
3 See the discussion below. 
4 Ludlow, “An insulated community?”; Romano,  From détente in Europe ; Romano, 
“Untying Cold War knots”; Zaccaria,  The EEC’s Yugoslav policy. 
5 Boje, Rostgaard and Rüdiger,  Handelspolitikken som kampplads under Den Kolde Krig. 
6 Woolcock, “Great Britain,” 143. 
7 For instance, Loth and Soutou, The making of détente. 
8 Rey, La tentation du rapprochement ; Vaïsse, La Grandeur; Badalassi, En finir avec la 
guerre froide. 
9 Bagnato, Prove di Ostpolitik; Fava, “Between business interests and ideological marketing.”
10 Dujardin, “Go-between: Belgium and Détente.” 
11 Rudolph, Wirtschaftsdiplomatie im Kalten Krieg. 
12 For instance, Hofmann, The emergence of détente in Europe; Niedhart, “Ostpolitik.” 
13 Loth, “The Cold War and the social and economic history of the twentieth century,” 520. 
14 For instance, Enderle-Burcel, Gaps in the Iron Curtain. 
15 Mueller, A good example of peaceful coexistence? , 16–20. 
16 Andras Inotai, “CMEA integration and national economic policies,” 81; Wallace and 
Clarke, Comecon, trade and the West,102–3; Berend, “What is Central and Eastern 
Europe?,” 413; Cutler, “Harmonizing EEC-CMEA relations,” 259. 
17 Cutler, “Harmonizing EEC-CMEA,” 259–60. 
18 Several scholars have analysed East-West business interaction and financial flows, often
with the aim of offering policy advice to governments, for instance, Paliwoda,  Joint East-
West marketing; Saunders, East-West cooperation in business; Hill, East-West trade; 
Fallenbuchl, “East-West trade in capital goods since 1970.” More recently, Tiusanen,
Western direct investments; Eloranta and Ojala, East-West Trade and the Cold War. 
19  Mikkonen and Koivunen, Beyond the divide; Villaume, Mariager and Porsdam,  The 
‘long 1970s’; Mikkonen, Jari Parkkinen and Scott-Smith, Entangled East and West; 
Bechmann, Pedersen and Noack, Tourism and travel during the Cold War. 
20 For instance, Sjursen, The United States, Western Europe and the Polish Crisis ; Chi-
ampan, “Those European chicken littles”; Bange and Villaume,  The long détente. 
21 Romano, “The UK policy towards socialist countries,” 467. 
22 Wenger, “NATO’s transformation in the 1960s.” 
23 “Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction, Statement of NATO Ministe-
rial Meeting,” Reykjavik, 24 and 25 June 1968, accessed 13 March 2020, www.nato. 
int/docu/comm/49-95/c680624b.htm. 
24 Crump and Romano, “Challenging the superpower straitjacket.” 
25 “NATO Declaration on European Security,” Brussels, 5 December 1969, paras. 14 and 
15, accessed 13 March 2020, www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c691204b.htm . 
26 See Bange and Niedhart, Helsinki 1975 and the transformation of Europe. 
27 On the consequences of this approach, Thomas, “Human rights ideas”; Snyder,  Human 
rights activism. 
28 For instance, Jarzabek, “Hope and reality”; Fisher,  Neutral power in the CSCE ; Makko, 
Ambassadors of realpolitik. 
  









































29 Romano, “The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: a reappraisal.” 
30 Bilandzic, Dahlmann and Kosanovic, From Helsinki to Belgrade; Selvage, “The super-
powers and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe”; Romano, “More 
cohesive, still divergent.” 
31 Selvage and Süß, Staatssicherheit und KSZE-Prozess. 
32 Stinsky, International cooperation in Cold War Europe. 
33 Chossudovsky, East-West diplomacy , 14. 
34 Chossudovsky, East-West diplomacy , 21. 
35 Ludlow, “European integration and the Cold War,” 191–2. 
36 Brabant, Economic integration in Eastern Europe , 8–12. 
37 Zubok, “The Soviet Union and European integration,” 85. 
38 Brabant, Economic integration in Eastern Europe, 46–7 and 52–54. 
39 Wallace and Clarke, Comecon, trade and the West , 5–6. 
40 Rey, “Le retour à l’Europe?,” 8–10. 
41 Ham, The EC, Eastern Europe , 64. 
42 Grachev, “The Soviet leadership’s view,” 40. 
43 Rey, “Le retour à l’Europe,” 13. 
44 Bideleux, “The Comecon experiment,” 186. 
45 See Chapter 3 by Pàl Germuska in this book. 
46 Bideleux, “The Comecon experiment,” 187–8. 
47 Kansikas, “Room to manoeuvre?,” 197. 
48 Brabant, Economic Integration in Eastern Europe, 85–89. Also, Stone,  Satellites and 
commissars. 
49 Dragomir, “Breaking the CMEA hold.” 
50 Kansikas, Socialist countries face the European Community , 59. 
51 Zaslavsky, “L’atteggiamento sovietico,” 63. 
52 Cutler, “Harmonizing EEC-CMEA,” 261–3. 
53 Rey, “Le retour à l’Europe,” 18. 
54 Kansikas, Socialist countries face the European community. 
55 Pinder, “Economic integration”; Lebahn, “Alternatives in EC/CMEA relations”; Chap-
man, “The economic relations between the EEC and the CMEA”; Cutler, “Harmoniz-
ing EEC-CMEA.” 
56 For details, see the specific chapters in this book. 
57 Romano, From détente in Europe. 
58 When not otherwise stated, the following part draws from Romano, “Untying Cold 
War knots.” 
59 See Chapter 9 by Benedetto Zaccaria in this book. 
60 Norway rejected membership in a referendum in September 1972; the others joined the 
EEC on 1 January 1973. 
61 See Chapter 3 by Pàl Germuska in this book. 
62 See Chapter 8 by Elena Dragomir in this book. 
63 Pinder, The European Community , 14. 
64 Zaccaria, The EEC’s Yugoslav policy , 30–45. 
65 Chenard, “Seeking détente.” 
66 See Chapter 7 by Elitza Stanoeva in this book. 
Bibliography 
Badalassi, Nicolas. En finir avec la guerre froide: La France, l’Europe et le processus 
d’Helsinki, 1965–1975. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2014. 
Bagnato, Bruna. Prove di Ostpolitik. Politica e economia nella strategia italiana verso 
l’Unione Sovietica 1958–1963. Firenze: Olschki, 2003. 
Bange, Oliver and Gottfried Niedhart, eds. Helsinki 1975 and the transformation of 


































46 Angela Romano 
Bange, Oliver and Poul Villaume, eds.  The long détente: changing concepts of security and 
cooperation in Europe, 1950s–1980s. Budapest: Central University Press, 2017. 
Bechmann Pedersen, Sune and Christian Noack, eds. Tourism and travel during the Cold 
War: negotiating tourist experiences across the Iron Curtain. London: Routledge, 2019. 
Berend, Ivá n T. “What is Central and Eastern Europe?”  European Journal of Social Theory
8:4 (2005): 401–16. 
Bideleux, Robert. “The Comecon experiment.” In European integration and disintegra-
tion: East and West, edited by Robert Bideleux and Richard Taylor, 174–204. London: 
Routledge, 1996. 
Bilandzic, Vladimir, Dittmar Dahlmann and Milan Kosanovic, eds.  From Helsinki to Bel-
grade: the first CSCE follow-up meeting and the crisis of détente. Göttingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 2012. 
Boje, Per, Marianne Rostgaard and Mogens Rüdiger.  Handelspolitikken som kampplads 
under Den Kolde Krig. Aalborg: Aalborg Universitetsforlag, 2012. 
Bozo, Frédéric, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow and Bernd Rother, eds.  Overcoming 
the Iron Curtain: visions of the end of the Cold War in Europe, 1945–1990. Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 2012. 
Brabant, Jozef van. Economic integration in Eastern Europe: a handbook. New York: 
Routledge, 1989. 
Chapman, Sheila A. “The economic relations between the EEC and the CMEA: a survey of 
problems and prospects.” La comunità internazionale 40:3 (1985): 421–49. 
Chenard, Marie Julie. “Seeking détente and driving integration: the European Communi-
ty’s opening towards the People’s Republic of China, 1975–1978.”  Journal of European 
Integration History 18:1 (2012): 25–38. 
Chiampan, Andrea. “Those European chicken littles: Reagan, NATO and the Polish Crisis, 
1981–2.” International History Review 37:4 (2015): 682–99. 
Chossudovsky, Evgeny.  East-West diplomacy for environment in the United Nations. New 
York: UNITAR, 1988. 
Crump, Laurien and Angela Romano. “Challenging the superpower straitjacket (1965– 
1975): multilateralism as an instrument of smaller powers.” In Margins for manoeuvre: 
the influence of smaller powers in the Cold War era, edited by Laurien Crump and 
Susanna Erlandsson, 13–31. London: Routledge, 2019. 
Cutler, Robert. “Harmonizing EEC-CMEA relations: never the twain shall meet?”  Interna-
tional Affairs 63:2 (1987): 259–70. 
Dragomir, Elena. “Breaking the CMEA hold: Romania in search of a ‘strategy’ towards 
the European Economic Community, 1958–1974.”  European Review of History (2019): 
1–33. Accessed 15 February 2020.  https://doi.org/10.1080/13507486.2019.1694492 . 
Dujardin, Vincent. “Go-between: Belgium and Détente, 1961–73.”  Cold War History 7:1 
(2007) 95–116. 
Eloranta, Jari and Jari Ojala, eds. East-West trade and the Cold War. Jyvä skylä : University 
of Jyvä skylä , 2005. 
Enderle-Burcel, Gertrude, ed. Gaps in the Iron Curtain: economic relations between neu-
tral and socialist countries in Cold War Europe. Crakow: Jagiellonian University Press, 
2009. 
Fallenbuchl, Zbigniew M. “East-West trade in capital goods since 1970.”  Studies in Com-
parative Communism 19:2 (1986): 129–47. 
Fava, Valentina. “Between business interests and ideological marketing: the USSR and 
the Cold War in Fiat corporate strategy, 1957–1972.”  Journal of Cold War Studies 20:4 





































 Fisher, Thomas. Neutral power in the CSCE: the N+N States and the making of the Hel-
sinki Accords 1975. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009. 
Grachev, Andrei. “The Soviet leadership’s view of Western European integration in the 
1950s and 1960s.” In Widening, deepening and acceleration: the European Economic 
Community, 1957–1963, edited by Anne Deighton and Alan Milward, 31–40. Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1999. 
Ham, Peter van. The EC, Eastern Europe and European unity. London: Pinter, 1993. 
Hanhimäki, Jussi M. “Détente in Europe, 1969–1975.” In The Cambridge history of the 
Cold War, vol. 2, Crises and détente, edited by Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, 
198–218. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
Hill, Malcolm. East-West trade, industrial co-operation and technology transfers: the Brit-
ish experience. Aldershot: Gower, 1983. 
 Hofmann, Arne. The emergence of détente in Europe: Brandt, Kennedy and the formation 
of Ostpolitik. London: Routledge, 2007. 
Inotai, Andras. “CMEA integration and national economic policies: adjustment to the 
changed world economic environment.” In Regional integration in East and West , edited 
by Christopher T. Saunders, 81–94. Vienna: Springer-Verlag, 1983. 
Jarzabek, Wanda. “Hope and reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 1964–1989.” Cold War International History Project Working Paper no. 56 , 2008.
Kansikas, Suvi. “Room to manoeuvre? National interests and coalition-building in the 
CMEA, 1969–74.” In Reassessing Cold War Europe, edited by Sari Autio-Sarasmo and 
Katalin Miklossy, 193–209. London: Routledge, 2011. 
Kansikas, Suvi. Socialist countries face the European Community: Soviet-bloc controver-
sies over East-West trade. New York: Peter Lang, 2014. 
Lebahn, Alex. “Alternatives in EC/CMEA relations.”  Aussenpolitik 31:2 (1980): 147–66. 
 Loth, Wilfried. Overcoming the Cold War: a history of Détente, 1950–1991. London: Pal-
grave, 2002. 
Loth, Wilfried. “The Cold War and the social and economic history of the twentieth cen-
tury.” In  The Cambridge history of the Cold War, vol. 2, Crises and Détente, edited 
by Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, 503–23. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010. 
Loth, Wilfried and George-Henri Soutou, eds.  The making of détente: Eastern and Western 
Europe in the Cold War, 1965–75. London: Routledge, 2008. 
Ludlow, Piers N. “An insulated Community? The Community institutions and the Cold 
War, 1965 to 1970.” In  European integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 
1965–1973, edited by N. Piers Ludlow, 137–51. London: Routledge, 2007. 
Ludlow, Piers N. “European integration and the Cold War.” In  The Cambridge history of 
the Cold War, vol. 2, Crises and détente, edited by Melvin Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, 
179–97. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
 Makko, Aryo. Ambassadors of realpolitik: Sweden, the CSCE and the Cold War. New 
York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2017. 
Mikkonen, Simo and Pia Koivunen, eds. Beyond the divide: entangled histories of Cold 
War Europe. New York: Berghahn Books, 2015. 
Mikkonen, Simo, Jari Parkkinen and Giles Scott-Smith, eds. Entangled East and West: 
cultural diplomacy and artistic interaction during the Cold War. München: De Gruyter 
Oldenbourg, 2018. 
 Mueller, Wolfgang. A good example of peaceful coexistence? The Soviet Union, Austria 









































48 Angela Romano 
Niedhart, Gottfried. “Ostpolitik: transformation through communication and the quest for 
peaceful change.” Journal of Cold War Studies 18:3 (2016): 3–13. 
Paliwoda, Stanley J. Joint East-West marketing and production ventures. Aldershot: 
Gower, 1976. 
Pinder, John. “Economic integration and East-West trade: conflict of interests or comedy 
of errors?” Journal of Common Market Studies 16:1 (1977): 1–21. 
Pinder, John.  The European Community and Eastern Europe. London: Pinter, 1991. 
Rey, Marie-Pierre.  La tentation du rapprochement: France et URSS à l’heure de la détente 
(1964–1974). Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1991. 
Rey, Marie-Pierre. “Le retour à l’Europe? Les décideurs soviétiques face à l’intégration oust-
européenne, 1957–1991.” Journal of European Integration History 11:1 (2005): 7–28.
 Romano, Angela. From détente in Europe to European détente: how the West shaped the 
Helsinki CSCE. Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009. 
Romano, Angela. “More cohesive, still divergent: Western Europe, the US and the Madrid 
CSCE follow-up meeting.” In European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 
1980s, edited by Kiran K. Patel and Ken Weisbrode, 39–58. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013. 
Romano, Angela. “The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: a reappraisal.” 
In The Routledge handbook of the Cold War, edited by Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Craig 
Daigle, 223–34. London: Routledge, 2014. 
Romano, Angela. “Untying Cold War knots: the EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 
1970s.” Cold War History 14:2 (2014): 153–73. 
Romano, Angela. “The UK policy towards socialist countries in the 1970s: trade as a cor-
nerstone of détente.” In The Foreign Office, commerce and foreign policy in the twen-
tieth century, vol. 2, edited by Effie Pedaliu, John Fisher and Richard Smith, 465–85. 
London: Palgrave, 2016. 
Rudolph, Karsten. Wirtschaftsdiplomatie im Kalten Krieg: Die Ostpolitik der west-
deutschen Großindustrie 1945–1991. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2004. 
Saunders, Thomas, ed.  East-West cooperation in business: inter-firm studies. Vienna: 
Springer-Verlag, 1977. 
Selvage, Douglas. “The superpowers and the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe, 1977–1983.” In Die KSZE im Ost-West-Konflikt: Internationale Politik und 
gesellschaftliche Transformation 1975–1990, edited by Matthias Peter and Hermann 
Wentker, 15–58. München: Oldenbourg, 2012. 
Selvage, Douglas and Walter Süß.  Staatssicherheit und KSZE-Prozess: MfS zwischen SED 
und KGB (1972–1989). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019. 
Sjursen, Helene. The United States, Western Europe and the Polish Crisis: international 
relations in the Second Cold War. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 
Snyder, Sarah B.  Human rights activism and the end of the Cold War: a transnational his-
tory of the Helsinki network. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Stinsky, Daniel.  International cooperation in Cold War Europe: the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe (UNECE), 1947–64. Bloomsbury, forthcoming. 
Stone, Randall W.  Satellites and commissars. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
Thomas, Daniel. “Human rights ideas, the demise of communism and the end of the Cold 
War.”  Journal of Cold War Studies 7:2 (2005): 110–41. 
 Tiusanen, Tauno. Western direct investments in European CMEA countries in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Helsinki: Finnish Institute for International Trade, 1990. 
Vaïsse, Maurice.  La Grandeur. Politique étrangère du Général de Gaulle, 1958–1969. 
















Villaume, Poul, Rasmus Mariager and Helle Porsdam, eds.  The ‘long 1970s’: human 
rights, East-West détente and transnational relations. London: Routledge, 2016. 
Villaume, Poul and Odd Arne Westad, eds.  Perforating the Iron Curtain: European détente, 
transatlantic relations and the Cold War, 1965–1985. Copenhagen: Museum Tuscula-
num, 2010. 
Wallace, William V. and Roger A. Clarke.  Comecon, trade and the West. London: Frances 
Pinter, 1986. 
Wenger, Andreas. “NATO’s transformation in the 1960s and the ensuing political order in 
Europe.” In Transforming NATO in the Cold War: challenges beyond deterrence in the 
1960s, edited by Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher, 221–42. Lon-
don: Routledge, 2007. 
Woolcock, Stephen. “Great Britain.” In  Economic warfare or détente: an assessment of 
East-West relations in the 1980s, edited by Reinhard Rode and Hanns-Dieter Jacobsen, 
141–56. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. 
Zaccaria, Benedetto. The EEC’s Yugoslav policy in Cold War Europe, 1968–1980. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 
Zaslavsky, Victor. “L’atteggiamento sovietico verso l’integrazione europea.” In  Atlantismo 
ed europeismo, edited by Piero Craveri and Gaetano Quagliariello, 51–70. Soveria Man-
nelli: Rubbettino, 2003. 
Zubok, Vladislav. “The Soviet Union and European integration from Stalin to Gorbachev.” 






 3 Attraction and Repulsion 
Hungary and European integration 
 Pál Germuska 
Amid easing international tensions, Hungary approached the West from the mid-
1960s onwards because it desired more intensive economic, cultural and tech-
nological cooperation with the developed market economies of Western Europe. 
However, Budapest repeatedly retreated from Brussels in the belief that it risked 
the benevolence of Moscow if it recognised the European Economic Community 
(EEC or Common Market). Before Mikhail Gorbachev’s root-and-branch reforms, 
the Hungarian elite did not dare to cross the Rubicon and conclude an agreement 
with the country’s most important Western economic partner. Although the Soviet 
Union was unable to provide financial resources to stabilise Hungary from the 
early 1980s,1 energy safety (secure supplies of crude oil and natural gas) remained 
a core issue for Hungarian decision-makers. A second crucial factor in this careful 
policy was the idée fixe of First Secretary János Kádár and his older generation 
comrades that Hungary was such a small and negligible country that any vacilla-
tion in their loyalty towards Moscow might result in a Soviet political intervention 
and provoke a U-turn in Soviet foreign economic policy towards Hungary. 
The issue of obtaining access to the Common Market provoked sharp debates 
within Hungarian elite groups from the mid-1960s, and this chapter analyses 
Hungary’s internal discussions on European integration and its envisaged role in 
pan-European cooperation. Although the Hungarian leadership adopted a nega-
tive Soviet stance on the Common Market and refused to diplomatically recognise 
the EEC (as did the other Soviet satellite states), this standpoint was questioned in 
confidential documents in the early 1960s. Faced with deepening Western Euro-
pean integration and evolving EEC protectionism, Budapest attempted to manage 
a rapprochement with Brussels. Hungary moved through two different channels: 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), hoping to unify the efforts 
of socialist countries to conclude a general agreement with Brussels; and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), trusting that the organisation 
would be able to persuade the European Community to abolish its protectionist 
measures. However, by the end of the 1970s both paths proved to be dead ends: 
CMEA-EEC negotiations manifestly reached stalemate, and GATT membership 
did not gain Hungary better access to the Common Market. When in 1980 Roma-
nia signed a separate agreement with the EEC, a small but loud-mouthed group 
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reiterating that Brussels should guarantee Hungary’s commercial rights on the 
ground of its GATT membership. As we will see, younger generation elite groups 
recognised the signs of the times that such an agreement with the EEC would have 
political importance (instead of economic) and it would demonstrate Hungary’s 
willingness to open its markets and recruit investors to modernise its economy. At 
the same time, this was precisely the situation that Moscow, and therefore Kádár 
himself, intended to avoid: turning a commercial problem into a political matter. 
The policy conducted towards the EEC was embedded in Hungary’s  four main 
foreign policy directions: the principal direction was the Soviet Union; the second 
was the Soviet bloc and the entire socialist community; the third circle of rela-
tions covered the West, including developed market economies and the EEC; and 
the fourth and newest direction was the “third world” with its developing coun-
tries.2 For understandable reasons of trade and foreign policy, the focus shifted 
from the socialist world towards market economies during the “long 1970s”, and 
the importance of the four pillars mentioned changed. It is undisputed that the 
Soviet Union maintained its first place as the leading force in the communist 
movement, the largest buyer of Hungarian goods and the vital supplier of energy. 
However, the importance of the European CMEA countries gradually decreased 
since the partner states were not able to intensify their cooperation. On the other 
side, as Eastern cooperation weakened, Western relations were appreciated more. 
According to Ervin Csizmadia, after its initial phase the Kádár regime aimed to 
broaden its international relations and during the 1970s the idea of socialist inte-
gration was supplemented with rapprochement to the West and Western integra-
tion. Therefore, the idea of ‘openness’ and an ‘open economy’ became a positive 
approach and the perception of the West in those years was re-constituted among 
the Hungarian elite. Moreover, Hungary was characterised by  a dual dependency: 
it depended on the Soviet empire but also on the Western world’s economy. 3 
The fourth foreign policy circle manifested the new challenges of the 1970s: 
how could Hungary cope with the radically changing world economy and how
could it profit from the expanding globalisation? A new party foreign economic 
policy decree of 1977 synthesised this issue at the conceptual level. It stated that 
Hungary and the socialist economies were an integral part of the world economy 
and Hungary had to open towards non-European markets too. To a certain extent, 
the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP) subsequently just approved the 
current situation, especially because the country multiplied its commerce with the 
global South in the early 1970s and extended its political, cultural and technical 
cooperation with the developing world.4 An additional consideration is the fact 
that the socialist states (re)joined several international organisations and enhanced 
their activities in these arenas.5 On the other hand, these organisations – where the
socialist states were a minority – played an increasingly important role in the eco-
nomic life of the socialist bloc. As Fritz Bartel has recently argued, the involve-
ment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the lender of last resort during 
the Eastern European debt crisis offered the Western states an indirect pressure 
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It is also important to remember that economic motivation was a core element 
in Hungary’s opening up policy: détente was not a foreign policy goal per se but 
rather an advantageous environment in which to do business. From 1963 to 1964 
the Hungarian leadership intended to normalise its relations with the Western 
powers, especially the US, aiming to return to the international financial markets 
to acquire loans for the modernisation of the economy. As the first ideas of an 
economic reform emerged, it was indisputably clear that it could not roll out with-
out a foreign policy opening towards the West. 7 Therefore, reform and opening 
progressed hand in hand in Hungary. 
The unfolding liberalisation offered more room for manoeuvre to large enter-
prises which were interested in the acquisition of modern technologies to win new 
markets. State-owned enterprises established joint ventures in Western Europe 
to facilitate market access, circumvent EEC regulations and sometimes smuggle 
embargoed products, parts or technologies. By 1970, forty companies with Hun-
garian shareholding operated in Western Europe. From 1972 a Ministry of Finance 
decree provided new possibilities for Hungarian enterprises to set up joint ven-
tures abroad. At the same time, this decree also enabled foreign owners to buy 
a share in newly established companies in Hungary. 8 Established international 
companies introduced new technologies and know-how, institutionalised Western 
production culture, and standardised higher quality requirements in Hungary. The 
joint ventures made the Iron Curtain permeable in both directions. 
Hungary’s import-led modernisation strategy had its downside: a permanent for-
eign trade deficit (see Appendix , Table A.1 ). The two oil shocks of 1973 and 1979
dramatically deteriorated the balance of exports and imports. Between 1974 and
1980 the cumulated trade deficit exceeded 5.7 billion US dollars. Ministerial plans
were elaborated from the turn of 1973–74 to re-shape the Hungarian export struc-
ture and to adjust the entire economy to the changed conditions, but competitiveness
adaptation progressed slowly. 9 Even though the export expansion had a strategic
rationale, hardly any change occurred within a decade. Agricultural products still
had considerably more weight in Hungarian exports to Western Europe than indus-
trial ones. According to Michael Marrese, in the period between 1974 and 1986,
animals, cereals, raw food materials, additional foods and food products, bever-
ages and tobacco constituted 25% of the Hungarian products that were exported to
European market economies, while machinery, equipment and industrial consumer
goods represented only 29%.10 In more detail, nearly a quarter of Hungarian agricul-
tural exports (22% in 1981 and 24% in 1984) went to the Common Market. Addi-
tionally, in the first half of the 1980s the foodstuff sector was a net exporting branch
of the Hungarian economy, contributing a notable surplus to the national foreign
trade balance.11 This is why agricultural tariffs and quotas remained permanently
at the forefront of Hungarian (economic) diplomacy. In the absence of marketable
industrial goods, grain, beef cattle and fresh fruit had to offset the sizeable Western
imports. As will be shown, the unchanged internal economic structure constituted a
hard constraint on foreign trade and policy towards the European Community.
This chapter proceeds in five steps in thematic order. The first section sketches 
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depicts the formulation of new trade policy directives, while the third presents 
foreign-policy initiatives to improve pan-European cooperation. The fourth sec-
tion examines discourse among the expert and academic communities during the 
1970s and shows the role of bankers in the economic policy turnaround at the end 
of the decade. The final section reveals non-public discourse regarding Hungary-
EEC relations when the young party elite sought to shift from the outdated stand-
point but clashed with the taboo of going against the Soviets. Using records from 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Hungarian National Bank and inter-ministerial 
bodies (like the Committee for International Economic Relations), the chapter 
demonstrates that in certain fields the Ministry of Foreign Trade was an active 
and independent agent while colourful – and sometimes contradictory – ideas 
flourished in internal debates. Since creating access to the Common Market 
was envisioned primarily as a tariff and commercial issue during the 1960s and 
1970s, the trade apparatus mainly managed the internal and external coordination 
of Hungary’s policy towards the EEC. As Gábor Szilágyi highlights, the HSWP
ignored the issue for a long time and new initiatives were mostly launched by the 
state bureaucracy. 12 This study challenges his interpretation on one crucial point: 
it argues that from the early 1980s the genuine initiator of a foreign trade policy 
shift was the reform wing of the party, while the foreign trade apparatus remained 
steadfast on non-recognition. The chapter sheds new light on the intersection 
between the different Hungarian foreign policy circles, where national interest 
confronted ideological doctrine. Exploration of these internal debates contributes 
to a better understanding of the Hungarian elite’s motivations and reveals the 
frontlines between the elite groups. 
Public interpretation of Hungary’s relations with 
the Common Market 
The 1957 treaty that created the EEC was a side issue in Hungary. The official 
newspaper of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party,  Népszabadság (Peoples’
Freedom), relegated news of the event to page 7. In the years that followed, the 
HSWP supported the Soviet stance on the Common Market and the official press 
regularly echoed this attitude. Indeed, the issue of collaborating with the Common 
Market was never discussed publicly due to the severity of the problem. A small 
circle of diplomats and commercial experts worked on new solutions in the back-
ground while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs promoted well-known clichés about 
the EEC in newspaper articles and diplomatic conferences. 
For example, Foreign Minister János Péter explained Hungary’s principal goals 
at an ambassadors’ conference from 30 July to 4 August 1962. (These so-called 
ambassadors’ conferences were held at random intervals and the three- to four-
day meetings aimed to summarise Hungarian foreign policy targets for the coun-
try’s diplomats.) He justified building new links with the Western countries on the 
grounds of peaceful coexistence; working in the interest of the worldwide victory 
of socialism; improving Hungary’s place among the socialist countries; and estab-
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Hungary should weaken the Western European integration efforts and prevent the 
accession of Austria to the EEC. 13 
By the mid-1960s, the peaceful coexistence of different political systems in 
Europe emerged as a favoured topic in public communication. Budapest insisted 
that Western countries should take the first steps to abolish obstacles to inter-bloc 
trade. On 11 February 1965, János Kádár told Parliament: ‘If the capitalist coun-
tries are going to develop commercial ties in reality, then these obstacles should 
be discontinued and most-favoured-nation [status] should be granted to the social-
ist countries’.14 Also in the following years, the Hungarian press paid close atten-
tion to key events in the Community, always informing its readers about harsh 
debates and contrasts between the six member states (the Six). 
On the occasion of a 1969 ambassadors’ conference, Deputy Foreign Trade
Minister Béla Szalai explained the three main targets of Hungary’s trade policy:
enlarging the circle of liberalised products; expanding trade quotas; and initiating
industrial cooperation and joint ventures. He reminded the ambassadors that the
next aim on the commercial agenda was to conclude agreements with the EEC and
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). He emphasised that although diplo-
matic recognition of the EEC should not be taken into consideration, a continuation
of technical talks was desired. The Economic Secretary of the HSWP, Rezső Nyers,
also argued for further negotiations with the Common Market as the organisation
was gradually formulating its common trade policy. 15 In August 1969, Pál Gulyás
condemned the launch of this policy. The columnist reminded the readers of the
Népszabadság that the planned EEC regulation would hurt the export interests of all
the socialist countries and stressed that expanding international trade was a winning
proposition, while those who hindered it with discrimination would be the losers.16 
In the first half of the 1970s, cooperation difficulties among the Six were con-
tinually highlighted, and discrimination by the Common Market remained a regu-
lar headline topic. For example, in February 1970 Hungarian radio pointed out 
that establishing a common monetary policy within the Common Market would 
be a ‘difficult and lengthy process’. It also touched on the common trade policy 
and envisaged that ‘small Hungary’ would confront the ‘giant monster of an eco-
nomic association’. At the same time, it expressed its hopes that the Western coun-
tries also intended to avoid unmanageable situations and that the liberalisation of 
product lists would be enlarged by 1972. 17 
Hungary’s sharp criticism of Common Market practices was also demonstrated 
in the party daily. In April 1972,  Népszabadság reported Foreign Trade Minister 
József Bíró’s attack on the EEC at the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) in Santiago de Chile. He condemned discriminatory 
restrictions which seriously affected the socialist states and indicted the Commu-
nity for refusing to grant them most favoured nation status for ‘political reasons’. 
The common agricultural policy was deemed ‘one heavy burden’ on international 
trade.18 Budapest also enhanced its protests when the Community ordered an 
import ban on beef cattle in the summer of 1974. Hungary demanded the with-
drawal of this decision and criticised the ‘irresponsible and outrageous behaviour’
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On the other hand, a more friendly tone was used regarding the EEC when gen-
eral pan-European cooperation issues were on the table. In September 1973, János 
Kádár welcomed a meeting between representatives of the Common Market and 
the CMEA. He expressed Hungary’s desires in an interview on Finnish radio and 
TV: ‘What we require from the contacts between the two organisations is that 
they offer their member countries the opportunity to take a serious step forward 
along the road toward amplifying their economic links and their co-operation and 
facilitating contacts’.20 
The first secretary was also a keynote speaker at the next ambassadors’ confer-
ence in July 1975. Kádár reminded his audience that peaceful coexistence was not 
a tactical usage in Hungarian foreign policy but a ‘communist policy for a his-
torical epoch’ which would indirectly assist the world revolution. He warned the 
diplomats that they should not be ‘more Catholic than the Holy Father in Rome, 
redder than Moscow and more leftist than the Central Committee and the Govern-
ment’. Namely, the Hungarian diplomatic corps should follow the intentions of 
the party exactly instead of formulating alternative pathways.21 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Frigyes Puja explained the concept more concretely
to department leaders in November 1976. He stressed that the capitalist states were
the second most important country group to deal with, as he noted ‘we can pur-
chase modern technologies there, we can acquire loans there, we can sell our goods
there’. He mentioned bilateral relations with Western states as a tool to improve the
international climate and resolve international debates. He complained that the EEC
subjugated its relations with the CMEA to its ‘fight against’ the Soviet Union. He
supposed that the Community did not wish for an inter-bloc agreement since then
the room for manoeuvre for the smaller socialist states (like Romania) would be
eliminated while Brussels would gain from division among the socialist countries.22 
At a 1978 ambassadors’ conference János Kádár was again the keynote speaker. 
He stressed the openness of Hungarian foreign policy and explained the equal 
importance of the three main directions: the socialist ally system, the developing 
world and the Western capitalist countries. On this occasion, the Common Mar-
ket was only mentioned in an expert report, which pointed out that the Hungar-
ian embassies did not maintain appropriate contacts with the representatives of 
NATO, the EEC and the European Parliament. 23 
The next ambassadors’ meeting in 1980 was the first occasion when Budapest-
Brussels relations received specific attention. Foreign Minister Puja reminded 
Hungary’s representatives about the worldwide economic recession, the heating 
of international tensions and the unfolding conflict of interests between the US 
and the EEC. The Community was depicted as the main hindrance to Hungarian 
export expansion since Brussels had not only intensified its protectionist mea-
sures but also undermined Hungary’s rights under the GATT Agreement. Puja 
stated that criticising trade discrimination was a constant cornerstone of Hunga-
ry’s foreign policy and encouraged further negotiations on trade and a contractual 
relationship between the CMEA and the Common Market. 24 
Noteworthily, in the following years the official press regularly repeated well-
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failures of summits, etc.) but never mentioned the exploratory discussions between 
Budapest and Brussels. Meanwhile Hungary was seeking new paths behind the 
façade of socialist unity. 
Challenging the socialist non-recognition policy – 
the foreign traders 
During the preparation for the economic reform, the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
proposed to seek Hungary’s entry into the GATT with the purpose of improving 
access to the Common Market. On 31 May 1966, the Committee for International 
Economic Relations (CIER) gave Hungary permission to submit an application 
for GATT observer status, which was conceived as a first step towards full mem-
bership.25 The top party leadership also consented. In October 1966, the HSWP
Political Committee (PC) requested new policy papers with different options on 
how to launch talks with the EEC and called on the Ministries of Foreign Trade 
and of Foreign Affairs to effectively represent Hungarian interests in tariff and 
discrimination issues abroad.26 
In April 1968, Deputy Minister Béla Szalai submitted a report to the Ministe-
rial Board with fresh ideas and evaluations regarding the Common Market. The 
report’s point of departure was the agricultural issue, since agriculture and food 
products represented 60% of Hungary’s exports to the Common Market. Before 
1968, exports of agricultural goods (especially eggs, poultry, pigs and pork) had 
dynamically expanded, and the EEC regulations on beef cattle were of crucial 
importance since this product alone amounted to 35% of Hungary’s agricultural 
exports. The ministry warned that Hungary would soon face new challenges due 
to the EEC’s decision to abolish its internal customs tariffs by 1 July 1968. Nearly 
half of Hungary’s Western trade involved EEC countries, and this was 13% of 
its total trade. In addition, West Germany and Italy were the primary suppliers of 
modern technologies to Hungary. It was therefore essential for Budapest to nego-
tiate with the Common Market. The ministry called the CMEA position an  out-
dated perspective and stated that CMEA member states should consider  official 
diplomatic recognition of the Common Market. In his conclusion, Szalai called 
on the government to reconsider its non-recognition policy at forthcoming CMEA
meetings. In the meantime, he suggested the continuation of informal Hungary-
EEC bilateral talks to resolve technical questions.27 
A finalised version of this proposal was circulated and commented on by the 
top leadership. Prime Minister Jenő Fock supported Hungary’s accession to the 
GATT and continuation of technical negotiations with the Community. He added 
that concluding multi-annual agreements with EEC member states on joint ven-
tures and technical cooperation would be desirable. Vice Prime Minister Antal 
Apró’s secretariat also agreed on the key points. Their note asserted that the for-
mer arguments against the EEC (that it was an economic arm of NATO, a tool 
of West-German revanchism, and a supranational power which would soon fall 
apart) had been proven wrong. Apró’s secretariat agreed with Fock’s comments 
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should reconsider its standpoint soon. In the meantime, Hungary might gain more 
advantages through accession to the GATT as an associate member. 28 On 10 May 
1968, the CIER debated the April proposal on the Common Market and passed 
a resolution requiring Hungary to initiate a re-evaluation and better coordination 
regarding CMEA-EEC relations within the CMEA.29 
Just a month later, on 10 June 1968, the Ministry of Foreign Trade suggested 
revising the internal customs tariff system to prepare for Hungarian accession to 
the GATT. It argued that full membership would result in further gains for Hun-
gary since the GATT, as a multilateral foreign trade coordination forum, played an 
increasingly significant role in discussing trade discrimination and barriers. The 
second most important argument for accession was: ‘It would be an advantage if –
in the framework of the GATT – we could directly negotiate with the Common 
Market in earnest without diplomatically recognising it’.30 This sentence reveals 
the true intentions behind the accession request: to make a new deal with the EEC 
without openly breaking socialist unity. 
On 21 June, the CIER supported the action plan and ordered the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade to elaborate a proposal to improve the tariff system and to draft a 
decree on GATT accession. 31 One year later on 9 July 1969, the Hungarian gov-
ernment submitted its application for full membership to GATT in accordance 
with Article XXXIII of the General Agreement. 32 
Already Hungary’s observer status fulfilled its expectations in the sense that it 
facilitated informal networking efforts with the EEC. In September 1969, János 
Nyerges, the Hungarian representative delegated to international economic organ-
isations, was welcomed in Brussels by Wolfgang Ernst, the deputy head of the 
Directorate General External Trade (DG XI) of the European Commission, and 
Commissioner Jean-François Deniau, head of DG XI. Although the Hungarian 
economic diplomat considered their meeting to be part of the general GATT talks, 
he consistently dealt with Budapest-Brussels relations. He argued for a flexible 
liberalisation of Common Market regulations, especially in the field of agri-
cultural trade. On the contrary, Deniau and Ernst suggested discussing general 
trade policy issues in the framework of the GATT. Foodstuff exports were again 
the core issue at a business lunch, but Edmund Wellenstein, director general of 
DG XI, declared that the Community could not offer any positive prospects for 
Hungarian agricultural exports since a decided intent of the EEC was to be self-
sufficient in terms of food. Therefore, Hungary should seek to change its export 
structure. Conversely, Nyerges insisted that, for economic and historical reasons, 
Hungary was not able to cease its agricultural exports and demanded a guarantee 
from Brussels that it would not change its trade regime in the future.33 
These non-official meetings continued in the following year, since Budapest 
intended to ensure a better position for its exports. In August 1970, the head of 
Jean-François Deniau’s cabinet, Pierre Duchâteau, visited János Nyerges at the 
ministry during a holiday in Hungary. They discussed the kind of treatment of the 
socialist states that would be desirable in a new Common Market Eastern policy. 
Nyerges argued again for a new EEC policy regarding agricultural trade which 
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volumes. He stated that Hungary ‘was fighting for’ normalisation of international 
commerce in the framework of the GATT talks and pointed out that trade liberali-
sation would not risk the Common Market states’ interests. 34 
Presumably, additional informal meetings were held even though technical 
issues were being increasingly addressed as the GATT negotiations proceeded. 
After four years of intensive negotiations, the GATT working party finalised its 
evaluation of the Hungarian application in July 1973 and submitted its recommen-
dations, including a draft protocol.35 On 10 August 1973, the Hungarian govern-
ment finally signed the Accession Protocol. The Hungarian economic leadership 
pinned all its hopes on getting better access to the Common Market because the 
Protocol envisaged the elimination of trade barriers. Nevertheless, these Hungar-
ian expectations were not realised since the EEC member states maintained most 
of the quantitative restrictions related to Hungarian exports.36 
A CMEA reform attempt and initiatives on pan-European 
cooperation – diplomats at the forefront 
A second strand in Hungary’s strategy regarded the socialist bloc. To create a 
solid background to its economic reform and to expand commercial opportunities, 
Budapest elaborated far-reaching reforms to improve the CMEA. A proposal in 
May 1968 aimed to foster CMEA integration with advanced financial conditions, 
monetise commercial relations between partner states, promote direct inter-firm 
links and provide non-socialist countries with opportunities to join the CMEA.37 
It soon became evident that Hungarian aspirations to find supporting partners 
within the CMEA would at most only be partially fulfilled. In January 1969, the 
Executive Committee passed a resolution on EEC relations declaring that each 
CMEA member state could have ‘links with EEC organs to defend their economic 
interests’ and calling on the member states to readily exchange information. 
Although the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Trade later interpreted this declara-
tion as advantageous (the Executive Committee did not explicitly prohibit build-
ing contacts with the Common Market), the decision also clearly dictated that the 
member states should abstain from granting diplomatic recognition to the EEC.38 
The Hungarian state apparatus regularly re-assessed recent developments in the 
Common Market – the planned enlargement of the Community and the decision 
to implement a Common Commercial Policy and so forth. In December 1970, the 
Foreign Trade Ministry summarised new tasks in Hungarian policy towards the 
EEC. A report by the Inter-state Department of European Non-socialist Countries 
analysed the EEC regulations concerning the most important Hungarian export 
products (beef, cheese, wine, etc.) in detail together with relations between the 
other CMEA members and the Common Market. Although it made clear that the 
EEC’s Common Commercial Policy was not  completely implemented, the depart-
ment proposed – and the Ministerial Advisory Board accepted – the following 
guidelines: Hungary should conclude agreements on certain products, initiate 
negotiations with EEC candidate countries and attempt to sign long-term trade 
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European integration would progress in the forthcoming years, the report consid-
ered it necessary to revise the CMEA’s approach. 39 
Facing firm Soviet resistance to the adoption of a new line, Hungarian diplo-
macy attempted to avoid the issue of diplomatic recognition by proposing ways 
to make direct ties between the CMEA and the EEC. In February 1972, for exam-
ple, a Hungarian proposal offered the following options: a CMEA declaration 
that the Eastern side was ready to establish contacts with the EEC; preliminary 
informative links between the CMEA and the EEC on possible forms of contact; 
principle agreements on certain economic and trade policy issues; and treaties 
or agreements on selected sectoral issues (coordination or mutual acknowledge-
ment of quality specifications and standards, environmental protection, transport, 
energy). 40 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also agreed that expanding economic 
relations with the EEC would be crucial for Hungary since Hungarian raw mate-
rial exports offset the imports of high-quality complex technologies, licences and 
industrial equipment. However, in accordance with the official CMEA policy, the 
Economic Policy Group of the ministry did not intend to build new ties with the 
supranational organs of the Common Market. 41 
Hungary also presented remarkable new initiatives to encourage wider pan-
European cooperation only half a year after the Budapest Declaration of the 
Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee. In October 1969, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs elaborated a detailed memorandum which suggested adding 
economic topics that went beyond questions of security to the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) agenda: cooperation in various 
economic sectors, including industry, supply infrastructure, and telecommuni-
cations and transport networks. Moreover, the ministry proposed to establish a 
new ‘Committee for European Economic Cooperation’ to re-shape the role of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.42 Before the commencement 
of CSCE talks in Helsinki, the Hungarian leadership once again voiced its interest 
in moving beyond common security issues regarding the bloc countries. In June 
1973, when the HSWP Political Committee discussed an upcoming speech by 
Foreign Minister János Péter to the CSCE, it placed more emphasis on cultural 
and economic cooperation, requesting the elimination of discriminatory trade bar-
riers and highlighting the importance of pan-European collaboration to improve 
the wellbeing of European citizens. It also pointed out that economic cooperation 
between the opposing political systems would provide increased security across 
the continent.43 
From the Hungarian viewpoint, it was a crucial result that the Helsinki Final 
Act declared in the first chapter (Commercial Exchanges) of Basket II that the 
participating states ‘will endeavour to reduce or progressively eliminate all kinds 
of obstacles to the development of trade’.44 Budapest had a legitimate expectation 
that the Act could give a new impetus to unhindered trade. 45 Shortly after the sign-
ing of the Helsinki Accords in September 1975, the secretariat of the Committee 
for International Economic Relations analysed the economic consequences of the 
CSCE in detail. János Szita, secretary of the CIER, recalled in this report that 
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Basket II. He drew attention to the fact that with its signing of the Act the EEC 
became not only a de facto but also a de jure actor in international politics. More-
over, he suggested that Brussels intended to give more expression to its role. The 
report assessed the tasks concerning the implementation of the Final Accord and 
the preparation for the follow-up Belgrade conference planned for 1977.46 
As a direct consequence of the Accords, in December 1976 Budapest proposed 
talks with nineteen Western countries in order to develop bilateral political, eco-
nomic and cultural relations. These proposals were highly ‘personalised’ since 
they varied from country to country. In the case of West Germany, for example, 
the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested initiating talks that would 
balance bilateral trade and abolish trade discrimination against Hungarian exports.
In addition, Budapest questioned whether the interlocutors would speak up for 
the establishment of official relations between the CMEA and the EEC after a 
Hungarian–West German summit. 47 
Maintaining détente also remained one of the main goals of Hungary’s foreign 
policy after the Belgrade Conference, which ended in the late winter of 1978 
with limited results. Budapest wished to continue the inter-bloc dialogue not 
only in the field of arms reduction and disarmament but also with more attention 
to economic and trade issues. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out in 
its October 1978 proposal, Hungary prioritised Basket II (economic and trade 
cooperation) rather than the Warsaw Pact plans to organise a pan-European con-
ference on environment protection and energy. Budapest treated Basket III with 
contradictory feelings: on the one hand it was considered a potential threat to the 
expanding unofficial contacts, but on the other hand cultural exchange was envis-
aged as a tool to correct the image of the socialist countries in Western states. 48 
Hungarian diplomacy kept trade issues at the forefront in the following years too, 
for example during the Madrid conference (see below). 
Forcing an economic policy turnaround – experts and bankers 
By the early 1970s, a structured network of background research institutes was 
supporting policymaking in Hungary. These institutions played a crucial role in 
re-formulating attitudes towards the West: the Institute for World Economics 
(VGI) of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS), the Economic Research 
Institute of the Central Statistical Office and the Institute for Economic and Mar-
ket Research shaped thoughts on the international economy while the Hungarian 
Institute for Foreign Affairs (re)fashioned the foreign-policy mindset. 49 
In 1973, the newly established Külpolitika (Foreign Policy; journal of the Insti-
tute for Foreign Affairs) proclaimed the official standpoint in an article by János 
Szita, the secretary of the Committee for International Economic Relations. He 
examined the differences between the CMEA and the Common Market and also 
the possibilities for cooperation. He argued that the CMEA countries’ policy did 
not lead to isolation from other parts of the world economy but the discriminatory 
policies of the Common Market towards non-affiliated countries seemed to slow 
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attempted to predict the ‘realistic possibilities’ for the future relationship between 
the two European integration organisations in the pages of  Külpolitika. He stated 
that the essential condition for developing inter-bloc cooperation was a revision 
of the EEC’s disadvantageous business policies and granting the most preferential 
terms to the socialist countries.51 Two years later, in his book on economic inte-
gration, Kozma suggested that the CMEA should learn from the experiences of 
the Common Market instead of copying the Western model. 52 
A leading Hungarian economics monthly,  Közgazdasági Szemle (Review of 
Economics; journal of the HAS Institute of Economics) paid special attention to 
advances in the EEC’s enlargement (with the UK, Ireland and Denmark). How-
ever, its author, Gabriella Ízikné Hedri, stressed that Brussels had no concept 
of how to cooperate with socialist countries. After 1976, the perception among 
economists of Western integration was more positive: the encouragement of inner 
mobility, the development of depressed areas and technological and structural 
regeneration were depicted as features of a successful adaptation model through 
the deepening integration.53 
Experts from these research institutes were also invited to participate in prepar-
ing a new foreign economic policy concept, which was ordered by the HSWP
Political Committee in July 1975. This party resolution aimed for a thorough anal-
ysis of global changes and their consequences for the Hungarian economy, and 
the Economic Policy Department of the HSWP Central Committee (CC) organ-
ised six working groups to elaborate guidelines. In January 1976, the Fifth Work-
ing Group – dealing with foreign economy strategy (as the fifth chapter of the 
planned document) – gathered key figures in the field: representatives of minis-
tries, the national bank, researchers, the party centre and the Hungarian Chamber 
of Commerce. In this way the academic sphere had the opportunity to give direct 
feedback to the decision-makers and encourage them to adopt a more active and 
open economic policy. 
One can follow the entire elaboration process of the concept from the first 
drafts to the finalised chapter in the personal files of János Nyerges. In March 
1976, Nyerges personally wrote the first sketch on ‘capitalist integrations’, in par-
ticular on the desired policy towards the Common Market. Since it was an internal 
preparatory outline, he formulated his ideas more frankly. He bitterly recalled that 
Hungary depended highly on the EEC and noted, ‘There is no real choice in the 
field of relations with the Common Market. The situation is that the Common 
Market keeps almost all our capitalist exports in its hands as an entail without a 
real effort or compelling competitive pressure’. 54 
Nyerges stressed that Hungary only had legal and political instruments against 
the Community since the country had no power to use any economic pressure. He 
considered the launch of CMEA-EEC talks a very hopeful sign, but in the long run 
there were no high hopes of concluding an agreement. Instead, other trade policy 
measures were deemed necessary like reaping the benefits from rivalries between 
the EEC and other third parties: improving Hungarian-US trade relations and 
negotiating with the EFTA member states. Last but not least, the GATT rounds also 
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In June 1976, the Fifth Working Group compiled a ‘Summary and Conclusions’
which tackled the EEC in five pages. This part of the document followed Nyerges’
argumentation but formulated measures more softly. The summary designated the 
Common Market as an organisation that gathered Hungary’s most important non-
socialist commercial partners. Therefore, this direction was crucial. It expressed 
the hope that a CMEA-EEC framework agreement could be concluded within two 
to three years if the socialist states could offer profitable economic opportunities 
to the Common Market. The working group proposed to reject any effort by Brus-
sels to sign a bilateral agreement with Budapest and stated that only the GATT
Agreement should be the principle framework for any talks with the Community. 
It also suggested substituting the commercially dominant EEC with an alternative 
market orientation (the US, non-EEC member European states, developing coun-
tries) since suppliers faced difficult competitive conditions. Overall, they argued 
that Hungary should develop its relations with EFTA members and build new ties 
with the “third world”.56 
The Economic Policy Department of the HSWP CC and the Committee for 
International Economic Relations drew up a final proposal from the working 
group reports submitted. The finalised document, titled ‘Guidelines for Long-
Term Foreign Economic Policy’, paid less attention to the EEC than the previous 
drafts since the new approach was to diversify Hungary’s relations. However, for 
the first time this report intertwined the three main tasks in Hungarian economic 
policy: handling the aftermath of the oil crisis, adjusting economic structure and 
opening towards the non-CMEA world. Détente – the easing of tensions in inter-
national relations – was favourable to expanding East-West cooperation. There-
fore, the proposal aimed to intensify more dynamic business links with the world 
economy. It stated clearly that deepening foreign economic relations brought 
risks, but this was a ‘smaller [hazard] than the economic and political outcomes 
of isolation’.57 The guidelines proposed building international economic relations 
with socialist and non-socialist states on a solid basis. However, it ranked rela-
tions according to a political criterion: cooperation with the Soviet Union came 
first, cooperation with the socialist states followed closely and last came coopera-
tion with capitalist states. Relations with the developed Western countries were 
presented as an important national interest and as an inherent part of a policy 
intended to foster peaceful cooperation between the two economic systems. The 
rapporteurs stated that Hungary should urge for negotiations between the CMEA
and the EEC and also aim to improve the Hungarian trade policy position. At the 
same time, they stated that the basic rule in Hungarian trade policy was the most 
favoured nation principle, and on the contractual legal basis of the GATT Buda-
pest should act against the defaulting Common Market practices.58 The HSWP
Political Committee accepted this document as a resolution in April 1977, and in 
the following year it became the guideline for further state measures. 
Although official attention was more devoted to non-European markets, new 
research projects were also launched to explore the current situation of the core 
Western European economies. Between autumn 1977 and spring 1978, an ad hoc 
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several different aspects of the EEC, among them the industrial structure and 
industrial policies in the Community; its relations with the EFTA states, Canada, 
Japan and China; developments in EEC-US relations; and the CMEA and East-
West trade. In his concluding study, principal investigator András Inotai identified 
an asymmetry of interests between the CMEA and the EEC. The Common Market 
had a much more important role in the realisation of the socialist states’ economic 
policy targets than vice versa. The EEC represented the larger part of the CMEA
states’ trade with capitalist countries while the CMEA had only a 4%–5% share in 
the EEC Nine’s imports and exports (excluding intra-German trade). Inotai also 
recalled that the CMEA members were attempting to expand their exports to the 
Nine in the sectors where the highest tariffs and quotas were levied (e.g. cloth-
ing products). Consequently, the socialist states should reshape their development 
policies and adjust their export patterns to forecast market demands. In his con-
clusion, Inotai warned that countries which had not yet established a contractual 
relationship with the EEC would be forced to act, and not Brussels. Therefore 
Inotai – and to a certain degree the expert community – argued for reaching an 
agreement as soon as possible: ‘Any problems involved in this step [of concluding 
an agreement], which is an imperative necessity, should thus be considered as the 
price for ensuring more favourable conditions for future and longer-term develop-
ment’. In his closing remarks, Inotai not only reflected on but also disproved the 
key point in the 1977 party resolution, stating that there was no real alternative 
market that could substitute socialist exports to the EEC.59 
At the end of the 1970s, another important expert community, bankers, also 
formulated criticism – at least in non-public documents. The central bank was the 
hub of Western business ties since Western European, North American and Middle 
Eastern banks were all among the country’s creditors. Between 1973 and 1979, 
Hungary borrowed 8 billion US dollars to stabilise its state budget, to finance its 
trade deficit and to restructure its industry (see Appendix , Table A.5 ). In fact, this 
‘planned indebtedness’ strategy was not supported and accepted uniformly. For 
example, the reformist president of the Hungarian National Bank (HNB), Andor 
László, expressed his disagreement, which caused his early retirement in 1975 
at the age of 61. His successor, Mátyás Tímár (previously vice president of the 
Executive Council), managed the central bank more smoothly. The HNB secured 
the required external funding for the national economy. However, several times it 
reported doubts.60 
Although the central bank was publicly rather passive concerning the issue 
of foreign trade policy, behind the scenes the HNB was the genuine engine of 
economic policy turnaround. From the perspective of the HNB, the ‘unresolved’
relation with the EEC was a serious obstacle that hindered Hungarian exports and 
negatively affected the entire financial balance. In September 1978, reviewing 
a CIER proposal, the foreign currency department of the central bank remarked 
that due to its organisational structure and its outstanding internal problems, the 
CMEA was not capable of managing inter-bloc talks. Therefore, dialogue should 
be continued but it was worth formulating the Hungarian standpoint to initiate 
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Hungary itself had to take the first step to avoid sizeable losses in trade, since 
the country’s financial balance did not permit any postponement of talks with 
the Community. 61 In July 1979, analysing another proposal by the Foreign Trade 
Ministry, the same department of the HNB pointed out the lack of concrete sug-
gestions on how to handle the ineffectiveness of the CMEA-EEC negotiations 
and called for a clear declaration that in the absence of a CMEA solution Hungary 
should negotiate with the Common Market itself.62 
A political deal with the EEC? – State ‘hawks’ and party ‘doves’
The crucial moment came in a year and a half. The CMEA-EEC negotiations 
reached stalemate in October 1980 and there was no hope of reviving them in the 
short term. The Hungarian leadership was disappointed and attempted to find a 
narrow path to avoid confrontation with the Soviets while at the same time trying 
to improve its relations with core Western European countries. It is noteworthy 
that in this delicate situation certain circles in Budapest envisaged the possibil-
ity of concluding a free trade agreement with Brussels. However, the idea was 
deemed ‘economic naivety’ by foreign traders since the Hungarian economy was 
only a reformed planned economy and not a genuine market economy. 63 Presum-
ably, given international commercial legislation the trade apparatus considered it 
illusory to draw up a contract with the EEC, while reformers desired a shift from 
the outdated standpoint. The general international climate was contradictory at 
the beginning of 1981. The Polish crisis overshadowed the prospects for any new 
reform in socialist states and the next CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid con-
tinued with endless disputes. Only economic cooperation seemed to be a promis-
ing neutral terrain at the conference. Regarding Basket II, Hungarian proposals on 
the exchange of market information, on industrial cooperation and on eliminating 
trade obstacles received positive echoes.64 
In these circumstances, the reformist younger generation within the party 
elite initiated action. In March 1981, the Department for Economic Policy of the 
HSWP CC elaborated a top-secret report on relations with the Common Market. 
In its memo, which was addressed to Ferenc Havasi, the economic secretary of the 
CC, it proposed concluding an all-embracing agreement with the Community to 
arrange economic and commercial issues simultaneously. The document stressed 
that such an agreement could improve the Hungarian economic position or at least 
would help to avoid major losses. The department assumed that Budapest might 
be able to bargain better conditions with Brussels like Romania or even Yugosla-
via. The rapporteurs underlined that the Romanian and Yugoslavian cases clearly 
demonstrated that an economic-commercial agreement with the EEC did not 
cause ‘political storms’.65 According to István Horváth’s (the subsequent Hungar-
ian ambassador in Bonn) memoirs, Havasi embraced the idea and consulted on 
this initiative with János Kádár, who informed the Soviet leadership during his 
summer holiday in Crimea.66 
Following preparatory talks with the West German Sozialdemokratische Partei 
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in November 1981. He stressed in Bonn that Hungary aimed to develop equally 
bilateral (Budapest-Brussels) and CMEA-EEC relations.67 In his memoirs, Havasi 
affirmed that West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt promised discrete sup-
port in negotiations on a Budapest-Brussels cooperation agreement.68 Despite the 
promising start, a month later Budapest received an unexpected warning from the 
chancellor. In an 18 December letter addressed to Kádár, Schmidt stated that the 
political risks of Hungary’s stronger attachment to the European Community were
evident. As he argued, since Hungary was an important member and partner in the 
CMEA, any attempt to establish closer links with the EEC would have far-reaching
implications of high political importance. He expressed his considerable doubts 
that the EEC could present an attractive offer in the economic field for Hungary. 
He concluded that the Hungarian leadership should assess whether the potential 
benefits of building a closer relationship with the EEC could outweigh the imme-
diate political risks.69 
The issue of a rapprochement was raised again in April 1982 in the last moments 
of a Kádár-Schmidt summit in Bonn. The West German chancellor stated that it 
was still unclear to Brussels what the exact content of an EEC-Hungary agree-
ment would be. Additionally, he repeated his concerns about Moscow since such 
negotiations might cause a serious conflict for Budapest. Finally, Schmidt explic-
itly advised the Hungarians to take the matter off the table. Gyula Horn (at the 
time deputy leader of the Department for Foreign Affairs in the HSWP CC) asked 
the chancellor why it was he, rather than the Hungarians, who were worried about 
the Soviets. Schmidt replied that it might be unpleasant for the Federal Republic 
of Germany if the Soviets found out that Bonn had helped to draw up a Budapest-
Brussels agreement.70 Following his visit in Bonn, Kádár also expressed criticism 
of Havasi and the CC departments for having suggested an agreement with the 
EEC which was not in accordance with reality. 71 Kádár seemed to be so disap-
pointed at Schmidt’s refusal that he never supported any similar action again. 
During the spring of 1982, the Ministry of Foreign Trade elaborated a new 
proposal on Hungary’s relations with the EEC. The ministry pointed out that even 
if they were successful the CMEA-EEC talks would not be able to improve Hun-
gary’s commercial position. Therefore, Budapest should continue its negotiations 
with Brussels and conclude agreements that would adequately satisfy its eco-
nomic interests. The report examined three main topics: tariffs, quantitative quo-
tas and the Common Market’s agricultural policy. Concerning tariffs, the ministry 
underlined that there was no chance of signing a free trade agreement under the 
current circumstances. The report also self-critically emphasised the low level of 
competitiveness of Hungarian suppliers, which was a greater hindrance to export 
expansion than Common Market customs tariffs. According to the report, agricul-
ture was a crucial area of dispute because this sector absorbed the heaviest losses 
from EEC protectionism. The trade ministry urged the Hungarian leadership to 
conclude a bilateral arrangement with the Community as soon as possible, even at 
the expense of Hungary bartering Western market opening with increasing food-
stuff imports from the Community. The concluding part of the report emphasised 
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important political gesture and pointed out that diplomatic recognition was inevi-
table sooner or later. 72 However, the finalised version of the proposal, which was 
signed by Minister of Foreign Trade Péter Veress on 7 June, clearly demonstrated 
that the time had not yet come to shift towards a new approach. The crucial last 
sentence of the proposal was changed to state that recognition was ‘no longer 
relevant’.73 
It is not hard to discover the coincidence between the parallel events. Indeed, 
Hungary was on the verge of total financial collapse by the beginning of summer 
1982. Although the IMF accepted the Hungarian request for accession in Novem-
ber 1981, turbulence in the international debt crisis resulted in panic reactions – 
several hundreds of millions in US dollar deposits were withdrawn from the 
Hungarian National Bank. In February 1982, the financial situation deteriorated 
dramatically. János Fekete, HNB vice president, forecast that without new exter-
nal credits the country’s savings would only stretch to the next month. On 6 May, 
József Marjai, vice prime minister, and Fekete signed the IMF accession docu-
ment at a lavish ceremony in Washington, but this membership did not in itself 
mean an immediate capital injection. Therefore, hard bargaining was launched 
with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and private banks to provide the 
country with fresh credit. At a Budapest meeting on 9 July, János Fekete hoped to 
convince Jacques de Larosière, the managing director of the IMF, that it was a pri-
mary interest of the West to support the ‘unique, firmly independent and difficult’
Kadarian path, since its failure would certainly delay opening up.74 
On the other hand, from time to time the Hungarians had to reassure the Soviets 
that the country did not depend on the West at all. For example, on 9 June 1982 
Prime Minister György Lázár affirmed to Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tikhonov, the 
Soviet chairman of the Council of Ministers, that Hungary was firmly commit-
ted to Soviet and socialist shipments. Lázár cited at length commercial data to 
demonstrate that Hungarian exports had expanded more intensively to the partner 
states than to the capitalist states, and he rejected a statement that Hungarian trade 
enterprises were exclusively interested in trading with market economies. He 
emphasised that Hungary purchased goods from developed capitalist countries 
only when it was impossible to acquire them from socialist or developing states.75 
Obviously, the Hungarian leadership was dancing on a razor blade. Budapest 
had to satisfy the requirements of the IMF in exchange for loans but did not want 
to incite Moscow’s anger with an additional Western deal. Therefore, when the 
economic cabinet of the Council of Ministers, presided by Marjai, accepted the 
Foreign Trade Ministry’s proposal at its 1 September 1982 meeting, it gave per-
mission for talks with the EEC to be launched and a comprehensive agricultural 
agreement to be negotiated, but explicitly stated that these negotiations would be 
solely an exchange of views of a technical nature.76 However, in November 1982 
on the occasion of a GATT ministerial meeting in Geneva, the Hungarian trade 
delegation suggested to the EEC representatives on a confidential basis that they 
should examine the possibility of concluding a comprehensive bilateral agree-
ment. In his 2016 book, Péter Balázs, at the time the commercial counsellor in 
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to the common CMEA standpoint. 77 Indeed, the idea of a bilateral agreement 
between Budapest and Brussels was undeniably a courageous measure. Neverthe-
less, the archival evidence reveals that it was part of a tactical game. The Ministry 
of Foreign Trade and the close circle of Vice Prime Minister Marjai confidentially 
showed a positive attitude towards the Common Market while they kept a watch-
ful eye on Moscow’s reactions, and in fact intended to avoid a compromise with 
the EEC. 
Publicly, Hungarian representatives repeatedly condemned EEC trade prac-
tices, as did Foreign Trade Minister Péter Veress at the thirty-eighth GATT minis-
terial meeting on 24–29 November 1982.78 However, at the expert level signs of 
dissatisfaction were observable, think tank institutions – hand in hand with certain 
HSWP CC departments – sought newer points to break out. A prime example of 
these pathfinding attempts was a January 1983 draft proposal by the Institute for 
Foreign Affairs titled ‘The Eighties and Hungarian Foreign Policy’. Gyula Gyovai, 
director of the institute, highlighted new opportunities for Hungarian foreign pol-
icy, since the room for manoeuvre for small countries had considerably expanded 
by the 1980s. The authors emphasised that the more trust and cooperation with 
the Soviet Union was built, the better Hungary could operate flexibly both inside 
the country and outside in the international arena. Moreover, it stated that in the 
current situation Budapest should narrow its confrontation with Moscow to the 
minimum and concentrate on the most important issues (like IMF membership). 
Regarding the capitalist world, the document stated that market economies would 
be ‘one of the strongest’ players in world politics, and in East-West relations the 
escalation of conflicts would change into an alternation between détente and ten-
sions by the second half of the 1980s. What is quite astounding in the draft is 
the idea of joining another trade association. It supposed that Budapest would 
have real a chance during the 1980s to prepare a proper framework agreement 
with the EEC. Moreover, it stated that ‘[Hungarian foreign policy] – following an 
adequate preparation and not demonstratively – could prepare the ground for Hun-
gary’s accession to EFTA. In order to ensure the modernisation and effective func-
tioning of the Hungarian socialist economy, these steps will be necessary.’ The 
authors trusted that Budapest would have the opportunity to realise this plan, even
though political criticism and protest was expected from both East and West. 79 
The Institute for Foreign Affairs submitted this proposal to the Department for 
Foreign Affairs of the HSWP CC, where its deputy head, Gyula Horn, reviewed 
it. He considered the document a collection of embryonic and fragile ideas which 
could not offer a coherent blueprint for Hungarian foreign policy. Although he 
criticised several points in the proposal in detail, he did not officially comment on 
the plan of joining EFTA or concluding an agreement with the EEC. However, in 
the margin of the document he remarked in pencil, ‘these things cannot be done 
under the table, nor are the others entirely stupid’.80 This comment may allow a 
presumption that Horn agreed with the ideas but that he deemed them unrealistic. 
This January 1983 plan and its perception unequivocally demonstrate the 
front lines between the state’s “hawks” and the party’s “doves”. Marjai’s circle, 
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Affairs preferred to only conclude a  commercial agreement with the EEC – with 
certain prerequisites. Meanwhile the reformist wing of the HSWP, in particular 
two departments in the Party Centre, intended to conclude a general, demonstra-
tive political agreement with the Common Market to prove Hungary’s goodwill 
and commitment to its most important European commercial partners.81 The for-
mer grouping still wished to avoid any confrontation with the Soviet Union and 
the CMEA partner states, while the latter desired to find Western supporters to 
advance the internal reform process. For a year and a half, the hawks’ approach 
prevailed over that of the doves. 
Bilateral negotiations with the EEC developed slowly and hesitantly, maybe 
due to the absence of a sincere Hungarian intention to compromise. After pre-
liminary soundings in which the Hungarian side tried to spur the Commission 
to declare an economic offer, Foreign Trade Minister Péter Veress met Commis-
sion Vice President Haferkamp on 17 January 1984. Haferkamp expressed the 
unequivocal political will of the member states to manage a rapprochement with 
Hungary. Conversely, Veress declared that Budapest would examine different 
options, including a comprehensive agreement, but was also interested in con-
cluding additional arrangements on agriculture, tariffs and so forth. 82 
Nearly a month later, Trade Minister Veress summarised the aims for the fur-
ther negotiations. In a 13 February memorandum to Vice Prime Minister Marjai, 
he paid special attention to the fact that for political reasons the Soviet Union was 
greatly inconvenienced by (potential) agreements between certain socialist coun-
tries and the Common Market apart from sectoral and technical arrangements. He 
stated that Moscow saw these agreements as a threat to the unity of the CMEA
and to the chances of a politically desirable CMEA-EEC general agreement. Ver-
ess suggested continuing the talks with Brussels but intended to only submit the 
issue to the top leadership at the last moment, when an agreement would be close 
to conclusion.83 
There is no archival record reporting that any government body discussed Ver-
ess’ proposal. Marjai himself probably decided that Budapest should show firm-
ness towards Brussels. Presumably, talks the vice prime minister had in Moscow 
urged him in this direction. During a meeting in the Soviet capital on 23 January 
1984, Marjai informed Nikolai Talyzin, Soviet deputy chairman of the Council of 
Ministers, about the Hungary-EEC negotiations. Talyzin declared that the Roma-
nian agreement with the Common Market opened not only a crack but also a gate in 
the bloc’s principles regarding the EEC. He commended and thanked Hungary for 
continual information on Budapest’s talks with Brussels. Talyzin reminded Marjai 
that in the current political situation a common action would be the most important 
goal, and all separate negotiation attempts would weaken these efforts. The Hun-
garian vice prime minister replied that Hungary would only conclude an agreement 
if it corresponded with common principles and resulted in relevant gains.84 
Additionally, the Soviet economic factor was still a hard constraint in the back-
ground. It was not possible to disregard the issues of energy supply, the USSR’s 
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by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1983 the Soviet Union had a 34% share of 
total Hungarian foreign trade and 17% of national income was realised in trade 
with the Soviets. The USSR delivered 90% of Hungary’s crude oil and 95% of 
its natural gas and timber imports, and the large Eastern neighbour purchased 
50% of total Hungarian machinery exports and 30% of its agricultural supplies. 
Moreover, at a 1983 annual summit Budapest requested the prolongation of a loan 
of one billion roubles (re-scheduling it from the 1986–90 plan period to the fol-
lowing post-1990 period), but Moscow still floated the issue during spring 1984.85 
To sum up, the Soviets possessed strong trump cards in their hands to handle the 
intractable Hungarians. They did not explicitly express their reservations. Instead, 
they temporarily blocked a shipment or postponed an important meeting at the 
appropriate moment. Therefore, the Hungarians had to read between the lines to 
decode Moscow’s intentions. 
In any case, at the end of February 1984 the Foreign Trade Ministry ordered 
the commercial counsellor at the Hungarian embassy in Brussels, Péter Balázs, to 
present a so-called non-paper paper to Haferkamp. This written memo aimed to 
underscore Hungary’s key conditions for any agreement. Budapest reconfirmed 
that it could not accept any discriminatory measures and asked the EEC to elimi-
nate all ‘quantitative restrictions inconsistent with Article XIII of the GATT’. The 
document also stated that the idea of effective reciprocity was not acceptable. 
Additionally, the non-paper claimed that a desirable agreement should result in a 
substantial improvement in export conditions for Hungarian goods.86 Some West-
ern partners were shocked by these firm Hungarian demands. As the West German 
ambassador in Budapest, Norman Dencker, pointed out, Bonn got the impres-
sion that the Hungarian government came to a sudden stop in its progress. On 12 
March, Dencker reminded Deputy Trade Minister Tibor Melega that a possible 
agreement between Hungary and the EEC would have political significance.87 
Despite the disappointment in Brussels, on 23 March Louis Kawan presented 
the Commission’s official proposal to continue the expert negotiations. When Mel-
ega reported on these latest developments, he highlighted that Brussels expected 
an unconditional approach, namely that Budapest should abandon its principles 
declared in its February non-paper. The deputy minister warned that acceptance 
of such a condition could discredit Hungary in the eyes of the Soviets: such an 
appearance may confirm the suspicion that Hungary was in fact not driven by 
economic but by political motivations. He suggested the following tactic to Mar-
jai: Hungary would send its representatives to the expert-level negotiations but 
maintain its positions concerning discontinuation of discrimination, rejection of 
effective reciprocity and so forth. 88 
It is no wonder that the next expert meeting in Brussels on 15–17 May 1984 
adjourned without any concrete result.89 The Belgian daily Le Soir reporting on 
these talks characterised the situation perfectly in its headline on 24 May: ‘Hun-
gary Approaches the Ten then Retreats: Attraction-Repulsion’. 
The HSWP Political Committee’s decision on 3 July 1984 in one sense closed 
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any further step towards the Community until Brussels suspended its discrimina-
tory and protectionist regulations. However, a loophole was hidden in the voted 
proposal: the Department for Economic Policy pointed out that a disagreement 
had emerged between the EEC member states regarding Hungary and suggested 
that any shift in the Community’s standpoint could only be initiated by the larg-
est, most respected countries.90 Thus Budapest retreated again but did not burn its 
bridges with Brussels. 
Conclusions 
On 25 July 1985, Foreign Trade Minister Péter Veress retrospectively evaluated 
the Hungary-EEC unofficial negotiations over the previous two years. First, he 
prided himself on having continually informed the CMEA states and especially 
the Soviet Union about these talks. He presented this as evidence of Hungary’s 
fidelity to its allies. Second, he blamed Brussels for its unwillingness to negotiate 
on the grounds of the GATT agreement. The EEC did not offer special treatment 
to Hungary and deemed Hungarian demands ‘excessively maximalist’. Accord-
ing to Veress, the real reason for the failure of the talks was Brussels’ fear that if 
the Common Market granted concessions to Hungary it would have to grant the 
same to all the socialist countries, including stronger exporters such as the GDR 
and Czechoslovakia.91 
The trade minister’s speech showed that in certain cases ideological doctrine 
still overrode the national interest; political loyalty towards Moscow remained a 
stronger factor than the expected economic gains of concluding a compromise 
with the second most important economic partner, the EEC. This notion brings 
an additional perspective to the general evaluation of the then Hungarian foreign 
policy. In a broader sense, according to Csaba Békés, Hungary’s Western rela-
tions dynamically developed during the first half of the 1980s. Indeed, Budapest 
presented an innovative and initiating foreign policy even in the coolest moments
of the period.92 László Borhi also emphasises that despite the deterioration in the 
superpower relations, Hungary was able to preserve the gains achieved in its rela-
tionship with the US in 1983–84.93 However, it is obvious that a significant dis-
crepancy arose between Hungary’s foreign and commercial policies. Békés argues
correctly in general terms when he states that the foreign policy was based on a 
relative independence from the end of the 1970s, with the slogan ‘that which is 
not forbidden may be free’.94 However, in fact Budapest showed a  self-restraining
character in its relations with the Common Market, and so its foreign economic 
policy remained ambiguous and ineffective in this direction. 
In comparison with the CMEA partner states, Hungary walked along its own indi-
vidual path, especially because it remained alone in its radical reforms following 
the repression of the Prague Spring. The former Polish-Hungarian-Czechoslovak 
axis no longer worked and divergent interests of the CMEA states prevented
the formation of a ‘united front’ against the Western ‘giant monster’, the EEC. 
Instead of coordinated cooperation, the bloc countries essentially became com-
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followed the meetings between the Community and the socialist states, Yugoslavia
and Romania served as a reference point for Budapest: Belgrade positively and 
Bucharest negatively. According to the interpretation at the time, the Yugoslavs 
had the chance to act more independently without additional risks while the Roma-
nians behaved obstinately and impeded any common action. (The latter percep-
tion became somewhat softened after the 1980 EEC-Romania agreement.) If one 
examines the macro-financial vulnerability of Hungary, it belonged to the heavily
indebted group within the bloc, together with Poland and the German Democratic 
Republic. Hungarian bankers did not follow the conservative Czechoslovak bor-
rowing pattern. Therefore, management of the debt crisis to a great extent deter-
mined the foreign economic policy targets. 
As far as the role of the ‘Soviet factor’ is concerned, it was at least as impor-
tant in the Hungarian case as in the East German one, not simply because of 
Hungary’s economic dependence on the Soviet Union but additionally for moral 
and emotional reasons (predominantly due to 1956). Certainly, what Helmut 
Schmidt wrote proved to be true: the Hungarian politicians carefully examined 
the short-term pecuniary advantages of a rapprochement and the long-term haz-
ard of confronting the Soviets, and finally they deemed it safer to stand in line. 
The previously mentioned dual dependency of the Hungarian economy (Eastern 
fuels and raw material, Western loans and technologies) required a prudent eco-
nomic policy after the end of the 1970s to maintain solvency and internal social 
stability. Presumably, the Hungarian leadership did not wish to lose Soviet sup-
port in exchange for an EEC trade agreement which might generate negligible 
commercial profit. It is a hypothetical question whether the Hungarian leadership 
had a real chance of conducting a bolder foreign (economic) policy before Gor-
bachev. Perhaps not. Maybe the foreign traders had a realistic view. However, 
party reformers paved the way for later changes. 
This chapter has shown that attitudes towards European integration underwent 
a radical transformation over time. Initially the EEC was depicted as the “eco-
nomic flank” of NATO, then it was designated as the main obstacle to Hungary’s 
export expansion in the West, and finally it was considered a prospective support-
ing partner. As has been seen, radically new approaches emerged from the middle-
level expert community in two waves: first, when the trade apparatus identified 
the problem of improving market access, which led to the GATT accession, and 
a second time when the younger party apparatchiks recognised the change of 
context and envisioned a political solution to cut the Gordian knot. The issue of 
an agreement with the EEC also became a home-front battlefield between the 
“hawks” and “doves” in the political leadership at the end of the 1970s. Although 
the reform wing of the HSWP lost this battle in 1983–84, the socialist unity idea 
irreversibly eroded. 
As an indirect consequence of these political discussions, in the mid-1980s a 
new public discourse was generated regarding terms like “Europe”, “European-
isation”, “re-Europeanisation” and the “paradigm of Europe”. Hungary’s histori-
cal roots and geographical place (Central Europe? East-Central Europe? Central 
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emancipation of Eastern Europe. Some experts argued that ‘the comprehensive 
institutional reform of the relations between Hungary and the European Commu-
nity fit[ted] in the process of the restoration of a geographically and historically 
determined system of relations’.95 From 1986 Budapest attempted to manage the 
disadvantageous consequences of a three-decade-long confrontation with the 
EEC. By 1989, Common Market membership was still an unreality for Hungary 
since the country was a member of another alliance system. However, according 
to Deputy Trade Minister Tibor Melega, a rapprochement towards the European 
economic development centre was strongly required in order to increase the effi-
ciency of the Hungarian economy. 96 During the political transformation process 
in 1989–90, the European Community became the symbol of Europeanism, it 
embodied peace and prosperity, and it emerged as a target to be achieved which 
would fulfil the desire of thousands of Hungarians to return to Europe. 
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 4 From ‘Economic Miracle’ to the 
‘Sick Man of the Socialist Camp’
Poland and the West in the 1970s 
 Aleksandra Komornicka 
The 1970s were a particular decade in Polish history. In December 1970, an 
economic and political crisis resulting from price increases led to the dismissal 
of Władysław Gomułka as head of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) 
and the appointment of a new leadership. Edward Gierek’s takeover of power 
symbolised a new beginning and hope for constructive reforms in Poland. Nev-
ertheless, ten years later in August 1980, Gierek and his political agenda were 
also dismissed in a context of economic and political crisis. However, despite 
some similarities, Poland’s situation in the summer of 1980 was very different 
to that before Christmas in 1970. Strikes were no longer spontaneous worker 
demonstrations but instead a coordinated cross-country movement supported by 
powerful dissident organisations. Moreover, this time the protesters demanded 
not only an improvement in economic and labour conditions but also human 
rights, such as freedom of speech, which the socialist regimes had committed to 
respecting in the Final Act of the CSCE, signed in August 1975. The economic 
situation which underlaid the political upheaval was additionally complicated by 
$22 billion in debts owed to Western creditors which had accumulated over the 
previous ten years. Unlike in 1970, the crisis could hardly be explained without 
considering Western influence or be handled independently of Western actors. 
The ties between socialist Poland and the capitalist world were the most irrevers-
ible outcome of Gierek’s decade. 
Despite the paramount impact which the unprecedented opening up towards the 
West had on the situation of the Polish socialist regime, it has rarely been studied 
as an independent phenomenon.1 Instead, the historiography of the 1970s deals 
predominantly with the two crises, their origins and consequences.2 The empha-
sis on revolts against the regime, however, results in a perception of political 
decisions, including those concerning economic and foreign policy, being solely 
responses to pressure from society. The strategy of the Polish socialist elite is 
therefore usually regarded as a constant balancing of claims by the population on 
the one hand and commands arriving from the Soviet Union on the other. How-
ever, looking at the socialist regimes from a comparative perspective allows the 
differences between national strategies to be highlighted and therefore the social-
ist elites to be rediscovered with their convictions, interpretations and goals as 
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This study contributes to this task by reconstructing the strategy of the Pol-
ish socialist elite and its dynamics between the 1970 and 1980 crises, a period 
marked by international détente and accelerating globalisation. While in these 
circumstances all the European socialist regimes increased their cooperation with 
the capitalist countries, aiming to improve their international and economic situ-
ations, Poland was not only the frontrunner in exchanges with the actors on the 
other side of the Iron Curtain but also was the country which ended the decade 
with the most spectacular economic and political crisis. As a consequence, in
the Polish case, alongside scrutinising the motivations and expectations behind 
the policy of opening up, the question also arises concerning the exaggerated 
scale of this phenomenon. 
This chapter argues that the opening towards the West was an outcome of the 
socialist elite’s ambition. This sentiment, which was driven by the traditional 
Polish aspiration for international grandeur, was reinforced in the 1970s by con-
fidence that the socialist state, even though unreformed, could experience an eco-
nomic revival and that détente would remain a permanent feature of international 
relations. However, as problems accumulated, the groups of policymakers who 
shared these assumptions became increasingly small. The history of Poland in the 
1970s is therefore not only a history of the escalating influence of Western actors 
on the domestic situation but also a history of internal decomposition caused by 
declining confidence and unity among the socialist elite. 
Towards détente, the late 1960s 
Poland was one of the socialist regimes most politically, economically and cul-
turally linked with Western Europe before the Second World War. While during 
the Stalinist years these economic exchanges almost disappeared, unofficial ties 
persisted. Polish emigration, on a scale and with an influence unseen in the cases 
of the other socialist regimes, played an essential role in maintaining private and 
cultural connections with the other side of the Iron Curtain. In this sense, Polish 
society exerted persistent pressure on the leadership to open up and positively 
welcomed any sign of rapprochement between the two parts of the continent. 
At the official level, a major revival of Polish cooperation with capitalist coun-
tries took place after 1953 thanks to the process of de-Stalinisation. The idea of a 
national way to socialism, which triumphed in 1956 with the takeover of power 
by Gomułka, who had been imprisoned between 1951 and 1954 under allega-
tions of national deviation, allowed Poland to loosen its dependence on Mos-
cow and enhance its activity in the international arena.3 Relying on his initial 
massive domestic support, the new first secretary of the PUWP openly rejected 
Soviet pressure concerning, for instance, collectivisation, which eventually failed 
to cover more than 11% of the land overall. 4 His insubordinate position, however, 
often drove him into conflict with the Soviet Union, which did not hesitate to 
threaten Poland economically with cuts in the supply of resources.5 
In this context, the idea of expanding relations with the capitalist countries 
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Moscow. Aiming to secure room for independent manoeuvre through hard-
currency income, Poland increased its exports of agricultural products and raw 
materials to the West. Gomułka considered the mining industry to be particularly 
important in guaranteeing Poland’s international position. The focus on indus-
trialisation but overlooking both innovation and domestic consumption, how-
ever, already in the mid-1960s resulted in economic stagnation. In this period, 
the Western countries appeared not only as recipients of Polish exports but also 
as an important source of new technology, and in some cases consumer prod-
ucts, which were repeatedly lacking in the domestic market. In order to facilitate 
these imports and the access of Polish goods to Western markets, in 1967 Poland 
joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), becoming the second 
socialist state in the organisation after Czechoslovakia. Similarly, in the late 1960s 
it reached bilateral trade agreements with France and the UK. In total, between 
1966 and 1970, the level of economic exchange with the capitalist countries rose 
by around one third.6
 Gomułka’s opening up was, however, limited. Despite developing foreign trade, 
the level of exchange with capitalist countries was never intended to come close 
to that with the CMEA members, which were envisaged by the leadership as the 
main receivers of Polish exports and the main pillar of Polish economic develop-
ment.7 During the late 1960s, Poland, alongside Hungary, became a main advo-
cate for a reform of the organisation and further economic integration between the 
socialist states.8 The aversion of Gomułka’s leadership towards engaging closer 
with Western countries was especially apparent in the case of foreign loans. In 
the late 1960s Polish indebtedness was among the lowest in Europe. During a 
meeting devoted to the difficult economic situation in early 1970, Gomułka and 
his closest collaborators fiercely rejected the possibility of taking Western credit, 
motivating this position with the risk of entering a trap of indebtedness or even 
‘walking on the leash of capitalism’.9 Instead, the leadership aimed to improve 
the economic situation through balanced economic exchanges and increasingly 
severe austerity measures. 
The reluctance to expand cooperation with capitalist countries was largely 
determined by unregulated political relations with the Federal Republic of Ger-
many (FRG). The lack of recognition of Poland’s western border on the Oder-
Nyssen line together with tragic memories of the Nazi occupation of Poland 
which were shared not only by the leadership but also the population fuelled the 
official antagonism towards West Germany and consequently Western Europe as 
a whole. Despite the establishment of a trade representation in Cologne in 1963, 
in this period Poland aimed to limit political rapprochement between the social-
ist countries and the FRG.10 Instead, Gomułka lobbied for a security conference 
which would confirm the territorial status quo in Europe and which he considered 
a preliminary condition for European détente.11 
Alongside the unresolved problem of the German border, the hesitance of the 
1960s leadership concerning further expanding East-West cooperation is often 
associated with the first secretary himself, or more broadly with his generation, 
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leadership in the late 1960s was marked by authoritarian methods, a limited 
inflow of challenges to the line he imposed and a concentration of policymaking 
in the small circle of politburo members.12 Furthermore, this group consisted pri-
marily of communists who had been politically trained in the interwar period and 
who were shaped by both the experience of the Second Polish Republic, a state 
economically dependent on the West and classical Marxist thought in which eco-
nomic accumulation was a necessary condition for political independence. They 
therefore remained reluctant to expand contacts with capitalist countries. 
A generational change and a gradual inflow of younger politicians, whose 
political views already originated in socialist Poland, challenged the older com-
munists’ monopoly of power. The events of March 1968, when the anti-Zionist 
narrative of the socialist states related to the Arab-Israeli war was used as a tool 
for party purges, played a major role in this respect. 13 The anti-Semitic campaign 
aimed at older communists of Jewish origin led to the removal of around a third 
of the party and government elite.14 
Moreover, the events of 1968 significantly damaged Gomułka’s authority and 
allowed the rise of alternative factions within the party. The first of these, labelled 
‘partisans’ and defending extreme national views such as strong hostility to West 
Germany, predominantly included party members linked with the secret services, 
most notably Mieczysław Moczar, a former minister of internal affairs. The other 
‘Silesians’ gathered around Gierek, a politburo member widely known for a mod-
ernisation programme he executed as the regional party leader in Silesia. Unlike 
the majority of the socialist elite at the time, Gierek experienced his political 
formation in the communist parties of France and Belgium, where he grew up and 
worked as a miner. 15 His faction mostly attracted the regional PUWP apparatuses 
and the managerial elite. 
The negative attitude of Gierek’s supporters to the leadership in place had its 
source in Gomułka and his closest co-operators’ strategy of ‘selective devel-
opment’ of the late 1960s for the new five-year plan for 1971–75. This policy 
attempted to focus exclusively on a few branches of economic production and 
marginalised others, which naturally resulted in opposition coming from the 
unprivileged sectors. Among other losses, the groups related to these industries 
were supposed to have limited access to new Western technologies, which they 
traditionally demanded.16 Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk, an engineer and the head of the 
Polish automobile industry association ‘Polmo’ in the late 1960s, was the most 
influential representative of these circles and became well known for his lobbying 
for the motorisation of Poland. Gomułka considered cars an unnecessary luxury 
good, contradictory to the very idea of socialism.17 On the contrary, already in the 
late 1960s Gierek openly supported Wrzaszczyk’s proposals. 18 
The question of motorisation became an emblematic battle over visions of the 
regime’s future, attracting not only industrial managers and politicians but also 
experts in the state apparatus, above all in the Planning Commission, and in aca-
demic institutions such as the Main School of Planning and Statistics. Within 
these groups, the most open supporting voice arrived from Józef Pajestka, pro-
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Not only did he advocate mass motorisation and point out its numerous strengths 
for the economy, but he also triggered a debate about the ‘socialist model of con-
sumption’.20 This long-lasting discussion between party-related and more inde-
pendent experts and also professional journalists increasingly revealed growing 
discontent with the economic austerity implemented in the late 1960s, pointing 
to shortages, low quality and the limited offer of accessible supplies. 21 Many 
of the economic experts participating in the debate, including Pajestka himself, 
advocated a policy of intensification of economic growth and technological mod-
ernisation which would move Poland towards a second phase of industrialisation 
in which the quality and modernity of production was expected to replace its 
quantity. 22 The Japanese model of fast modernisation through technology trans-
fers was considered a possible example for Poland.23 Postulates concerning mod-
ernisation, foreign technology and consumption often appeared on the pages of two
weeklies: Polityka (Politics), edited since 1958 by Mieczysław Rakowski; and Życie
i Nowoczesność (Life and Modernity), established in early 1970 and edited by Stefan
Bratkowski. While both editors-in-chief were PUWP members and subject to censor-
ship, their newspapers represented liberal and reformist outlets of the socialist elite.
 Gomułka’s policy was finally challenged by the détente agenda in Western 
Europe. In March 1969, several Western European leaders positively welcomed 
the Budapest Appeal for a European Security Conference issued by the social-
ist states. In September, the results of elections in the FRG brought the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) to power. The new chancellor, Willy Brandt, 
advocated a policy of bringing the two parts of the continent closer and among 
other things started negotiations with the Polish leadership on a bilateral treaty. 
This period witnessed a substantial change in attitudes to the FRG, and as a conse-
quence to Western Europe as a whole, which found reflection in the party’s theo-
retical monthly Nowe Drogi (New Paths). In late 1968 and early 1969, the journal 
still emphasised links between the US and the FRG and evidenced their ‘imperial’
and ‘Cold War’ aims.24 By September 1970 Brandt’s policy was classified as a 
force for peaceful coexistence.25 Although the visible change in the official narra-
tive might be interpreted as an effort to rationalise the ongoing negotiations with 
West Germany, it still signalled a major shift in the ideological framework of the 
Polish socialist regime, which traditionally legitimised itself with the threat of 
German revisionism. In this context, the treaty of 7 December 1970 in which FRG 
accepted Poland’s western border on the Oder-Neisse line was widely recognised 
as a historical breakthrough.26
 Gomułka and his closest collaborators expected this diplomatic success to 
improve their popularity and facilitate the austerity measures they planned to 
introduce a few days later. 27 On 12 December, the leadership increased the prices 
of basic alimentary products, most notably of meat. The decision led to social 
upheavals on a scale previously unseen in Poland’s socialist history. Brutal sup-
pression of workers’ demonstrations in the coastal region executed by the army 
resulted in the dismissal of Gomułka and the appointment of Gierek as PUWP first 
secretary. This course of events, however, remains an object of historical debate. 
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to opinions that he himself triggered the political crisis or that his victory was 
planned in advance in Moscow. 28 In any case, the dismissal of Gomułka and the 
arrival of Gierek might be seen as a reflection not only of political manoeuvring 
but also of ideas present in the party. The choice of him was a victory over other 
agendas popular among the socialist elite, in particular those represented by the 
nationalist “partisan” faction. 
Despite developing foreign trade, Gomułka’s leadership had remained hesitant 
about engaging more closely with capitalist states until the very end. However, the 
last years of the decade brought increasing challenges to the official policy arriv-
ing from the evolving international situation and from different groups among the 
socialist elite. Many arguments raised during that period signalled the direction of 
upcoming changes in the early 1970s. 
A new ambitious strategy, 1971–72 
In addition to the new first secretary, replacements of personnel in the party and 
the government took place which continued the generational change in the leader-
ship initiated in 1968. In total, in 1971 ten of the sixteen members of the politburo 
lost their positions, as did half of the ministers and presidents of commissions in 
the government, in what has been labelled a ‘revolutionary’ reshuffle. 29 
However, while the manner and speed of personnel replacements might have 
had a revolutionary character, they did not foreshadow a revolutionary change in 
the political line. Despite the removal of Gomułka and his closest collaborators, 
still around half of the leadership, including Gierek, had been part of the previous 
cohort. This was also the case of the new prime minister, Piotr Jaroszewicz, who 
held this position throughout the 1970s. As vice prime minister and Polish repre-
sentative to the CMEA for many years, Jaroszewicz was definitely not new to the 
socialist leadership. Similarly, Stefan Jędrychowski, a member of the government 
since 1945 and of the politburo since 1954, kept his position in the main decision-
making bodies, first as minister of foreign affairs and after 1972 as minister of 
finance, as did Wojciech Jaruzelski, who had been active in the Polish army 
since the Second World War and became its general in 1956 and was minister of 
national defence and a member of the politburo throughout the 1970s. Although 
in 1971 Gierek marginalised Moczar within the leadership, many of his associates 
remained in place and acquired new positions. For instance, Franciszek Szlachcic, 
who was very influential in secret-service circles, joined the new politburo while 
Stefan Olszowski took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late 1971. The com-
mon characteristic of the majority of the newly promoted party and government 
members, including both those mentioned earlier, was their political training in 
the Union of Polish Youth, a formation inspired by the Soviet Komsomol which 
existed in the Stalinist period. Resulting from this education, younger members of 
the leadership often presented highly ideological attitudes. 
Nonetheless, Western governments and media quickly labelled the new Polish 
leadership ‘technocratic’.30 Indeed, the renewed composition of the key political 
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Among others, this was the case of Wrzaszczyk, the new minister of machinery 
industry; Tadeusz Olechowski, who became minister of foreign trade after over 
twenty years of a professional career in foreign trade ventures and trade represen-
tations; Henryk Kisiel, who after serving at the National Bank for over twenty-
five years first led the Trade Bank and then became minister of finance in the 
1970s; and Pajestka, who had a position in the Planning Commission. 
The professionalisation of the leadership was accompanied by institutional 
change. Already in January 1971, the politburo issued a document regarding 
a need for increased parliamentary activity. 31 This very early decision laid the 
ground for a rise in the government’s influence, especially over economic matters, 
eventually marginalising the party apparatus in this respect. Given the overlap 
between the politburo and government members, at first glance this change might 
not appear relevant. Indeed, throughout the decade over a half of the politburo 
members also held ministerial positions. The leading role of the government, 
however, allowed the rise of people who had never pursued careers in the party 
structures, like Wrzaszczyk. The increase in government influence also meant 
a growth in the independence of particular ministries. Already in the first years 
of the 1970s, many of them officially widened their competences and therefore 
secured broader autonomy from the centre.32 
Apart from improving existing institutions, the leadership aimed to establish 
new ones. In February 1971, the politburo decided to create a Commission for the 
Modernisation of the Economy and State Functioning – Szydlak’s Commission, 
named after its supervisor, Jan Szydlak, one of Gierek’s closest co-operators from 
Silesia. Over two hundred politicians, experts and professionals were gathered 
in ten different sections of the body to provide the party and government with 
effective solutions to tackle the most pressing problems. Also in 1971, for the 
first time in Polish socialist history the first secretary named a personal advisor. 
Zdzisław Rurarz was a graduate from the Main School of Planning and Statistics 
and a former employee of the Ministry of Foreign Trade with impressive interna-
tional experience, including a career in Polish representation at Geneva dealing 
with the GATT and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). 
As is often stressed in testimonies from the decade, the new first secretary did 
not bring any ready-made programme but worked out a plan during his first year 
in power. 33 In this context, the increasing involvement of broader groups of the 
socialist elite became critical for the new agenda. Nevertheless, Polish histogra-
phy often dismisses the technocratic character of policymaking in the 1970s.34 
However, when compared with other socialist states such as Bulgaria and Hun-
gary, where power was still concentrated in the hands of older generation com-
munists, the new leadership and its governing methods stand out as unique.35 
The new management model was expected to improve the domestic situation and 
enable the successful implementation of a new agenda despite the principal ideo-
logical and personal continuities. 
Already on 19 December, Gierek communicated a shift in economic strategy 
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following day, the politburo decided to increase salaries and social benefits. These 
immediate actions were followed in January by a price freeze to the same level 
as before the 1970 rise. Further development of this agenda took place over the 
following year and resulted in a radical revision of the five-year plan for 1971– 
75 prepared by the previous leadership. Doubling the figures in the previous 
version, the new plan envisaged a rise in salaries of 18% and a 40% growth in 
consumption.36 
Scholars usually see these decisions as an immediate response to the crisis 
and a means of securing social stability. 37 While this logic undoubtedly drove 
the immediate reactions and above all the cancellation of the price rise, it fails to 
explain the model of consumption proposed by the new leadership. Rather than 
efficiently improving the accessibility of foodstuff, as the protesters demanded 
in December 1970, the new five-year plan focused on enriching the supply of 
more sophisticated consumer goods, including electronics and machinery, thus 
responding to the postulates raised by experts in the late 1960s. Already in Febru-
ary 1971, the leadership started to explore the possibility of purchasing a licence 
to produce a widely accessible personal car, which materialised in a deal with 
Italian Fiat signed later in the year. Purchases of licences for many other consumer 
products including tape recorders, buses and colour TV sets followed. Given that 
the country was slowly emerging from economic turmoil, the decisions to initiate 
complex production and increase imports of machinery appear bold rather than 
necessary. 
Moreover, the new model of consumption went further than improving the 
accessibility of goods. For example, the renewed five-year plan proposed a 17% 
rise in expenditure on tourism, leisure and sport.38 Already in 1972, the leader-
ship introduced the first free Saturdays and the annual number of them rose sys-
tematically through the decade.39 The proposed model of life based on leisure, 
free time and the widespread accessibility of consumer products differed from 
that of the 1960s. As Rurarz recalls, he suggested to Gierek that he should call 
this programme a new official socialist doctrine of ‘mass consumption’. The first 
secretary, however, objected to the proposal for ideological reasons. 40 Although 
since the 24th Congress of the CPSU the Soviet leadership had also aimed to 
improve the quality of life, it still regarded the concept of consumption as a capi-
talist state perversion. According to Rurarz, an article he wrote for  Nowe Drogi, 
in which he praised the new consumption model, caused significant controversy 
among Soviet officials, who became sceptical about his advisory role to the first 
secretary. 41 In the article, he stated among other things that ‘cars and comfortable 
apartments will become accessible for everyone. . . . To the mass tourism of those 
[Western] societies we will reply with our mass tourism’. 42 
Alongside improving the quality of life, the new leadership aimed to inten-
sify economic growth and thus fulfil the ideological requirements of the socialist
regimes concerning continual industrialisation. The revised five-year plan increased
the envisaged 6% annual growth to 9%.43 The document also dismissed the proposal
for ‘selective development’ from the 1960s, instead introducing balanced growth
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the leadership initiated new investments in heavy industry. The most spectacular
ones were in the Katowice Steelworks and the Gdańsk Refinery, both launched in
1971. Moreover, the government encouraged both new and more traditional indus-
tries to look for modern technology abroad.44 The five-year plan named imports
of Western technology one of the principal pillars of the new programme and rec-
ommended using licences to establish more long-term cooperation agreements
with Western companies. The document assessed that the lack of ties with foreign
industries had often limited Poland’s production ability and recommended dou-
bling expenditure on this kind of agreements.45 The impetus of the modernisation
programme of the early 1970s stimulated comparisons with the demanding first
six-year plan implemented after the Second World War. 46 Moreover, the Japanese
development model based on technology imports and intensified economic growth,
which was praised by experts already in the late Gomułka period, explicitly reso-
nated in official documents from the early 1970s. 47 
While the new leadership responded to pressures from regional PUWP appa-
ratuses and the managerial elite securing the internal cohesion of the party, its 
proposals concerning intensified economic growth carried many risks. Combin-
ing intensified economic growth with a similarly ambitious rise in consumption 
violated the assumptions of the socialist economy, which regarded the simultane-
ous development of both as exclusive. Moreover, the experience of the previous 
decades spoke against exaggerated economic goals. The new plan also openly 
encouraged closer links with companies in the capitalist countries, disregarding 
the possibility of dependency on Western industries. Finally, in the post-crisis 
reality Polish accumulated capital was not sufficient to achieve these ambitious 
aims. From early 1971 onwards, it was clear that the new strategy critically 
depended on foreign loans. 
The politburo explored Western credit opportunities immediately. 48 The new 
economic plan for 1971–75 was initially expected to allow Poland to extend its 
debt to 9 billion exchange złotys – over twice as much as was proposed in the 
late 1960s. A strong preference was given to investment credits, but consumption 
credits were also acceptable from 1971 onwards.49 This policy encountered an 
especially strong backlash from the highly positioned members of the previous 
leadership, including Gomułka himself, who in an emotional letter to the PUWP
Central Committee blamed the new leadership for ‘eating from someone else’s 
plate’.50 On the other hand, according to testimony from Piotr Kostikow, head of 
the Polish department in the Central Committee of the CPSU, Moscow not only 
allowed but recommended the Polish leadership to look for credit opportunities 
in the West. 51 Undoubtedly, in the early years of the decade the Polish leadership 
informed Moscow about its economic plans concerning credits and regularly con-
sulted on its political choices.52 
Given the scale of the envisaged debt, long-term repayment schedules and the 
launch of costly new investments, the success of the new economic agenda was 
conditioned on efficient trade with the capitalist countries. The new five-year 
plan forecast a 57% increase in foreign trade volume, including 55% in exports.53 
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but also surprising given the experience of unfulfilled export promises in previous 
economic plans.54 
While expecting an improvement in economic performance, the new agenda 
did not entail significant systemic reforms. As already mentioned, the newly 
established Commission for the Modernisation of the Economy and State Func-
tioning was expected to propose more general changes in this respect. Its activity 
was, however, ideologically limited. As Szydlak, the head of the Commission, 
stated during a meeting, ‘First of all, we will not be making any noise, any pro-
paganda noise. As you all well know, comrades, we are under constant fire, both 
from within the country and from the outside, so we will not make any noise. 
Economic reforms are the least suited to propaganda noise’.55 According to testi-
monies from the decade, ideological concerns constrained implementing propos-
als from the Commission.56 Similarly, the idea of fashioning the Polish economic 
system on the Hungarian or Yugoslavian models, which had supporters among the 
socialist elite, remained at the level of unofficial debates. 57 In the aftermath of the 
suppression of the Prague Spring and the rise of the Brezhnev doctrine, reform of 
the system became a taboo for the Warsaw Pact members. 58 
Members of the leadership were well aware of the bold character of the new 
agenda. As Jaroszewicz framed it when referring to the new economic plan: ‘We 
have to conclude that the plan is not smooth and easy. It is bold and ambitious 
and contains many difficulties and risks’. 59 During discussion on how to present 
the new agenda to society, Stanisław Trepczyński, a diplomat, highlighted that ‘a 
big novelty is the vision of our industrial modernisation on a scale unseen before. 
This includes the question of foreign debt and licenses and other things which 
used to be a deadly sin to think of, and we are not afraid of them’.60 Interestingly, 
the ambition and confidence underlying the new economic strategy were also 
expected to serve as a means of mobilising society and improving the popularity 
of the socialist elite. This logic stood behind famous propaganda slogans, such as 
‘Poland, the 10th global industrial power’ and ‘We are building a second Poland’, 
which originated in that period.61 
A bold international agenda accompanied the new five-year plan. The new guide-
lines for foreign policy expected Poland to become the most influential socialist state
in Europe after the Soviet Union. The document considered Europe as a primary
field of Polish diplomatic activity, identified the EEC as an important new actor
in European politics and recommended expanding contacts with the body as well
as improving the institutional apparatus working on integration processes. It also
envisaged Poland having a critical role in shaping the CSCE.62 The list of the first
secretary’s planned travels and visits by politicians to Poland reflected the launch of
a new diplomatic offensive. 63 Apart from traditional channels, documents from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs conceptualised economic relations as an integral part of
foreign policy, describing them as a means of ‘making détente irreversible’. 64 
In view of the traditional hostility between socialist and capitalist countries, 
the choices in the early years of the decade not only signalled the boldness of the 
leadership but also reflected the evolving perception of the international situation. 
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after its ratification by the Bundestag in May 1972, antagonism towards West 
Germany gradually disappeared from propaganda and foreign policy. 65 More-
over, official documents and academic publications associated Western European 
integration with a trend towards European ‘emancipation from American hege-
mony’.66 The ongoing talks preceding the CSCE, together with the increasing 
role of social democratic parties in Western European states, further fuelled the 
positive perception of the region as opposed to the US.67 In this context, from the 
early 1970s not only the popular press and PUWP journals but also some official 
documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs started to refer to the Cold War as a 
phenomenon of the past, proclaiming a new era of peaceful coexistence whereby 
the superiority of one system over the other would be decided by its attractive-
ness.68 Similarly, in academic party-related writings, the period between the end 
of the Second World War and the Polish-FRG treaty was depicted and historicised 
as a ‘Cold War’. 69 In an interview with Gierek published in 1990, the first sec-
retary himself confirmed that at the time he ‘bet on the end of the Cold War’. 70 
The strong confidence in the attractiveness and success of the renewed domestic 
economic agenda and of the durability of détente in Europe allowed the leadership 
to introduce significant cultural liberalisation in the early 1970s. An immediate 
improvement in the traditionally problematic relationship between the PUWP
and the Catholic Church became emblematic of the new approach.71 Moreover, 
already in the first years of the decade, authors and artists banned from present-
ing their work publicly by the censorship received rehabilitation. An inflow of 
Western culture followed, including publications, films, arts and music. Also, the 
leadership substantially liberalised the passport policy and created a fund allow-
ing Polish citizens to exchange a limited amount of domestic currency against 
foreign currencies at the official beneficial rate. This decision opened the door 
to an unprecedented number of visits to Western countries, which tripled within 
five years compared to 1971.72 Except for Yugoslavia, which was known for its 
openness and broader individual freedoms, no socialist regime experienced such 
a cultural liberalisation in the détente period. The decisions enabling the inflow of 
Western culture and visits to the West are evidence not only of the belief that the 
system could stand up to domestic challenges but also that it could successfully 
sustain comparison with capitalism. 
The Gierek leadership’s first plan largely responded to the questions raised by 
different groups in the socialist elite already in the late 1960s. The new leadership 
took into consideration the demands of regional party apparatuses, the managerial 
elite and experts and lastingly increased the influence of these groups in poli-
cymaking, securing a unity of the socialist elite in a period of a shift in national 
strategy. The new technocratic approach and détente, which was assumed to be 
the permanent condition of international relations, drove the ambition underlying 
the new agenda for complex cooperation with the West. 
External and domestic challenges, 1973–76 
The 1970s are often referred to as a belle époque in socialist Poland’s history. 73 
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witnessed consistently rising wages and a substantial increase in consumption, 
which contributed to securing domestic stability. The policy of large investments 
also allowed accommodation of the children of the post-war demographic boom, 
who entered the job market during this period. Moreover, in 1975 the volume of 
foreign trade with capitalist countries tripled compared to 1970, fulfilling lead-
ership’s expectations from the beginning of the decade. 74 However, it quickly 
became apparent that while imports rose, exports remained quite modest, which 
made the repayment of loans more and more burdensome. Polish indebtedness in 
1975 is estimated at around $11 billion. At the same time, however, the economic 
plan drawn up in 1971 foresaw that the ‘investment harvest’ would only come in
the second half of the decade when all the new factories would start producing.75 
The honeymoon in political relations with Western Europe accompanied prom-
ising results in the domestic economy. Gierek’s command of French and German 
soon enabled him to establish personal relations with Western leaders and, along-
side Nicolae Ceaușescu, pursue a ‘policy of prestige’.76 The diplomatic renewal 
was marked by numerous visits, such as trips by the first secretary to Paris in 
1972, Brussels in 1973 and Bonn in 1975. Likewise, Western leaders including 
Richard Nixon, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and others visited Poland during that 
period. Preparation for the CSCE additionally drove the explosion of contacts 
with Western politicians. The first secretary’s international activity brought an 
unprecedented quality change in official relations with Western partners and 
improved his domestic image.77 The press widely described Gierek’s international 
travels, portraying him as an influential global leader. 78 
These results in economic and foreign relations fuelled confidence in the early 
1970s. As is pointed out in testimonies from the decade, the leadership was over-
whelmed and surprised by its own success.79 Positive assessment of the new policy 
also found reflection in support from the PUWP, which between 1970 and 1980 
acquired 700,000 new members, reaching its maximum size, involving around 
12% of the Polish population. This perception was also shared by both Eastern 
and Western observers. As Kostikow recalled, more and more people talked about 
a Polish ‘economic miracle’.80 Similarly, Western states competed for lucrative 
business opportunities in Poland, debating whether Gierek had found a ‘magic 
key which unlocked the door to efficiency’. 81 In the circumstances of internal and 
external enthusiasm, the leadership did not perceive a revision of its strategy to 
be necessary. 
At the same time, international developments in the 1970s accelerated Polish 
cooperation with the West. While Poland praised the Western European states for 
increasing their independence from the US, their proceeding integration posed a 
significant economic challenge for Poland. Unlike exporters of natural resources 
such as the Soviet Union and Romania, Polish exports to Western Europe con-
sisted above all of agricultural products, the access of which to the EEC market 
was already limited in the 1960s with the introduction of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). The enlargement of the Community to the UK, Poland’s second 
biggest trading partner in the West, challenged Poland’s export ability in 1973. 
The most important threat, however, concerned the Common Commercial Policy 
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could no longer be negotiated and signed with Western European states but had 
to be agreed with the European Commission instead. The EEC’s intensified inte-
gration process clashed with Polish plans in the early 1970s based on large-scale 
exchanges and a vision of Pan-European cooperation. 
In these circumstances, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade, two institutions primarily concerned with the EEC, responded 
by expanding the institutional apparatus monitoring developments in Western 
Europe, for instance by establishing a special unit in the Polish embassy in Brus-
sels.82 The general CMEA policy of non-recognition of the EEC, however, limited 
the actions of such institutions. In the period of increasing Western European 
integration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
associated experts became a source of pressure on the politburo and the govern-
ment to regulate the relationship with the Community. 83 
Unwilling to depart from the unified socialist front, while lobbying alongside 
Hungary in Moscow for recognition of the EEC, the Polish leadership aimed 
instead at means to overcome the challenges posed by EEC integration, par-
ticularly before the introduction of the CCP in 1975. 84 As a consequence, the 
guidelines for Polish foreign policy assumed: ‘Our goal is to maintain, as long as 
possible, bilateral relations with the EEC states, not allowing any interference by 
the Commission. In the short term, we should take advantage of these relations to 
mitigate harmful restrictive and discriminatory practices.’85 Following this direc-
tion, Poland concluded economic agreements with eight out of nine members of 
the EEC before 1975, some for the first time since the Second World War. More-
over, looking for an alternative to the regional integration in Western Europe and 
for a space for interaction with the representatives of the officially unrecognised 
European Commission, Poland intensified its activity in international organisa-
tions, above all in the GATT and the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (ECE). The Polish leadership aimed for as many economic gains as pos-
sible before the further closure of the EEC markets. Although the EEC never 
planned to unify the terms of credits, reports from the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
suggested: ‘We should expect that the EEC will aim to unify the terms of invest-
ment credits for socialist states, especially after 1974. We should take advantage 
of the time separating us from this moment to get indebted as much as possible 
with the EEC member states.’86 A similar recommendation concerned establish-
ing as many long-term cooperation agreements as possible, which if signed before 
the introduction of the CCP could still function on the terms in the original con-
tracts.87 This strategy of bypassing the EEC, however, often reached a dead end 
and direct unofficial contacts with representatives of the European Commission 
became inevitable. In the first half of the 1970s, alongside Hungary and Romania, 
Poland became a frontrunner in such practices among the CMEA members. 88 
Inflation in capitalist countries in the early 1970s, fuelled by the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system and a stock market crash resulting from the oil embargo 
proclaimed by Arab petroleum countries in 1973, similarly accelerated Poland’s 
engagement with the West. The leadership welcomed the difficulties of the capi-
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real prices of instalments are lower than initially assumed’, and pushed for as 
many loans as possible.89 Poland’s position as a coal exporter only encouraged 
its confidence in its ability to take advantage of the turmoil in global resources.90 
At the same time, the problem of energy supplies put Poland in a disadvan-
tageous position with regard to the other socialist states. As the key producer 
of coal, it was obliged to sell more to the CMEA countries at set unfavourable 
prices.91 This concern caused increasing scepticism over socialist economic inte-
gration, which in that period was also emerging over the unreformed model of 
economic exchanges still based on transferable roubles, which meant that Polish 
goods, which were often based on expensive foreign technology and contained 
parts imported from the West using hard currency, were sold for prices not cor-
responding to the production costs. This situation naturally led to privileging the 
West as a trading partner. 
However, the oil crisis had another effect on Polish national strategy in the 
1970s. Reports from the Planning Commission assumed the difficulties of the 
capitalist countries to be the reason behind insufficient Polish export revenues. 92 
This argument was often used by Jaroszewicz when justifying his commitment to 
the economic agenda of the early 1970s. According to this logic, the moment the 
international economic situation improved, Polish trade exchanges would bring 
the expected results.93 In this sense, the oil crisis not only speeded up Poland’s 
opening towards the West but also blurred the picture of the domestic economic 
situation. 
Not everyone in the new leadership, however, shared the mainstream interpre-
tation of ‘beneficial momentum’ with regard to the first half of the 1970s. Reports 
produced by Minister of National Defence Jaruzelski warned against a positive 
assessment of Western Europe and the building of economic ties with the EEC 
states, recalling the continued existence of security dangers.94 Similarly, some 
reports from the Planning Commission in 1974 advised a cut in expenditure and 
an economising of resources given the prospect of economic slowdown in global 
markets as a consequence of the oil crisis.95 Minister of Finance Jędrychowski 
also insisted on a reversal of the economic strategy, which drove him into conflict 
with Jaroszewicz and resulted in his dismissal from the government in 1974.96 
The same trajectory was followed by Szlachcic, who openly warned the politburo 
against ‘idealising credits’ and ‘slithering towards the West’. 97 He lost his influ-
ence soon afterwards and was removed from the leadership in 1975.98 
Criticism of the official policy was also the reason behind the removal in 1973 
of the original editorial board of the weekly Life and Modernity, which since 
early 1970 had consisted of members of the liberal side of the socialist elite and 
economic experts advocating reforms and modernisation. Moreover, already in 
late 1972, Rurarz, Gierek’s personal advisor, resigned from his position and trans-
ferred back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his own assessment, this change 
was motivated by profound disagreement over the economic choices made by the 
leadership.99 He was quickly replaced with Paweł Bożyk, a professor at the Main 
School of Planning and Statistics and, like his predecessor, a specialist in foreign 
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The mid-1970s also witnessed a decline of the Commission for the Modernisa-
tion of the Economy and State Functioning. While the majority of the proposals 
prepared by this institution remained unimplemented, the government estab-
lished Huge Economic Units (WOG) in 1973 following a recommendation by 
the Commission. The new entities enjoyed unprecedently wide prerogatives. Not 
only were they exempt from the obligation to follow the central plan closely, but 
they could also decide on foreign trade deals and in some cases on the prices of 
goods produced.100 The reform contributed to the general trend of widening the 
competences of specific ministries and industries initiated after Gierek’s arrival 
in power, which made the coordination ability of the central institutions looser. 
Moreover, each industry and ministry behind it was primarily concerned with its 
own interests and constantly sought funding for new investments. The activity of 
Wrzaszczyk, the highly influential minister of machinery industry, best illustrates 
these practices, which were labelled ‘investment pressure’.101 Even though many 
of the newly initiated productions, such as the Fiat, turned out to be much costlier 
than initially assumed, he always successfully persuaded the rest of the leadership 
to provide more funds and launch further investments.102 
Already before his removal, Szlachcic drew attention to the loss of coordination
over the rising economic engagement with the West, above all credit-taking. 103 
Ensuing efforts to increase party and government control over the matter, however,
did not prevent a growing concern in the Soviet Union over the economic situation
in Poland.104 Signs of the Soviet preoccupation are often recalled in memoirs by 
the policymakers of the decade.105 They also find illustration in the leadership’s 
actions aiming to obscure the cooperation with the West, for instance by cover-
ing up official statistics which indicated that the level of economic exchange with 
capitalist countries already overtook that with the CMEA around 1975. 106 The 
Soviet Union’s growing concern explains Gierek’s symbolical gestures of subordi-
nation, which multiplied in that period. In 1974 the first secretary honoured Leonid
Brezhnev with the Virtuti Militari, the highest Polish military award. Moreover, 
a year later he announced plans to incorporate into the constitution a new article 
proclaiming a timeless alliance with the Soviet Union. 
These actions triggered the unification of the opposition-minded intellectu-
als, who in early 1976 issued a ‘Letter of 59’ protesting against changes in the 
constitution and calling for respect for citizens’ rights. The signatories directly 
referred to the Final Act of the CSCE signed in Helsinki in August 1975, which 
acknowledged these prerogatives. The leadership strongly condemned the protest 
and accordingly proceeded with its initial plans despite the objections raised. 
In late 1975, alongside revising the constitution the government launched work
on the new economic plan for 1976–80. Driven by Poland’s positive achieve-
ments and regardless of the increasing domestic scepticism and worrying external
developments, the document predicted a boom in exports and modern high-quality
production and therefore established intensified growth and improvement in the 
quality of life as the main economic goals for the following five years.107 Similarly,
with the peak of European détente marked by the CSCE Final Act, the leadership 
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of economic policy, the guidelines for foreign policy for 1976 remained largely 
untouched.108 
Securing the status quo, 1976–80 
The second half of the 1970s brought to the fore the previously marginalised 
negative outcomes of Gierek’s policy. The existing price freeze combined with 
rising wages, which in 1976 were double those of 1970, resulted in repeated short-
ages and often made it necessary to import basic agricultural products from the 
West. Aiming to restore equilibrium, in June 1976 Jaroszewicz announced price 
rises. Gierek is reported to have expected that the population would support the 
leadership and its agenda and understand the necessity of the decision.109 Instead, 
the new prices triggered mass protests, especially in Radom and Ursus, where 
the police brutally intervened, injuring some of the participants. This negative 
reaction resulted in an immediate cancellation of the decision.110 Social stability 
had been one of the key features of the early 1970s, and the leadership wanted to 
secure it at any price. 
An alarming report issued after these events by the Planning Commission in 
cooperation with Bożyk exposed the state of the Polish economy. It revealed 
expenditure was around 20% higher than income and that the debts accumulated 
over the previous years already consumed 44% of export revenue, a figure that 
would probably rise to more than 60% in the next two years. It stated that exports 
were often rejected due to their disappointing quality and were growing insuffi-
ciently, while imports, which were necessary for continuing production in many 
sectors, were rising rapidly. The authors firmly recommended drastically cutting 
the number of new investments, improving centralised control and accelerating 
exports.111 These recommendations laid the ground for a revision of the draft 
five-year plan prepared in 1975, which was labelled an ‘economic manoeuvre’. 
By slowing down the negative trends, the leadership aimed to put the original 
agenda on hold rather than drastically reversing it. This strategy, based on the 
hope of a sudden improvement in Polish performance, continued until the end 
of the decade. 
However, even the limited changes in economic policy quickly proved difficult 
to implement in practice. The ‘open plan’ idea aiming to improve the leadership’s 
flexibility in reality only facilitated unforeseen expenditure. Moreover, a partial 
cancellation of the WOG reform in 1976, which was part of the programme to 
reinforce central control, did not put an end to ‘investment pressure’. Represen-
tatives of the managerial elite still often managed to successfully persuade the 
leadership to grant more funds.112 Preserving the unity of the socialist elite by 
avoiding discontentment among these groups became another feature of the pol-
icy to maintain the status quo. 
The continuation of exchanges with the West was critical to maintain the 
favourable situation of the early 1970s, and the leadership interpreted interna-
tional developments as not foreshadowing any change. Elections in the FRG 
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reversal of Ostpolitik. Moreover, despite increasing awareness among the West-
ern states and banks about the real state of the Polish economy after the 1976 
crisis, foreign loans continued to flow in to Poland.113 These developments con-
firming the durability of détente enabled and encouraged the Polish leadership’s 
passive policy in the second half of the 1970s. 
At the same time, however, its actions following the price rises contributed to 
a deterioration in East-West relations. Despite the fact that the scale of repres-
sion in 1976 was much less severe than in 1970, it substantially undermined the 
peaceful image of the leadership. The persecution of demonstration participants, 
which included lay-offs and imprisonment, raised the attention of the opposition-
minded intellectuals who had already been active on the occasion of the ‘Let-
ter of 59’. A Workers Defence Committee (KOR) was officially established in
September 1976 with the aim of supporting the families harmed by the repres-
sion both financially and legally. This continually growing group and others that 
originated in that period became permanent actors on the political landscape in 
the second half of the 1970s.114 Although only the US officially linked the stream 
of loans with respect for human rights, Western European politicians also regu-
larly inquired about the KOR and the situation of dissidents.115 Fearing an end of 
détente and economic exchanges with the West, policymakers tolerated the dis-
sident activity. 116 As Rakowski stated in his memoirs, ‘A few words from Giscard 
d’Estaing . . . would be enough to let everyone out of prison’.117 
The events of 1976 and the following rise of the dissident movement triggered 
concerns not only in the West but also in the East. As memoirs of the decade recall, 
the Soviet Union frequently urged the Polish leadership to regulate the domestic 
economic and political situation.118 In addition, the other socialist states became 
anxious about possible contagion by the Polish situation and annoyed about often 
unfulfilled export promises.119 As a result, from 1976 the Soviet Union increased 
its scrutiny of the socialist regimes.120 The rising concern and involvement of 
Western and Eastern actors limited the independence of the Polish leadership, 
confirming its passivity. 
The external developments further harmed Poland’s economic situation. After 
the implementation of the CCP, the EEC introduced new regulations negatively 
impacting Poland’s steel exports and its access to fisheries in the Baltic Sea. 121 In 
addition, the continuing slowdown of the international economy caused by the oil 
crisis limited the access of Polish exports to Western markets. Against the expec-
tations of the mid-1970s, the cost of servicing foreign debt increased as a result 
of Western countries defending their currencies with high interest rates. 122 More-
over, many energy-intensive Polish industries experienced unforeseen costs as a 
consequence of energy price rises, especially after the oil crisis in 1979 caused 
by the Iranian revolution. If that was not enough, in the second half of the decade 
Poland suffered adverse meteorological conditions. In particular in 1979, a “win-
ter of the century” and a devastating drought during the summer resulted in agri-
cultural difficulties and unexpected energy consumption. 
These developments and the lack of decisive action by the Polish leadership 
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everyday life and burdensome shortages, the suspension of many investments 
resulted in massive depreciation. Meanwhile the debts kept rising and reached 
over $20 billion in 1979, which made Poland the most indebted socialist state in 
Europe. In these circumstances, Polish economic problems were ‘on the lips of all 
the [PUWP] members’.123 A rise in Cold War tensions due to the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan in December 1979 fuelled and polarised internal debates. 
On the one hand, the economic crisis pushed Poland closer to the Soviet Union, 
which to some members of the socialist elite appeared as the only remedy to the 
situation. This group included the former minister of foreign affairs, Olszowski, 
who according to Rakowski’s journals already stated in 1976 that ‘in order to leave 
the crisis we need to rely on Moscow. There is no other choice’.124 Jaruzelski and 
Stanisław Kania, the politburo member responsible for the security services, also 
shared this view. Together with Olszowski, they became the strongest opponents 
of Gierek’s policy and the most prominent candidates to replace him. 125 However, 
Moscow signalled to Polish interlocutors that the idea of a ‘Soviet umbrella’ over 
the Polish economy was misplaced.126 Soviet engagement in Afghanistan only 
lowered the chance of it providing economic support. 
Meanwhile, expert bodies suggested a more profound reform of the system, an 
improvement of export capacity and an easing of the increasingly burdensome 
loan instalments through cooperation with Western institutions. Reports issued 
by the team of experts gathered by Bożyk unequivocally insisted on joining the 
IMF and the World Bank. 127 Similarly, bankers and representatives of the Ministry 
of Finance, who in this period acquired unprecedented importance as they were 
at the forefront of securing Polish economic stability, advocated the solution of 
negotiations with creditors and participation in Western economic institutions. 128 
Experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Rurarz, who since the 
early 1970s had called for regulation of the relationship with the EEC, in this 
period explicitly emphasised the positive economic and political consequences 
that could flow from recognition of the organisation. 129 Despite these recommen-
dations, both joining the IMF and the World Bank and establishing official rela-
tions with the EEC remained impossible due to the position of Moscow. 130 
Despite the pressure, the leadership, which was increasingly concentrated in 
small group around the first secretary, still hoped to continue balancing between 
the West and the East and to handle the crisis independently. While a meeting 
between Giscard d’Estaing and Brezhnev in Warsaw in May 1980 aimed to pre-
serve the favourable international circumstances, a rise in the prices of basic ali-
mentary products in June was the last attempt to cure the Polish economy. 
The decision triggered massive strikes, especially in the coastal region, which 
eventually led to the creation of the independent self-governing labour union 
Solidarity and an unprecedented rise of civil society. While the price rise was 
the spark for the protest, historiography concerning the origins of the phenom-
enon shows longer structural developments. Despite the daily worsening of the 
economic situation, propaganda continually proclaimed spectacular successes, 
which contributed to the frustration in society. 131 Moreover, in 1978 Polish Car-
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became a symbol of the strength of the Polish church and an important counter 
authority to the socialist leadership. His official visit to Poland in 1979 played a 
major role in the mass mobilisation.132 Finally, scholars studying Solidarity also 
agree on the paramount importance of the economic agenda established in the 
early 1970s. The new consumption model elevated social expectations which 
were still unfulfilled in the late 1970s, more prevalent visits to the West brought 
frustration with domestic living standards and liberalisation created space for the 
rise of alternative culture centres and organisations; all jointly paved the way for 
the rise of civil society. 133 
The 1970s ended with a consolidation of workers, the church and the opposition, 
and the PUWP experienced a profound crisis. Already in early 1980, Jaroszewicz 
lost his position, being blamed for the economic decline. Facing mass protests 
in the summer of the same year, the vulnerable leadership agreed to twenty-one 
demands formulated by Solidarity, thereby confirming its legal existence. The 
event triggered the replacement of Gierek and his closest collaborators such as 
Wrzaszczyk and Szydlak. Kania acquired the first secretary position, acting (as 
is often stressed) under the influence of Jaruzelski, who took over the prime min-
ister’s office in early 1981 and after a few months became head of the PUWP. 
After a party convention in July 1981, only four previous members remained in 
the politburo and none of the ministers from Jaroszewicz’s government secured 
their positions. The critical economic situation also affected the regional party 
apparatuses and the managerial elite, preventing these groups from initiating new 
investments or even modernising and completing old ones. Similarly, widely mar-
ginalised leading experts retreated from political life to academia, as in the case of 
Pajestka; emigrated to the West, as in the case of Rurarz; or joined the opposition, 
as in the case of Bratkowski. Between 1980 and 1981, a period described as the 
“carnival of Solidarity”, over 300,000 members officially left the PUWP. 
The events in Poland in 1980 caused not only an internal crisis among the 
socialist elite but also a deterioration in Polish relations with both the East and 
the West. On the one hand, since the rise of Solidarity a threat of a Warsaw Pact 
intervention in Poland hung over the PUWP leadership. On the other hand, from 
the Western European perspective, the consolidation of the opposition challenged 
the policy of close cooperation with the socialist leadership. From the summer of 
1980, Western states maintained relations with both the official Polish representa-
tives and the opposition, regarding Poland as the ‘sick man of the socialist bloc’
which could be used to undermine socialist unity. 134 The tragic financial situation 
resulted in the launch of multilateral talks concerning rescheduling Polish debts in 
Paris and London clubs gathering the creditors. Facing these institutions in March 
1981, Polish representatives declared that the country was insolvent.135 
The new circumstances terminated the peaceful coexistence as envisaged by 
the Polish leadership in the early 1970s and put a radically polarised choice in 
front of Poland. The introduction of martial law in 1981 epitomised a short turn 
towards the East, which hardly helped the domestic situation. Economic support 
from Moscow was limited, and the suspension of foreign debt repayments further 
aggravated the economic situation. The socialist elite was left in no doubt that the 
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 Conclusions 
The ambition of the leadership in the early years of the 1970s plays a paramount 
role in understanding of the subsequent developments in socialist Poland. In fact, 
the scale of the confidence underlying the agenda at the beginning of the decade 
was in proportion to the scale of the crisis which ended it. In the early 1980s, 
unlike in the late 1960s, the accelerating problems could hardly be resolved with 
personnel replacements in the party and the government. Poland’s dependence 
on both the West and the East and the rise of civil society permanently limited 
leadership’s room for independent manoeuvre. Moreover, the socialist elite never 
recovered from internal decomposition caused not only by the bankruptcy of the 
regime and the rise of alternative authorities but also by increasingly diversified 
views and declining confidence. Frequent personnel reshufflings characterised the 
leadership in the 1980s. Moreover, socialist Poland never pursued such an ambi-
tious economic and foreign strategy again. Gierek’s leadership was the last one 
to believe that the system could experience revival without profound economic 
reforms implying marketisation and moving further away from the Soviet model. 
In comparison with the other socialist regimes, the Polish strategy in the 1970s 
had some important particularities. The significant cultural liberalisation and the 
tolerance of dissident activity in the second half of the decade had no equivalent 
in the other socialist countries. At the same time, the Polish trajectory in the 1970s 
shares some important similarities with the GDR and Hungary, where the ruling 
elites also focused on rising living standards and consumption. All three – Hungary 
with its special economic system and unreformed Poland and the GDR – found 
themselves on the edge of economic collapse at the end of the 1970s. With debts 
exceeding $22 billion in 1980 – more than Hungary’s and the GDR’s debts com-
bined – and with Solidarity disqualifying the possibility of introducing austerity 
measures as in Romania, Poland was the only socialist state to default.136 
Assessments of Polish policy in the 1970s vary between two positions. Accord-
ing to most contemporary Polish historians, the agenda was misplaced and rooted 
in the incompetence and short-term thinking of the Polish socialist elite. In con-
trast, the participants in the events, including politicians and experts, instead 
blame external factors and the lack of central coordination of economic matters. 
The answer to this dilemma lies in the middle. On the one hand, the Polish leader-
ship successfully tackled some challenges of the 1970s such as the demographic 
boom, modernised Poland’s industry on a scale incomparable with the 1960s 
and 1980s and effectively participated in easing Cold War tensions. Moreover, 
Gierek’s policy mirrored the modernisation efforts and credit practices not only 
of other socialist states but also of other peripheral countries around the world. 
In the case of Poland, however, the strategy was characterised by overconfidence 
and misinterpretation. Assumptions regarding the termination of the Cold War 
underlying the ambitious planning of the early 1970s and expectations concerning 
the consequences of the oil crisis and Western European integration accelerated 
the negative outcomes of the decade. As the leadership nevertheless continued the 
policy of the early 1970s, the external factors were not the only ones to blame for 
the regime’s evident decline in the early 1980s and fall at the end of the decade. 
  
   
 








   
  
   
 














   
 
 







98 Aleksandra Komornicka 
Notes 
1 For general studies on Poland’s history in the 1970s, see Kemp-Welch,  Poland under com-
munism, 180–236; Paczkowski, The spring will be ours, 351–410; Eisler,  Czterdzieści
pięć lat , 287–352.
2 E.g. Paczkowski, Revolution and counterrevolution in Poland; Friszke, Rewolucja 
Solidarności 1980–1981; Eisler,  Grudzień 1970. On critiques of this approach and 
the cultural turn in Polish historiography, see Fidelis, “Pleasures and perils of socialist 
modernity,” 1–12; Zaremba and Brzostek, “Polska 1956–1976,” 25–37. 
3 On Gomułka, see Prażmowska, Władysław Gomułka; Eisler,  Siedmiu Wspaniałych, 
167–252. On Poland in 1956, see Machcewicz, Rebelious satelite; Skrzypek, Dyplo-
matyczne dzieje PRL , 15–97. 
4 Jarosz, “The collectivization of agriculture in Poland,” 113. 
5 Skrzypek, Mechanizmy autonomii , 65–312. 
6 Jasiński, Bliżej centrum czy na peryferiach? , 231. 
7 Archiwum Akt Nowyth (AAN – Central Archives of Modern Records), KC PZPR 
1354, III/51, “Stenogram XI plenarnego posiedzenia KC PZPR” (Minutes of the 11th 
PUWP Plenary Session), 27–28 February 1968, 304. 
8 Kansikas, Socialist countries face the European Community, 59–92; See Chapter 3 by 
Pál Germuska in this book. 
9 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, XI/186, “Stenogram narady członków BP i sekretariatu KC z 
I sekretarzami KW i kierownikami wydzałów KC oraz członków Rady Ministrów i 
Prezydium Komisji Planowania” (Minutes of the PUWP and government meeting), 
16 April 1970, 256. 
10 On Poland and FRG, see Stokłosa, Polen und die deutsche Ostpolitik ; Jarząbek, Pol-
ska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa. 
11 Jarząbek, “Hope and reality,” 6. 
12 Namiotkiewicz, Byłem sekretarzem Gomułki, 80; Tejchma,  Pożegnanie z władzą , 81 
and 89; Bobrowski, “Na to nas nie stać . . .,” 190–1. 
13 On 1968 in Poland, see Eisler, “March 1968 in Poland,” 237–52; Stola,  Kampania 
antysyjonistyczna w Polsce 1967–1968. 
14 Szumiło, “Pomarcowa wymiana kadr-elita PZPR w latach 1968–1970,” 528. 
15 On Gierek, see Eisler,  Siedmiu Wspaniałych , 253–312. 
16 Dwilewicz, “Reformy Bolesława Jaszczuka,”107. 
17 Rakowski, Dzienniki 1958–1962, 124; Rakowski, Dzienniki 1969–1971, 266; Rurarz, 
Byłem doradcą Gierka , 113. 
18 Rakowski, Dzienniki 1969–1971 , 52. 
19 Józef Pajestka, “O społeczno-kulturową koncepcję motoryzacji,” Polityka 2 (1969): 3. 
20 Józef Pajestka, “Problemy polityki strukturalnej konsumpcji na obecnym etapie roz-
woju,” Nowe Drogi 10:245 (1969): 12–29; Józef Pajestka, “Smalec czy garsonka?,” 
Polityka 38 (1969): 1 and 5. 
21 See the summary of the debate: “Kierunki kształtowania struktury konsumpcji,” 
Życie Gospodarcze 10–11:964–5 (1970): 2–4. 
22 E.g. Józef Pajestka, “Na nowym etapie postępu,” Życie gospodarcze 22:872 (1968). 
23 Włodzimierz Wowczuk, ‘Japonia. Kulisy dynamicznego rozwoju’,  Życie Gospodar-
cze 14:864 (1968): 11. 
24 Marian Naszkowski, “Na widowni międzynarodowej,” Nowe Drogi 10:233 (1968): 114;
Marian Naszkowski, “Na widowni międzynarodowej,” Nowe Drogi 3:238 (1969): 40;
Marian Naszkowski, “Na widowni międzynarodowej,” Nowe Drogi 4:239 (1969): 65.
25 Marian Naszkowski, “Na widowni międzynarodowej,” 9:256 (1970): 74. 
26 Westad, “Beginnings of the end,” 68–81. 
27 Eisler, Grudzień 1970 , 59. 
28 For debates on Gierek’s arrival in power, see Szumiło, “Rozmowy Edwarda Gierka,” 
315–36; Eisler,  Grudzień 1970 , 282–93. 
 
 
















   
 
  









   
 
 
   







Poland: ‘Economic Miracle’ to ‘Sick Man’ 99 
29 Szumiło, “Kierownictwo PZPR w latach 1971–1980,” 32. 
E.g. “Poland’s new leader,” New York Times, 21 December 1970, 15; Adam Bromke,
“Beyond the Gomulka era,” Foreign Affairs 49:3 (1971): 480–90; Adam Bromke, “Poland
under Gierek. A new political style,”  Problems of Communism 21:5 (1972): 1–19.
31 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/91, “Wnioski w sprawie aktywizacji funkcji Sejmu” (calls 
for increase in parliamentary activity), 25 January 1971. 
32 E.g. AAN, URM 290, 5.4/22, “Projekt rozporządzenia Rady Ministrów w sprawie 
zakresu działania Ministra Handlu Zagranicznego i jego uprawnień w dziedzinie 
koordynacji stosunków gospodarczych z zagranicą” (draft decision concerning com-
petences of the Minister of Foreign Trade), 9 July 1971. 
33 Bożyk, Apokalipsa według Pawła, 34; Waszczuk,  Biografia niezlustrowana , 33. 
34 Dwilewicz, “Rola ekspertów,” 7–46. 
See Chapter 7 by Elitza Stanoeva and Chapter 3 by Pál Germuska in this book. 
36 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/100, “Główne propozycje, zadania i problem projektu 
planu 5-letniego na lata 1971–1975-plan podstawowy” (main tasks of five-year plan), 
Planning Commission, accepted by the politburo, 15 February 1972, 4. 
37 E.g. Dwilewicz, “Polityka gospodarcza,” 333–53; Jarząbek, “Polish economic pol-
icy,” 298. 
38 “Główne propozycje,” 14. 
39 Council of State decision no. 203, 20 July 1972, accessed February 2020, http:// 
prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU19720290203/O/D19720203.pdf . 
Rurarz, Byłem doradcą , 157. 
41 Rurarz, Byłem doradcą , 162-3. 
42 Zdzisław Rurarz, “Przesłanki przyspieszonego rozwoju kraju,” Nowe Drogi 10:281 
(1972): 137. 
43 “Główne propozycje,” 3. 
44 AAN, URM 290, 5.4/20, “Zamierzenia w zakresie polityki licencyjnej w latach 
1971–1975 na tle dotychczasowych wyników wykorzystania zakupów licencyjnych 
w krajach kapitalistycznych” (plans concerning license policy), Committee of Sci-
ence and Technology, accepted by the government, 14 May 1971. 
“Główne propozycje,” 17. 
46  Eisler, Czterdzieści pięć lat , 293. 
47 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, XIA/1172, “Koncepcje Rozwoju Gospodarczego Polski w
latach 1971–1995” (concepts of Poland’s economic development), Rurarz’s report for
Gierek, 24.
48  AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/90, “Protokół nr 24 posiedzenia Biura Politycznego” (Pro-
tocol from the politburo meeting), 29 December 1970, 3. 
49 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/92, “Notatka w sprawie kierunkowych założeń rozwoju gos-
podarki narodowej w latach 1971–1975” (memo on the direction of Poland’s economic
development), Planning Commission, accepted by the politburo, 16 April 1971, 9.
 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/93, Gomułka’s letter to PUWP Central Committee, 27 
March 1971, 25. 
51  Kostikow and Roliński, Widziane z Kremla , 152. 
52 On Poland and the Soviet Union in the 1970s, see Szumski, “Leonid Brezhnev and 
Edward Gierek,” 253–86; Borodziej, “Polskie peryferie polityki,” 51–72; Skrzypek, 
Mechanizmy klientelizmu , 119–221. 
53  “Notatka w sprawie kierunkowych,” 8. 
54 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/90, “Podstawowe założenia projektu Narodowego Planu 
Gospodarczego na 1971” (economic plan proposal), Planning Commission, accepted 
by the politburo, 30 October 1970, 3. 
AAN, KC PZPR 1354, XIA/415, “Dyskusja na posiedzeniu Komisji Partyjno-
Rządowej d/s usprawnienia gospodarki narodowej” (Minutes from the Commission 




   
 
   
   
   
   
 
  











   
 
 
   
   
 
 
   
   
 
 
   
   
   
100 Aleksandra Komornicka 
56 Rurarz, Byłem doradcą , 82–4. 
57 Bożyk, Marzenia i rzeczywistość, 221; Rurarz, Byłem doradcą , 83. 
58 Kramer, “The Czechoslovak crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine,” 169. 
59  AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/100, “Protokół nr 11 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego” 
(Protocol from the politburo meeting), 28 February 1972, 2. 
60 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, XIA/337, ‘Stenogram z posiedzenia komisji zjazdowej” 
(Minutes from Congress Commission meeting), 23 July 1971, 51. 
61 On propaganda in the 1970s, see Zaremba, “Propaganda sukcesu,” 22–32. 
62 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/92, “Kierunki działania Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych 
na rok 1971” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs guidelines for 1971), accepted by the polit-
buro, 11 May 1971, 12–21 and 25–7. 
63 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/91, “Pilna notatka” (Memo on diplomatic visits), Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, accepted by the politburo, 2 March 1971. 
64  AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/120, “Węzłowe kierunki i zadania polityki zagranicznej 
PRL w 1974” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs guidelines for 1974), accepted by the polit-
buro, 15 January 1974, 3. 
65  Mazur, Propagandowy obraz świata , 179–80. 
66 E.g. Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (AMWZ – Archive of the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs), Dep. IV, 27/77, w.10, “Program pracy na 1971” (work 
plan for 1971), March 1971, 3; Jerzy Sułek, “Prognoza rozwoju Europy w latach 
siedemdziesiątych,” Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 3:250 (1973): 104–10. 
67 E.g. Janusz Gołębiowski, “Socjaldemokracja a problemy współczesności,” Nowe 
Drogi, 12:283 (1972): 76–85. 
68  Jan Główczyk, “Przesłanki europejskiej współpracy gospodarczej,” Polska Prasa, 
10 (1972): 9; Mieczysław Rakowski, “Szanse na wielki pokój,” Nowe Drogi , 11:282 
(1972): 69; AMSZ, Dep. IV, 27/77, w.10, “Perspektywiczny plan działania w sto-
sunku do krajów Europy Zachodniej” (prospective plan concerning Western Europe), 
9 July 1971, 1. 
69 Frelek, Historia zimnej wojny , 24. 
70  Gierek and Rolicki, Przerwana dekada , 105. 
71 On relations between the PUWP and the church in the 1970s, see Pawlicka,  Polityka 
władz wobec kościoła katolickiego; Dudek and Gruz, Komuniści i Kościół , 277–350. 
72 Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia? , 486–7. 
73 Paczkowski, The spring will be ours , 351. 
74 “Tabela obrotów handlu zagranicznego” in  Rocznik statystyczny 1976 , 333. 
75 Bożyk, Marzenia i rzeczywistość , 101. 
76  Machcewicz, “Materiały: Polityka Zagraniczna PRL w roku 1975,” 120. 
77 On bilateral relations with Western European states see, e.g., Jarosz and Pasztor, 
Polska-Francja, 1970–1980. Relacje wyjątkowe?; Tavani, “Muddling through the 
European bloc system,” 147–68; On FRG and Poland, see Stokłosa, Polen und die 
deutsche Ostpolitik; Jarząbek, Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa. On Polish foreign 
policy in specific years, see the introductions to volumes Polskie Dokumenty Dyp-
lomatyczne (Polish Diplomatic Documents) published by Polski Instytut Spraw 
Międzynarodowych (Polish Institute of International Affairs); On diplomacy in the 
1970s in general, see Skrzypek, Dyplomatyczne dzieje PRL , 188–302. 
78 E.g. Życie Warszawy, 3 October 1972, 2. 
79 Bożyk, Marzenia i rzeczywistość, 35 and 46; Pajestka, Polski kryzys, 52; Rurarz, 
Byłem doradcą , 63. 
80  Kostikow and Roliński, Widziane z Kremla , 171. 
81 The UK National Archives (TNA), FCO 28/1931, “The Polish economy,” Fretwell’s 
report from Warsaw, 27 September 1972, 6. 
82 AMSZ, Dep. IV, 27/77, w.11, Staniszewski to Paszek, 29 June 1971. 
83 E.g. AMSZ, Dep. IV, 27/77, w.11, Olszowski to Jaroszewicz, 7 August 1971. 
 
   
 
   
 
 
   
   
   
   
   





   
   
  
  
   
  
   
  
    
 









Poland: ‘Economic Miracle’ to ‘Sick Man’ 101 
84 Kansikas, “Room to manoeuvre?,” 200–2; See Chapter 3 by Pál Germuska in this 
book. 
 “Kierunki działania,” 20–1. 
86 AAN, URM 290, KT 75/8, “Notatka w sprawie kredytów na import z krajów kapi-
talistycznych rozwiniętych w okresie 1972–1975” (memo on credits from capitalist 
states), Ministry of Foreign Trade, February 1972, 10. 
87 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/101, “Wstępne poglądy strony polskiej w sprawie sto-
sunków pomiędzy RWPG i krajami EWG” (on attitudes towards EEC-CMEA rela-
tions), Ministry of Foreign Trade, accepted by the politburo, 14 March 1972, 12. 
88  Romano, “Untying Cold War knots,” 153–73. 
89 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/93, “Zasady polityki kredytowej w zakresie obrotów 
płatniczych z zagranicą w latach 1971–1975” (report on credit policy), Planning 
Commission, accepted by the politburo and government, July 1971, 8. 
AMSZ, Dep. IV, 20/79, w.11, “Plan pracy na 1974” (work plan for 1974), December 
1973, 3. 
91 AAN, URM 290, 5.4/71, “Podstawowe zasady koordynacji planów z krajami RWPG 
na lata 1976–1980” (report on coordination of planning between CMEA countries), 
Planning Commission, accepted by the government, January 1974, 1. 
92 AAN, URM 290, 5.4/71, “Informacja w sprawie podstawowych problemów real-
izacji NPSG w 1974 roku” (report on problems with fulfilling five-year plan), Plan-
ning Commission, accepted by the government, 5 February 1974, 9. 
93 E.g. AAN, URM 290, 5.4/71, “Zapis przebiegu obrad posiedzenia Prezydium Rządu” 
(minutes from government meeting,) 8 February 1974, 86–106. 
94 AMSZ, Dep. IV, 46/77, w.10, “Pilna notatka dotycząca militarnych aspketów funk-
cjonowania EWG” (memo on military aspects of the EEC), Jaruzelski, 2 April
1972.
 “Informacja w sprawie,” 9–10. 
96 Bień, Jak doszło do zadłużenia Polski, 18-24; Rurarz, Byłem doradcą , 75. 
97 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/110, “Skrót wypowiedzi F. Szlachcica na posiedzeniu Biura 
Politycznego” (Szlachci’s speech during the politburo meeting,) 11 December 1972, 
2–3. 
98 Barcikowski, U szczytów władzy, 65; Gierek and Rolicki, Przerwana dekada, 162; 
Tejchma,  Kulisy dymisji , 132. 
99 Rurarz, Byłem doradcą , 131–71. 
On WOG, see Slay, The Polish economy , 36–42. 
101 Kotowicz-Jawor, Presja inwestycyjna. For other authors describing the phenomenon, 
see Balcerowicz, Przetarg planistyczny ; Kuczyński, Po wielkim skoku. 
102 E.g. AAN, URM 290, 5.4/72, “Zapis przebiegu obrad posiedzenia Prezydium Rządu” 
(minutes from the government meeting), 1 March 1974, 41–52. 
103 “Skrót wypowiedzi,” 11 December 1972, 3. 
104 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/110, “Uchwała Biura Politycznego KC PZPR o zasadach 
koordynacji i organizacji stosunków PRL z zagranicą” (decision concerning the coor-
dination of foreign relations), December 1972. 
Rakowski, Dzienniki, 1972–1975, 163; Tejchma,  Odszedł Gomułka, 133; Waszczuk, 
Biografia niezlustrowana , 64. 
106 Gierek and Rolicki, Przerwana dekada, 84; Rakowski, Dzienniki, 1979–1981 , 30. 
107 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/131, “Podstawowe założenia społeczno-gospodarczego roz-
woju kraju 1976–1980” (five-year plan proposal), Planning Commission, accepted by 
the politburo and government, 6 June 1975. 
108 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/134, “Węzłowe kierunki i zadania polityki zagranicznej w 
1976 r.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs guidelines for 1976), accepted by the politburo, 
January 1976. 
109 Tejchma, Kulisy dymisji , 221. 
   
  
   
 
  

















   
  
  
   







102 Aleksandra Komornicka 
110 On the events of 1976, see Kemp-Welch,  Poland under communism, 206–36; 
Zaremba, “Upalny czerwiec 1976,” 106–19. 
111 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, XIA/486, “Możliwości i warunki kontynuacji strategii 
dynamicznego rozwoju Polski w latach 1977–1980” (report on strategy of dynamic 
development), Planning Commission and Bożyk’s team for Gierek, 20 October 1976. 
112 E.g. AAN, URM 290, 5.4/135, “Zapis przebiegu obrad posiedzenia Prezydium 
Rządu” (minutes from the government meeting), 18 February 1977, 22–78. 
 113 E.g. Das Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PA/AA), BA63/122531, “Ver-
schuldungssituation Polens,” 21 August 1978; Centre des Archives diplomatiques de 
la Courneuve (CADC) 1929/4594, “Relations économique franco-polonaises, Minis-
tre de l’Economie,” 14 September 1978; Mourlon-Druol, “The role of a creditor in the 
making of a debt crisis.” 
 114 Lipski, KOR ; Skórzyński, Siła bezsilnych. 
115 E.g. AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/139, “Pilna notatka dotycząca rezultatów oficjalnej wiz-
yty w W. Brytanii Prezesa Rady Ministrów Piotra Jaroszewicza” (memo on Jarosze-
wicz’s visit to the UK), 18 December 1976, 4; AAN, KC PZPR 1354, XIA/662, “Pilna
Notatka z oficjalnej wizyty we Francji I Sekretarza Komitetu Centralnego PZPR, Tow.
Edwarda Gierka” (memo of Gierek’s visit to France), 17 September 1977, 19. 
 116 Jarząbek, “A trap and a chance,” 150–60. 
 117 Rakowski, Dzienniki, 1976–1978 , 220. 
 118 Rakowski, Dzienniki 1976–1978, 199, 301 and 440; Rakowski, Dzienniki, 1979– 
1981, 21, 42 and 46. 
 119 Lüthi, “Drifting apart,” 382. 
120 Majewski, “Polityka zagraniczna PRL w roku 1977,” 115–17. 
121 Romano, “Untying Cold War knots,” 15–7. 
122 See Chapter 1 by Federico Romero in this book. 
123 Rakowski, Dzienniki 1976–1978 , 416. 
124 Rakowski, Dzienniki 1976–1978 , 398. 
125 Pawłow,  Generał Pawłow, 84–5; Rakowski, Dzienniki 1976–1978 , 292–3. 
126 Rakowski, Dzienniki, 1979–1981 , 141. 
127 Kozłowski, Raporty dla Edwarda Gierka , 192. 
128 Bień, Jak doszło do zadłużenia Polski, 80–1; Karcz, Zadłużenie zagraniczne Polski, 
29 and 57–8. 
129 AMSZ, Dep. IV, 1/83, w.17, “Stanowisko Polski wobec projektu porozumienia RWPG-
EWG” (Polish attitude to EEC-CMEA agreement), Rurarz, 14 November 1977. 
130 AMSZ, ZD, 24/79, w.11, Olszowski to Gierek, 17 March 1977 in Majewski,  Polskie 
dokumenty dyplomatyczne 1977 , 234–6. 
131 Kubik, The power of symbols , 31–74. 
132 Kubik, The power of symbols, 129–52; Zaremba, “Karol Wojtyła,” 317–36. 
133 E.g. Ash, The Polish Revolution, 13–34. Staniszkis, Poland’s self-limiting , 150–88. 
134 Rakowski, Dzienniki, 1979–1981 , 130. 
135 Although Poland declared default, the creditors did not proclaim it officially insol-
vent. See Bartel, “Fugitive leverage.” 
136 See Chapter 5 by Maximilian Graf and Chapter 3 by Pál Germuska in this book. 
Bibliography 
Published primary sources 
Polskie dokumenty dyplomatyczne 1977, edited by Piotr M. Majewski, Warszawa: Polski 
Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2009. 
Raporty dla Edwarda Gierka, edited by Krzysztof Kozłowski, Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnic-






























Poland: ‘Economic Miracle’ to ‘Sick Man’ 103 
 Secondary sources 
Ash, Timothy Garton.  The Polish Revolution: Solidarity. London: Jonathan Cape, 1983. 
Balcerowicz, Ewa. Przetarg planistyczny: mechanizmy i skutki społeczno-gospodarcze. 
Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1990. 
Barcikowski, Kazimierz. U szczytów władzy. Warszawa: Projekt, 1998. 
Bartel, Fritz. “Fugitive leverage: commercial banks, sovereign debt, and Cold War crisis in 
Poland, 1980–1982.” Enterprise & Society 18:1 (2017): 72–107. 
Bień, Witold. Jak doszło do zadłużenia Polski za granicą w latach 1970–1985. Wspomnie-
nia uczestnika wydarzeń. Warszawa: Difin, 2017. 
 Bobrowski, Czesław. “Na to nas nie stać. . . .” In Władysław Gomułka we wspomnieniach, 
edited by Bronisław Syzdek, 184–96. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, 1989. 
 Borodziej, Włodzimierz. “Polskie peryferie polityki zagranicznej Związku Radzieckiego-
lata siedemdziesiąte.” In Modernizacja. Centrum. Peryferie. Księga jubileuszowa z okazji
70. Rocznicy urodzin Profesora Ryszarda Stemplowskiego, edited by Włodzimierz Boro-
dziej and Sławomir Dębski, 51–72. Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych,
2009. 
Bożyk, Paweł. Marzenia i rzeczywistość, czyli anatomia polskiego kryzysu. Warszawa: 
Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1983. 
Bożyk, Paweł. Apokalipsa według Pawła. Jak zniszczono nasz kraj? Wrocław: Wektory, 2015.
Dudek, Antoni and Ryszard Gruz.  Komuniści i Kościół w Polsce 1945–1989. Kraków: 
Znak, 2003. 
Dwilewicz, Łukasz. “Polityka gospodarcza, a spokój społeczny. Posunięcia władz partyjnych
i państwowych od grudnia 1970 r do grudnia 1971.” In Gospodarka i społeczeństwo w 
czasach PRL-u, edited by Elżbieta Kościk and Tomasz Głowiński, 333–53. Wrocław: 
Gajt, 2007. 
Dwilewicz, Łukasz. “Rola ekspertów w zarządzaniu gospodarką PRL w latach
siedemdziesiątych.” Studia Polityczne 24 (2009): 7–46. 
Dwilewicz, Łukasz. “Reformy Bolesława Jaszczuka i polityka gospodarcza ekipy
gierkowskiej- zwrot i ciągłość.” In Dekada Gierka. Wnioski dla obecnego okresu mod-
ernizacji Polski, edited by Krzysztof Rybiński, 73–120. Warszawa: Wyższa Szkoła 
Ekonomiczno-Informatyczna, 2011. 
Eisler, Jerzy.  Grudzień 1970. Geneza, przebieg, konsekwencje. Warszawa: Sensacje XX 
wieku, 2000. 
Eisler, Jerzy. “March 1968 in Poland.” In  1968: the world transformed, edited by Carole 
Fink, Philipp Gassert and Detlef Junker, 237–52. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013. 
Eisler, Jerzy.  Siedmiu wspaniałych. Poczet pierwszych sekretarzy KC PZPR. Warszawa: 
Czerwone i Czarne, 2014. 
Eisler, Jerzy.  Czterdzieści pięć lat, które wstrząsnęło Polską. Historia polityczna PRL. 
Warszawa: Czerwone i Czarne, 2018. 
 Fidelis, Małgorzata. “Pleasures and perils of socialist modernity: new scholarship on post-
war Eastern Europe.” Contemporary European History 25:4 (2016): 1–12. 
 Friszke, Andrzej. Rewolucja Solidarności 1980–1981. Kraków: Znak, 2014. 
Gierek, Edward and Bohdan Rolicki. Przerwana dekada. Warszawa: Fakt, 1990. 
Jarosz, Dariusz. “The collectivization of agriculture in Poland: causes of defeat.” In The col-
lectivisation of agriculture in communist Eastern Europe, edited by Constantin Iordachi 
and Arnd Bauerkämper, 113–46. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014. 
Jarosz, Dariusz and Maria Pasztor.  Polska-Francja, 1970–1980. Relacje wyjątkowe?






























104 Aleksandra Komornicka 
Jarząbek, Wanda. “Hope and reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe, 1964–1989.” Working Paper No. 56. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson 
International Centre for Scholars, 2008. 
Jarząbek, Wanda. Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa wobec polityki wschodniej Repub-
liki Federalnej Niemiec w latach 1966–1976: wymiar dwustronny i międzynarodowy. 
Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2011. 
Jarząbek, Wanda. “Polish economic policy at the time of détente.”  European Review of 
History 21:2 (2014): 293–309. 
Jarząbek, Wanda. “A trap and a chance: Basket III, dissidents and state authorities in Com-
munist Poland.” In Human Rights in Europe during the Cold War, edited by Rasmus 
Mariagerm Karl Molin and Kjersti Brathagen, 150–60. Abingdon: Routledge, 2014. 
Jasiński, Leszek. Bliżej centrum czy na peryferiach? Polskie kontakty gospodarcze z 
zagranicą w XX wieku. Warszawa: Trio, 2011. 
Kansikas, Suvi. “Room to manoeuvre? National interests and coalition-building in the 
CMEA, 1969–75.” In Reassessing Cold War Europe, edited by Sari Autio-Sarasmo and 
Katalin Mikló ssy, 193–209. Abingdon, Routledge, 2011. 
Kansikas, Suvi. Socialist countries face the European Community: Soviet-bloc controver-
sies over East-West trade. New York: Peter Lang, 2014. 
Karcz, Zbigniew.  Zadłużenia zagraniczne Polski. Gra o miliardy. Kiedy do Euro?
Warszawa: Difin, 2006. 
 Kemp-Welch, Anthony. Poland under communism: a Cold War history. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2008. 
Kramer, Mark. “The Czechoslovak crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine.” In  1968: the world 
transformed, edited by Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert and Detlef Junker, 111–71. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Kostikow, Piotr and Bohdan Roliński. Widziane z Kremla, Moskwa-Warszawa. Gra o 
Polskę. Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1992. 
Kotowicz-Jawor, Joanna.  Presja inwestycyjna w latach siedemdziesiątych. Warszawa: 
Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1983. 
Kubik, Jan. The power of symbols against the symbols of power: the rise of Solidarity and 
the fall of state socialism in Poland. University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 
1994. 
Kuczyński, Waldemar. Po wielkim skoku. Warszawa: NOWA, 1979. 
Lipski, Jan Józef. KOR: a history of the Workers Defense Committee in Poland, 1976– 
1981. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 
Lüthi, Lorenz M. “Drifting apart: Soviet energy and the cohesion of the communist bloc in 
the 1970s and 1980s.” In Cold War energy: a transnational history of Soviet oil and gas, 
edited by Jeronim Perović, 371–400. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 
Machcewicz, Paweł. Rebelious satelite: Poland 1956. Translated by Maya Latynski. 
Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2009. 
 Machcewicz, Paweł. “Materiały: Polityka Zagraniczna PRL w roku 1975.”  Polski Przegląd 
Dyplomatyczny 4:62 (2011): 119–52. 
Majewski, Piotr. “Polityka zagraniczna PRL w roku 1977.”  Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny
52:6 (2010): 108–38. 
Mazur, Mariusz.  Propagandowy obraz świata. Polityczne kampanie prasowe w PRL 1956– 
1980. Warszawa: Trio, 2003. 
Mourlon-Druol, Emmanuel. “The role of a creditor in the making of a debt crisis: the French






























Poland: ‘Economic Miracle’ to ‘Sick Man’ 105 
constraints, 1958–1971.” Financial History Review (2020): 1–22. Accessed 18 March 
2020.  https://doi.org/10.1017/S0968565019000222 . 
 Namiotkiewicz, Walery. Byłem sekretarzem Gomułki. Warszawa: Comandor, 2002. 
 Paczkowski, Andrzej. The spring will Be ours: Poland and the Poles from occupation to free-
dom. Translated by Jane Cave. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003.
 Paczkowski, Andrzej. Revolution and counterrevolution in Poland 1980–1989: Solidar-
ity, martial law, and the end of communism in Europe. Translated by Christina Manetti. 
Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2015. 
Pajestka, Józef. Polski kryzys, 1980–1981. Jak to do niego doszło i co rokuje? Warszawa: 
Książka i Wiedza, 1981. 
Pawlicka, Katarzyna. Polityka władz wobec kościoła katolickiego: grudzień 1970-
październik 1978. Warszawa: Trio, 2004. 
Pawłow, Witalij. Generał Pawłow: byłem rezydentem KGB w Polsce. Warszawa: Oficyna 
Wydawnicza BGW, 1994. 
Prażmowska, Anita. Władysław Gomułka a biography. London: I.B. Tauris, 2015. 
 Rakowski, Mieczysław.  Dzienniki polityczne 1958–1962. Warszawa: Iskry, 1998. 
 Rakowski, Mieczysław.  Dzienniki polityczne 1969–1971. Warszawa: Iskry, 2001. 
 Rakowski, Mieczysław.  Dzienniki polityczne, 1972–1975. Warszawa: Iskry, 2002. 
 Rakowski, Mieczysław,  Dzienniki polityczne, 1976–1978. Warszawa: Iskry, 2002. 
Romano, Angela. “Untying Cold War knots: the European Community and Eastern Europe 
in the long 1970s.” Cold War History 14:2 (2014): 153–73. 
 Rurarz, Zdzisław.  Byłem doradcą Gierka. Chicago: Andy Grafik, 1990. 
Skórzyński, Jan. Siła bezsilnych. Historia Komitetu Obrony Robotników. Warszawa: Świat 
Książki, 2012. 
 Skrzypek, Andrzej. Mechanizmy autonomii: stosunki polsko-radzieckie 1956–65. Pułtusk: 
Akademia Humanistyczna im. A. Gieysztora, 2008. 
 Skrzypek, Andrzej. Mechanizmy klientelizmu. Stosunki polsko-radzieckie 1964–1989. 
Pułtusk: Akademia Humanistyczna im. A. Gieysztora, 2008. 
 Skrzypek, Andrzej. Dyplomatyczne dzieje PRL w latach 1956–1989. Pułtusk: Akademia 
Humanistyczna im. A. Gieysztora, 2010. 
Slay, Ben.  The Polish economy: crisis, reform, and transformation. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994. 
Staniszkis, Jadwiga. Poland’s self-limiting revolution. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984. 
Stokłosa, Katarzyna. Polen und die deutsche Ostpolitik 1945–1990. Göttingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 2011. 
Stola, Dariusz. Kampania antysyjonistyczna w Polsce 1967–1968. Warszawa: Instytut 
Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2000. 
Stola, Dariusz. Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski 1949–1989. Warszawa: Instytut 
Pamięci Narodowej, 2010. 
Szumiło, Mirosław. “Rozmowy Edwarda Gierka z dyplomatami sowieckimi w latach 
1963–1965 (dokumenty odnalezione w RGASPI).” Komunizm: system, ludzie, doku-
mentacja 2 (2013): 315–36. 
Szumiło, Mirosław. “Kierownictwo PZPR w latach 1971–1980.” In  PRL na pochylni 
(1975–1980), edited by Marcin Bukała and Dariusz Iwaneczko, 30–59. Rzeszów: Insty-
tut Pamięci Narodowej, 2017. 
Szumiło, Mirosław. “Pomarcowa wymiana kadr-elita PZPR w latach 1968–1970.” In 



















106 Aleksandra Komornicka 
65 rocznicę urodzin, edited by Jan Olaszek, Antoni Dudek, Łukasz Kamiński, Krzysz-
tof Kosiński, Michał Przeperski, Konrad Rokicki, Paweł Sasanka, Robert Spałek and 
Sławomir Stępień, 514–28. Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2017. 
Szumski, Jakub. “Leonid Brezhnev and Edward Gierek: The making and breaking of an 
uneven friendship.” Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 45:3 (2018): 253–86. 
Tavani, Sara. “Muddling through the European bloc system: the evolution of Italian-Polish 
relations over the 1970s and 1980s.” In Disintegration and integration in East-Central 
Europe: 1919-post-1989, edited by Wilfried Loth and Nicolae Pãun, 147–68. Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2014. 
Tejchma, Józef.  Kulisy dymisji. Z dzienników ministra kultury. Kraków: Oficyna Cracovia, 
1991. 
Tejchma, Józef.  Pożegnanie z władzą. Warszawa: Projekt, 1998. 
Tejchma, Józef.  Odszedł Gomułka przyszedł Gierek. Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2006. 
Waszczuk, Jerzy.  Biografia niezlustrowana: zapamiętywanie czasu nieutraconego. Warszawa:
Studio Emka, 2007.
Westad, Odd Arne. “Beginnings of the end: how the Cold War crumbled.” In  Reinterpret-
ing the end of the Cold War: issues, interpretations, periodizations, edited by Silvio Pons 
and Federico Romero, 68–81. London: Frank Cass, 2011. 
Zaremba, Marcin. “Upalny czerwiec 1976.” Więź 6:512 (2001): 106–19. 
Zaremba, Marcin. “Propaganda sukcesu. Dekada Gierka.” In Propaganda w PRL, edited 
by Piotr Semków, 22–32. Gdańsk: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2004. 
Zaremba, Marcin. “Karol Wojtyła the pope: complications for comrades of the Polish 
United Workers’ Party.”  Cold War History 5:3 (2005): 317–36. 
Zaremba, Marcin and Błażej Brzostek. “Polska 1956–1976: w poszukiwaniu paradyg-








 5 Drifting Westward? East Germany 
and Integrated Europe 
 Maximilian Graf 
In spring 1983, when the German Democratic Republic (GDR) faced acute danger 
of bankruptcy, Erich Honecker’s critics in the East German leadership reported 
to Moscow that the general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands [SED]) considered the ‘European 
Community to be way ahead of the CMEA’. In their view, his position was 
‘anti-communist, false, slanderous and has to be appropriately shattered through 
a proper appraisal of the history of the CMEA and a thorough exposure of the 
imperialist EC’.1 But this was only the tip of the iceberg. For some years they had 
complained about Honecker’s economic policy, the growing dependence on the 
West and West Germany and, in their view, an increasingly ambivalent attitude 
towards the Soviet Union. Next to Honecker, the almost almighty SED secretary 
of economics, Günter Mittag, was the main target of their criticism. They even 
demanded his removal. Seeing no way of changing the course within the polit-
buro, Honecker’s critics hoped for action by the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU).2 Among them were politburo members Werner Krolikowski, 
Prime Minister Willi Stoph and, though to a varying degree, Minister of State 
Security Erich Mielke, who in the years of economic and financial crisis often 
backed Honecker’s policy in Moscow. 3 Within the GDR’s ruling circles these 
back-channel critics stayed surprisingly silent and hardly ever openly opposed the 
political course. Regarding economics, opposition was instead voiced by experts. 
However, their criticism fell on deaf ears and economic policy was not changed 
throughout the Honecker era. 
In comparison to other CMEA countries, the economic history of the GDR is 
especially well researched. It is well known who the economic decision-makers 
were, and internal conflicts have been studied in detail. At the macro level, eco-
nomic decision-making was dominated by Honecker’s ‘small circle’. This con-
sisted of the politburo members responsible for economic policy and the head of 
the State Planning Commission, Gerhard Schürer, whose influence declined in 
the Honecker era. Although officially out of office from 1973 to 1976, the most 
remarkable figure in this circle was Mittag, who also presided over the politburo’s 
FRG Working Group. 4 Foreign policy decision-making was centralised to, and at 
times even monopolised by, the secretary general and his closest advisors. Never-
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of Germany (FRG), it remains questionable whether Honecker’s critics were right 
in accusing him of a westward drift or if this policy was more a result of the unre-
solvable paradoxes of the existence of the GDR. 
Among the European socialist states, East Germany was a special case char-
acterised by several particularities. Many of these were direct consequences of 
the division of Germany. While the more prosperous FRG became a permanent 
magnet for the East German population, the Soviet Union was the most important 
political and economic partner and controller when it came to the GDR’s relations 
with the West. Therefore, Moscow and Bonn were the points of reference for the 
most exposed Warsaw Pact country. Historiography has established solid knowl-
edge of the GDR’s foreign relations, 5 but a thorough analysis of East Germany’s 
perceptions of the West and its dealings with it in the “long 1970s” is lacking. 
By combining often separated narratives on foreign policy and foreign trade, this 
chapter aims to broaden our understanding of the East German regime’s rationale 
and actions by widening the perspective to a pan-European view. 
The early 1970s brought not only a normalisation of German-German relations 
but also long-desired diplomatic recognition by the West and a sudden multiplica-
tion of international relations. Notwithstanding the centrality of the FRG in the 
East German concept of the West, this led to a far more pan-European approach 
than the common narrative centred on Bonn and Moscow suggests. Even though 
publicised SED policy documents only ranked the priority of the West after the 
socialist world and developing countries, the GDR devoted much energy to 
improving relations with it, especially with a view to reducing its dependency 
on the FRG.6 Although the GDR’s pan-European policy extended to most coun-
tries on the continent, this chapter focuses on its foreign and economic policy 
towards the European Economic Community (EEC) and its member states. Apart 
from the FRG, France, Italy and the UK became preferred partners, though the 
smaller countries mattered as well.7 Although the GDR pursued a strictly bilat-
eral approach in its relations with the West, it had to cope with the progress of 
European integration. While existing scholarship on the East German attitude to 
the EEC is mostly limited to perceptions of the integration process,8 this chapter 
investigates how the GDR dealt with the economic policies of the EEC and their 
repercussions on trade. The analysis is embedded in a broader account of how the 
East German elites perceived the role of Western Europe and the EEC in times of 
incipient globalisation, economic turbulence and détente. 
What strategies did the East German regime develop to secure its goals against 
the challenge presented by the fact that long-desired international recognition and 
growing economic cooperation also resulted in dependencies and required at least 
some opening up? How did they change when the GDR faced growing economic 
problems towards the end of the decade? We know that many East German poli-
cies constituted little more than wishful thinking, but their intent was to make the 
existence of the GDR under SED rule permanent. Hence, the leadership aimed 
at demarcation, far more regarding West Germany than the rest of the West. The 
seemingly westward drift of the GDR in the Honecker era must be placed in its 
proper historical context by stressing continuities originating in the 1960s. There-
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background. It will then examine the first half of the 1970s, a period of self-
perceived success and confidence in which foreign and domestic political con-
siderations shaped East German politics most. The third section will analyse the 
second half of the decade, when economic problems became more pressing and 
finally led to the debt crisis of the early 1980s. The conclusion emphasises how 
the East German way of surviving a severe economic crisis without fundamen-
tally changing the failed economic policy was successful in the short term but 
contributed to the collapse of the regime in 1989. 
European and German-German background 
The East German long 1970s were decisively shaped by earlier developments, 
not only by the division of Germany but also the economic path(s) chosen. The 
industrialised East German territory was cut off from the broader economic area it 
belonged to until 1945 and lacked supplies of raw materials and the sales markets 
in which it was formerly embedded. Instead, it became a centrally planned econ-
omy integrated in the socialist bloc. The founding of two German states in 1949 
was a result of the Cold War’s division of Europe and was followed by two decades 
of mutual non-recognition. However, in the economic field, strong and beneficial 
bonds persisted. Intra-German trade became a unique specialty that developed out 
of exchanges between the occupation zones. It was regulated in 1951 through the 
indefinite Berlin agreement on trade between the currency zones of East and West 
Germany, which (with modifications) remained in force until German unifica-
tion. The intentionally balanced exchange of goods was deducted in clearing units 
(Verrechnungseinheiten [VE]), with one VE equalling one deutsche mark (DM) 
and one GDR mark. Due to its nature, intra-German trade meant considerable 
economic advantages for the GDR, while the FRG pursued primarily, although 
not exclusively, political interests. There were tax benefits and no customs, and 
West Germany provided an interest-free technical loan covering the (anything but 
temporary) imbalances in the clearing account, the so-called swing.9 
The founding of the EEC did not affect intra-German trade. In a protocol 
annexed to the Rome Treaties of 1957, the member states accepted the FRG’s 
stance that trade between the two Germanies was domestic trade and did not 
require certificates of origin and was not subject to customs. Privileged access 
to the West German market made the GDR’s economic relations with the West 
unique. While the other socialist states lacked this advantage and complained 
about it, the GDR defended it regardless of broader political goals. After an initial 
decline in the first half of the 1960s, due to the Störfreimachung policy aiming 
at a reduction of economic dependence on the FRG, the trade volume increased 
towards the end of the decade. This development was facilitated by easings that 
Bonn offered on investment loans and a more generous “swing”. 10 
None of the Western countries recognised the GDR until the settling of German-
German relations with the Basic Treaty of 1972. Despite the absence of diplo-
matic relations, economic exchanges between East Germany and the West had 
never ceased, and they re-intensified in the mid-1960s. East Berlin’s political elite
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recognition. The first loan-financed investment deals with Western companies were
intended to serve this purpose. In 1970, a large railway rolling stock order amount-
ing to 800 million francs was placed in France. Paris enabled this deal by violating
the EEC credit guidelines, which were changed a little later on French request. The
next year, Mittag was invited to the French capital. East Berlin celebrated this as a
major success, although it did not lead to any progress regarding recognition.11 
The share of East German exports to the CMEA countries declined from 66.4% 
in 1965 to 59.5% in 1971 and the share of imports from 63.3% to 58.3%. How-
ever, the impact of economic decisions taken for political purposes should not 
be overestimated. In fact, the West’s increasing share in the GDR’s foreign trade 
had basic economic reasons. The USSR and the other CMEA members were not 
willing or able to provide everything the industrialised East German economy 
needed to promote its competitiveness. For example, the production of machin-
ery required new (Western) technology, and components needed to export to the 
socialist states had to be bought in the West. The CMEA Comprehensive Pro-
gramme of 1971 did not facilitate the situation, as catching-up specialisation by 
the less developed member states reduced the sales markets in the East. In the 
West, East German products became less and less marketable. Terms of trade 
worsened both in the East and West, and increased exchanges with the West 
boosting the technology level of the East German economy seemed the only way 
out of this downward spiral. Nevertheless, the GDR was well integrated in the 
CMEA market, and modernisation through economic cooperation with the West 
always aimed to reduce dependence on the West and especially West Germany in 
the long run. As Ralf Ahrens states, ‘Trade with capitalist countries was always 
a necessary evil to compensate the shortcomings of intra-COMECON trade and 
Eastern bloc economic coordination’.12 
André Steiner has demonstrated that the New Economic System reform of the 
1960s (which included some market elements, a very limited short-lived liberali-
sation of the foreign trade regime and a strategy of import-led growth labelled as 
a technology offensive) had remained within the concept of a centrally planned 
economy. It failed and was finally abandoned in 1970–71. The escalating number 
of large-scale investments exceeded the economic means of the GDR. One of the 
reasons why this was paralleled by a change of party leader in 1971 was internal 
and Soviet disagreement over the reforms and growing dependency (in the form 
of debts) on the West and West Germany. 13 
The hopeful years: recognition, cooperation and welfare 
without opening 
In May 1971, the politburo ousted First Secretary Walter Ulbricht from power, 
elected Honecker as his successor, abolished the economic reforms and returned to 
strict central planning. Following the example of the CPSU, the eighth Party Con-
gress of the SED later that year adopted the so-called Main Task, a socialist wel-
fare policy concept that was later labelled Unity of Economic and Social Policy. 
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and imports of consumer goods. The East German economy was never able to 
cover the costs. The State Planning Commission (headed by Schürer), central 
and foreign trade bankers (Grete Wittkowski, Horst Kaminsky, Helmut Dietrich, 
Werner Polze), Minister of Finance Siegfried Böhm and experts from academia 
(Helmut Koziolek, Otto Reinhold) immediately warned about the potential conse-
quences of increasing debts. In later years their chorus was joined by the Ministry 
of State Security. Apart from the issue of debt, the agency of these economic elites 
is less visible than in other CMEA countries. Economic decisions were taken in 
Honecker’s party-state small circle, and his rationale was to keep people satis-
fied (to the greatest possible extent). Hence, the policy remained unchanged even 
when the situation dramatically worsened from the mid-1970s onwards.14 
Why did criticism fall on deaf ears for so many years? Against the background of
the Polish workers’ uprising in 1970 and incipient détente, the East German leader-
ship truly believed that any worsening of living conditions was likely to destabi-
lise the regime. Among the reasons for this are the socialisation of politicians in
the interwar period, or more precisely Honecker’s distrust of his own people, 15 as
well as the spectre of another people’s uprising haunting the SED leadership since
1953. At least in retrospect, the belief that better living conditions would automati-
cally lead to improved economic performance was wishful thinking.16 Although the
policy was unaffordable in the long term, even the critical chief planner Schürer
admitted in his memoirs that the loan-financed economic and social policy created a
hopeful and more satisfied atmosphere in the first half of the 1970s, until it became
clear that servicing the debts had turned into a serious problem.17 
The rise of the Commercial Coordination division (Bereich Kommerzielle 
Koordinierung [KoKo]) operating outside the plan is proof of the leadership’s 
acknowledgement that the economic policy did not work. Founded in 1966, 
KoKo was formally part of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, but in fact it was 
closely connected to the Ministry of State Security and under the control of the 
party’s leading economic officials. The purposes of this institution, headed by 
Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, were to earn convertible currency, make West-
ern trade more flexible and solve financial crises. It gained importance throughout 
the 1970s, and in the 1980s KoKo organised Western and intra-German trade, 
reaching a share of more than 40%. Nevertheless, it acted within the economic 
policy decreed by the SED, which was not put into question.18 
Already in August 1971, the Council of Ministers regarded the balance of pay-
ments as a major problem. However, there was no easy way out. The need for 
further imports clashed with a level of debt that was regarded as unreasonable. 
The aim of increasing exports to the West clashed with export obligations to the 
CMEA countries, which secured the necessary supply of raw materials. 19 Was 
there a real economic strategy, or did the preservation of power shape policy the 
most? The consumerist turn in the early Honecker era points in the latter direction 
and reduced the available funds for innovation and the technology offensive of 
the late Ulbricht years. However, soon after this policy shift, investments in the 
East German economy continued to serve foreign trade purposes. Modernisation 
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developed into a permanent strategy. As it turned out, subsequent import sub-
stitution did not work. Investments in other sectors were too small and never 
paid back sufficiently. In a meeting of the State Planning Commission in 1972, 
Deputy Chairman Heinz Klopfer recalled that the investments were intended to 
increase exports and stated, ‘The opposite is the case. The stream of imports has 
more and more increased. In my view, this is the main reason for our current situ-
ation’.20 Although the debt was small in comparison with later years, the ratio of 
liabilities to annual export revenue was already alarming. However, in the age of 
easy access to cheap money the downside of this economic policy seemed negli-
gible, or at least far away. When criticised for increasing debts in 1972, Honecker 
remarked that he ‘did not intend to pay back the GDR’s debts within two years’. 21 
In the first half of the 1970s it seemed that global economic and financial devel-
opments might work in favour of socialism. The monetary crisis following the 
end of the Bretton Woods system, and the first oil shock of 1973 troubled the 
Western economies. Initially, the crisis was interpreted in classical ideological 
terms by academics and the party alike. The dictum of the ‘chronic contradictions 
of the imperialist system’ was in vogue again. 22 Although to the foreign trade 
ministry it was clear that economic turbulence would limit the sales markets for 
exports and worsen conditions for financing imports,23 the effects that global eco-
nomic changes would have on the GDR were hardly predicted and did not lead to 
policy changes. The oil shock can be seen in this regard. In the long run it resulted 
in high costs and massively influenced the domestic energy strategy, 24 but initially 
and throughout the 1970s the GDR profited from rising world market prices. The 
export of refinery products made from cheap Soviet crude oil increased and has 
been interpreted as a logical answer to the need to earn more hard currency. 25 
Indeed, the export of processed oil products to West Berlin was lucrative, and 
profits increased with the second oil shock in 1979.26 
However, even before the first shock, it had become clear that there would be 
no endless raw material supply from the USSR.27 In May 1973, chief planner 
Nikolai Baibakov informed the East Germans that the Soviet Union ‘had over-
extended itself’ with promises of deliveries.28 With regard to oil and rolled steel, 
this was a massive blow to the GDR’s long-term export planning. East Berlin’s 
acknowledgment that this would further increase imports from the West did not 
change the Soviet position even though the Kremlin worried about East German 
indebtedness. In August 1973, Prime Ministers Stoph and Aleksei Kosygin dis-
cussed the figures in detail. Annual payment obligations started to exceed the 
annual export earnings. This was considered the absolute maximum. Neverthe-
less, Stoph expected debt to rise further and told Kosygin that any forecast up to 
1980 depended on the raw materials supplied by the Soviet Union and the other 
CMEA countries. In a nutshell, the GDR openly admitted that without growing 
quantities of cheap raw material from the USSR, indebtedness would continue to 
rise. Only increased production with this support could counteract this develop-
ment. Kosygin remarked that the socialist countries must capitalise on the eco-
nomic chaos in the West but conceded that Moscow had no idea how this could be 
done.29 Neither had the GDR. In the age of détente, East German dealings with the 
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After twenty years of international isolation, by the early 1970s diplomatic 
recognition of the GDR in the West was under way due to the West German Neue 
Ostpolitik and the Soviet Union pushing through its own détente goals. The con-
clusion of the Basic Treaty in 1972 was a political bargain in which the GDR had 
to concede increasing contacts with the FRG and received economic benefits in 
return.30 Serving ‘the economic interests of the GDR’, as the politburo stated, 
intra-German trade remained unchanged.31 Entirely different assessments existed 
about its future development. In 1970, the Ministry of Foreign Trade expected 
a change in global economic developments in favour of the socialist world and 
anticipated a decreasing dependence on the FRG as a result of growing diversi-
fication of trade with the West. 32 In contrast, in 1973 the State Planning Com-
mission warned that the danger of economic dependency on the FRG was still 
underestimated.33 However, a turnaround was not in sight. The FRG was by far 
the most important Western trading partner and overall second only to the Soviet 
Union. While intra-German trade doubled in nominal value during the 1970s, in 
other fields the GDR aimed at a demarcation from the FRG. East Berlin refused to 
make any change to the border regime and doubled the minimum exchange rate of 
DM for West German visitors in 1973. Only economic pressure undermined this 
strategy. In 1974, after lengthy negotiations, East Berlin accepted some easing of 
the travel regime in exchange for a prolongation of the “swing”.34 Concessions 
to maintain favourable economic ties were unavoidable but no formal linkage 
was accepted. East Berlin’s attitude to the FRG remained ambivalent. It ‘oscil-
lated between cooperation and demarcation’, and sometime these antipodes could 
also coexist.35 In 1975, cooperation agreements with the West German companies 
Krupp and Hoechst were concluded (enabling loan-financed imports of steel and 
chemical plants).36 Political dialogue continued, based on the assumption that the 
division of Germany was permanent,37 but even in the heyday of détente, increas-
ing contacts across the border were not on the agenda. 
After the Basic Treaty, the EEC member states recognised East Germany and it 
was admitted to the United Nations. International recognition increased the GDR’s 
prestige, contributed to the legitimacy of its leadership and was another source of 
optimism. The GDR participated in the CSCE from the very beginning and the 
SED leaders celebrated the signing of the Final Act as the endpoint of achieving 
international recognition. Although the ministerial bureaucracy anticipated several 
potential consequences, in the mid-1970s the regime felt secure and the population 
seemed more satisfied, not least due to social and consumerist improvements. Dis-
sidence was repressed and Western influence kept out to the best possible extent. 
However, the rising number of people requesting to permanently leave East Ger-
many had been underestimated, even by the Ministry of State Security. In the long 
term, this seriously harmed the legitimacy of the SED regime.38 On the one hand, 
demarcation from the West increased. On the other, political and economic rela-
tions were about to be further developed. When the economic situation worsened, 
the GDR’s approach to East-West relations came under pressure, but it was for-
mally, though not consistently, upheld throughout the “long 1970s”. 
Apart from international recognition, the first half of the 1970s brought only 
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were signed, and state visits remained scarce.39 As always in East-West rela-
tions, economics came first. Given that intra-German trade represented the largest 
share of the GDR’s Western trade (more than 30%, and at times up to 40% and 
beyond),40 the relevance of other Western states had its limits. Aiming to create 
a counterbalance to its dependence on the FRG, the GDR tried to exploit the rest 
of the West. Those who agreed to visibly improve political relations became pre-
ferred economic partners. After recognition, some of the European neutral states 
took the lead.41 Among the EEC members, France, Italy and the UK were of most 
interest,42 but the development of economic relations was immediately influenced 
by the progress of European integration. 
In the first two post-war decades, the GDR denounced every form of West-
ern European integration as directed against the socialist camp and consistently 
argued that the project would fail due to the ‘contradictions of imperialism’. From 
the mid-1960s onwards, a more nuanced approach evolved in the state and party 
apparatus.43 In the late 1960s, the SED top level had come to terms with the EEC 
as a reality but refused to recognise it as a political entity. The Community’s 
economic efficiency and political attractiveness were acknowledged internally, 44 
although traditional ideological patterns of capitalism analysis prevailed. In 1972 
the politburo did not doubt the further progress of integration, but it expected 
enlargement in 1973 to cause conflicts among the main ‘capitalist powers’, which 
would be exacerbated by ‘cyclical crises of capitalism’.45 
Since the second half of the 1960s, the CMEA’s EEC policy had become a 
major issue in intra-bloc discussions. Facing protectionism, Romania, Hungary, 
Poland and Bulgaria had hardly any other option than to deal with the Commu-
nity to maintain the quantity of their exports. Hence, these countries aimed at 
a more flexible policy, while the Soviet Union and the GDR advocated strict 
non-recognition of the EEC.46 The East German leadership was conscious of the 
socialist states’ need for Western technology, which had to be paid for by exports, 
but it did not expect any easing from Brussels. Despite the meagre results of the 
Comprehensive Programme, the GDR demanded deeper integration of the CMEA
and a coordinated policy towards the EEC,47 a stance that sometimes brought it to 
the ‘brink of isolation’ within the socialist camp. 48 
Due to its special situation, the progress of Western integration initially affected 
the GDR less than other countries. The status quo of intra-German trade remained 
in place; for the other member states the newly recognised GDR became a third 
country. 49 Since the GDR had never stipulated a trade agreement with any of 
them, the changes resulting from the EEC’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP) 
seemed to be limited. On the contrary, the recently concluded cooperation agree-
ments with almost all the Western countries were regarded as progress. However, 
none of them was ready to violate the CCP. 50 
Nevertheless, the GDR opted for bilateralism when dealing with the EEC mem-
bers until it recognised that ignoring the Community had repercussions on trade. 
When additional charges caused losses to the export of pigs and pork to Italy and 
France in 1975, the Ministry of Foreign Trade recommended commencing tech-
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operandi from Hungary. After consultation with the responsible party units, the 
politburo regretfully concluded that a concerted action by the CMEA was no longer
possible and the GDR could only follow the path of the other member states. The 
SED accepted the advice from the state bureaucracy and approved the establish-
ment of ‘technical contacts of companies and institutions of the GDR with the 
EEC organs’. 52 While acknowledging that the GDR, like the other socialist states, 
could solve all economic questions directly with the EEC, in 1977 the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade stressed the political importance of a desired agreement between 
CMEA and EEC. 53 In an internal note, academic Hermann von Berg asked whether 
a framework agreement with the EC would not be the best solution and questioned 
if the GDR had a strategy at all. In his view, relations with the EEC were primarily 
shaped by the FRG’s stance within the Community and it was in the GDR’s interest 
that no questions regarding intra-German trade were raised during the CMEA-EEC 
negotiations. Furthermore, he wondered why the GDR was still so reluctant to con-
duct technical contacts and accepted the economic disadvantages.54 
In 1977, the implementation of the EEC’s common fisheries policy induced 
Poland, the USSR and the GDR to open direct negotiations.55 Since a substantial 
economic interest was impaired, the politburo agreed to talk to the Commission 
but insisted that this would not imply recognition of the EEC.56 The negotiations 
finally failed due to the question of the inclusion of the Berlin clause. Honecker 
personally authorised every step during the negotiations and interfered in the 
formulations regarding Berlin.57 The Common Market’s increasing protection-
ism made the GDR’s economic relations with the West no easier. However, the 
already inconsistent policy of non-recognition did not change, and bilateralism in 
relations with the West prevailed. 
The fateful years: prestige, dependence and the debt crisis 
In the second half of the 1970s, political relations with the West intensified, yet 
East German efforts achieved only limited results. From 1975 to 1978, first visits 
at the foreign minister level took place. Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer travelled 
to all the EEC capitals except Bonn and Dublin (since Ireland abstained from 
recognising the GDR until 1980). Several Western foreign ministers paid return 
visits to East Berlin, but only towards the end of the decade did high-level dip-
lomatic encounters intensify. Visits by the heads of government or state only fol-
lowed in the 1980s. To the public, all the visits and agreements were sold as proof 
of the international reputation the GDR had achieved. Regularly dominating the 
headlines of East German media, they were portrayed as the GDR’s contribution 
to détente and economic cooperation in Europe (after 1975, always with reference 
to the CSCE). Naturally the public was not informed about the consequences of 
increasing economic exchanges with the West. 58 
Internally, the dilemma of import needs and growing indebtedness was omni-
present. The establishment of crisis management bodies like the Economic Com-
mission and the Balance of Payments Working Group in 1976, together with the 
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of all the economic bodies was reducing imports from the West, but sometimes 
the only path to reach this goal was further investment in industrial sectors that 
still demanded imports to fully function. The top-down implementation of import 
reduction through the plan failed due to the needs and obstinacy of various indus-
trial sectors which had to keep buying from the West. 59 With debt on the rise, the 
GDR’s ability to meet its financial obligations was endangered. 60 The outlook for 
the 1976–80 planning period was bleak, and avoiding bankruptcy seemed to be 
the real Main Task. 61 
The internal discussions reveal a strange dualism of realism and delusion. In a 
meeting of the small circle in November 1976, Schürer stated, ‘The gap between 
imports and exports has widened further but it has to be closed by all means. That 
is a fateful question for the GDR’. Some considered rigorous import cuts; oth-
ers reasoned about the causes within the CMEA and a re-prioritisation of invest-
ments. Stoph argued that major insecurity resulted from the development of the 
capitalist economy. Mittag endorsed this view by pointing to the difficulties in 
selling on Western markets. However, he also mentioned examples of favourable 
trade relations, such as with Greece, where the GDR had a high market share in 
machinery and imported agricultural products. Additionally, he highlighted the 
growing Western acceptance of countertrades. Contracts with France and Japan 
resulted in increasing trade volumes and constituted the best positions in the bal-
ance of payments. Mittag wanted to continue along this path. Honecker concluded 
that the 1976–80 plan was shaped by enforcement of the Unity of Economic and 
Social Policy. He stated: ‘We can only walk our socialist path. The capitalists are 
currently cutting everything that serves social policy. . . . We shall not and cannot 
limit this side’. Whether a delusion or belief, Honecker remarked further: 
The GDR is admired by many. Capitalism has taken the path of deflation or 
inflation. We are not taking those roads. We tread the path of planned and 
proportional development of our economy on an ever-higher level. . . . We 
have to keep that course. All this must not be achieved at the expense of the 
worker’s bones. 
Regarding foreign trade, he said, ‘We have to master the new problems due to the 
pressure external commerce exerts on our republic’. Honecker did not expect any 
progress in CMEA integration, expressed his worries about the balance of pay-
ments, and advocated increasing exports to the West and developing countries as 
well as cooperation in third markets if they earned hard currency. Like Mittag, he 
saw potential in trade with the West. He mentioned Greece and Sweden, counter-
trades with France and Japan, and similar possibilities with Italy and the US that 
would enable East German production to expand.62 
In summer 1976, Honecker told Leonid Brezhnev that the GDR possessed a 
‘special plan to become independent from the West’, but he did not detail it. 63 The 
archival documents do not reveal any such plan, but it is very likely that moderni-
sation through countertrades resulting in increased exports to the West was his 











East Germany: Drifting Westward? 117 
hard-currency deficit by making use of the differences between CMEA and world 
market prices for Soviet raw materials. However, these hopes were shattered by 
Kosygin in a conversation with Stoph at the end of 1976 when he stated that 
increased imports of such valuable resources would have to be paid for in hard 
currency. In March 1977, the balance of payments had worsened to such an extent 
that Schürer and Mittag for once joined forces and reported to Honecker, ‘For 
the first time, we are in acute financial difficulties’. When confronted with their 
call to immediately change trade policy, Honecker reacted furiously. He regarded 
their step as an all-out attack on him and his economic policy. In the end, Mittag 
and Schürer backed down.64 In the next meeting of the small circle, the general 
secretary proposed to solve the acute problems by making use of existing secret 
reserves (like West German subsidies, which were under his exclusive control and 
probably contributed to his rather relaxed attitude). However, he regarded this as 
a last resort.65 
In 1977, East Germany’s export earnings did not suffice to service its debts. At 
the end of 1978 the balance of payments showed a deficit of 17.8 billion Valu-
tamark (VM)66 in convertible currencies. Ninety percent of the imports from 
the West were loan-financed. Interest payments and amortisations required new 
loans. As always, the East German leadership intended to solve this problem by 
reducing imports, increasing exports and adopting other measures that through-
out the 1970s constantly failed to materialise. Nevertheless, not everything was 
a direct result of the state planning system’s failure. Global developments were 
beyond the SED’s control. According to East German estimates, the 1971–78 rise 
in world market prices had increased the deficit by 3.1 billion VM and unplanned 
imports of grain (due to crop shortfalls in the GDR and the USSR) added another 
3.8 billion VM. The overall outlook was bleak. Since the annual hard-currency 
spending on interest payments and amortisations exceeded export earnings, the 
deficit was growing year after year. An analysis of the GDR’s balance of pay-
ments in 1978 by Schürer, Böhm, Kaminsky and Polze stated the obvious: ‘This 
spiral cannot be prolonged’. It was entirely clear that ‘without the willingness of 
foreign, and especially capitalist, banks to provide further loans of the amount 
needed, the planned imports and the due payment obligations cannot be realised’. 
Without a fundamental turnaround in the GDR’s trade balance with the West, 
debt was expected to skyrocket until the mid-1980s.67 In November 1980, the 
economic experts of the Ministry of State Security advocated a complete stop to 
all imports from the West that were not indispensable to keep production afloat. 68 
Nevertheless, the GDR’s assessment of the economic situation in Western 
Europe seems to have encouraged its economic elite to pursue the path of loan-
financed imports and countertrades further – there seemed to be no alternative.69 
In Italy, GDR foreign traders registered a growing interest in developing eco-
nomic relations and aimed to treble the trade volume until 1980.70 In the case of 
France, the economic situation of the country was seen as an incentive for more 
intense economic relations with the GDR.71 One of the preferred strategies was 
loan-financed countertrades – a business model that made the development of 
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deals had a credit period of up to eight years and favourable credit conditions. 
Additionally, the compensation principle guaranteed certain exports in return (up 
to 100%, but generally way below 50%).72 
Internal plans for loan-financed countertrades reveal how debt-driven this busi-
ness had become. In 1978, State Secretary Gerhard Beil, who was in charge of 
day-to-day business in trade relations with the West, prepared a detailed list of 
the sums available for export funding and loans in various Western countries that 
would not impair the credit volumes of the East German Foreign Trade Bank. 
The overall volume amounted to 7.9 billion VM. 73 In 1979 the GDR planned to 
conclude countertrades worth more than 15 billion VM. 74 Despite the year-long 
failure to reach a balanced trade with the West, Honecker objected to any nega-
tive views on compensation within the state and party economic elite: ‘This is 
nonsense. It is of great value for us. We import to export in the future’. 75 In the 
view of his opponents, the general secretary and Mittag had entered an economi-
cally unjustifiable ‘technological alliance with capitalism’ camouflaged as coun-
tertrades to keep their ‘consumer socialism’ afloat. 76 
Metallurgy products played an important role in many of these countertrades. 
In this regard, EEC policies on imports made the life of the East German foreign 
traders more difficult. Against the backdrop of a crisis in the European steel sector, 
in December 1977 the European Council ‘decided that all countries exporting steel 
to the EEC’ had to conclude bilateral agreements so that the EEC ‘could impose 
price discipline’.77 Varying from country to country, up to 100% of the exports 
seemed endangered. While in 1975 the Ministry of Foreign Trade had promoted 
technical contacts with the EEC, in 1978 it warned that sectoral agreements on 
quotas and minimum prices would go beyond technical contacts.78 Again, East 
Berlin hoped for concerted action by the CMEA members. At the next meeting of 
the CMEA Executive Committee’s Standing Commission on Foreign Trade, Foreign 
Trade Minister Horst Sölle proposed considering if a threat or actual shifting of 
the CMEA’s steel imports from the Common Market to other suppliers could be 
used as a means of commercial policy. 79 While East Germany considered counter-
action potentially more effective than negotiations with the Commission, most of 
the other CMEA countries thought differently. 80 
Within four months, Czechoslovakia concluded an agreement with Brussels and 
was soon followed by Hungary, Romania and Poland. The GDR and the USSR 
refused to enter negotiations and faced the consequences. Several EEC countries 
announced restrictions on East German steel exports. The UK imposed an import 
contingent, reducing planned exports by 15%.81 Furthermore, many of the loan-
financed steel plants and other industrial complexes predominantly had to be refi-
nanced by metallurgy exports. The GDR had to rely on the good will of its partners. 
By successfully negotiating with Italy, Beil secured refinancing exports and there 
was hope that similar results could be reached with other countries.82 
According to the commercial department of the GDR’s embassy in Brussels, the
1977 Davignon Plan for Europe’s Steel had led to the establishment of permanent
‘working contacts’ with other CMEA member embassies in the EEC that aimed to
‘secure individual economic interests’. Despite intensive cooperation among the 
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limited use’. Even appealing incentives, like Belgian interlocutors stating that the
GDR would be in ‘a far better position, if it were willing to negotiate with the EEC’,
did not change the East German stance.83 Instead, the GDR faced several anti-
dumping measures.84 To ‘prevent economic losses’, the Ministry of Foreign Trade
decided that foreign trade companies should establish short-term technical contacts
with the Commission, which they did in five out of ten cases until mid-1980.85 
Despite the problems in day-to-day business, no initiative to change policy 
towards the EEC came from the ministries or foreign trade companies. It was the 
CMEA Working Group of the SED, headed by Horst Tschanter, that became frus-
trated about the CMEA’s inability to negotiate a treaty with the EEC and in 1979 
recommended that the GDR also made its own agreements with the Common 
Market.86 Only in 1981 did the commercial department of the embassy in Brus-
sels argue that an engagement with the EEC regarding certain commodity groups 
would positively influence exports to the Common Market.87 In the end, none 
of these recommendations led to a policy change. Against all odds, bilateralism 
continued. At the end of the 1970s, the GDR aimed at a breakthrough in political 
and economic relations with France. Top-level visits were accompanied by the 
placing of large-scale orders, and cooperation agreements were concluded. How-
ever, even though the trade volume increased significantly in the early 1980s, it 
hardly ever exceeded 10% of the volume of intra-German trade.88 In 1980, Soviet 
Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolai Patolichev told the East Germans, ‘As soon as 
France breaks out of the EEC bloc regarding cooperation with the Soviet Union, 
the EEC measures will be more or less without effect’. 89 The East German eco-
nomic elite perceived it as characteristic of the French attitude to accept proposals 
violating certain EEC provisions as long as they did not appear in the official text 
of the treaty subject to review by the Commission.90 East Berlin was in line with 
Moscow and, indeed, the EEC was definitely not a field on which the SED lead-
ers intended to quarrel with the already suspicious Soviets. Even though attempts 
to diversify trade continued, West Germany remained by far the most important 
economic partner in the West. In August 1980, Soviet criticism escalated. At a 
meeting in Crimea, Brezhnev attacked Honecker’s economic policy, the GDR’s 
Western orientation and especially its relations with the FRG. 91 The Soviet leader 
was furious about the resulting dependence and repercussions on trade with the 
USSR. According to Schürer, the ‘distinctness and harshness’ of his criticism was 
new in form and scale. Mittag and Honecker engaged in appeasing but countered 
Brezhnev by blaming Moscow for not satisfying the GDR’s raw material needs 
and defending the resulting increased exchanges with the West as unavoidable. 92 
In fact, because of the Soviet stance and for its very own reasons, in the sec-
ond half of the 1970s political relations with the FRG stagnated, while economic 
and financial reasons commanded continued cooperation.93 Altogether, the annual 
lump sums for transit and communication and the money earned from trading 
political prisoners94 increased from 600 million DM in 1975 to 1.556 billion DM 
in 1979.95 In return for benefits beyond this already high level, Bonn demanded 
concessions in other fields. Additionally, the GDR feared a spillover of EEC pro-
tectionism to intra-German trade.96 Securing economic exchanges on the best 
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and in early 1979 the idea of such an accord between the two German states 
surfaced.97 Obviously the Soviet–West German agreement of 1978 served as an 
incentive, and a first draft was agreed with the USSR.98 According to West Ger-
man sources, Honecker was even willing to give up the benefits of intra-German 
trade.99 The East German sources reveal no such intention, and for the FRG only 
an agreement not affecting the principles of intra-German trade was conceivable. 
In the end, no agreement was concluded, most probably because of West German 
considerations regarding the EEC.100 
In August 1980, Helmut Schmidt cancelled a visit to the GDR on short notice 
and Honecker was relieved, despite publicly regretting the cancellation. Like the 
West German chancellor, he feared potential repercussions of the situation in 
Poland, with Solidarity turning from a strike committee into a political force. In 
part a result of Soviet criticism and in part due to the Polish crisis, in autumn 1980 
the climate in German-German relations worsened. Honecker issued his Gera 
demands aiming at basic political concessions (i.e. West German recognition of 
East German citizenship) and increased the minimum exchange rates for Western 
visitors to the GDR. Bonn regarded this step as a moral breach of the 1974 com-
promise, and the expiry of the “swing” agreement at the end of 1981 gave it a 
lever over the economically ailing GDR. During a visit to the GDR in December 
1981, Schmidt granted an interim six-month prolongation of the “swing”, point-
ing out that a future agreement would be psychologically linked to the minimum 
exchange rates.101 Nevertheless, East Germany upheld its dogma that negotiations 
on economic questions must not be linked with other bilateral issues.102 In April 
1982, Schalck-Golodkowski, who had a prominent role in developing relations 
with the FRG, warned that a reduction of the “swing” would strengthen those in 
the leadership who already advocated economic isolation and closed borders.103 A 
compromise was reached in June and constituted a relief during the GDR’s debt 
crisis, which had worsened since the turn of the year. 
Apart from the uncertainty about the future of the “swing”, the year 1981 had 
dramatically complicated the economic situation. In the summer, the USSR 
announced a reduction in crude oil deliveries to the GDR by 2 million tons. This 
was a massive blow, because the refined oil was sold for hard currency on the 
world market. According to Krolikowski, Honecker reacted with an ‘enforced drift 
westward’. He wanted to keep the GDR stable with a more ‘elastic’ approach to 
the West and the FRG. In November, behind closed doors, central banker Kamin-
sky confirmed Stoph’s assessment of the financial situation: ‘If I got it right, with-
out a miracle, we will go bankrupt in 1982’.104 Things became much worse, with 
a Western ‘credit boycott’ after the imposition of martial law in Poland on 13 
December. The GDR’s practice of servicing debts by taking out new loans imme-
diately brought it to the verge of bankruptcy. To the discomfort of most of the 
economic elite, the politburo opted for a going-out-of-business sale during which 
everything possible was sold. Even though an active trade balance was achieved, 
the effort was not enough to prevent insolvency. In spring 1982, debt conver-
sion or bankruptcy seemed unavoidable to many of the GDR’s experts, but the 
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expensive trade operations by KoKo created liquidity. 105 According to a report by 
the economic division of the Ministry of State Security, Günter Ehrensperger, the 
head of the SED’s department for Planning and Finance, remarked, ‘Mittag has to 
save his face and to postpone insolvency of the GDR as long as possible’. He ‘is 
fighting for his political existence’. Others even held the revealing view that the 
future existence of the GDR ‘depended solely on the West’. 106 
However, unlike other socialist countries, the GDR did not aim at joining the 
International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. 107 The economic elite had toyed 
with several options. A bailout by the Soviets was favoured by many but was 
unlikely, yet the USSR helped by selling additional quantities of crude oil for 
world market prices with favourable credit periods. In return, the GDR exported 
consumer goods purchased in the West. The immediate conversion of Western 
export loans and clearing units from intra-German trade into hard currency and 
large-scale oil deals with the Soviet Union – and interestingly, also Austria – finally 
secured solvency in 1982–83. Indeed, the USSR contributed much to this, but 
ironically, it was still Western money that saved the GDR from bankruptcy. The 
Western vendors providing export loans to boost their own economies became the 
real creditors. Since these trade operations were extremely expensive, the search 
for new loans continued. In the early stages of the ‘credit boycott’, the option 
of a West German loan following the principle of ‘freer movement in return for 
cash’ (the so-called Zurich model) was seriously considered by the GDR. How-
ever, a loan of up to 5 billion DM would have required substantial concessions in 
return, which the SED leadership intended to avoid. Until the government change 
in Bonn in October 1982 (when Schmidt tumbled in a no-confidence vote and 
Helmut Kohl became chancellor), no loan was provided.108 Finally, two loans 
of 1 billion DM contrived by the Bavarian Prime Minister Franz-Josef Strauß in 
1983 and 1984 released the GDR from its acute debt crisis, not least because they 
re-established the country’s creditability in the international financial markets. 109 
However, they did not solve all the problems and, indeed, allowed the leadership 
to avoid changes in economic policy. 
In a meeting of the small circle after the first Strauß loan held in August 1983, 
Honecker remarked, ‘The Milliardenkredit is not here to bridge gaps in the plan. 
No minister can rely on this. We have to act as if we did not have the money’. He 
pointed to the necessity of reducing short- and medium-term loans and continuing 
the policy of reducing imports and increasing exports. Honecker was fully aware 
that the prolongation of the extreme foreign trade strategy would face opposition in 
the West: ‘Countries like France, Great Britain and Belgium, with whom we have 
an active balance, also want to sell and not only buy’. However, at that time there 
was still no alternative to reducing imports and selling oil on the world market. 
Nevertheless, pointing to developments in the other socialist countries, Honecker 
stated, ‘I want to put on record that our economic system is altogether in best 
order. It just depends on using the advantages of socialism properly. I am saying 
this because there is talk about reforms in many countries’.110 Indeed, despite and 
because of its own reform experiment in the 1960s, the East German leadership 
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Although the preceding statements leave few doubts that Honecker’s dealing 
with the ‘necessary evil’ was primarily aimed at securing power by continuing 
his economic policy, his critics saw it differently and so did Moscow. 111 In 1984, 
immediately after the second Strauß loan and with preparations for a visit by 
Honecker to the FRG in full swing, the East German leadership was called to 
the Kremlin. The CPSU leaders harshly criticised Honecker’s policy towards the 
FRG and pressed him to cancel his visit.112 However, the question remains: were 
Honecker’s opponents right when they denounced him in Moscow, claiming that 
he did not believe in socialism anymore and only reached out for cooperation 
with the West and especially with West Germany? Indeed, not least because of 
economic needs, relations with the FRG intensified and demanded concessions 
in return, but their development was a visible proof of the existence of an inde-
pendent GDR under SED rule, which Honecker’s politics aimed to make per-
manent.113 However, the economic foundations of the second German state had 
further weakened and the shortcomings of socialist integration were frustrating. 
Permanently facing the more functional West changed perceptions of it. 
Despite continually deploring EEC protectionism, the East German view of 
Western European integration had altered profoundly since the mid-1970s. First 
came academics, followed by officials in the ministries involved (although at dif-
ferent levels), and somehow this knowledge also made it up to the top level of 
the party. Regarding the EEC, the Institute of International Politics and Econom-
ics (IPW) was the most important academic institution. Founded in 1971, it pri-
marily focused on West Germany, but right from the start European integration 
was also on its research agenda. Because of scientific contacts with the West and 
analyses based on Western materials, the IPW was something special within the 
GDR, although at least in the first few years it remained an ideological think 
tank presenting results according to the official party line. 114 Over the years, the 
IPW’s analyses improved and the image of the EEC as a growing and more inte-
grated community underwent a change. Despite still playing on the ‘irreconcil-
able antagonisms of capitalism’, the EEC member states’ ability to compromise 
in decision-making processes was gradually recognised.115 
This became visible in 1976 when the IPW analysed the Tindemans Report for 
the politburo. It was perceived as an attempt to overcome the crisis of Western 
Europe and the ‘so far severest crisis’ in its integration. Instead of predicting a 
foreseeable failure, the analysis acknowledged the will and the ability of the EEC 
to overcome crises. The conclusion stated: 
Altogether, it can be expected that due to the mentioned contradictions the 
proposals of the ‘Tindemans report’ will be subject to multiple trade-offs 
and in most cases only compromises on the least common denominator will 
materialise. However, in the basic direction, certain enhancements of West 
European integration will take place.116 
The Foreign Ministry was a little more cautious in its assessment, considering 
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Union’ constituted a nightmare, and the foreign policy goal was still to ‘make 
use of all contradictions in order to delay or obstruct integration processes espe-
cially in the political and military field’.118 The analyses produced in the follow-
ing years show that the basic assessments on the prospects for integration were 
stable. Furthermore, the EEC was explicitly recognised as the core of the Western 
European ‘imperialist power centre’, which especially economically had gained 
‘weight, importance and influence in the capitalist world’. Through its internal 
development, enlargement and the expansion of its economic sphere of influence, 
the EEC had become a ‘considerable competitor of the USA’. 119 The approaching 
second enlargement of the EEC was primarily seen as ‘politically motivated’ and 
the candidate countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal) were qualified as ‘politically 
unstable and economically less developed capitalist states’, yet the consequences 
for GDR trade were foreseeable.120 Interestingly, despite the decried protection-
ism of the Common Market and non-recognition of the EEC, the example of 
Western European integration was increasingly regarded as something to strive 
for in the CMEA. 
Not least, Honecker started to regard the EEC as a desirable model for the 
CMEA. Against the background of the first elections to the European parliament 
in 1979, he told CMEA Secretary Nikolai Faddeev that this Western step must be 
an incentive for closer integration in the East, and one should not allow Romania 
to obstruct it.121 In 1982, Honecker told Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko 
that ‘despite the contradictions in the EC’, the economic integration of the West 
‘is further developed than in the CMEA’. 122 In March 1983, in a conversation with 
Hungarian politburo member Görgy Aczél, Honecker openly spoke about the dif-
ferences between the CMEA and the EEC. He pointed to the fact that 
despite unemployment, the EC functions better than the CMEA. In principle, 
the CMEA is based on bilateral relations and does not fulfil the tasks which 
the EC accomplishes. The EC has a council of ministers, commissions, a par-
liament, that indeed has not much say, while the socialist world is separated 
into single states. 
Towards the end of his remarks he frustratedly stated that in the CMEA 
not even the transport of goods works smoothly. Recently, there was a traffic 
jam at one of the stations on the Soviet border in which trains with 650 wagons 
were caught. There was a tailback to the factories. There are no such incidents 
in the EC. North-south traffic does not run smoothly either. Fruit from Bul-
garia is stopped en route at closed frontiers and then arrives in Berlin rotten.123
 Conclusion 
Certainly, many SED leaders still believed that capitalism was doomed, but by 
the years of the debt crisis there was a certainty that even the crisis-ridden West 
functioned better, something that became evident in assessments of the EEC. From 
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a capitalist stillbirth, Western European integration had turned into a role model 
for the CMEA. Despite this, the GDR still refused to recognise the EEC. East 
Berlin stuck with Moscow’s line and had to face the consequences. Even though 
access to the Common Market was decisively privileged due to the unique intra-
German trade, in its economic relations with the rest of the West the GDR was no 
less affected by the progress of European integration than the other socialist states. 
The CCP also applied to the GDR, and EEC protectionism impaired its economic 
interests. This became clear already in the first half of the 1970s, a time when poli-
tics dominated over economics in East Berlin’s rationale in dealing with the West. 
At the beginning of the 1970s, the long-isolated East German regime gained 
international recognition. The SED leadership celebrated this development and 
aimed at a diversification of its relations with the West, not least (as ever since) 
to reduce dependence on the FRG. Their increase had been one of the reasons for 
the abortion of the economic reforms (which had included an import-financed 
technology offensive) and the change in the party leadership in 1971. Neverthe-
less, regarding foreign trade and indebtedness to the West, continuities from the 
1960s predominated. Basic economic reasons were the driving factor. As in the 
case of Czechoslovakia, regardless of political decisions certain components 
and raw materials had to be bought in the West to keep the comparatively well-
developed industrial production afloat. Additionally, loan-financed investments 
seemed to be the only possible way to modernise the economy and to improve 
its competitiveness. The consumerist turn in the Honecker era reduced the finan-
cial leeway in this regard. Growing debt immediately led to internal criticism by 
economic experts, but it fell on deaf ears and the course was not changed. In the 
hopeful years, stability mattered more and the downside seemed far away. As in 
Poland, there was hope that investments would pay back and time would work in 
the direction of socialism. Throughout the 1970s, cheap Soviet crude oil allowed 
hard currency to be earned by selling refined products. Additionally, various non-
trade-related economic exchanges, or more precisely West German subsidies for 
the GDR, eased the life of the SED leadership, but it had to make concessions 
in return. In order to avoid them, other Western countries gained importance. 
Attempts to diversify Western trade intensified but in the end remained limited to 
several loan-financed large-scale orders and the respective countertrades. Apart 
from international recognition, no real breakthrough in relations with the West 
was achieved during the 1970s, and the development of economic relations was 
additionally impaired by the progress of European integration. A real counterbal-
ance to dependence on the FRG was out of reach. 
Because of costly consumer socialism and continual trade deficits with the West 
(similar to Poland and Hungary), the East German balance of payments crisis 
worsened towards the end of the 1970s. Despite all internal warnings and massive 
Soviet complaints about dependence on the West, the concept of the Unity of Eco-
nomic and Social Policy remained unchanged, and all the measures taken to reach 
a favourable trade balance proved insufficient. On the one hand, the much-needed 
cooperation with the West had caused financial dependence and conflict with the 
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showed that any change in social policy was too risky. 124 Declining Soviet sup-
port (raw materials) and the financial turbulence in other socialist states (Poland, 
Romania) made the situation even worse. In spring 1982, the GDR faced a West-
ern credit boycott, and bankruptcy seemed unavoidable. By implementing several 
emergency measures, ironically still financed with Western money, solvency was 
secured in the short term. In the years of the debt crisis, East Berlin’s leeway was 
more limited than ever. Within the limits Honecker perceived as tolerable for the 
infinite existence of two German states, he turned to the FRG until Moscow showed 
the red light. However, this outcome was not the result of a political westward drift 
aiming at closer bonds with the FRG; it was rooted in the particularity of the GDR 
and reflected the unresolvable paradoxes in the existence of the second German 
state. The East German economy had drifted westward ever since and, indeed, 
since progress in CEMA integration never materialised, only increasing economic 
cooperation with the West seemed to have the potential to lay the foundations of a 
stable and independent GDR. Although the result was the opposite, the aims of the 
economic strategy clearly indicate that in a political sense no westward drift took 
place. The desired but deceiving financial salvation came in the form of the Strauß 
loans in 1983–84. Regardless of potential Western intentions behind them, it was 
their unintended consequences that contributed to the demise of the GDR, namely 
allowing the leadership to proceed with its failed economic policy. 125 The SED 
rule survived a severe economic crisis and secured the existence of a socialist Ger-
many in the short term. However, surviving the debt crisis in 1982–83 proved to 
be a Pyrrhic victory. The measures taken caused growing dependence on the FRG, 
continuing economic decline and lowered East German living standards. Against 
the background of a changed international environment, these factors decisively 
contributed to the collapse of the GDR in 1989.126
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 6  Czechoslovakia’s Pan-European 
Relations During the “Long 
1970s” 
 Pavel Szobi 
The “long 1970s” in Czechoslovakia marked their start with the beginning of a 
normalisation process in 1969 and their end with overcoming economic stagna-
tion in 1982. While the first half of the 1970s can be designated a consolidation 
process during which the state regained its grip on previously de-centralised eco-
nomic planning and used extensive growth to increase the gross national product, 
the second half of the 1970s was a period of broader opening towards cooperation 
with the West, investment and consideration of reforms. This is why Czechoslo-
vakia had the lowest level of indebtedness among the CMEA countries. It only 
became higher towards the end of the 1970s. With no investment in the first half 
of the decade, Czechoslovakia was risking losing its competitiveness in global 
markets in the long run, but the strategy eventually paid off at the end of the 
decade when East German and Polish hopes of investment returns and export 
revenue from new production lines failed to materialise. However, Czechoslovak 
industry gradually became outdated with growing competitiveness problems in 
Western markets, which were aggravated by expanding EEC competences and 
EEC enlargement. An active balance of payments was progressively achieved 
thanks to exports of food, raw materials and consumer goods instead of machinery 
products. This stabilised the economy for the remaining decade but warned econ-
omists of the fustiness of the system and its growing technological backwardness. 
This chapter contributes to existing historiography, which has dealt with the 
role of Czechoslovakia in pan-European relations and its foreign trade in the long 
1970s rather marginally, the main focus being on political aspects of international 
relations.1 The most notable work on the subject has been done by a team of 
Czech and Slovak historians under the leadership of Václav Průcha in the sec-
ond volume of their extensive Economic and Social History of Czechoslovakia, 
1918–1992.2 Particular aspects of Czechoslovak relations with Western Europe 
have been discussed in studies and articles by Karel Svoboda, Oldřich Tůma and 
Tomáš Vilímek, which will be specifically discussed later in the chapter. 
The consolidation process and credit policies 
The 1970 document ‘Lessons Drawn from the Crisis Development in the Party 
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by the party’s Central Committee counts as the main document which set out the 
normalisation process characterising the late period of state socialism in Czecho-
slovakia.3 However, the economic strike back against the 1968 reform initiative 
started much earlier than that. After the suppression of the Prague Spring, the 
Czechoslovak economy and foreign trade had to undergo specific changes regard-
ing ideological requirements. Deliveries of British Vickers VC-10 aircrafts for the 
Czechoslovak airlines were suspended, construction contracts for Czechoslovak 
construction teams to work in West Berlin were cancelled and thoughts of an 
automobile factory built by a French-Italian consortium in Slovakia were aban-
doned.4 Although the Dubček administration was considering a credit from the 
International Monetary Fund in 1968, this plan was also quickly buried.5 A month 
after Gustáv Husák became the new first secretary of the party, in May 1969 the 
Central Committee adopted the document ‘Realisation Direction for the Party 
Strategy Until the 14th Congress’, which effectively enforced state control over 
the national economy. The half-started reform connected to the Prague Spring was 
condemned as chaotic and contradicting the rules of the socialist way of life.6 In 
June, so-called stabilisation measures stopped increases of nominal wages and 
stabilised consumer prices in order to control inflation. The progressive passive 
balance of payments and the private consumption boost of the late 1960s were to 
be fought with a strong pro-export policy, an autarky programme and limitation of 
foreign debt. This consolidation strategy was intended to endure for a short period 
of two years, but it eventually defined the whole first half of the 1970s. In order to 
re-centralise economic planning, the conservative communist leadership argued 
from experience of earlier years in which a conservative interpretation of central 
planning had proven to be useful. This approach would certainly not provide any 
economic miracles but it would guarantee modest but stable economic growth. 
The Czechoslovak federal and republican elite set the paradigm of the economic 
consolidation process which would endure until 1975–76. The main keynotes of 
the policy were ‘stability’ and ‘a calm environment for work’. The only signifi-
cant investment plans were realised in Slovakia as part of a long-term policy of 
equalising the two parts of the federation and involved financial transfers from the 
Czech part of the federation to the Slovak part.7 The fast economic growth in Slo-
vakia and the preference for investing in this part of the federation were a source 
of hidden national tension between the Czech and Slovak elites and also between 
common citizens.8 The conservative investment policy, an emphasis on autarky 
in grocery and consumer good production9 and reinforcement of the energy base 
were crucial in the consolidation process. Many technological innovations were 
sold to Western companies instead of being implemented in Czechoslovak indus-
try. 10 One well-known and telling example was the invention of soft contact lenses 
by Czechoslovak chemist Otto Wichterle. This could have been a success story 
for Czechoslovakia, but the invention was sold to the US. In 1971, the Bausch + 
Lomb company started to sell Wichterle’s lenses, launching a revolution in the 
field of optical aids.11 
In the mid-1960s, other CMEA member countries followed the traditional ide-
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The exports which were expected to pay for the credits did not manifest. State 
socialism found itself in a hole but could not stop digging. In the next decade, 
most CMEA members decided to take advantage of the financial market, which 
was flooded with cheap oil dollars with favourable credit conditions. The situa-
tion convinced many socialist countries that they could use credits for imports of 
consumer goods to keep the citizens calm, which meant abandoning the policy 
of self-sufficiency and economic independence from the West. 12 However, the 
Czechoslovak political and economic elite, shaken by the events of 1968, turned
in the exact opposite direction. In particular, Prime Minister Lubomír Štrougal 
and Chairman Stanislav Potáč of the Czechoslovak State Bank were eager to 
limit imports, to stop inflation and to re-establish a balance between supply and 
demand in the domestic market – all this with an accent on autarky. The social 
contract with citizens used other social policy tools, like housing, leisure at the 
state’s expense and pensions. This worked out rather well all through the normali-
sation period because the citizens were not dissatisfied enough with the situation. 
As Czech journalist Petr Honzejk has stated in a commentary on the Czech men-
tality in this historical context, ‘If there is something here, even when we know 
that it is horrible and it badgers us, we learn to live with it very fast and make it 
bearable. And if it is bearable why should we change it?’ 13 
Eventually, the relatively high level of economic growth and the good results 
from the fifth five-year plan (1971–75) convinced the high level of the party that 
the return to fully centralised planning was the right decision and the system 
should be maintained with eventual amendments which would merely bring the 
system closer to perfection. The belief in continuing growth convinced the State 
Planning Committee and economic ministries to consider the possibility of an 
ambitious investment wave in the sixth five-year plan (1976–80). Observers in the 
West German Foreign Office saw the success of the first half of the decade as evi-
dence for the Czechoslovak leaders that growth and development were possible 
without the 1968 reform attempts and the success silenced any remaining liberal 
thinking within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC).14 The remaining 
latent liberals would not raise their voices until changes in the Soviet Union in 
1985. 
The investment plan, which included projects like the construction of a high-
way between Bratislava and Prague, a metro system in Prague and a steel mill in 
Košice, required imports of technologies, materials and licenses. This required 
an amount of free convertible currency which the foreign trade was not able to 
generate. Therefore, it was at this time that Czechoslovakia jumped on the “credit 
train” to finance the new investment projects. The first large credits from Western 
European bank consortia were only received in 1975 and 1976, amounting to 
60 million dollars and 200 million dollars, respectively. 15 The debt to the West 
then slowly began rising but remained relatively small in comparison to the other 
CMEA countries. At a Bundesbank board meeting in December 1982, it was 
stated that Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria were able to keep their foreign indebt-
edness very low. 16 When the Western states reacted to martial law in Poland in 
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of joining the International Monetary Fund like the other CMEA countries but 
instead reduced imports and followed an export ‘at any cost’ policy. 17 
The high investment rate and the renewed growth in private consumption
resulted in cyclic development with phases of acceleration and deceleration.
While in the first half of the 1970s acceleration was notable, the results in the
years 1976–78 pushed economic growth into a deceleration phase.18 This unex-
pected development urged the economic authorities in the federal government
to think about changes. In 1979, several programmes in the investment plan
were halted and the government introduced new prices for consumer goods to
stop private spending and to decrease the need for imports. Chairman Stanislav
Potáč of the Czechoslovak State Bank strongly defended the autarky policy and
rejected requests from enterprises across the country for free currency. He was
able to back his stand with the unique position of the State Bank as the final con-
troller of the state budget and finances, which made the bank a strong voice in
the national economy, unlike in the other CMEA countries. 19 At the same time,
Potáč opposed suggestions from some CPC Central Committee Presidium mem-
bers who would have preferred to take out a loan to continue with the invest-
ment programmes.20 A modest liberalisation of foreign trade conditions for
Czechoslovak enterprises as a means to achieve an active balance of trade with
Western countries was followed by the first reform attempt since 1968. Strongly
advocated by federal Prime Minister Lubomír Štrougal, it was introduced with
the document ‘Series of Policies for Improving the System of Central Planning
in the National Economy after 1980’.21 It would be a simplification to state that
this was a repetition of the unsuccessful 1959 economic reform, but at the same
time the ‘Series of Policies’, as it was commonly referred to in public institu-
tions, shared many of the 1959 reform’s aims. The strategy was to intensify
production and to improve the efficiency of planning, the effects of economic
inputs, the level of management and workers’ participation in it. The Series
of Policies is generally dismissed as having been unsuccessful. The original
tasks in the five-year plan could not be completed and the first three years were
planned individually. Between 1980 and 1982, economic growth was close to
zero, and Western sources calculated it as negative: −0.1% in 1981 and −0.3%
in 1982.22 Nevertheless, it can be argued that the implementation of the Series of
Policies stopped the stagnation/negative growth of the Czechoslovak economy,
and from 1983 it started to grow modestly.
The second half of the 1970s was also marked by a significant decrease in 
Czechoslovak competitiveness in foreign trade, with the terms of trade hitting 
the bottom in 1984. One of the reasons for this trend was the late effect of the 
oil crisis in the West, as the Soviet Union demanded price increases for its oil 
deliveries within the CMEA.23 The higher energy expenditure increased the cost 
of Czechoslovak industrial production and therefore the final product prices. The 
negative impact of the bad terms of trade was not resolved with any systematic 
changes. The federal government used short-term tactics like decreasing imports, 
as mentioned earlier. At the same time, it pushed for additional exports of con-
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one hand, these decisions helped to achieve an active balance of foreign trade and 
successful discipline in paying Western creditors. On the other hand, they repeat-
edly caused shortages of goods for the Czechoslovak population. Moreover, the 
increasing amounts of groceries, raw materials such as brown coal and lumber, 
and semi-finished products like plywood in the export portfolio were a warning 
sign of technological backwardness and an inability to sell high-quality industrial 
goods to Western customers. 
The ‘normalised’ elite 
Economic, financial and foreign-trade policy decision-making was done by a 
new political and economic elite which emerged from the purges in the normali-
sation process. A series of committee hearings at all levels in the hierarchy of 
public organisations, enterprises and agencies led to the firing of 30% of party 
members.24 This is generally well known and it has been relatively well anal-
ysed. More penalties for supporting the 1968 reforms were applied in the Czech 
part of the federation. The positions freed in state institutions, academia and 
state enterprises were mostly filled by a ‘second league’ of less experienced but 
loyal party members. Among the successful Czech professionals able to deal 
with the complex issues arising in foreign trade and international relations who
rose to higher levels were the federal prime minister, Lubomír Štrougal; the fed-
eral minister of finance, Leopold Lér; the federal minister of technology and
innovation, Ladislav Šupka; the federal vice minister of foreign trade, Jaroslav 
Jakubec; and the chairman of the Czechoslovak State Bank, Stanislav Potáč. 
These men created a closed think tank which achieved a consensus on how to 
develop the Czechoslovak economy in the years to come. Attached to them, a 
large Slovak cohort emerged in the higher political levels, mainly due to the fact 
that the normalisation process and sacking of elite members in Slovakia was 
much less harsh than in the Czech lands. Among the Slovaks most influential in 
decision-making, we should name the first secretary of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS), Jozef Lenárt; the prime minister of 
the Slovak Socialist Republic, Peter Colotka; and the federal minister of foreign 
trade, Andrej Barčák. I do not include the first/general secretary, Gustáv Husák, 
in this group as he concentrated on political matters and particularly relied on
Lubomír Štrougal and Peter Colotka in the economic and investments areas. 
Both of them originally supported the 1968 reform process but pragmatically 
withdrew from their reformist positions. This helped Gustáv Husák save them 
from the purges, as he considered both to be close allies. 
Their knowledge, experience and business thinking made managers of state 
enterprises a regular choice for political posts in the respective economic minis-
tries. The federal and republican governments had numerous specialised ministries 
for individual industries. Prime Minister Štrougal identified promising young man-
agers and either actively promoted their professional careers in state enterprises or 
appointed them as ministers, vice ministers or ministerial state secretaries. Among 
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agronomist who took over an average cooperative farm in Slušovice in 1963 and 
turned it into a thriving business with a turnover of 7 billion crowns by 1989. Čuba 
used the location of the farm in the relative periphery of the Gottwaldow region 
and started to implement specific methods reminiscent of capitalist business. 
Thanks to his good connections with the region’s political elite, he was not invited 
to the committee hearings after 1968 and survived the purges. His achievements 
during the 1970s attracted the attention of high-level politicians, who suspected 
Čuba of anti-socialist ideas. As a businessman who felt that his success could be a 
reason for firing him, Čuba entered regional politics, and as a member of the sys-
tem sealed his position as the Slušovice chairman. As an advocate of cooperation 
with Western partners, he created cooperation projects with companies in Canada, 
Italy and West Germany. The peak of Čuba’s managerial career was to come after 
1985, when his cooperative farm was taken as an example of a successful social-
ist business by the first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Volodymyr 
Shcherbytsky. 25 Although Čuba may be an extreme case among the Czechoslovak 
managerial elite, a “capitalist” approach among successful Czechoslovak enter-
prises was taken by many other managers. Miroslav Zapadlo, who between 1969 
and 1979 was the director of AZNP Mladá Boleslav, which produced the popular 
Skoda cars, was a manager who went to the limits of the existing laws to acquire 
more convertible currency for the company and tried to involve Western European 
automobile companies in cooperation talks. Although he led the Skoda factory 
through a massive expansion in his ten years in charge, his actions eventually led 
to a decision to remove him from office. 26 
The specific case of academia 
The academic elite was not a consistent group and has to be defined on the basis 
of specialisations. Particularly economists were kept close to political decisions 
and participated in creating economic policy in the long 1970s. The initial purge 
among academic economists affected all those who had collaborated with the 
main representatives of the 1968 economic reform. In a critical article in the main 
academic economic journal in Czechoslovakia, Politická ekonomie, the 1960s 
reform process was interpreted as counter-socialist and revisionist. 27 The main 
author, Felix Oliva, was an old-school Stalinist economist who had always been 
a loud opponent of the 1968 reforms. The normalisation process at the University 
of Economics in Prague which, together with the Czechoslovak Academy of Sci-
ence, was the centre of Czechoslovak economic thinking, was led by Chancellor 
Stanislav Hradecký. In the first normalisation years, Soviet textbooks on eco-
nomic theory were hastily translated into Czech and Slovak. However, the situa-
tion in academia could not be wound back to the 1950s. Academics who formally 
agreed with the Soviet invasion and the subsequent normalisation process started 
to release their own textbooks, like one on credit and monetary policies by Jiří 
Petřivalský, who based his argumentation on capitalist examples and authors. 28 
František Vencovský, who had been active at the University of Economics and 
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State Bank since 1970, stated that research into the usefulness and possibilities 
of monetary policy in a centrally planned economy should not be limited at all, 
as long it did not doubt the re-centralisation of economic planning back in 1970. 
The research was based on the most recent findings in the West, along with the 
most important scientific books and journals which were accessible in university 
and department libraries.29 Thanks to this, the next generation of economic gradu-
ates was not only not affected by the purges but was training with knowledge of 
Western economic models and policies. The works on Czechoslovak foreign trade 
by another prominent economist, Karel Dyba, show the same picture.30 This was 
an important element in creating a managerial elite with a realistic vision of the 
West and able to do business with partners in foreign private enterprises. After all, 
many members of this managerial elite went on to transfer into the private sector 
in the Czech and Slovak economies in the 1990s. 
It is not necessary to name other branches of academia individually. In all the 
specialisations, the generation of scientists who had held positions in 1968 was 
subject to committee hearings and could only keep their posts if they expressed 
their ‘agreement with official Party policy’ following the Soviet military invasion. 
Together with the upcoming young generation of scientists, Czech and Slovak 
academics in all fields were eager to work with technologies they read about in 
foreign research papers. Their attitude to contacts with the West was therefore 
very stable: the more conferences with foreign scientists they could attend or 
fellowships at Western European universities they obtained, the more contacts 
they could establish, hopefully with significant research outcomes and patents for 
Czechoslovak industry. Among historians, Miroslav Hroch became the doyen of 
Czechoslovak academics, attending conferences abroad and publishing in West-
ern European journals. His work on nations and nationalism became crucial in 
narratives on the creation of national states.31 Among molecular biologists, Jiří 
Bártek was one of the most successful Czechoslovak scientists working on can-
cer treatment. He was allowed to take up fellowships in the UK and to conduct 
research which eventually brought him into the position of being the only Czech 
scientist considered for a Nobel Prize. Nevertheless, both scientists were able to 
internationalise their research thanks to deals with Czechoslovak State Security 
(StB).32 The scientists’ wish to get travel permits to the West went along with a 
willingness to report or deliver. The State Security hoped for information that 
would be valuable either in negotiating with Western countries or in competing 
with them. Economic espionage was among the key tasks of the service, and its 
attempts to gain know-how concerned both military and civil technology. 33 Bártek 
was allowed to travel to the West in exchange for doing technological espionage. 
Smuggling biological cultures and devices from top British laboratories helped 
Czechoslovak cancer research and generic drug development. Bártek later stated 
in a newspaper interview, ‘Young people are lucky that nowadays nothing like 
that can happen to them. They do not have to go through the choice. For me, it was 
about my job. I learnt so much in the West’. 34 Bártek is a symbol of a period when 
not only scientists but broad parts of the Czechoslovak population compromised 
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The impact of global changes on Czechoslovak economic 
relations with the West 
At the beginning of the 1970s, the CMEA European members were receiving 
between 80% and 90% of their oil imports from the Soviet Union. Measured 
even with today’s criteria, the Soviet oil reserves were seemingly endless. And 
although statistically the Soviet Union/Russian Federation has been floating on an 
oil basin, already by the mid-1960s extraction had to be moved to remote regions 
of Siberia so the Soviets could meet the demand in the world market. Exploration 
and extraction costs in these regions due to the harsh climate were considerably 
higher. Costs were further increased by the long-distance transportation of the 
oil, which grew from an average of 80 kilometres in 1970 to 1910 kilometres 
in 1980 – only within the Soviet Union.35 Oleg Bogomolov, the director of the 
Institute for the World Socialist Economic System at the Soviet Academy of Sci-
ences, openly expressed the Soviet discontent. Bogomolov pointed to three main 
problems that aggravated the situation for the Soviet Union: the high costs of raw 
material extraction, the lack of incentives on the part of allies to compensate the 
USSR for these high costs, and the relative unprofitability of oil exports. There-
fore, the Soviet Union wanted either a major increase in the prices paid for its raw 
material exports or much greater Czechoslovak participation in investments in 
new mining installations. The Czechoslovak government needed to start benefit-
ing the ‘underdeveloped and exploited’ USSR. 36 
The year 1973 brought a big change for Czechoslovakia and the other small 
CMEA countries which lacked their own oil reserves. At the beginning, it seemed 
to be a very promising year, as the socialist camp had the big advantage of cheap 
Soviet oil, unlike the Western competitors. The input to Czechoslovak industry 
was therefore bargain-priced and accordingly contributed to Czechoslovak com-
petitiveness. This was one of the reasons for the high levels of economic growth 
in the first half of the decade. However, the seemingly advantageous situation had 
a dark side: the West’s ability to absorb CMEA goods was diminished due to the 
enduring economic crisis. Moreover, the Soviets were not happy to sell their oil 
to socialist allies at dumping prices. From 1975 onwards, the five-year moving 
average of prices for this particular commodity would be valid for one year only. 
For 1975, the average for a shorter period (1972–74) was calculated. The Soviet 
Union was able to achieve a 32% change in its favour in the terms of trade with 
the other CMEA members. 37 Notwithstanding this achievement, the price change 
did not diminish the Soviet requirement for its customers to contribute their share 
to the costs of raw material extraction before it would consent to increase its 
deliveries. In this respect, Czechoslovakia had an advantage in comparison to 
other CMEA members. The country had participated in a broad Soviet oil indus-
try modernisation project since 1966. In exchange, Czechoslovakia was granted 
5 million tons of crude oil for a fixed price of 15.8 transferable roubles (approxi-
mately 25 dollars per ton).38 The Soviets were not happy about the terms of the 
agreement as the deliveries were guaranteed until 1984. The pressure they put 
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until 1979, when the Czechoslovak investment credit would be paid back.39 These 
missing oil deliveries became a matter requiring a diplomatic solution. In 1977, 
Czechoslovakia decided to lend 200 million US dollars to Iran in exchange for 
the necessary oil deliveries at acceptable prices and a similar deal was done with 
Turkey. 40 However, Czechoslovakia continued to search for other partners among 
the oil exporting countries, for two reasons. First, during a visit to Czechoslovakia 
in June 1979, Brezhnev warned that the Soviet Union could not guarantee con-
tinued oil deliveries. The Soviet production levels were dependent on declining 
reserves.41 Second, as at the beginning of the 1980s, the world market price for 
oil was dropping but the CMEA countries still paid at prices based on a five-year 
moving average. This meant a long-lasting burden for energy-demanding indus-
trial economies like Czechoslovakia. The country needed to diversify its export 
portfolio with items such as agricultural crops, food and lumber in order to keep 
its energy consumption at affordable levels. 
The rules on Czechoslovak trade with the West 
Unlike the other CMEA members, Czechoslovakia was a founding member of 
both the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). In 1947, the Soviet Union refused to participate in the GATT on the 
ground that it was simply a tool in the hands of the Americans to implement their 
economic expansion and dominance of the world economy. The Soviet rejection 
crystallised the growing tension between the USSR and the Western allies and 
can be explained by Moscow’s apprehension that participation in a multilateral 
trading system dominated by the capitalist countries might threaten its centrally 
planned economy and its aspiration to implement a system of bilateral trading 
arrangements with the countries in its sphere of influence. Therefore, when the 
USSR refused to become a member of the GATT, the Eastern European countries 
were not allowed to join either. The only exception was Czechoslovakia, as it had 
been an original contracting party from the time before the communist takeover. 42 
Although its IMF membership was cancelled due to the unacceptable circum-
stance of the Czechoslovak currency reform in 1953, the country continued to be 
an active GATT member throughout the whole period of state socialism. This had 
a particular benefit for Czechoslovakia. Foreign trade did not depend on bilateral 
agreements with Western European countries and it automatically had the sta-
tus of most favourite nation (MFN).43 With the exception of the US, the GATT
contracting parties continued to grant MFN treatment to Czechoslovakia and did 
not want to disrupt their trade relations. However, the discriminatory quantitative 
restrictions introduced or retained by numerous contracting parties against prod-
ucts originating from socialist countries applied to Czechoslovak products too.44 
Unlike its socialist neighbours Poland and Hungary, Czechoslovakia did not 
establish any legislative conditions for opening its economy to foreign investment. 
The institution of joint ventures, which was creating a thriving business in Hungary, 
was only enabled in the late 1980s.45 Nevertheless, small steps were taken in the 
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of extensive economic growth was exhausted and export results were becom-
ing fragile. In 1976, foreign businesses were allowed to open representations in 
Czechoslovakia.46 At the same time, the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade started 
an offensive policy in the Czechoslovak diplomatic representations and at interna-
tional industry fairs promoting Czechoslovak exports and licence agreements with 
Western companies. At this time, Czechoslovakia was far behind the other socialist 
countries in the matter of licenses. By 1980, in the CMEA area over 2000 coopera-
tion or licence agreements were signed.47 Compared to this cumulative number, 
Czechoslovakia rated poorly and had not even reached fifty agreements.48 
The late opening of the Czechoslovak economy to the West was observed by 
the Czechoslovak State Bank as an example of the gradually deteriorating export 
position of the ČSSR among the CMEA countries. By the end of the 1970s, 
Czechoslovak per capita participation in world trade put it in eighteenth position, 
while Bulgaria was fifteenth and East Germany sixteenth.49 To support exports, in 
1980 the Czechoslovak government issued a new law which allowed state com-
panies to go by themselves into foreign trade up to a value of 10 million crowns, 
or 30 million crowns if the overseeing government institution did not object.50 
However, it took three more years before four renowned state companies were 
selected for experimental autonomy regarding direct trade relations with partners 
in the West. 51 
Czechoslovakia, the CMEA and the global South 
Czechoslovakia had a traditionally strong position in the markets in Latin Amer-
ica, Southeast Asia and Africa. It had one particular advantage in its competition 
with socialist exporters in the global South markets and in particular in newly 
established African national states following the dynamic but often chaotic and 
uncoordinated decolonisation process. The African independence movements 
which eventually became the governments of the former African colonies showed 
more trust in Czechoslovakia than in the USSR. They understood that Czecho-
slovakia was a fledgling country that had never occupied others and had its own 
history of being subject to the multinational Habsburg Empire until 1918 and to 
occupation by Nazi Germany between 1939 and 1945.52 In this context, there 
was a natural prospect for mutual understanding. By contrast, the Africans saw 
Czechoslovakia’s East German competitors in an ambivalent way. First, even if 
they were a socialist country, they were still Germans, and Germany was a colo-
nial power in Africa until 1918. However, at the same time, as Germans they were 
expected to deliver high-quality products but at cheaper prices because they were 
in the socialist camp. Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia also faced competition from 
recently industrialised countries which started to influence the world machinery 
market. Countries like Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, Yugoslavia, Hong Kong, 
Mexico and Singapore more than doubled their share in the world market, from 
3.3% in 1970 to 8.5% in 1982. These countries offered relatively cheap machinery 
goods compared to the Czechoslovak portfolio. Therefore, they were more effec-
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Although the debt crisis was deeply connected to the credits which the socialist 
countries had received from the West, credits by socialist regimes to the global 
South should also be emphasised. In particular, the Soviet Union and East Ger-
many, which was finally recognised as a sovereign country by the UN, invested 
large amounts of resources to help allies in Africa and Southeast Asia, such as 
Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and Vietnam. The East Germans were hoping for 
both economic revenue and a high profile in world politics. 
Credits in convertible currency played an important part in this help, but the
financial solvency to pay back these credits was a liability. Although Czechoslova-
kia played its part in the global South, the Czechoslovak Trade Bank advocated a
strictly conservative approach regarding any financial aid to developing countries,
even those which were on a socialist course. The Czechoslovak State Bank was also
lukewarm about the possibility of providing African countries such as Angola with
new credits in general.54 The Czechoslovak bank elite had a strong negotiation posi-
tion with the federal government and expressed concerns regarding the credibility
of the comrades in Luanda.55 The Czechoslovak Trade Bank and the Czechoslovak
State Bank were even able to stop a 100-tractor contract for a credit of 1 million US
dollars from being realised despite efforts by the Czechoslovak Ministry of For-
eign Affairs and the embassy in Luanda. 56 There was not much enthusiasm for Afri-
can credits among high ministry and party officials either. Secretary Vasil Biľak,
who was responsible for international relations, stated in a private discussion with
Angolan officials that Czechoslovakia lacked US dollar reserves and could not risk
increasing its debt to the West. 57 All in all, on the Czechoslovak side business think-
ing clearly prevailed over ideological solidarity in this matter.
However, in the 1970s two developing countries which had observer status 
in the CMEA, Cuba and Vietnam, became full members of the organisation in 
1972 and 1978, respectively. The admission of these states to the organisation was 
based on purely political motives. It was the Soviets in particular who advocated 
the expansion of the territorial scope of the CMEA outside Europe. One of the 
motives for this was that with CMEA membership USSR would get an important 
tool to even more closely politically connect Cuba and Vietnam with Moscow. 
This supports the view that the USSR perceived the CMEA as a tool for its own 
foreign policy purposes.58 This explanation seems to be even more plausible in the 
light of repeated reports of opposition from Hungary and Czechoslovakia to devel-
oping states becoming CMEA members. Czechoslovakia particularly opposed 
the admission of Vietnam, as the other developing member states Mongolia and 
Cuba were already a considerable burden on the limited resources of the CMEA. 
The Czechoslovak opposition may have contributed to the fact that for the rest 
of the CMEA’s existence no other candidates, such as Ethiopia or Mozambique, 
were accepted as members. This confirms that the Czechoslovak elite preferred a 
business-driven approach in relations with developing countries.59 
The perception of the EEC in Czechoslovakia 
Understanding of the CMEA as an evident outcome of the socialist countries’
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not the case with the European Economic Community, which was perceived as 
an ideological and economic counterpart to the CMEA in the West. The Czecho-
slovak elite’s approach was restrained in both communication and politics at the 
beginning of the EEC. In the late years of state socialism in Czechoslovakia, 
newspaper articles were still embedded with propagandistic terms of anti-capitalist 
rejection.60 The tone of academic texts was never openly hostile but remained 
passive-aggressive. Nevertheless, Western economic development and the devel-
opment of the Community were studied with rising interest. Otto Klička, deputy 
minister of foreign affairs, proclaimed already at a conference in December 1962 
that the integration of the EEC had become faster and had recently acquired new 
features: ‘Therefore it is important to eliminate the superficiality of our interest 
and the fragmentation of research on this important symbol of the third phase 
in the general crisis of capitalism’.61 In a speech repleted with Marxist-Leninist 
terms, he added that the Common Market of six countries in Western Europe was 
evidence of the fact that capitalist enterprise would inevitably grow beyond the 
limits of town, region and eventually even country. 62 He summed up EEC inte-
gration as an action of the Bonn-Paris axis which was only a temporary power 
marriage used by revanchist West German politicians and businesses. 63 In 1963, 
Vladimír Landa from the Research Institute for National Economic Planning in 
Prague stated that the creation of imperialist international organisations would be 
a natural outcome of the conditions in state monopolistic capitalism. According to 
Landa, the EEC was one of them.64 Some Czechoslovak academics like Vladisav 
Pavlát from the University of Economics in Prague proposed an interesting expla-
nation for the acceleration of the EEC integration process, namely that the capitalist 
world felt the necessity to fortify itself against the growing socialist camp,65 yet 
he also argued that the CMEA countries were only able to react to increasing EEC 
integration with single countermeasures in foreign trade directives and lacked a 
theoretical base regarding the EEC as such: ‘The CMEA countries are actually 
at the very beginnings of a unified approach to the EEC. And here, unsolved 
theoretical issues make practical measures nearly impossible’.66 In the second 
part of the 1960s, Czechoslovak academia attempted to promote a less politicised 
approach in research on the EEC. One of the outcomes was a collective work led 
by Vladislav Pavlát ( EEC. Today and Tomorrow) which brought objective eco-
nomic reasons for EEC integration into the light and recognised its usefulness.67 
Research papers and studies released in the 1970s and 1980s no longer questioned 
the existence of the EEC and instead concentrated on specific branches of the 
integration process, like the agricultural market, or discussed the benefits and 
possible difficulties of EEC enlargement. 68 Academic circles closely observed the 
new member countries and analysed the differences which had arisen between 
the original Six and the new members since the enlargement, especially the UK’s 
perpetual attempts to change the Community’s agricultural policy. 69 Agricultural 
experts in the Czechoslovak government were looking at the UK with great inter-
est also because the country was trying to satisfy demand for food with its own 
resources to strengthen its negotiating position at EEC summits, but at the end 
of the 1970s it still had to import 30% to accommodate the domestic market.70 
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countries, it counted on a rise in crop exports in the future. The shortfall in the 
UK’s production hinted at a possible market for Czechoslovak grain or meat 
surpluses. 
Czechoslovak newspapers and television mostly copied statements in Soviet 
articles about the EEC,71 but sometimes Czechoslovak press and TV editors 
did their own pieces on the topic. František Šulc wrote an article in which he 
asked rhetorically whether the Common Market existed, criticising the fact that 
despite the official line of the Brussels Eurocrats each member country was doing 
what was in its best interests. He used the French monetary decision to float 
the exchange rate of the franc as evidence of this.72 According to him, the 1973 
Copenhagen meeting was a fiasco demonstrating that the member states were not 
able to find any common ground regarding common fiscal and energy policies. 
However, Šulc acknowledged that the new members from the EFTA group were 
relatively successful in harmonising their policies with the original Six.73 His final 
statement can be interpreted as an official statement from the Czechoslovak gov-
ernment as Rudé právo was the main press agency of the CPC: ‘This does not 
mean that the EEC stands in front of an imminent collapse, but it is merely clear 
that the reality of world economic development is more powerful than the hopes 
and wishes of the Brussels “Europeans”’.74 All in all, the Czechoslovak press 
informed on the integration process and the functions of the EEC, even citing the 
reactions of the Western European press following the results of the Norwegian 
referendum on EEC membership in 1972.75 At the same time, Czechoslovak jour-
nalists regularly added bittersweet comments about a ‘so-called parliament of the 
Communities’ or about the prevalence of West German, French and NATO and 
global capitalist interests over the wishes of small member states.76 When in 1982 
the EEC celebrated the 25th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome,  Rudé právo
described it as ‘a celebration with a wormwood aftertaste’, claiming that there 
was not much to celebrate, as economic crisis and unemployment were spreading 
in the EEC member states.77 
Czechoslovak diplomatic contacts with EEC officials 
At the diplomatic level, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to 
figure out the state of the European Community and its possible future. In a report 
to Prague in 1970, the Czechoslovak chargé d’affaires in Brussels, František Raj-
man, wrote that political union of the EEC would be very difficult. He argued that 
the Community would have problems in adding the economies of the prospective 
new members to the highly integrated economies of the older members.78 How-
ever, although the future integration of the Community was observed with some 
scepticism, Czechoslovak officials gradually took the organisation more and more 
seriously, as is demonstrated by the growing numbers of reports on the EEC found 
in the archives of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is also supported 
by the fact that a relatively high-ranking party official, Vladimír Koucký, was 
appointed as Czechoslovakia’s ambassador to Belgium for nine years running, 
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even led Koucký to request an additional employee for the embassy in Brussels 
who would be specifically responsible for Community matters.79 
During his years in service, Koucký created good relations with officials in 
the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and especially with the director of the 
Political Section, Andre Forthomme. In his meetings with Koucký, Forthomme 
was quite open about his opinions regarding relations with the Eastern European 
regimes. In a meeting on 20 November 1970, he mentioned that Western Euro-
pean politicians were perplexed about the interest in enhancing trade and other 
relations among European countries which had been expressed by the socialist 
regimes at the meeting of the UN Economic Commission for Europe earlier that 
month. He made it clear to Koucký that if the only interest of the socialist coun-
tries was to question the sense of the Common Market, the Belgians would not 
have any interest in such discussions at all, as they were fully satisfied with the 
EEC in its recent form and with its further evolution.80 Koucký responded that 
the latest developments in the EEC created a problem for economic relations 
with other European countries, which would need to be discussed and resolved, 
eventually at the European security and cooperation conference.81 Koucký also
regularly met Étienne Davignon, who was the director general of the Belgian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the early 1970s. Over lunch on 3 May 1972, they 
had an animated discussion about the relations of the EEC with the socialist coun-
tries. Davignon stated that there was no sense in the EEC insisting on it being 
recognised by the Eastern European countries because that would mean that the 
organisation was depending on it or would be inferior without it. It was further-
more important for the socialist regimes to abandon their public notion of the EEC 
being only a NATO agency. In response, Koucký argued that it was the EEC and 
the ultimatums from the ‘Europe’ agency to the socialist countries which were not 
helping to improve the climate in mutual relations.82 He claimed that the Western 
Europeans underestimated the importance of the CMEA and were over-confident 
about improvements within the EEC. Davignon responded ironically that he was 
not aware of the CMEA already behaving as a spokesperson for its members and 
acting on their behalf. If that became a fact, it would be a most interesting one.83 
The Czechoslovak embassy in Brussels maintained relatively intensive rela-
tions with EEC insiders like the long-time socialist member of the European par-
liament, Lucien Radoux, who Ambassador Koucký used to get information about 
future EEC member trade policies towards the socialist countries after 1 January 
1975 as, because of their non-recognition policy, the CMEA countries were not 
able to get any official information. Radoux responded that he was not aware of 
the details, but he was wondering why the Czechoslovak authorities, unlike the 
other socialist governments, did not have at least technical contacts with EEC 
officials. He mentioned the Romanians and Poles as good examples: their techni-
cal contacts with the EEC Commission would certainly make some deal possible. 
As he wrote in his report, Koucký reacted in a very cold way. 84 Even Jürgen von 
Alten, a highly placed West German diplomat who helped to negotiate the estab-
lishment of official diplomatic relations between Bonn and Prague, suggested that 
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embassy consul Vladimir A. Gnevashev and his meetings with the FRG’s ambas-
sador to the EEC, which were essential for the further Soviet approach to the EEC. 
Von Alten even offered Koucký his assistance in creating such contacts. 85 One of 
the important contacts for the Czechoslovak diplomats was the deputy director 
of the EEC Directorate-General for External Relations, Wolfgang Ernst. He was 
used to dealing with the Eastern Europeans and told Ambassador Koucký during 
their first accidental meeting at the Japanese embassy in September 1972 that 
he was happy to finally meet a Czechoslovak official in Brussels. He stated that 
‘the ČSSR is one of the few socialist countries not maintaining regular technical 
relations with the EEC Commission. Just in the last week, several diplomats from 
socialist countries visited our department. I can remember officials from the Pol-
ish and Romanian embassies’.86 Ernst proposed establishing casual relations and 
talks. He mentioned that the problem of official relations between the EEC and the 
Eastern European countries had not been dealt with at the highest level yet, as the 
socialist countries had more imminent problems to resolve, particularly exports of 
agricultural goods to the EEC market.87 Ernst’s proposal led to an informal lunch 
meeting in May 1974 with the first secretary of the Czechoslovak embassy, Jan 
Stehno, who referred to it as almost conspiratorial. Ernst commenced the meeting 
with a statement that in the time of détente it was important to maintain personal 
contacts and exchange ideas to resolve small issues in order to move the contacts 
between the CMEA and the EEC to the next level. He expressed his surprise that 
recently all the socialist countries had maintained contacts with the EEC except 
Czechoslovakia and Albania. Ernst reassured his interlocutor that these ‘meetings 
do not bind the participants to anything and are not understood in any way by the 
Commission as recognition of the EC’.88 Ernst’s initiative brought results: unof-
ficial meetings with EEC officials started to be a regular part of the work at the 
Czechoslovak embassy in Brussels. After a meeting in March 1974 with the head 
of the EEC department for socialist countries, Friedrich Klein, chargé d’affaires 
Vasiľ Choma wrote in a report to Prague: 
Our meetings with Mr. Klein and the experience of our friends in Brussels 
show so far that the European Commission does not avoid contacts with 
embassies of the socialist countries. For the last two years approximately, 
these relations have been fully ordinary while being considered by both sides 
as being of a strictly technical nature.89 
Czechoslovak official policy towards the EEC in the 1970s 
and 1980s 
The intensive diplomatic contacts show that high-ranking party and government 
members took the EEC seriously, not as an institution but rather as a threat to 
Czechoslovak foreign trade interests. Already in December 1969, a summit of 
CMEA leaders convened in Moscow to adopt a common strategy for approaching 
the EEC. A policy of ‘controlled bilateralism’ emerged at this meeting as the guid-










Czechoslovakia’s Pan-European Relations 149 
individual Eastern European initiatives were to be consistent with the pace of the 
entire bloc towards the EEC. Regular consultations with Moscow would ensure 
that no state was out of step with the group.90 At the top party level, Czechoslo-
vakia supported the Soviet stance that the question of relations with the EEC was 
first and foremost a political one.91 However, during a lead-up session to the meet-
ing of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact in January 1972, 
Czechoslovakia, along with Hungary and Poland, did not rule out the possibility 
of establishing some kind of contacts with the EEC.92 Prime Minister Štrougal 
confirmed this stance three years later when he acknowledged the importance of 
CMEA-EEC contacts: ‘As we are two different economic groups, the first con-
tacts cannot be more than probes. . . . We do not wish to disturb EEC quests, but 
we would like to talk with the EEC about mutual goals in multilateral affairs.’ 93 
Nonetheless, the EEC started to have a significant impact on the CMEA
countries and their export policies. It is no surprise that the socialist regime in 
Czechoslovakia perceived the EEC as an obstacle to foreign trade. The EEC was 
a protectionist organisation adopting limits on imports of certain goods, import 
duties and contingent amounts, protecting French farmers as much as West Ger-
man steel mills or Danish pork breeders. Since 1 January 1975, countries interested 
in doing business with an EEC member had to enter into complex negotiations 
with the Community to get the desired import rights. Based on the CPC Central 
Committee Presidium records from throughout the 1970s, it is more than obvious 
that the high political levels misunderstood and disdained the EEC as a purely 
economic organisation which created problems for Czechoslovak steel or textile 
exports to countries like West Germany. Apart from this view, there is hardly a 
record of serious discussions in Presidium sessions regarding the EEC and how 
to handle relations with it. If any, the discussion was very short and vague, even 
though the Presidium was supposed to discuss such serious matters as a dossier 
on EEC antidumping procedures against Czechoslovakia. 
The attitude of the top party and government levels to the EEC does not mean it 
was not closely observed by the ministerial, party, academic and diplomatic opera-
tives at the middle level, and by trade organisation experts. Already in May 1967, 
the University of Economics in Prague organised an international colloquium titled 
‘Actual Situation and Perspectives on EEC Development’, which was attended by 
two EEC officials, the director of the cabinet of the vice president of the Commis-
sion, Sicco Mansholt, and a functionary from EUROSTAT. 94 With the acceleration 
in East-West trade relations in the second half of the 1960s, Czechoslovak politi-
cians feared the implementation of the EEC’s common tariff policy. However, not 
all Czechoslovak export specialists considered the EEC’s common tariff policy 
to be a problem. The foreign trade corporation Strojimport considered tariffs to 
be only a marginal element in the final price of machinery products for custom-
ers in EEC countries. Ján Janšta from the Department of International Economic 
Organisations argued that the real problem was the competition among CMEA
countries to access Western markets and the complicated decision-making between 
foreign trade organisations and production factories regarding suitable offers to 
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on products from sectors the member states wished to protect, such as agricul-
tural and manufactured goods. On the one hand, these were exactly the type of 
goods the Eastern Europeans wanted to export, and they would have to face import 
quotas and higher customs duties. On the other hand, the Community would not 
restrict imports of raw materials that were in high demand, like fossil fuels. The 
common tariffs did not scare exporters of natural resources, especially of coal. 96 It 
was general knowledge that the EEC countries needed Eastern European natural 
resources and would not impose high tariffs on them. 97 A more considerable issue 
were tariffs on glass, textile and steel, which would make Czechoslovak products 
less competitive against West German and Italian goods, as the EEC institutions 
would continue with protectionist policies for domestic enterprises.98 
The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Trade recognised the growing dualism 
of the economic/trade competences of the EEC institutions and the national gov-
ernments of the member states. In the mid-1970s, the loss of individual EEC 
member state rights regarding the liberalisation of import contingents from the 
socialist states created much concern in the CMEA. From January 1975, the EEC 
member states were no longer allowed to negotiate bilateral agreements. The 
socialist countries were not appeased by a resolution of the EEC Council on 12 
November 1974 which assured them that the CMEA countries would continue to 
have MFN status.99 Czechoslovak diplomats complained about small Belgian and 
Dutch import contingents for the years 1975 and 1976, which were the result of 
decisions by the Commission and were not in accordance with the high volumes of 
Czechoslovak and other socialist countries’ exports to Belgium and Netherlands. 
Commission officials blamed the continuing economic crisis in the EEC member 
states for the small contingents. The truth is that the problem was both economic 
and political. Czechoslovakia and the other CMEA members faced a political 
barrier hindering their access to the EEC market: in order to be able to continue 
trading with EEC member states they had to acknowledge the competence of the 
EEC Commission in trade policy. This was a challenge to the non-recognition 
policy, which the CMEA had adhered to since the very beginning. 100 The EEC’s 
expanding competence and prestige was becoming an issue for the unity of the 
CMEA and the Soviet leadership in it. The EEC was becoming an attractive trade 
partner for some CMEA countries which had strong economic motives to take up 
negotiations. Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and East Germany feared the pro-
tectionist EEC policy regarding some very traditional export items, such as steel. 
Czechoslovakia put pressure on the CMEA to start formulating a policy towards 
the EEC which would secure the members’ foreign trade interests. 
As long as there was no institutional framework to negotiate trade agreements 
with the EEC, Prague had to negotiate with the EEC individually, using other 
channels. Although Czechoslovak diplomats in Brussels feared that the latest pro-
tests by Western Europeans against the denial of human rights in Czechoslova-
kia following the publication of Charter 77 could be an issue, communication 
went smoothly. 101 To resolve problems with metallurgy exports, in April 1978 
Czechoslovakia used the GATT platform to sign a self-limiting sector agreement 
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first steel arrangement between a CMEA country and the EEC, and also the very 
first official document signed between the ČSSR and the EEC. The deal proved 
to be very beneficial: in exchange for respecting a given EEC minimum price, 
the steel agreement allowed 90% of Czechoslovak steel to be sold on the EEC 
market.102 This benefited all the Czechoslovak steel mills, especially the one in 
Košice, which was extending its production and depended on rolling product 
exports. The steel deal was therefore followed by a similar agreement on textiles 
in 1982. By contrast, the Czechoslovak diplomats were not able to push some 
agricultural products through a negotiation process with the Commission. This led 
to a refusal of certificates for Czech hops, a traditional Czechoslovak high-quality 
export item.103 Even though agricultural products and groceries had never played 
big roles in Czechoslovak exports, the growing self-sufficiency of Czechoslovak 
food production brought an expectation of higher levels of meat, dairy, fruit and 
vegetable exports in the 1980s.104 However, only one agreement on more mut-
ton, vine and seed exports was negotiated between the EEC and Czechoslovakia. 
The three sector agreements mentioned in this paragraph covered merely 20% 
of Czechoslovak exports to the EEC market and limited Czechoslovak possibili-
ties until a sector agreement on industrial goods and a general trade agreement 
between the CSSR and the EEC were signed in late 1988.105 However, already 
in the mid-1980s Czechoslovakia needed to establish intensive contacts with the 
EEC institutions, the banks had to apply the new European standardised systems 
and computing, research institutions had to collaborate with intergovernmental 
platforms like EUREKA and foreign trade corporations needed to use the Euro-
pean Currency Unit in business deals with Western European partners. 106 In simple 
terms, Czechoslovak enterprises and institutions had to adapt to EEC standards 
in order to sustain and boost business contacts with the EEC countries. When the 
moderator of the main news panel on Czechoslovak Television, Rastislav Bajer, 
invited Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Jiří Němec to the studio in August 1988 
shortly after the establishment of official relations between the CMEA and the 
EEC, his question was remarkably open: ‘How is it possible that the normalisa-
tion of mutual relations took all of fifteen years?’ Němec replied that what was not 
possible in the previous fifteen years had been resolved relatively easily now due 
to the broader context of East-West relations. 107
 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the socialist camp was not a consistent group of 
like-minded regimes with similar economic and foreign trade policies. Strongly 
affected by the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion and its aftermath, Czechoslovakia 
quickly diverted from its economic reform plans to the safe waters of re-centralised 
economic planning, autarky and an active balance of payments. The consolidation 
programme, which became the economic companion of political normalisation, 
safeguarded the stabilisation of the Czechoslovak economy and fast economic 
growth during the fifth five-year plan (1970–75). Unlike the other CMEA coun-
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were appeased by a generous social policy. An important ingredient in the growth 
in exports was favourable circumstances in the world market following the rise in 
oil prices. The mixed blessing of bargain-price oil deliveries from the Soviet Union 
secured cheap machinery production and made Czechoslovak products more com-
petitive on Western markets in the short term. However, as the economic crisis 
in the West took root, the Western market’s absorption capacity was eventually 
exhausted, which created problems for Czechoslovak export targets in the sec-
ond half of the decade. Together with an ambitious investment policy and large 
amounts of credit taken under the sixth five-year plan (1976–80), this was the 
reason for a deceleration in economic growth, eventually leading to stagnation in 
1982. The economic problems were intensified by Soviet attempts to sell their nat-
ural resources, crude oil in particular, at higher prices based on the moving average 
world prices over the previous five years. This meant that, while at the beginning 
of 1980 the world market prices for oil were dropping, Czechoslovakia still had to 
pay the higher market price from the period of the 1979 oil crisis. 
The second part of the long 1970s saw a late re-opening by Czechoslovakia 
towards the West. The country was trying to catch up with fellow socialist allies 
in signing cooperation agreements and buying industrial licenses, but it had to 
face difficulties due to the economic crisis in the Western European countries and 
the EEC’s expanding competences and membership. In the process of negotiating 
with the Community, Czechoslovakia backed Soviet positions and did not come 
up with its own initiatives. In comparison to other CMEA partners, Czechoslova-
kia was late in developing contacts and sectoral agreements with the Community. 
Nevertheless, it was the first CMEA country to sign a steel agreement with the 
EEC after its individual members had lost the authority to sign bilateral trade 
agreements with other countries. As Czechoslovak exports were mainly industrial 
products, and not crops as in the case of some other CMEA members, this was an 
important step to spur the volume of exports to the EEC market, especially to the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
The end of the long 1970s was marked by a recovery of economic growth in 
1983. For the rest of the decade, the economy was able to produce modest but sta-
ble growth, although industrial modernisation efforts had been partly abandoned 
due to the previous stagnation. In order to achieve an active balance of payments, 
Czechoslovakia diverted its export portfolio from uncompetitive machinery 
goods towards raw materials and semi-products. In other words, the conserva-
tive economic strategy secured the stability of the economy and the regime itself, 
but in the long term it put the country on a course towards backwardness and the 
position of a developing country. But the fear of the political, economic and social 
consequences that reforms could bring prevailed until the very end of state social-
ism in Czechoslovakia. As the common Czech sayings have it, ‘If it works, don’t 
mess with it’ and ‘All changes can only make things worse’. 
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 7 Balancing Between Socialist 
Internationalism and Economic 
Internationalisation 
Bulgaria’s economic contacts 
with the EEC 
 Elitza Stanoeva 
During his first visit to Bonn in 1975, Todor Zhivkov, Bulgaria’s party leader and 
head of state for nearly two decades, met an assembly of West German entre-
preneurs, and not just any, but the top management of powerful concerns such 
as Krupp and Daimler-Benz – ‘the monopolies and firms which control 50% of 
the economic potential of the country’, as argued in the lauding report on the 
visit afterwards submitted to the politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party 
(Balgarska komunisticheska partiya [BKP]).1 Five pages later, the same report 
highlighted Zhivkov’s witty retort to an SPD politician: ‘Regardless of whether 
the elections are won by the social democrats or the Christian democrats, Beitz, 
the boss of Krupp, who represents capitalism in Germany, will remain in place’. 2 
The irony of criticising West German politicians for being in cahoots with the 
corporate world while trying to strike a deal with the very same corporations 
passed unnoticed. After all, Zhivkov went to Bonn to do business, namely to give 
a boost to the strained Bulgarian economy by securing a long-term loan from the 
West German government. In this mission, which ultimately failed, he did not shy 
away from reaching out to the corporate milieu with promises of high profits in 
the Bulgarian market. Neither did he shy away from depicting his native socialist 
economy as one overpowered by ‘trade unions, party organisations and the like 
whom even we cannot cope with’ – in order to divert West German requests for 
direct investment options.3 
Rather than being an anecdote on political duplicity, Zhivkov’s conflicting 
statements, admittedly aimed at different audiences, illustrate the duality in Bul-
garia’s policy of doing business with the West as a balancing act between socialist 
internationalism and economic internationalisation. This was particularly the case 
with regard to Bulgaria’s interactions with the European Economic Community 
(EEC), where separating political and economic issues became increasingly dif-
ficult in the 1970s. And while a political compromise would have been a step 
too far, the economic benefits were indispensable. From the 1960s onwards, pur-
chases from EEC members provided technology and manufactured inputs that 
were essential for the modernisation of Bulgarian industry. The party perceived 
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which would be evidence of the growing international prestige of socialist Bul-
garia. As the country was devoid of raw materials that could generate demand 
in world markets, it was in dire need of state-of-the-art factory production that 
could be competitive in international trade. Although Bulgarian industry repeat-
edly failed to optimise the benefits of costly technological transfers, it grew ever 
more dependent on Western imports and craftier in requesting their delivery from 
the state leadership. 
To expand exports was therefore a primary aim of all purchases from the capital-
ist economies, while improving domestic consumption was relegated to domestic 
manufacturers. Unlike Poland, Bulgaria, which was still running a predominantly 
agricultural economy, never experienced food shortages and price spikes of food-
stuff, so direct imports for domestic consumption never became urgent. 4 As in the 
rest of the bloc, the Bulgarian regime attached priority to consumption from the 
1960s onwards but improving it was pursued through domestic economic reforms 
aimed at raising quality and increasing variety. 5 Therefore, the share of imported 
consumer goods remained negligible up until 1989. In 1956, ‘means of produc-
tion’ accounted for 93% of Bulgaria’s imports (against 7% for consumer goods) 
and they never dropped below 86% in the decades to come.6 Moreover, imported 
consumer goods were sold mainly through hard-currency shops, Corecom, and 
the international tourism system so they were not bound to the social policy of 
raising standards of living for the population at large but to the needs of Bulgarian 
foreign trade.7 
In the literature on the Eastern bloc, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria (Narodna 
republika Balgariya [NRB]) is usually portrayed as the most loyal follower of 
the Soviet line (or even as a ‘Soviet locum tenens’),8 an orthodox satellite that 
in the Cold War gave up any autonomous pursuits on the international stage. In 
the perspective of its foreign economic pursuits, what is more remarkable about 
Bulgaria’s standing within the bloc, however, is its internalised perception of hav-
ing secondary importance in the eyes of the West. This frustrated self-image as a 
provincialised periphery no doubt had deeper historical roots than state socialism. 
But in the post-war period, Bulgaria’s new geopolitical position in the Soviet 
sphere of influence put it at a more pronounced disadvantage vis-à-vis the Central 
European states than previously within its region. This gave new urgency to its 
catching-up endeavour on the European stage. 
While arguably all the socialist regimes were in one way or another torn between
fraternal solidarity and mutual competition in their opening up to the West, for
Bulgaria this rivalry, from a position of recognised weakness, was a determining
dimension in its foreign policy. And Bulgaria’s competitive weakness prompted the
regime to cover all bases: on the one hand it provided incentives for expanding and
diversifying bilateral partnerships with the West and on the other hand for maintain-
ing tight bonds with the Soviet Union. Regarding the latter, Bulgaria could always
rely on economic benefits in exchange for political loyalty. While these benefits
seemingly came for free, they further hampered Bulgaria’s outreach to the West.
Exacerbating its competitive disadvantage was the fact that unlike the rest of 
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it could easily reactivate once opening up was possible after de-Stalinisation. 
With a low level of industrialisation and agricultural mechanisation and scarce 
natural resources, its feeble economy was doomed to fare worse than the oth-
ers in the Eastern bloc. Ultimately, it lacked both geopolitical importance and 
substantial economic resources to increase its attractiveness to potential Western 
partners. But its fledgling economy matched the needs of Soviet commerce better 
than others and so added economic rationale to Bulgaria’s heavy dependency 
on the Soviet Union. Being the most export-oriented country in the bloc (rela-
tive to its GDP), Bulgaria was also the one bloc member that relied the most on 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) market, and primarily on 
the Soviet Union.9 Economic transfers with the latter notwithstanding, Bulgar-
ian industry gradually developed a strong dependency on high-tech inputs from 
capitalist countries. In this regard, trade with the EEC was vital, despite sporadic 
attempts to reduce costly imports from its members in order to keep the balance 
of payments in check. Throughout the period, Bulgaria suffered from endemic 
trade deficits in the free market, and although it strove to offset this by prioritising 
sales of machinery and other heavy industry outputs, its agricultural production 
dominated the composition of its exports. Ultimately, this led the regime into a 
debt spiral due to its constant demand for credits from foreign banks and firms.10 
Against this backdrop, from the early 1960s onwards opening up to the West 
was an imperative for the Bulgarian regime that at no point diminished regard-
less of Cold War geopolitics. Naturally, the socialist establishment did not use the 
phrase “opening up to the West” to describe its policy of cooperation with capital-
ist countries. While this was certainly a catchphrase in the writings of Western 
commentators at the time, the socialist rhetoric depicted the process in terms of 
peaceful coexistence. Both phrases were politically charged and with normative 
connotations: while the former conveyed the West’s self-understanding as the 
centre of gravity in the process, the latter expressed the socialist camp’s self-
confidence in leading initiatives securing world peace. This interpretative split 
goes a long way to explaining why the Bulgarian establishment had neither ideo-
logical problems in pursuing a course of “opening up” nor serious discords with 
Moscow over the scope of its openness (as Romania did).11 Any milestone in that 
regard served the regime’s self-legitimation as proof of the country’s growing 
international prestige. Domestic propaganda along these lines was framed by the 
party dogma that the Cold War was the sole responsibility of the West due to its 
antagonism towards the socialist bloc over its being at the forefront in the struggle 
for world peace. 
In tackling Bulgaria’s opening up to the West in the “long 1970s”, this chapter 
breaks away from several fundamental assumptions pervading much of the post-
1989 national historiography of the socialist era where the totalitarian paradigm 
still occupies central place. First and foremost, it contests the notion of a party-
state monolith which takes for granted that the party top made all the important 
decisions and the state institutions had a passive role in their execution with no 
policy initiative. The role of a few individuals (mainly Zhivkov) is often exag-
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to Zhivkov’s closest circle, the politburo, which de facto constituted the party 
apex. Nevertheless, its concentration of powers did not necessarily translate into 
decision-making initiatives: much of the policymaking discussed in this chapter 
was done in the state ministries despite it requiring formal authorisation by the 
politburo. With nine to twelve members throughout the period, the party top brass 
could have only partial oversight and, moreover, it had limited economic compe-
tence for more active involvement in steering the foreign-economic course of the 
country. Therefore, this chapter shifts the focus from the actors who held power 
to those who forged policies – concerning general strategies, long-term plans, 
priorities in foreign policy and economic cooperation. And its point of departure 
is to decouple the party-state entity and approach the different institutional levels 
as having their own logics, stakes and interests – in other words, institutional 
rationality. 
First steps in opening up to the West in the 1960s: 
main trends and actors 
Initial contacts with Western European countries in the 1960s, including with EEC 
members, evolved at the economic level and were administered in a rather hori-
zontal fashion without much top-down interference from the party leadership. The 
Bulgarian economic services, particularly foreign-trade envoys stationed abroad, 
were to a great extent emissaries of the post-Stalinist doctrine of peaceful coexis-
tence. Moreover, the trade envoys were still the only actors in direct contact with 
foreign partners and with first-hand knowledge of both the efficiency and sys-
temic setbacks in economic cooperation in the concrete conditions in each EEC 
country. However, they were also people who were excluded from policymaking 
and lacked inside knowledge of broader policy deliberations. These deliberations 
took place at the top levels of the economic ministries, which at times coordinated 
their policies in a cross-sectoral manner but often pursued incompatible agendas: 
for example by securing high-tech imports (industrial ministries), by maintaining 
the trade balance by reducing costly imports and securing commercial credits 
from foreign banks (the Ministry of Foreign Trade [MFT]) and by preserving 
financial discipline and avoiding indebtedness (the Ministry of Finance, the Bul-
garian National Bank).12 
In many Western countries, the trade envoys forged contacts ahead of diplo-
mats, and foreign trade missions were often set up prior to (and independently of) 
embassies. This was the case in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Bul-
garia’s largest economic partner in the West, as long as the Warsaw Pact refused 
diplomatic normalisation.13 But it was also the case in Denmark, for example, 
where Bulgaria simply lacked any solid relations from previous times and its trade 
representatives enjoyed easier entry than party functionaries.14 Trade thus became 
instrumental in opening channels for intergovernmental contacts with Western 
states. 
The significance of foreign trade in the Bulgarian planned economy, on the 
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reviving commercial contacts with the West also witnessed an escalation of the 
trade deficit into the first debt crisis in the Bulgarian socialist economy, the peak of 
which was between 1959 and 1963.15 The ensuing financial shock was overcome 
thanks to ‘palliative emergency support by the Soviet Union’ – what Roumen 
Avramov describes as a conventional tool for solving any runaway hard-currency 
debt in the decades to come until Gorbachev shut down this emergency exit. 16 
Given its easy solution, this crisis did nothing to shake the Bulgarian resolve to 
expand commercial links with the West. Moreover, national economic reforms, 
which were undertaken between 1963 and 1968 under the New Economic Sys-
tem heading, were from the onset dependent on both increases in costly imports 
of production equipment, inputs and know-how from technologically advanced 
Western economies and increases in high-value exports to Western markets that 
could replenish the hard-currency reserves of the country. 
The 1960s were a particularly dynamic period in Bulgaria’s interactions with 
the West as various forms of economic cooperation were tested, centralised con-
trol over the economic envoys was still rudimentary and the bureaucratic ground 
rules were subject to negotiation. Ministries and other government branches 
founded special sections dedicated to economic relations with capitalist countries, 
and the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank was established. The most controversial 
organisations for fostering economic cooperation with the West were the so-called 
trans-border firms, which mushroomed from 1960 onwards. These were private 
companies set up with Bulgarian capital abroad to circumvent embargoes or 
other trade barriers (and sometimes to facilitate illicit arms trading).17 They were 
loosely affiliated to the MFT and often went rogue by withholding profits, falsify-
ing their accounts or engaging in unauthorised economic activities. Despite regu-
lar audits and closures, the number of trans-border firms multiplied to over 450 
by 1989, with the highest number being based in the FRG.18 Another instrument 
for circumventing trade barriers was mixed firms, joint ventures with foreign and 
Bulgarian capital, similar to the trans-border firms except that they operated in 
open cooperation instead of hiding Bulgarian involvement. The legal provisions 
for establishing such companies were passed in the mid-1960s and were continu-
ally amended to make them more accommodating to the foreign partners. 
Since in the 1960s foreign policy towards Western Europe was to a great extent 
implemented by economic agencies, Bulgaria’s opening up to the West evolved 
first and foremost as economic cooperation. The first bilateral treaties with EEC 
countries consisted of trade protocols and agreements together with other docu-
ments ascertaining the mutual will for economic cooperation. Cultural exchanges, 
conversely, were an area where the regime would take a conservative turn when 
some retreat from openness to the West was expedient, be it as a show of loyalty 
to the Soviet line or in response to domestic concerns over Western influences. 19 
However, in the mindset of the party leadership, increasing the number of eco-
nomic deals retained high priority, as it did at the managerial level where this 
imperative was additionally conditioned by an institutional path dependency: for 
the operatives in the foreign service, expanding partnerships with Western entities 
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successfully meeting their annual targets and ultimately protecting their personal 
positions. Such micro-institutional stakes enhanced the bottom-up commitment to 
opening up to the West. 20 
Another pillar in the Bulgarian strategy of economic cooperation with the West 
was international tourism, which was responsible for most of Bulgaria’s invisible 
earnings from the mid-1960s onwards. In the tourism business, Bulgaria enjoyed 
competitive advantages over the other CMEA members that it lacked in trade 
due to its geographical and climatic conditions. The “sun-and-sea” became the 
trademark of its tourism as the first resorts for foreigners were built on the Black 
Sea in the late 1950s. Providing much-needed hard currency, the development of 
international tourism was from the onset closely linked to the foreign-trade strat-
egy towards the West. 21 The authorities in charge of the sector presented its fun-
damental economic service as being ‘export in situ’, a form of trade that not only 
complemented the conventional exchange of goods but substantially ameliorated 
the country’s balance of payments. 22 
Another path for Bulgaria’s economic outreach to the West, which was embarked 
upon in the 1960s and followed throughout the 1970s, was multilateral coopera-
tion within the frameworks of international organisations. 23 All the state institu-
tions were encouraged to participate in as many such fora as they were eligible 
to.24 However, to advance its commercial interests and particularly to negotiate 
better terms of trade with its capitalist partners in the EEC, Bulgaria set its hopes 
mainly on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). While it was an enthu-
siastic member of the UNCTAD ever since its establishment in 1964, Bulgaria 
initially had a more ambivalent attitude towards the GATT because of its profile 
as an organisation of rich countries imbued with the economic logic of capital-
ism and thus not entirely accommodating the specificities of a socialist state with 
central economic planning and a state monopoly over trade. 
Bulgaria’s approach to international organisations was elaborated under the aus-
pices of the economic branches of the state apparatus, and only key decisions such 
as membership applications were forwarded to the politburo for approval. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) oversaw the relevant activities of all national 
and local institutions on a day-to-day basis through its International Organisations 
Section.25 A similar unit was also set up at the MFT to manage ministerial affili-
ation to international trade organisations. Further up the chain of command, the 
Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation (CESTC) at the 
Council of Ministers (CM) was the body which reviewed and eventually autho-
rised any policy proposals in this field. 
In December 1966, the CESTC approved probing contacts with the GATT and 
a year later Bulgaria acquired observer status and started considering full mem-
bership.26 To this end, a special Inter-institutional Section on Issues of Capitalist 
Integration and the GATT (ISICI) was set up, which was modelled on a similar 
body focused on the UNCTAD. 27 The ISICI dispatched an envoy to Bulgaria’s 
Permanent Representation in Geneva and soon afterwards an entire Trade Section 
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First concerns about the EEC 
In the 1960s, the overall pragmatic agenda of economic cooperation with the West 
was rarely coloured by ideological issues and was shielded as much as possible 
from the demagoguery of Cold War politics. Bulgaria was quite active in fostering 
economic relations with all the EEC members on a bilateral basis. By 1968, the 
FRG, Italy and France together accounted for almost half of Bulgaria’s exports 
to capitalist countries and for more than half of its imports from such countries. 
Bulgaria’s exchanges with the Common Market might have been at nowhere near 
the level of its commerce within the CMEA, yet the bloc countries’ share of total 
turnover was steadily decreasing: from 82% in 1956 and 81% in 1960 down to 
74% by 1970.29 While the EEC market area held the lion’s share of Bulgaria’s 
commercial exchanges outside its geopolitical bloc, it was also responsible for the 
bulk of its trade deficit. Bulgaria did not maintain a positive trade balance with a 
single member state.30 All the government’s attempts at tackling this problem were 
concentrated in bilateral negotiations. The EEC as such was a matter of interest for 
trade envoys stationed in the member states and academics specialising in capital-
ist economic groupings at home but not yet an issue in the policymaking arena. 
The EEC entered the party top’s political agenda for the first time at the begin-
ning of 1968, although the deliberation did not concern the EEC as a suprana-
tional organisation but its member states as a distinct group of countries. At this 
point, the politburo endorsed a rather concise document titled ‘Considerations 
for the Directions of NRB’s Foreign-Economic Relations with the Countries in 
the EEC (Common Market)’, which set the baseline for the regime’s approach to 
the EEC for years to come. Although it emphasised the need to expand economic 
ties with its members for purchases of machines, licenses and synthetic materi-
als, the blueprint was motivated by Bulgaria’s growing deficit with the Common 
Market due to existing agricultural protectionism and also by further anticipated 
discrimination. Amid this mix of incentives and challenges, the document called 
for coordinated actions with the other socialist countries and bilateral negotia-
tions with individual EEC members.31 The details of how to carry through these 
two approaches, however, were left entirely in the hands of the relevant state 
institutions, mainly the MFA and the MFT. The general aim, as defined by the 
politburo, was simply to ‘take advantage of political and economic disagreements 
among the EEC members’.32 A cornerstone of the general strategy was a differen-
tial approach to individual countries, which would remain a keyword in all further 
policy papers concerning the EEC. 
With this resolution, the politburo also gave the green light to attempting tech-
nical contacts with the EEC bodies and full membership of the GATT, again del-
egating decisions on timing and procedure to the state administration. A final item 
in the resolution, which was deemed a technical issue of secondary importance 
but in the next years would prove quite intricate, concerned amending the Bulgar-
ian customs system. The introduction of multiple import tariffs was specifically 
for the purpose of bargaining with the EEC countries: to counter discrimination 
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To this brief blueprint was appended a much lengthier memorandum by polit-
buro member Tano Tsolov, who was Bulgaria’s permanent representative at the 
CMEA and head of the CESTC until the mid-1970s. The latter post effectively 
made him the person overseeing not only all cooperation activities with Western 
countries but also all advances towards Western economic organisations, includ-
ing the EEC. In this capacity he maintained party oversight of state policies while 
the politburo focused on other issues. Explaining the nature of the EEC, Tsolov’s 
memorandum underlined the growing share of this group of countries in Bul-
garian trade (a fourfold increase between 1961 and 1966 compared to a twofold 
increase in the total volume), also pointing out that the value of imports was twice 
that of exports. Given Bulgaria’s import dependency on the EEC for complex 
machinery and manufactured production inputs, Tsolov recommended improving 
the national export capacity rather than reducing purchases.33 
Discussing EEC protectionism, the document emphasised its differentiated 
application to third countries with a strong bias against the socialist states. 
Despite reiterating the cliché of ‘inevitable disagreements between EEC mem-
bers’, Tsolov warned that clashes of interests among them would not impede 
further economic integration in the long run. Therefore, he argued for a ‘realistic 
policy’ towards the EEC that would factor in future enlargement and a deepening 
of integration.34 Arguing that Bulgaria was the worst affected socialist country, 
Tsolov highlighted the high share of agricultural goods in the composition of 
Bulgarian exports: 53% compared to 41%–43% for Hungary, Poland and Roma-
nia and only 13% for Czechoslovakia. In light of this, the ‘realistic policy’ he 
proposed underscored a need not only for technical contacts with the EEC but 
also for the CMEA’s position to be revised in the near future and for official 
contacts to be established.35 
By 1968, cooperation with the West had become a firm dimension in Bulgarian 
economic planning. The invasion of Czechoslovakia, however, disrupted estab-
lished contacts and economic cooperation hit an abrupt low after a previous peak 
in 1966–67. Many partnerships were hurt by the diplomatic repercussions of the 
Bulgarian military participation in the invasion. Other commercial exchanges, 
however, were reduced under the pressure of pragmatic concerns over the trade 
deficit among the Bulgarian economic authorities. Indeed, in the next three years 
(1969–72) they succeeded in improving the balance of payments, ending each fis-
cal year with a trade surplus.36 Simultaneously, at home the party leadership was 
wary of losing control over its economic reforms, which had often been depicted 
by outside observers as having ‘great affinities with the Czechoslovak model’, 
and so tightened its reins over the economic sectors.37 This led to serious reshuf-
fles in many economic institutions and a re-composition of the cabinet.38 Within 
the Bulgarian leadership, the Prague Spring stirred internal rather than external 
political concerns – a fear of the growing influence and institutional autonomy 
of the managerial elite. Foreign trade experienced the harshest backlash because 
of unchecked activities in the West. For Bulgaria, therefore, the party’s dilemma 
regarding opening up to the West was not between exposure and retreat but 
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In the aftermath of the 1968 crisis: new strategies 
with old guidelines 
With the hard-line shift, reinforcing centralised control cut across all levels of 
management of the foreign-trade sector. The prerogatives of the foreign-trade 
operatives, which previously had been continually broadened, were now nar-
rowed down to their main activities. In addition, the post-1968 overhaul involved 
purges of middle-level managers and top-level technocrats, although they were 
nowhere as severe or sweeping as in Czechoslovakia.39 Five directors of foreign-
trade organisations were indicted for selling commercial secrets to West Germany 
along with three department heads in the ministry. 40 Even more impactful was a 
trial of the entire managerial board of the largest trans-border company, Texim, 
which by 1968 had grown into a true corporate empire in control, among other 
things, of the entire Bulgarian merchant fleet.41 This was the first massively pub-
licised corruption trial in socialist Bulgaria, and one that hit the socialist regime’s 
most ever successful business venture. Finally, at the very top of the MFT, two 
consecutive ministers were reassigned and thus demoted: Ivan Budinov in Decem-
ber 1968 and his successor Luchezar Avramov in April 1971, both of whom were 
particularly active in expanding cooperation with capitalist countries. 
Just like all the moves to enhance centralisation, the repressive wave was nei-
ther a signal to cut off economic ties with the West nor a trigger for any sub-
stantial modification of the general course vis-à-vis the EEC. On the contrary, 
the blueprint for Bulgaria’s foreign policy, which had been rubber-stamped by 
the politburo in May 1969, determined economic relations to be the fundamen-
tal objective of all diplomatic missions worldwide. It urged better coordination 
between the MFA and the economic ministries and between the embassies and the 
trade representations in order to improve economic performance abroad. Within 
the EEC area, this meant reducing the alarming trade deficit, especially vis-à-vis 
the FRG, and mitigating the impact of discriminatory policies.42 A lengthy state-
ment of the motivation for the politburo’s resolution further highlighted MFA’s 
foreign-economic functions with an underlying definition of national interests on 
the international stage in economic terms: ‘[the MFA sections] should not only 
deal with “pure” politics . . . but at the centre of their attention should stand, in a 
more determined way and in closer coordination with political matters, foreign-
economic, commercial and scientific-technological questions’.43 In economic 
planning, in turn, industrial production was to be subordinated to the goal of for-
eign trade being required to ‘take into consideration the demands of international 
markets when organising production activity’. 44 
Following this greater prioritisation of commerce in Bulgaria’s foreign affairs, 
the network of trade missions continued to expand ahead of the diplomatic corps. 
By 1972, Bulgaria had trade representations in eighty-two countries. Unsurpris-
ingly, the largest was that in the Soviet Union with seventy-two operatives, but it 
was followed in size by that in the FRG, which employed thirty-one people, thus 
overshadowing the missions in the largest CMEA economies (the GDR, Poland 
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two main partners in the EEC, which exceeded the size of the Bulgarian missions 
in Hungary and Romania.45 
At the same time that the economic aspects of foreign policy assumed cen-
trality, the particulars of the economic policy towards the West were spared any 
profound revision. In the mind of the central bureaucracy, enhancing financial 
discipline was a typical remedy for the growing trade deficit, yet it was one that 
worked out on paper, in the annual plan, but quickly fell apart in the process of 
implementation. Keeping a lid on the trade deficit with any Western country was 
nearly impossible for the trade envoys who negotiated the sales and purchases on 
the ground. Along with a constant under-fulfilment of export contracts by producers 
and suppliers, manufacturers often sent urgent requests for imports beyond the 
set limits, with the argument that ‘the factory is brought to a standstill’. 46 Pro-
ducers’ hunger for Western technology and their continual reluctance to adopt 
higher standards in export-bound production was a bad match that undermined 
Bulgaria’s competitiveness in international markets. 
Another typical measure imbued with wishful thinking that was hardly new was
to decrease the predominance of agricultural exports in favour of machinery and
industrial goods by binding imports of factory machinery and production facilities to
compensatory exports of finished produce. In 1969, machinery in the structure of Bul-
garian exports to capitalist countries accounted for as little as 1.8%.47 While the MFT’s
blueprint forecast that by 1975 it would rise to 25.5%, from the viewpoint of the trade
officials abroad this was simply impossible considering the many returns of defunct
items. Most of the increases in machinery exports highlighted in annual reports hinged
on one-off deals, and many such deals were short-lived, often falling apart because of
negligence on the part of the producer. 48 Because of their unpredictability, such fail-
ures caused by structural problems in the planned economy were a greater problem for
the foreign trade representatives in the West than trade discrimination. 49 
With regard to the EEC, two consecutive general strategies in the foreign-
trade sector, which were authored under the guidance of two freshly appointed 
ministers, simply reiterated previous guidelines. The one by Lachezar Avramov 
in 1969 did not require any reduction in hard-currency imports, which by then 
were in permanent demand in all industrial areas. Instead, it stipulated the usual 
adjustment in export structure (a shift from agriculture to machinery) alongside 
a modification of the geographical distribution of imports – a shift from the EEC 
to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which was currently estimated 
to represent 32% of Bulgaria’s trade volume with capitalist countries, compared 
with 55% for the EEC.50 All these changes were relative given the backdrop of an 
absolute increase across the board. Moreover, the importance of the EEC coun-
tries to Bulgaria’s commerce was reconfirmed. At the same time, internal reforms 
which were aimed at improving Bulgaria’s trade position in the Common Market, 
like the new customs system, were assessed less optimistically than before. While 
reiterating the need for technical contacts with the EEC and full membership of 
the GATT, the document admitted that Bulgaria could not have much sway alone 
‘so we should make efforts to secure efficient coordinated counter-measures by 
the CMEA member states, both in the sphere of production and mutual trade and 
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Little changed in the blueprint compiled after Avramov’s removal in 1971, 
although the MFT’s new leadership claimed that it had been reworked in light of 
the CMEA’s Comprehensive Integration Programme of 1971. 52 The policy line 
towards the EEC was narrowed down to coordinated actions by CMEA members, 
yet actions defined broadly enough to not delegate the initiative exclusively to the 
CMEA bodies. Refusal of official recognition of the EEC was explicitly added, 
but its uncompromising resolve was undermined one paragraph later with the 
condition that ‘if later the right situation emerges for establishing official contacts 
with the EEC, then the best path will be negotiation led by the CMEA in order to 
obtain better results’.53 Technical contacts, however, remained a national preroga-
tive, not a matter of collective endeavour. 
Indeed, the earlier decisions about launching contacts with Western organisa-
tions, specifically the EEC and the GATT, had gone into implementation already
in 1969. At this point, the CESTC mandated the MFT to approach the EEC Com-
mission for technical contacts.54 The first talks in October 1969 were considered
exploratory and were followed by a second phase of negotiations a year later when
the two parties signed agreements concerning crucial Bulgarian export items such
as pork, sheep, cheese and wine. The EEC exempted these products from any addi-
tional customs duties while the Bulgarian government committed to complying
with certain standards, including anti-dumping rules. The Bulgarian delegation also
expressed interest in continuing negotiations and expanding these arrangements
towards other agricultural goods.55 Simultaneously, in September 1969 the CESTC
decided to start negotiations for membership of the GATT and authorised prelimi-
nary unofficial contacts with its secretariat and bilateral consultations with the main
members.56 
All these diplomatic advances built on the 1968 politburo resolution on rela-
tions with the EEC and were conducted with ministerial discretion. Few sub-
sequent Western-oriented policies implemented by the MFA and the MFT were 
scrutinised by the party organs. Instead, they were reported to the CESTC chair-
man, Tano Tsolov, who by way of his position in the politburo guaranteed their 
compliance with the party line. It was not the economic approach to the West 
but the positions of the Bulgarian delegations at CMEA sessions that invariably 
required politburo sanctions, even if they were just formal endorsements – still 
more items that passed through Tsolov. Whereas in internal policy deliberations 
he was quite vocal about the national interest in stabilising relations with the EEC, 
within the CMEA forum he maintained a more restrained stance and took his cues 
from Soviet statements. Moreover, in the CMEA context he gave more weight to 
the political aspects of potential approaches to the EEC, while in debates at home 
he discussed the EEC mainly in economic terms. 
Reporting to the politburo on CMEA deliberations regarding its Comprehensive 
Integration Programme in 1972, Tsolov once again discussed establishing offi-
cial contacts with the EEC, yet this time he refrained from voicing his support 
and instead made reference to the favourable Hungarian and Romanian posi-
tions. While Bulgaria certainly shared the Romanian concerns over EEC barriers 
against agricultural exports, Tsolov’s report stressed the political repercussions, 
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the Romanians for underestimating them. This understanding then shaped the 
official Bulgarian position: the political aspect outweighed the economic benefits, 
so the question of official relations with the EEC should not be rushed. 57 Such 
declarations paid lip service to the Soviet position and contradicted the pragmatic 
position at home. As an example of this, at a ministerial meeting with the trade 
representatives in capitalist countries two months later, Boris Velchev, a member 
of the politburo and Zhivkov’s right-hand man at the time, described the link 
between the political and economic aspects of cooperation with the West in the 
opposite way: ‘Our trade and mutual ties with the developed capitalist countries 
also have a political side. The capitalist countries are in Europe. [Therefore] we 
should pursue politics of détente in Europe’.58 
Even though the EEC was becoming an issue of growing concern, there was no 
discernible spike in the propaganda against it in the post-1968 period. Reports on 
EEC summits invariably mentioned ‘sharp contradictions among the members’, 
which were evident to the socialist commentator. While news reports remained 
truthful about events, their narratives gave more weight to confrontational aspects 
and added a touch of scepticism about any resolution of outstanding issues as a 
matter of unstable and transient compromise. When delving into such internal 
disagreements, correspondents highlighted member states’ positions that were in 
synchrony with the grievances of the socialist bloc, for example France’s desire 
for a Western European union outside of American tutelage or West German 
opposition to agrarian protectionism.59 
In short, post-1968 policy changes regarding Bulgarian interactions with the 
West took place internally, through enhanced centralised control inside the state 
institutions in charge of these interactions. In contrast, the external aspects con-
cerning the scope of permitted contacts and the breadth of cooperation remained 
the same. While economic relations with the West were streamlined under the 
supervision of the CESTC, the MFT and the MFA, and the party abstained from 
direct intervention, on the international stage its top brass took a more visible, 
though largely ceremonial, role. Bulgaria’s new constitution, adopted in 1971 and 
nicknamed ‘Zhivkov’s Constitution’, was a means of international (self-)promo-
tion of the general secretary. It introduced a new supreme body, the State Council, 
the leadership of which was reserved for Zhivkov, thereby bestowing on him a 
status in state affairs equivalent to president, instead of his previous title of prime 
minister. 60 The new post granted him entry into the diplomatic arena outside the 
socialist camp. In economic matters, however, any advances would still be in the 
competence of the state apparatus, although Zhivkov did not abstain from pursu-
ing economic objectives during his state visits abroad. 
In pursuit of preferential conditions: Bulgaria’s participation 
in international economic fora 
In the early 1970s, the state administration took several steps to improve the terms 
of trade with the EEC. Although they were pursued in various fora, these efforts 
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provisions of international trade organisations. As the Bulgarian authorities soon 
realised, a key bargaining tool was the customs system approved in 1968 as a 
punitive measure in response to the Common Market trade discrimination that 
Bulgarian exports encountered. It had been rushed into implementation for political 
reasons without being given much thought economically. 61 While initially the 
Bulgarian leadership had hoped that the threat of higher duties for entry into its 
import-hungry market might motivate Western countries to ease their own restric-
tions against Bulgarian products, it now discovered the usefulness of a tariff sys-
tem as a legal instrument. It gave Bulgarian foreign trade a semblance of market 
rationality and thus qualified the country to apply for various preference schemes 
that were averse to the planned economies.62 However, the Bulgarian government 
seemed at a loss as to the details of the new customs system and its differential 
tariffs. It tried to resolve these issues through consultations with the other two 
CMEA members that applied tariffs, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and ultimately 
by mechanically emulating their approach.63 
In the pursuit of better terms for East-West trade, the UNCTAD aspired to be 
a friendlier multilateral forum for the socialist bloc than the GATT. In the early 
1970s, Bulgaria’s activity within the UNCTAD was additionally motivated by the 
organisation’s Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP), which was designed 
to aid developing countries. Following the example of Romania, which claimed 
developing country status, Bulgaria adopted a similar approach but one different 
enough to not be at odds with the socialist bloc’s dogma of the superiority of its 
socio-economic system. In particular, Bulgaria claimed an intermediate position 
on the scale of economic development. This was a relational argument: claiming 
to have reached a more advanced stage than the developing countries, an accom-
plishment thanks solely to socialist economic overhaul, yet admitting that it was 
just as far behind the developed capitalist economies as it was ahead of the “third 
world” as a result of historical reasons and external challenges.64 
Within the UNCTAD, the Bulgarian regime committed to granting develop-
ing countries preferential access to its national market but made this conditional, 
although with the necessary diplomatic subtlety, on being itself considered for 
inclusion in the systems of preferences adopted by the developed countries. The 
Bulgarian delegates at the UNCTAD presented this conditionality as a positive 
thing – evidence that they were attempting to become not only recipients (like 
Romania) but also providers of preferences.65 To this end, the newly inaugurated 
customs tariffs were instrumentalised as an ‘important economic weapon’. The 
tariff system also served to advance additional demands for preferential treatment 
on a reciprocal basis, with regard to both the EEC members and the countries in 
the global South.66 
In the early 1970s, when Bulgaria was still recovering from the economic cool-
off in the aftermath of the events in Czechoslovakia and facing the new challenge 
of deepening Western European integration, its bid for better terms of trade within 
the UNCTAD became a priority on the agenda of the MFT. For this purpose, 
Minister Lachezar Avramov invited Manuel Pérez-Guerrero, secretary-general of 
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held meetings not only with Avramov but also with Foreign Minister Ivan Bashev 
and the chairman of the Committee for Economic Coordination, which were com-
plemented with broader discussions with state experts, academics and journal-
ists. In all the talks, the statements of the Bulgarian representatives were closely 
synchronised, aiming on the one hand to achieve better terms of trade with the 
organisation’s Western members and on the other hand to strengthen Bulgaria’s 
participation in the international division of labour by taking a more prominent 
role in the UNCTAD. 68 
In light of the upcoming EEC Common Commercial Policy (CCP), Bulgaria 
put more hope on its request for preferential treatment under the UNCTAD provi-
sions than on its demand for most favoured nation (MFN) treatment, the instru-
ment for liberalising trade backed by the GATT. While in the previous years, 
requests for MFN status were a standard item on the Bulgarian agenda in any 
bilateral trade negotiation with Western countries, now the MFT concentrated its 
efforts on obtaining tariff preferences. 69 The MFA also became mobilised in this 
endeavour once the EEC Council of Ministers embraced the UNCTAD’s GSP in 
March 1971. The MFA assigned its economic advisors the task of approaching 
the ambassadors of member states (and other capitalist countries) stationed in 
Sofia in order to directly submit official requests for reciprocal GSP application. 70 
While most states reacted favourably (especially Italy), their envoys also urged 
the Bulgarian government to forward its request straight to the EEC Commission 
for an all-encompassing multilateral solution. This was still a step too far for the 
Bulgarian regime, which was bent on keeping the issue within the safe bounds 
of bilateral relations and reducing all contacts with the EEC supranational bod-
ies to the accepted minimum.71 Consequently, it was non-EEC members (Austria 
and Japan) that not only reacted benevolently but indeed fulfilled the Bulgarian 
requests.72 
Apart from the direct economic benefits of its system of preferences, the 
UNCTAD offered less direct political benefits too, namely advantageous oppor-
tunities to discuss the pressing problems of East-West trade on the broadest inter-
national basis and to co-opt the support of developing countries in the process. 
Speaking on their behalf and arguing that Western economic groupings like the 
EEC damaged the fledgling decolonised economies made the “third world” a sort 
of proxy for the socialist bloc’s agenda. 73 This was especially convenient when 
the bloc wished to criticise the EEC without being suspected of hollow ideo-
logical antagonism.74 At the same time, the socialist bloc was wary of any special 
benefits and exemptions designed exclusively for the needs of the developing 
countries. Such exclusivity was even more alarming given the additional prefer-
ences that EEC association agreements gave north African and Mediterranean 
countries in the Common Market.75 Exclusive benefits were feared to give devel-
oping countries a competitive edge over the socialist bloc in trade with the West, 
a concern that ran deep in the Bulgarian case given the similarity in the types of 
goods Bulgaria exported westward.76 
After the third UNCTAD session in 1972, when Bulgaria acted as official spokes-
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countries was becoming ever more internally diversified. While some were on the 
side of the socialist camp, ‘upholding distinct anti-imperialist positions’, others 
were gravitating closer to the Western alliance, seduced by the promised ben-
efits of cooperation. Last but not least, the West was putting up less of a united 
front. As the EEC was becoming more integrated and discriminatory towards non-
members, the interests of the socialist countries converged with those of capitalist 
countries outside of Europe.77 This realisation pushed more active engagement 
with the GATT up the Bulgarian foreign-trade agenda in light of its upcoming 
trade round, which was scheduled to start in 1973 and focus on non-tariff barriers 
and problems of trade in agricultural goods.78 
Shortly before the launch of the GATT’s Tokyo round, the ongoing Hungar-
ian negotiations over membership made the experts in the ISICI more optimistic 
about the price Bulgaria might need to pay for entry. So far, they had reviewed 
the accession process undergone by Poland and Romania and concluded that the 
conditions they had been offered were quite harsh and overall disadvantageous. 
Hungary, however, used a very different negotiating strategy, stressing the mar-
ket aspects of its new economic mechanism (in both price-setting and customs 
tariffs) and thereby under-playing the impact of the state’s central planning on 
foreign trade.79 As Bulgaria was in the process of enacting its own “new economic 
mechanism”, the state-affiliated experts on capitalist integration felt that the Hun-
garian precedent could serve them well, especially in arguments bearing on the 
tariff system. 80 Accordingly, the Bulgarian bargaining position was optimistically 
defined as ‘deriving from the possibility of adapting the General Agreement to the 
particularities of the economic structure of the socialist countries by not allowing 
the opposite – the adaptation of our foreign-trade policy to the GATT’s order’. 81 
At the same time, the Bulgarian experts assessed GATT membership as a pre-
requisite, more important than ever before, for economic normalisation with the 
“first world”, not least because it would facilitate contacts with the EEC organs 
without any pressure for recognition of their authority. 82 As at the UNCTAD, the 
deliberation style at the GATT was conducive to geopolitical alliances. In con-
trast with UNCTAD, however, it encouraged alliances with developed capitalist 
countries outside the EEC instead of developing countries. This opportunity to 
unite forces was something that ‘for our country, whose opportunities for bilateral 
influence over larger trade partners are understandably limited . . . is of particular 
significance’.83 However, Bulgaria’s prospective membership application would 
not advance any further by the end of the 1970s as many aspects of its tariff sys-
tem still remained unclear and GATT’s evaluation procedures were quite demand-
ing. Prior to the launch of the Tokyo round, the GATT’s directorship had invited 
Bulgaria to take part in talks under its observer status, guaranteeing that this form 
of participation was sufficient to qualify the country for negotiated concessions, 
and this took away the urgency of pursuing full membership at any cost. 84 
With the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Hel-
sinki approaching, the Bulgarian economic advisors also highlighted the growing 
importance of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) in 
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argued for more active involvement with it. 85 In short, they lobbied for increased 
participation by Bulgaria in all international organisations focused on economic 
issues, counting on continuing adjustment and reformulation of national demands 
for better terms of trade with reference to instruments specific to each organisation. 
‘Capitalists of the world, integrate!’86 Assessing the challenges 
of EEC enlargement and deepening integration 
Bulgaria’s stepping up of its participation in international organisations – and 
in the international division of labour – was motivated mainly by the integra-
tion processes in Western Europe, and especially the widening and deepening 
of the EEC with the ensuing aggravation of trade discrimination. So far, both in 
deliberations on macro-policies at the top level of the ministries and in pragmatic 
discussions on policy implementation at the level of the managerial elite, the rel-
evant Bulgarian institutions viewed European integration through the lens of its 
economic repercussions (i.e. with a narrow focus on the Common Market). The 
political dimensions of European integration were noted in passing and usually in 
terms of their linkages with economic prospects. Some political implications were 
even positively construed, particularly signs of a rift between the US and Western 
Europe over clashing commercial interests. 
While ‘conflicts among capitalist countries’ was a cliché in all reports on Euro-
pean integration, the officials at the MFT and the MFA who authored these reports 
never failed to add that conflicts could not be expected to weaken the overall 
trend of deepening integration.87 Accordingly, the state apparatus adhered to a 
realistic policy of improving economic relations with the West and particularly 
with the EEC by way of increasing cooperation instead of reducing exposure. The 
first wave of EEC enlargement in 1973 unsurprisingly stirred much commotion 
within the state administration. The party’s politburo, in contrast, seemed to have 
withdrawn to a passive role: relegating policy initiatives to the state branches on 
the one hand and to the CMEA’s collective organs on the other hand. (This pas-
sivity on a key economic issue was not unusual. As Vachkov and Ivanov argue, 
the politburo similarly dealt only ‘peripherally’ with the problems of Bulgaria’s 
debt.)88 Indeed, 1973 was the last time the EEC was on the politburo’s agenda, 
and only for formal ratification of the CMEA’s draft guidelines on the scope and 
forms of acceptable contacts with it, which were circulated a month earlier. 89 
These guidelines stipulated that the CMEA members should refrain from estab-
lishing diplomatic relations bilaterally and limit interactions to technical contacts 
while at the same time deciding on their content in consultation with each other 
and keeping in close mutual coordination. An additional tenet allowed for official 
recognition if relations could be forged between the EEC and the CMEA as ‘two 
equal economic organisations’. 90 
The MFA and the MFT, and sometimes jointly with the Ministry of Finance, 
commissioned their experts to prepare an avalanche of evaluations, analyses 
and forecasts of the impact of the EEC’s enlargement on Bulgaria. The fact that 
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the new members entailed did little to offset pessimistic expectations. During a 
meeting at the MFA, for example, the UK’s ambassador in Sofia attested to his 
government’s commitment to open trade: 
England, as you know, is a country with ideas for much more open foreign-
economic relations with all countries in the world. It is only natural that with 
its presence the UK will exert influence over the EEC, especially with regard 
to settling relations with third countries. I can already state that once the UK 
enters the EEC, the Community will certainly change its outlook. It cannot 
remain as tightly closed as it has been so far. 91 
In the Bulgarian assessment, however, the EEC accession of the UK along with 
Ireland and Denmark was harmful at many levels. Despite cuts in tariffs with 
regard to some goods as a result of tariff harmonisation, Bulgarian economic 
interests were strongly hurt because of the expansion of the customs union and 
the subsequent intensification of intra-EEC trade.92 Furthermore, the EEC pref-
erences towards associated third countries, among them Bulgaria’s neighbours 
Turkey and Greece, and agreements with the EFTA members further damaged 
the competitiveness of Bulgarian goods, and to a far greater extent than tariffs. 93 
Additional trade complications resulted from what the Bulgarian trade services 
perceived as ‘para-tariff taxation’ in the form of compensational and antidumping 
fees and standards and quality norms that increased customs formalities.94 
Nevertheless, not all the dimensions of integration were seen in a critical light. 
The prospects for a monetary union, for example, were evaluated as a measure 
that would have a positive impact on East-West trade because currency stabilisa-
tion could only contribute to economic normalisation after the abandonment of the
Bretton Woods system. 95 Despite substantiated concerns, the EEC’s integration 
was not presented to the domestic public as a capitalist ‘evil plan’, not even in the
mouthpiece of party propaganda, the daily Rabotnichesko Delo (Workers’ Cause).
The year of the first EEC enlargement was the point when issues related to the 
Common Market gained most coverage in the BKP’s daily. Apart from subor-
dinating the EEC’s development to the interests of the capitalist monopolies in 
Western Europe, the newspaper noted the impressive success of integration, which
turned the alliance into the largest economic actor worldwide. It also emphasised 
its potential counterweight to the American superpower and the expected miti-
gation of its anti-socialist thrust thanks to the Helsinki process: ‘The closeness 
of this economic grouping shows the conservativism of the principles that it is 
built upon. Now, more and more people on our continent see that all economic 
and social problems can be solved best on the basis of pan-European economic 
cooperation.’96 
Furthermore, the EEC’s ongoing consolidation was seen as a model for suc-
cessful socialist integration, although proposals for such emulation never left the 
internal institutional channels. Analysing the new phase in European integration 
from Bonn, Todor Matanov, a secretary at the Bulgarian embassy, highlighted the 














176 Elitza Stanoeva 
not one to be mechanically replicated.97 And an MFT report on ‘new forms of 
mutually beneficial cooperation with the EEC’ suggested free trade zones simi-
lar to the Common Market between socialist and neutral capitalist countries in 
Europe under the auspices of the CMEA.98 
The most detailed proposal along these lines came from influential economist 
Evgeny Mateev, who held leading positions in various economic branches of the 
state apparatus. In 1973, he submitted to the MFT some chapters from a broader 
study of his which dealt specifically with socialist economic integration and 
included an evaluation comparing it with the Common Market. Marking dogmati-
cally the EEC’s lack of coordinated economic planning as a weakness compared 
to the CMEA, he argued that it nonetheless compensated well for this deficiency 
with successful harmonisation of policies, institutions and regulatory mechanisms 
in agriculture and customs and potentially in taxation, social welfare, trade law, 
transport, energy and monetary policies. In contrast, he went on, ‘in many of 
these areas, the CMEA does not manifest enough dynamism and initiative for 
unification’.99 
Further on, Mateev emphasised the greater turnover in internal EEC trade com-
pared to CMEA trade, the EEC’s higher level of internationalisation of capital and 
its more advanced preparation to be a supranational organisation. He also added 
a point regarding ‘integration and the ordinary man’, where he went as far as to 
claim that 
although capitalist integration mainly serves monopolistic capital, in the EEC 
the ordinary man in his everyday life feels more directly and strongly the 
growing ties to the other countries in the Community (through the mass sup-
ply of imported consumer goods, intensive mobility of people across borders, 
etc.) than in the CMEA member states. 100 
The bottom line of his comparison tacitly suggested taking the EEC as a model for 
reforming the CMEA: ‘Some of the above-mentioned tendencies and character-
istics of integration are typically capitalist so it is not necessary to emulate them, 
but others, regardless of their social system, constitute real achievements’.101 
The Common Market also received more attention in Bulgarian economics lit-
erature. In the 1960s, Bulgarian scholarly works had dealt with it very rarely 
and within the study of alternative economic systems, a rather theoretical aca-
demic pursuit. Once the EEC’s deepening integration started affecting Bulgaria’s 
external economic activities more tangibly, the academic approach expanded 
beyond the idiosyncrasies of the Common Market to analysing its interrelations 
with the CMEA, or even, albeit more rarely, the consequences of the integra-
tion processes for Bulgarian trade.102 Additionally, in 1976 a statistical periodical 
dedicated exclusively to exchanges between the CMEA and the EEC went into 
circulation.103 
All these assessments, however, did not shift Bulgarian foreign-trade policy 
vis-à-vis the EEC in a different direction. The non-recognition policy, despite 
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economically in the mind of state officials. To yield on this, they thought, would 
only aggravate Bulgaria’s position in relation to the Common Market, especially 
since the bulk of its exports were still agricultural and therefore, ‘even if they 
wished to, the Common Market could not grant us any substantial relief’. 104 
Accordingly, the state apparatus favoured expanding technical contacts while still 
refraining from official advances. 105 
The Bulgarian institutions, however, realised that their approaches bypassing 
the Commission or reducing negotiations with it to technical contacts were hit-
ting a wall. During the third round of technical contacts, the Bulgarian delegation 
failed to secure new preferences and found itself under strong pressure to raise the 
level of the talks, thus making an official approach to the Commission. Moreover, 
as the embassy in Brussels reported, the head of the Bulgarian delegation was told 
in private that a refusal to keep the talks going under such conditions would have 
negative repercussions in the forthcoming negotiations on a Bulgarian-Benelux 
trade agreement, a threat that soon came true.106 
After Helsinki: Bulgaria’s foreign policy of ‘reasonable 
compromise’
Bulgaria’s lobbying for better treatment did not yield any significant results, at 
least not from the EEC members, which refused to apply the UNCTAD’s GSP on 
a bilateral basis and referred the Bulgarian envoys to the EEC organs. 107 Instead, 
Bulgaria obtained preferences from non-European capitalist countries like Japan, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand simultaneously with signing trade agree-
ments with them, and also from neutral capitalist countries in Europe like Swe-
den, Austria and Finland, with which it had enjoyed stable trade relations since 
the 1960s.108 The shortcomings in their approach to the EEC and the implementa-
tion of the CCP led the Bulgarian economic services to refocus discussions with 
EEC members from trade issues in the narrow sense to options for economic 
cooperation involving licenses, transfers of technology, joint production and joint 
ownership. They hoped that exports of cooperative production would enter the 
Common Market more easily. None of these mechanisms was new to Bulgarian 
economic strategy, but in the mid-1970s they all underwent further elaboration 
and came to the fore as main vehicles of economic relations with developed capi-
talist countries. 
The Helsinki Final Act additionally encouraged this strategy. While the Bul-
garian leadership was aware of the uncomfortable concessions it had accepted 
regarding civil rights, it was quite optimistic about the commitments in the 
Accords for increased contacts and exchange between East and West in the areas 
of scientific-technological progress and industrial cooperation. This trade-off 
was indeed described by Andrey Lukanov, Tano Tsolov’s successor at the helm 
of the CESTC, as a ‘reasonable compromise’.109 Economic issues had been at 
the centre of the Bulgarian position at the CSCE from the very beginning: ‘The 
surge in prosperity of the population of the European continent and the preserva-
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hinges to a great extent on such developments [expansion of commercial, eco-
nomic and scientific-technical links on an equal footing].’110 Expecting a peak in 
pan-European cooperation, some state experts even envisaged an ‘all-European 
programme for trade liberalisation’ modelled on that of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) but covering equally capitalist 
and socialist states.111 While the humanitarian clauses were seen as an instrument 
for slandering the socialist system, in turn the regime did not shy away from 
instrumentalising aspects of the Accords concerning economic rapprochement to 
accuse Western European governments of acting ‘completely at odds with the 
constructive spirit of Helsinki’ when they abstained from closer partnerships. 112 
Accordingly, the Bulgarian embassies across Western Europe were instructed 
to closely follow how the Helsinki provisions were being implemented and to 
notify the government of instances in which they were disrespected or violated in 
national policymaking or EEC policy resolutions.113 
In light of the anticipated new opportunities, in early 1974 the politburo adopted 
a resolution on production-technological cooperation with non-socialist countries. 
As the resolution boasted, this was an entirely new approach compared to the ‘clas-
sical way of industrial cooperation’, one that encompassed the complete process 
from factory equipment to market placement. Manoeuvring between opening up 
to the West and staying firmly in the Soviet orbit, the party defined this new form 
of cooperation as being at the service of the principal path of Bulgaria’s foreign-
economic activity: creating greater cohesion between the national and Soviet 
economies and facilitating socialist integration in general.114 For the economic 
agencies, however, this seemingly key point remained an ideological pledge with 
little bearing on their actual practice of contracting cooperation deals with Western 
companies. 
Now, their efforts were legislatively bolstered by giving broader rights to for-
eign partners. The terms improved so much that the  Financial Times stated that 
Bulgaria offered the best conditions for foreign investors in the Eastern bloc. 115 
By the end of 1975, Bulgaria had concluded a total of around one hundred coop-
eration contracts in machine building, electronics, industrial agriculture and food 
processing. As with the trans-border firms, the highest number of joint production 
contracts outside the bloc was with the FRG, accounting for a quarter of all the 
partnerships with the capitalist world, followed by Italy and France.116 Once the 
Community’s CCP put an end to bilateral trade agreements, the Bulgarian govern-
ment delegations in economic negotiations shifted their focus to treaties on eco-
nomic, industrial and scientific-technical cooperation with a ten-year term, which 
had not yet come under the supranational authority of the EEC.117 
The post-Helsinki era brought not only a new emphasis on cooperation but also 
a specific focus on economic cooperation within the Balkan region and mainly 
with the Balkan capitalist countries: Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. 118 The end of the 
reign of the junta in Greece in 1974 enabled normalisation of diplomatic relations 
after years in which the Bulgarian regime had clandestinely supported the under-
ground communist opposition. The renewal of inter-governmental contacts imme-































Bulgaria: Balancing Internationalism 179 
intensified trade.119 The year 1975 witnessed a diplomatic stir in Bulgaria’s rela-
tions with both Greece and Turkey as Todor Zhivkov separately met their prime 
ministers, Konstantinos Karamanlis and Süleyman Demirel, and even proposed 
mediating between them in the conflict over Cyprus.120 Bridge-building initia-
tives in the Balkans were promoted by the Bulgarian leadership as an ‘important 
contribution, in accordance with the capacities of our country, to the strengthen-
ing and deepening of the overall process of easing of tensions in Europe’.121 
The economic dimension of Balkan cooperation was quite impressive. While 
in 1975 total exports to the EEC members dropped by 35 million lev compared to 
the year before, exports to Greece increased by exactly the same amount and to 
Turkey by 21 million. 122 As a result, that year Bulgaria’s two southern neighbours 
were responsible for a 211% spike in exports, which contrasted sharply with the 
stagnation in overall trade with capitalist countries. Moreover, Bulgaria scored 
huge trade surpluses with both countries.123 
While the association agreements of the two countries with the EEC had both-
ered the Bulgarian government for reasons of competitiveness, in the second 
half of the 1970s Greece’s impending membership worried them for its negative 
impact on bilateral cooperation.124 Driven by this anxiety, the Bulgarian trade rep-
resentative in Athens pushed for an acceleration of all projects under discussion 
that concerned assembled factories so that the contracts could be sealed prior to 
Greece’s accession and the expected shift in its foreign-economic activity towards 
the Common Market.125 The largest joint project, an agreement to connect the 
energy systems of Greece and Bulgaria, was signed in 1977. 126 
Regarding the EEC itself, the immediate post-Helsinki period did not wit-
ness much progress in negotiations on concessions despite the high expectations
among Bulgarian technocrats during the early phases of the CSCE. At the same
time, Bulgaria’s non-member participation in the GATT’s Tokyo Round opened
up a chance for bargaining with the EEC without extending official recognition
through the mechanism of bilateral GATT consultations. 127 By then, however,
the MFT was all but optimistic about its chances of achieving better terms of
trade with the Common Market, and the incentive to engage in such talks was
purely bureaucratic. The minister was concerned that if they did not carry out
any consultations in the Tokyo Round, it might provide evidence that its par-
ticipation was limited to being a passive observer and therefore justification
for denying Bulgaria the right to benefit from negotiated concessions. In the
consultations with the EEC that the Bulgarian delegation initiated at the end
of 1976, exports of agricultural goods were a central topic. In response, the
EEC underscored its members’ reciprocal difficulties in exporting agricultural
produce into the Bulgarian market because of the lack of reliable statistical
data on national production and consumption and on trade policies and the bal-
ance of payments. For the Bulgarians, this counter-request had the ring of a
ruse to obtain confidential information about the national economy and was
therefore rejected.128 Thus, the consultations reached a dead end, which was
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The end of Bulgaria’s “long 1970s”: foreign debt, growing 
trade barriers and diplomatic predicaments 
Despite ambitious ideas and general optimism stirred up by the Helsinki process, 
the second half of the 1970s turned out to be a difficult period for the Bulgar-
ian economy, especially in its international dimension. The travails that it faced 
resulted from both internal factors, namely the rigidity of planning and production 
undermining the competitiveness of national production and the global impacts 
of the two oil shocks in 1973 and 1979. While Bulgaria was shielded from the 
immediate impact of the oil crises by its flow of subsidised Soviet oil, its trade 
nevertheless suffered from the limits on imports imposed across Western Europe. 
The Bulgarian state was therefore attentively and sympathetically looking at
Western efforts at recovery. Against the gloomy background of the drop in total 
commerce with the Western countries in the second half of the 1970s, the Balkan 
capitalist countries as a sub-group of economic partners in the other camp were on 
the rise in Bulgaria’s trade relations. The dynamism in economic relations within 
the region was the only positive development in trade with capitalist Europe in the 
difficult years between the two oil crises. 130 
Moreover, Bulgaria’s planning system could not adjust quickly enough to the 
changing conjuncture and minimise the losses incurred. In 1974, Bulgarian for-
eign trade was badly hit due to a sharp disbalance in the rising values of exports 
and imports to and from non-socialist countries, which immediately led to a dou-
bling of the country’s foreign debt. 131 As it went into a spiral of borrowing to pay 
off outstanding loans, already in 1975–76 Bulgaria entered a debt crisis ahead of 
all the other socialist countries. As Vachkov and Ivanov argue, the earlier exacer-
bation of Bulgarian financial troubles compared to the rest of the bloc was actu-
ally Bulgaria’s lucky chance to get out of the debt trap more easily and faster than 
the others as the regime did not face fraternal competition when asking for Soviet 
help. Thanks to direct Soviet aid and re-exports of cheap Soviet oil, by 1979, 
when the Central European members of the CMEA hit the bottom, Bulgaria not 
only had left the worst behind but also managed to achieve a trade surplus and 
accumulate hard-currency reserves that would facilitate restructuring and even 
early acquittal of its foreign loans.132 This exogeneous solution delayed Bulgaria’s 
economic travails until the Soviets refused to keep subsidising its unreformed and 
underperforming economy. 
Once Bulgaria embarked on the path to financial recovery in 1978, the CESTC 
renewed technical contacts with the EEC to update the existing agreements and 
test the ground for further exemptions regarding textile and metallurgy products. 
The initial talks with the Commission were construed by the Bulgarian delega-
tion as an attempt to shift the conversation from the practicalities of commercial 
relations to the intricacies of diplomatic recognition. The Commission reminded 
the negotiating party about its outstanding proposal for a bilateral trade agreement 
made back in November 1974 and announced that Bulgaria’s export problems 
‘could be solved only in the context of comprehensive negotiations between Bul-
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delegation desperately tried to reduce its contacts with the Commission, which 
it viewed as non-compromising and pursuing its own political objectives, and to 
conduct most of the talks with the representatives of the industrial sectors of inter-
est, but to no avail. The delegates felt repeatedly blackmailed into granting the 
EEC official recognition in order to trade on its markets on a par with others. This 
boosted Bulgaria’s suspicions of the Commission as opposed to the member states 
and their economic experts, who were perceived as more pragmatically minded: 
At present, when a number of socialist countries have established contacts with
the EEC’s Commission and conduct talks on concrete issues and sectors, cer-
tain circles in the Commission intensify their efforts to extort within the frames
of these contacts political concessions from the socialist countries, and to this
end they resort to any means. One can see in these actions a desire to bring an
element of distrust into the bilateral relations between socialist countries and
EEC member states. Apparently, the level reached in the development of our
bilateral relations with the EEC member states is a substantial obstacle for the
Commission to carry out its foreign-policy ambitions and goals.134 
Despite its doubts about the potential usefulness of the negotiations, the Bulgarian 
delegation persisted well into 1979, when it finally managed to renew the agree-
ments on some agricultural goods, ferrous metallurgy and textile products. 135 At 
the same time, the GATT’s Tokyo Round ended and Bulgaria recommenced its 
probes into full membership of the organisation, although it would eventually 
submit an official application only in 1986. 136 
The early 1980s were marked by the boldest campaign of popularising the coun-
try worldwide – an exuberant celebration of ‘1,300 Years of Bulgaria’ in 1981. 137 
But this period also witnessed the gravest tarnishing of the regime in the eyes of 
the world, first when it was implicated in the assassination attempt on Pope John 
Paul II in 1980 and later when it launched an aggressive assimilation campaign 
against the national Muslim minority in 1984–89. The international outcry against
the alleged state sponsorship of terrorism and later against the gross human rights 
violations under BKP rule damaged many of the previously developed amicable 
relations and forms of cooperation with the West, and specifically with EEC mem-
bers.138 In effect, it was only in 1989 that Bulgaria started and completed nego-
tiations for a diplomatic agreement with the EEC and its application for GATT
membership was finally accepted – shortly before Zhivkov’s demise a day after the
fall of the Berlin Wall. 139
 Conclusion 
Ever since the 1960s, for Bulgaria economic cooperation with the capitalist coun-
tries of Europe served both the pragmatic objective of industrial modernisation in 
an endeavour to catch up with the Central European countries in its camp and the 
symbolic purpose of bolstering the regime’s international reputation. Despite its 
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cooperation with the European capitalist states throughout the 1970s, Bulgaria 
certainly fell behind its allies in economic bridge-building towards Western 
Europe and specifically the EEC members. The reasons were both economic and 
political. On the one hand, Bulgaria’s relentless efforts to find a diplomatic solu-
tion to trade obstacles did nothing to ameliorate the structure or quality of its 
westbound exports, a systemic failure which even the Soviet Union under Gor-
bachev would soon lose its tolerance for. On the other hand, Bulgaria’s opening 
up to the West, as ambitious as it was, inevitably seemed cautious and hesitant to 
prospective partners on the other side of the Cold War divide, thus diminishing 
their political incentives to make transactions more beneficial to the Bulgarian 
economic agencies.140 
Many of the intricacies of this opening up can be described as a balancing act 
between socialist internationalism and economic internationalisation. Ironically, 
whereas both provided the Bulgarian regime with easy remedies for the shortcom-
ings of its planned economy – in the form of Western imports of state-of-the-art 
production technology and regular injections of generous Soviet subsidies – in 
the long run these two paths of economic interactions would ensure the doom of 
Bulgaria’s socialist economy. 
Purchases from the West inevitably led to insurmountable trade deficits and 
growing debts. Soon the main purpose of imports became to improve produc-
tion in such a way as to prop up the quality, structure and ultimately the value of 
Bulgarian exports.141 This vicious circle, which never worked out as planned, was 
maintained by the growing hunger of Bulgarian industry for high-tech transfers, 
despite the fact that overall industry failed to optimise the benefits they brought. 
At the same time that economic dependency on the West was growing, diplomatic 
negotiations on more beneficial forms of cooperation stalled and ultimately faced 
uncompromising conditions by the EEC that the Bulgarian regime could not 
accept without jeopardising Soviet protectionism. 
The Bulgarian strategy for dealing with the EEC proved less flexible and hence 
less successful than those of its allies in the socialist camp and especially Romania 
or Hungary. It relied rigidly on a twofold approach: state institutions bargaining for 
exemptions bilaterally with the EEC members, thereby ignoring the supranational 
authority of the Commission, and socialist countries coordinating their national 
approaches through the CMEA and responding jointly to the EEC. As this dual 
course did not yield the desired results, the Bulgarian state institutions pursued 
better terms of trade simultaneously at the UNCTAD and the GATT, adjusting the 
general strategy to the instruments available in the two organisations. Within their 
fora, the Bulgarian foreign services also took advantage, with more or less suc-
cess, of different options for building coalitions – with the global South under the 
umbrella of the UNCTAD and with non-European capitalist countries under the 
GATT. These twofold efforts demonstrated both the limits of socialist solidarity 
with the so-called third world and the breadth of ideological compromise vis-à-vis 
the “first world”. At times, the “third world” was used as a proxy to advance the 
socialist position in trade negotiations; at times it was seen as a potential competitor 
with the socialist bloc on Western markets. On the other hand, while the capitalist 
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West was imperialist in the view of Marxist-Leninist ideology, in commerce there 
were interesting convergences of interests, especially with non-European states 
once the protectionism of the Common Market was the topic of discussion. 
Regardless of the coalitions it forged internationally, Bulgarian foreign trade 
remained plagued by internal problems of low quality, low flexibility and few 
incentives for reform. Its failure became irreversible towards the end of the 1970s, 
when balancing between expanding cooperation with Western Europe and politi-
cal pressure to tow the Soviet line (and also between costly imports and the grow-
ing difficulties in exporting) became an impossible predicament. 
Notes 
1 Tsentralen darzhaven arhiv (TsDA), f.1B, op.35, a.e.5557, l.145, Information about 
Todor Zhivkov’s official visit to the FRG, 24–28 November 1975. See also Baev, 
“The establishment of Bulgarian–West German diplomatic relations,” 174–5. 
2 TsDA, f.1B, op.35, a.e.5557, l.151, Information. 
3 TsDA, f.1B, op.35, a.e.5557, l.183, Todor Zhivkov’s meeting with representatives of 
FRG’s business circles. 
4 See Chapter 4 by Aleksandra Komornicka in this book. 
5 Guentcheva, “Material harmony”; Stanoeva, “Inventing the socialist consumer.” 
6 Statisticheski Godishnik na NRB 1965, 299; Statisticheski Godishnik na NRB 1968, 
308; Statisticheski Godishnik na NRB 1974, 302; Statisticheski Godishnik na NRB
1979, 369; Statisticheski Godishnik na NRB 1985 , 362. 
7 See Guentcheva, “Mobile objects”; Ivanova, Turizam pod nadzor; and Stanoeva, 
“Exporting holidays.” 
8 Pedaliu, “The US, the Balkans and détente,” 198. 
9 Lampe, The Bulgarian economy , 177–84. 
10 Vachkov and Ivanov,  Balgarskiyat vanshen dalg , 140. 
11 Mavrodin, Romania and the Cold War, ch. 5. 
12  Avramov, Pari i de/stabilizatsiya , 124–47. 
13 TsDA, f.1477, op.25, a.e.761, l.15; Information regarding trade relations between 
Bulgaria and the FRG and the trade mission’s operation, May 1969. 
14 Stanoeva, “Squeezed between external trade barriers and internal economic problems.” 
15  Vachkov and Ivanov, Balgarskiyat vanshen dalg, ch. 4; Avramov,  Pari i de/stabilizatsiya, 
123–4. 
16  Avramov, Pari i de/stabilizatsiya , 8–9. 
17  Vachkov and Ivanov, Balgarskiyat vanshen dalg , 147–8. 
18  Hristov, Imperiyata na zadgranichnite firmi , 12–14. 
19 On Bulgaria’s cultural diplomacy in the 1970s, see Dragostinova, “The East in the West.”
20 Stanoeva, “The imperative of opening to the West.” 
21  Stanoeva, “Exporting holidays.” 
22 TsDA, f.310, op.5, a.e.6, l.4; Report by Petko Todorov, Chairman of the Committee 
on Tourism, on the conception of development of the “International and internal tour-
ism” sector in the sixth five-year plan 1971–75, 8 August 1970. 
23 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.460, l.185, “NRB’s participation in international trade-economic
organisations,” 1 August 1972. 
24 TsDA, f.1B, op.81, a.e.171, l.2–6, Report by Tenyu Petrov, Director of the MFA’s 
Economic Section, 12 December 1968. 
25 Arhiv na Ministerstvoto na vanshnite raboti (AMVnR), op.32, a.e.67, Materials 
related to the Economic Department’s report on the work of the “International Organ-
isations” sector in 1971. 
   
   
   
     
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
   
   
   
   
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
    
   
   
   
   
   







184 Elitza Stanoeva 
26 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.460, l.187, “NRB’s participation”; TsDA, f.1B, op.35, a.e.12, 
l.32, Report on further activisation of Bulgaria’s work in international organisations, 
18 November 1967. 
27 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.61, l.112, Information by Penko Penkov, Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Trade, on UNCTAD’s third session and our country’s preparation, 1972. 
28 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.460, l.148–9, Report on NRB’s accession to GATT, Septem-
ber 1972. 
29 Statisticheski Godishnik na NRB 1971 , 320–2. 
TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.88, l.53, Report on the state’s additional considerations 
regarding the position towards the EEC, 19 February 1972; TsDA, f.259, op.44, 
a.e.173, l.62, the MFT’s conception of the role and significance of foreign trade for 
NRB’s economic development, 1971. 
31 TsDA, f.1B, op.35, a.e.12, l.12, Considerations for the direction of NRB’s foreign-
economic relations with the countries in the EEC (Common Market), November 1968. 
32 TsDA, f.1B, op.35, a.e.12, l.13, Considerations. 
33 TsDA, f.1B, op.35, a.e.12, l.17–18, Report on NRB’s position towards the EEC 
(Common Market), 16 November 1967. 
34 TsDA, f.1B, op.35, a.e.12, 20, Report on NRB’s position towards the EEC. 
TsDA, f.1B, op.35, a.e.12, 23, Report on NRB’s position towards the EEC. 
36  Vachkov and Ivanov, Balgarskiyat vanshen dalg , 157–8. 
37 Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archive (HU OSA), 300–8–3–676, f-112, 
Curt – Bulgaria’s Economic Reform, 9 December 1965. 
38 HU OSA 300–8–3–776, RFE Research East Europe: Structural and Personnel 
Changes in Bulgaria, 3 January 1969; HU OSA 300–8–3–770, RFE Research East 
Europe: Reshuffle at the Deputy Level in Economic Ministries, 29 January 1969. 
39 See Chapter 6 by Pavel Szobi in this book. 
HU OSA 300–8–47–25–72, 6, RFE Research East Europe: Situation Report, Bulgaria 
26 November 1969. 
41 Slavova, Georgi Naydenov i Teksim-Imekstrakom. 
42 TsDA, f.1A, op.35, a.e.704, l.2–39, Resolution of politburo on elevating MFA’s role 
and responsibility in elaborating and implementing NRB’s foreign policy and its fur-
ther activisation, 27 May 1969. 
43 TsDA, f.1A, op.35, a.e.704, l.81–82, Letter to politburo by Boris Velchev, Ivan 
Bashev, K. Tellalov, Gero Grozev, Boris Tsvetkov, 12 May 1969. 
44 TsDA, f.259, op.44, a.e.173, l.19, MFT’s conception. 
TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.142, l.177–8, Report by Ivan Ivanov, Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Trade, 13 January 1972. 
46 TsDA, f.1477, op.25, a.e.761, l.24, Bulgarian trade representation – Frankfurt: Infor-
mation regarding trade relations between NRB and FRG and the trade representa-
tion’s work, May 1969. 
47 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.61, l.24, Report by Ivan Ivanov, Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Trade, on fulfilment of the export-import plan for 1971 and the 1972 plan’s main aim. 
48 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.88, l.55, Report by Ivan Nedev. 
49 Stanoeva, “Squeezed between external trade barriers and internal economic problems.”
TsDA, f.1B, op.35, a.e.1202, l.186–7, Conception of the strategy and tactics of NRB’s 
foreign trade: Appendix 8, 1969. 
51 TsDA, f.1B, op.35, a.e.1202, 189, Conception. 
52 TsDA, f.1B, op.35, a.e.3079, l.42–3, Report on the endorsement of the strategy and 
tactics of NRB’s foreign trade, March 1972. 
53 TsDA, f.1B, op.35, a.e.3079, l.108, Strategy and tactics of NRB’s foreign trade, 1972. 
54 On the first round of technical contacts with the EEC, see Grigorova, “Kolebaniya i 
reshitelnost.” 
TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.89, l.188–90, Report by Ivan Nedev, Minister of Foreign 
Trade, 15 March 1972; TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.357, l.81–2, Letter by I. Dimitrov, 
   
   
   




   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Bulgaria: Balancing Internationalism 185 
Director of Section “International Organisations” to H. Sheinov, Chief Director of 
“Hranexport,” 27 January 1972. 
56 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.460, l.71, Report of Section “International Organisations” on 
NRB’s position towards GATT, 1972. 
57 TsDA, f.1B, op.35, a.e.2828, l.121–2, Information about the 56th session of CMEA’s 
Executive Committee, 27 January 1972. 
58 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.168, l.19, Protocol of meeting with trade representatives in 
developed capitalist countries, 25 July 1972. 
59 For example, the following articles published in 1969 in the BKP’s daily,  Rabotnichesko
delo: Ivan Dimitrov, “Koy finansira agrarnata politika na Obstiya pazar?,” 9 January
1969, 4; “Otnovo seriozni protivorechiya,” 28 January 1969, 5; Georgi Konstanti-
nov, “Pred konferentsiyata na shestte v Haga,” 1 December 1969, 6; Ivan Slavkov, 
“Golemiyat pazarlak zapochva edva sega,” 12 December 1969, 5; Pavel Pisarev,
“Zapadnoevropeyski problem,” 18 December 1969, 4–5. 
60  Vezenkov, “Institutsiyata na darzhavnia glava.” 
61 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.460, l.59–66, Information about some new elements in NRB’s 
customs policy in view of questions that foreign experts might ask, 25 February 1972. 
62 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.460, l.79–80, 123, Report. 
63 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.459, l.356–370, Report by Simeon Enchev, economist in the 
“International Organisations” section, on consultation between Bulgarian, Hungarian 
and Czechoslovak experts on tariff preferences for developing countries, 4 June 1971. 
64 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.459, l.43, Report on the visit to Bulgaria by the Secretary-
General of UNCTAD, Mr. Pérez-Guerrero, 12–16 July 1970; TsDA, f.259, op.36, 
a.e.459, l.320, Verbal note, 5 May 1971. 
65 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.459, l.357, Report by Simeon Enchev. 
66 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.459, l.44, Report on the visit; TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.61, 
l.121, Information by Penko Penkov. 
67 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.61, l.104–6, Report by Penko Penkov, Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Trade, on a meeting with UNCTAD Secretary-General, 20 September 1969. 
68 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.61, l.7–14, Report by Penko Penkov, Deputy Minister of For-
eign Trade, on meetings in Bulgaria with UNCTAD Secretary-General, Mr. Guerrero, 
20 July 1970. 
69 TsDA, f.259, op.44, a.e.173, l.59, MFT’s conception. 
70 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.459, l.341–383, Reports by Mihail Paskalev, Deputy Director 
of MFA’s Economic Section, 29 April – 7 May 1971. 
71 TsDA, Reports by Mihail Paskalev, 342–3. 
72 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.100, l.145, Report by Ivan Nedev, Minister of Foreign Trade, 
on the work and results of UNCTAD’s third session, 18 June 1972. 
73 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.100, l.138, Report by Ivan Nedev Minister of Foreign Trade, 
on the work and results of UNCTAD’s third session, 18 June 1972; TsDA, f.259, 
op.36, a.e.459, l.3, “UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),” 10 
February 1972; TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.61, l.150, Information by Penko Penkov. 
74 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.459, l.3, “UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD),” 10 February 1972; TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.61, l.150, Information by Penko 
Penkov, 126. 
75 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.459, l.332, unnamed document [1971]. 
76 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.459, l.336–7; TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.61, l.140, Information 
by Penko Penkov. 
77 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.100, l.154, Report by Ivan Nedev. 
78 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.460, l.72, Report by “International Organisations” section; 
TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.110, l.182, Report by Ivan Nedev, Minister of Foreign Trade, 
Petar Mladenov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on NRB’s position towards GATT’s new 
multilateral negotiations, 23 August 1973. 
79 See Chapter 3 by Pàl Germuska in this book. 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
    
 
  
   
   
   
    
 
 
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
    
   
   
   
   
186 Elitza Stanoeva 
80 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.460, l.71–81, Report on NRB’s attitude towards GATT, 1972. 
81 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.460, l.47, Information by Petko Baev. 
82 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.460, l.78, Report on NRB’s attitude. 
83 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.460, l.154, Report on NRB’s accession. 
84 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.110, l.181, Report by Ivan Nedev. 
85 AMVnR, op.32, a.e.5172, l.30, Information on the implementation of the CSCE’s 
Final Act and preparation for the Belgrade meeting, 23 November 1976; TsDA, f.259, 
op.36, a.e.174, l.62, “Abolishing restrictions and discrimination in international trade, 
seeking new forms of mutually beneficial cooperation with the EEC,” April 1973. 
86 An MFT report from April 1973 opened by qualifying developments in the West this 
way. TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.174, l.32. “Abolishing.” 
87 TsDA, f.259, op.32, a.e.18, l.97a-98, “Building economic and monetary union – a new
phase in West European integration” (Т. Matanov, Bonn), 18 October 1973; TsDA, 
f.259, op.36, a.e.88, l.65–66, Report by Ivan Nedev; TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.174, l.34– 
36, “Abolishing”; TsDA, f.1477, op.30, a.e.549, l.52, Information about some new 
elements in the relations between Western countries manifested during their meetings in
Brussels and Copenhagen (A. Yankov, Ambassador in London), 28 December 1973. 
88  Vachkov and Ivanov, Balgarskiyat vanshen dalg , 185. 
89 TsDA, f.1B, op.35, a.e.4142, Protocol A-342 of politburo session, 15 May 1973. 
90 TsDA, f.1B, op.35, a.e.4142, l.20, Proposals on the permitted order, forms and con-
tent of CMEA contacts with the EEC. 
91 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.459, l.392, Report by Mihail Paskalev, Deputy Director of 
MFA’s Economic Section, 20 May 1971. 
92 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.460, l.126, Information by Petar Mladenov, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Ivan Nedev, Minister of Foreign Trade, on the impact of the Common Market’s
expansion and EEC’s free-trade treaties with Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Ice-
land and Portugal on NRB’s economic relations with these countries, 20 October 1972.
93 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.88, l.62, Report by Ivan Nedev. 
94  TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.174, l.46–8, Abolishing. 
95 TsDA, f.259, op.32, a.e.25, l.10, Monetary-financial problems in economic relations 
between member states of the CMEA and the EEC (Prof. Nesho Tsarevski, Scientific 
Institute on Problems of Socialist Economic Integration), 12 January 1974. 
96 Volen Butashkov, “Predizvikatelstvoto na Obshtiya pazar,”  Rabotnichesko delo, 2 
January 1973, 5. 
97 TsDA, f.259, op.32, a.e.18, l.98, Building. 
98 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.174, l.54–63, Abolishing. 
99 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.174, l.8, Exploration of some problems concerning the opera-
tion of state and public bodies under contemporary conditions (Е. Mateev, Chairman 
of the Council on Reproduction of Material Resources), 11 April 1973. 
100 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.174, l.9, Exploration of some problems. 
101 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.174, l.10, Exploration of some problems. 
102  For example, Lalov, Vanshnotargovskata politika na stranite ot “Obshtiya pazar”
and the works of Nacho Nachev: Agrarniyat protektsionizam v EIO; Targovska poli-
tika na EIO; Otnosheniyata mezhdu SIV i EIO. 
103 SIV i Obshtiyat Pazar: Statisticheski spravochnik (published in 1976, 1977 and 1980).
104 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.88, l.68, Report by Nedev. 
105 TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.88, l.63, Report by Nedev. 
106 TsDA f.1B, op.81A, a.e.171, l.13–14, Information by Petar Avramov, third secretary at 
Bulgarian Embassy in Brussels, on technical contacts conducted between representa-
tives of Bulgarian foreign trade organisations and experts at the EEC Commission – 
18–19 April 1972, Brussels, 28 April 1972. 
107 TsDA f.1B, op.81A, a.e.171, l.18, Information from the MFT’s “International Organ-
isations” section on a conversation with a representative of the EEC Commission, 19 
September 1972. 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
    
   
   
   
   
   
 
   
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
  
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Bulgaria: Balancing Internationalism 187 
108 TsDA, f.259, op.39, a.e.49, l.51, 67, Information on the meeting with the heads of 
trade-economic missions in developed capitalist countries, 18 February 1976. 
109 TsDA, f.259, op.39, a.e.49, l.86, Information on the meeting with the heads of trade-
economic missions. 
110 TsDA, f.1477, op.27, a.e.4371, l.70, Information on NRB’s standpoints on matters of 
European security, 21 August 1971. 
111 AMVnR, op.32, a.e.6312, l.1, Some ideas, 1969. 
112 TsDA, f.259, op.39, a.e.49, l.66, Information on the meeting. 
113 AMVnR, op.32, a.e.5172, l.27, Information; AMVnR, op.32, a.e.5175, l.39, Tasks for 
NRB’s embassies in implementation of the Final Act’s resolutions and recommenda-
tions, 4 February 1976. 
114 TsDA, f.259, op.39, a.e.49, l.84–5, Information on the meeting. 
115 Financial Times 8 September 1979, cit. in Bell, The Bulgarian Communist Party , 146. 
116 TsDA, f.259, op.39, a.e.49, l.62–3, Information on the meeting. 
117 TsDA, f.259, op.39, a.e.49, l.47–8, Information on the meeting. 
118 On the “Balkan micro-détente,” see Pedaliu, “The US, the Balkans and détente,” 206–11.
119 TsDA, f.259, op.39, a.e.49, l.95–8, Information on the meeting. 
120 AMVnR, op.33, a.e.5172, l.15, Information on the implementation. 
121 AMVnR, op.33, a.e.5172, l.16, Information on the implementation. 
122 TsDA, f.259, op.39, a.e.49, l.55–8, Information on the meeting. 
123 TsDA, f.259, op.44, a.e.181, l.16, Information on the activity of the “Economic Coop-
eration with Developed Capitalist Countries” department in 1977. 
124  TsDA, f.259, op.36, a.e.174, 66, Abolishing. 
125 AMVnR, op.33, a.e.918, l.28, NRB’s Embassy in FRG: Some trends in EEC’s develop-
ment and positions of FRG authorities regarding the anticipated reply by EEC’s Council
of Ministers to the letter from the CMEA Executive Committee, September 1976.
126 TsDA, f.259, op.44, a.e.181, l.18, Information on the activity. 
127 TsDA, f.259, op.44, a.e.181, l.21, Information on the activity. 
128 TsDA, f.259, op.44, a.e.921, l.93, Report by Hristo Hristov, Minister of Foreign 
Trade, on implementation of the bilateral meeting between NRB and EEC representa-
tives within GATT’s multilateral trade negotiations, 1 April 1977. 
129 TsDA, f.259, op.44, a.e.922, l.150, Report by Hristo Hristov, Minister of Foreign 
Trade, on GATT’s multilateral trade negotiations and NRB participation, 24 October 
1978. 
130 TsDA, f.259, op.39, a.e.49, l.33,79, Information on the meeting; TsDA, f.259, op.44, 
a.e.181, l.1, Information on the activity. 
131  Vachkov and Ivanov, Balgarskiyat vanshen dalg , 159. 
132  Vachkov and Ivanov, Balgarskiyat vanshen dalg , 176–84. 
133 TsDA, f.259, op.44, a.e.922, l.9–11, Report by Hristo Hristov, Minister of Foreign 
Trade, on implemented talks with representatives of EEC Commission, 28 June 1978. 
134 TsDA, f.259, op.44, a.e.922, l.8, Report by Hristo Hristov. 
135 TsDA, f.259, op.44, a.e.922, 1.60–7, Report by Hristo Hristov, Minister of Foreign 
Trade, on the conclusion of negotiations and the long-term treaty for commerce with 
textile products between NRB and EEC Commission, 28 February 1979. 
136 TsDA, f.259, op.45, a.e.1336, l.1, Information on NRB’s negotiations with GATT, 13 
May 1987. 
137 Stanoeva, “Bulgaria’s 1,300 Years and East Berlin’s 750 Years.” 
138 Iakimova, “Ustanovyavane na ofitsialni otnosheniya,” 178; Mihaylov, “Targoviyata 
mezhdu Balgariya i Evropeyskata ikonomicheska obshtnost,” 199. 
139 TsDA, f.259, op.45, a.e.1332, l.8–11, Report by Atanas Paparizov, Director of 
“Developed Capitalist Countries and Multilateral Trade Policy” bureau, on talks in 
Brussels on 26 June in preparation for the agreement between NRB and the EEC, 26 
June 1989, on diplomatic negotiations with the EEC in the late 1980s. See Marcheva, 
“Parvi stapki na Balgariya.” 
 

































188 Elitza Stanoeva 
140  Grigorova, “Kolebaniya i reshitelnost.” 
141 A similar argument is made with regard to the GDR in Chapter 5 by Maximilian Graf 
in this book (i.e. modernisation through economic cooperation with the West aimed 
at reducing East German economic dependency on the West). 
Bibliography 
Avramov, Roumen.  Pari i de/stabilizatsiya v Balgariya 1948–1989. Sofia: Ciela, 2008. 
Baev, Jordan. “The establishment of Bulgarian-West German diplomatic relations within 
the coordinating framework of the Warsaw Pact.”  Journal of Cold War Studies 18:3 
(2016): 158–80. 
Bell, John. The Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov. Stanford: Hoover 
Press, 1986. 
Dragostinova, Theodora. “The East in the West: Bulgarian culture in the United States 
of America during the global 1970s.”  Journal of Contemporary History 53:1 (2018): 
212–39. 
Grigorova, Irina. “Kolebaniya i reshitelnost: tehnicheskite kontakti na Balgariya s EIO v kraya
na 60-te i nachaloto na 70-te godini na XX vek.” Historical Review 5–6 (2012): 127–44.
Guentcheva, Rossitza. “Mobile objects: Corecom and the selling of Western goods in 
socialist Bulgaria.” Études Balkaniques 1 (2009): 3–28. 
Guentcheva, Rossitza. “Material harmony: the quest for quality in socialist Bulgaria, 
1960s–1980s.” In Communism unwrapped: consumption in Cold War Europe, edited 
by Paulina Bren and Mary Neuburger, 140–63. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Hristov, Hristo.  Imperiyata na zadgranichnite firmi: Sazdavane, deynost i iztochvane na 
druzhestvata s balgarsko uchastie zad granitsa 1961–2007. Sofia: Ciela, 2009. 
Iakimova, Irina. “Ustanovyavane na ofitsialni otnosheniya mezhdu Balgariya i zapadnoev-
ropeyskiya Obsht pazar.” In  Integratsiya i dezintegratsiya v Evropa prez 80-te godini na 
XX vek, edited by Iskra Baeva, 152–81. Sofia: Sofia University Press, 2016. 
Ivanova, Maya. Turizam pod nadzor: Balkanturist – nachaloto na mezhdunarodniya i 
masov turizam v Balgariya. Sofia: Ciela, 2018. 
 Lalov, Lalo. Vanshnotargovskata politika na stranite ot “Obshtiya pazar” i ikonomi-
cheskite im vrazki sas stranite ot SIV. Leningrad, 1975. 
Lampe, John. The Bulgarian economy in the twentieth century. London: Croom Helm, 1986. 
Marcheva, Iliana. “Parvi stapki na Balgariya kam obedinyavashta se Evropa v kraya na 80-te
I nachaloto na 90-te godini na XX vek.” Bulgarian Historical Review 1–2 (2006): 348–64.
Mavrodin, Corina. Romania and the Cold War: the roots of exceptionalism, 1953–63. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming. 
Mihaylov, Venelin. “Targoviyata mezhdu Balgariya i Evropeyskata ikonomicheska obsht-
nost prez 80-te godini.” In Integratsiya i dezintegratsiya v Evropa prez 80-te godini na 
XX vek, edited by Iskra Baeva, 197–213. Sofia: Sofia University Press, 2016. 
Nachev, Nacho.  Agrarniyat protektsionizam v EIO i iznosat na balgarski selskostopanski 
stoki. Sofia: Balgarska targovsko-promishlena palata, 1974. 
Nachev, Nacho.  Targovska politika na EIO kam sotsialisticheskite strani. Sofia: BTPP, 1977.
Nachev, Nacho.  Otnosheniyata mezhdu SIV i EIO – vazhen faktor na evropeyskoto satrud-
nichestvo. Sofia: Partizdat, 1980. 
Pedaliu, Effie G.H. “The US, the Balkans and détente, 1963–73.” In  The Balkans in the 
Cold War, edited by Svetozar Rajak, Konstantina E. Botsiou, Eirini Karamouzi and 













    
    
    
    





Bulgaria: Balancing Internationalism 189 
Slavova, Petya. Georgi Naydenov i Teksim-Imekstrakom: “Komisionerska” ikonomika i 
stopanska avtonomia prez sotsializma ot 60-te. Sofia: Ciela, 2017. 
Stanoeva, Elitza. “Bulgaria’s 1,300 years and East Berlin’s 750 years: comparing national 
and international objectives of socialist anniversaries in the 1980s.” CAS Working Paper 
Series 9 (2017): 3–40. 
Stanoeva, Elitza. “Inventing the socialist consumer: worker, citizen or customer? Politics 
of mass consumption in Bulgaria, 1954–1960.” In New perspectives in transnational 
history of communism in East Central Europe, edited by Krzysztof Brzechczyn, 171–98. 
Berlin: Peter Lang, 2019. 
Stanoeva, Elitza. “Squeezed between external trade barriers and internal economic prob-
lems: Bulgaria’s trade with Denmark in the 1970s.”  European Review of History: Revue 
européenne d’histoire (2019): 1–23. Accessed 7 April 2020.  https://doi.org/10.1080/13 
507486.2019.1663796. 
Stanoeva, Elitza. “Exporting holidays: Bulgarian international tourism and the Scandina-
vian market in the 1960s and 1970s.” In Tourism and travel during the Cold War: nego-
tiating tourist experiences across the Iron Curtain, edited by Sune Bechmann Pedersen 
and Christian Noack, 23–46. London: Routledge, 2020. 
Stanoeva, Elitza. “The imperative of opening to the West and the impact of the 1968 crisis: 
Bulgaria’s cooperation with Denmark and West Germany in the 1960s.”  Margins for 
manoeuvre in Cold War Europe: the influence of smaller powers, edited by Susanna 
Erlandsson and Laurien Crump-Gabreëls, 110–29. London: Routledge, 2020. 
Statisticheski Godishnik na NRB 1965. Sofia: Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie pri MS, 
1965. 
Statisticheski Godishnik na NRB 1968. Sofia: Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie pri MS, 
1968. 
Statisticheski Godishnik na NRB 1974. Sofia: Ministerstvo na informatsiyata i saobshteni-
yata, 1974. 
Statisticheski Godishnik na NRB 1979. Sofia: Komitet po edinna sistema za sotsialna infor-
matsiya pri MS, 1979. 
Statisticheski Godishnik na NRB 1985. Sofia: Komitet za sotsialna informatsiya, 1985. 
Vachkov, Daniel and Ivanov, Martin.  Balgarskiyat vanshen dalg 1944–1989: Bankrutat na 
komunisticheskata ikonomika. Sofia: Ciela, 2008. 
Vezenkov, Aleksander. “Institutsiyata na darzhavnia glava v Bulgaria (1944–1990). 

























 8 Romania Turns West 
National and international rationales 
 Elena Dragomir 
From the late 1960s, the Romanian authorities intensified their struggle to increase
exports to Western Europe, aiming to improve the state’s balance of payments by
accumulating hard currency. However, reducing the country’s trade deficit was not
an easy objective as the foreign trade sector was affected by a series of both domes-
tic and foreign difficulties. Among the latter, the intensification of the Western inte-
gration process was perceived in Bucharest as one of the major threats to Romania’s
commercial interests. Different institutions and specialists were given the tasks of
studying the impact of EEC protectionism on Romania’s economic interests and of
recommending solutions. Based on the proposals received, in the late 1960s and
early 1970s Romania defined its approach to the EEC, an approach that guided its
relations with the Western European states during the 1970s and beyond.
This chapter investigates Romania’s openness to the West in the “long 1970s”
and focuses on how the Romanian authorities prepared for the consequences of EEC
integration and enlargement and the overall results of the endeavour. It addresses
the period between 1968, when the Romanian authorities began to put together a
strategy towards the EEC, and 1980, when for the first time since 1961 Romania
registered a positive balance of trade in its relations with the EEC member states.
The subject of Romania’s relations with the West is much overlooked by schol-
arship, which tends to focus instead on the country’s relations with the Soviet 
Union or its so-called maverick position within the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact. 1 
Petre Opriș has examined specific micro-case studies of how Romania obtained 
industrial (civil and military) licences from various Western firms, but not the 
question of how the Romanian leadership conceptualised cooperation with West-
ern states.2 Despite some progress, studies on the country’s bilateral relations with 
different Western states 3 and Western-based international organisations 4 are also 
rather scarce, and even scarcer when it comes to Romania’s approach to the Com-
mon Market.5 This chapter appraises Romania’s economic approach to the EEC 
and the West in general in the long 1970s, a time of East-West mutual rediscovery, 
détente and cooperation. 
The foreign trade sector reconsidered in the late 1960s 
Having been defined by the communist leadership in the late 1940s, Romania’s 
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however, changing much in terms of its ultimate goals and main conception. 
Throughout the post-war era, industrialisation remained the concept at the centre 
of this strategy, deriving in equal measure from the leaders’ ideological view of 
socialism and from their desire to improve people’s living standard. Following 
Marxist-Leninist teachings, the Romanian communist leadership wanted to build 
a socialist state based on a dictatorship of the proletariat, ‘the supreme principle 
of which was the alliance of the working class with the working peasantry’. It 
was argued that ‘socialist industry and, first of all, heavy industry’ constituted 
the main mandatory condition for building the economic base of socialism, the 
ultimate aim of which was to create welfare and a high standard of living for 
the people.6 In defining the main lines of Romania’s economic development for 
the next five-year plan (1961–65) and for the next fifteen-year prospects pro-
gramme (1961–75), the third Congress of the Romanian Workers’ Party (RWP) in 
June 1960 envisioned ‘the development of the technical-material base of social-
ism’ and ‘the continuation of the industrialisation of the country, giving priority to
heavy industry and its hub – the machine-building industry’. A sixfold increase in 
industrial production was expected by 1975. By the mid-1970s, Romania was to 
become ‘a developed industrialised country with diversified and highly produc-
tive agriculture’, ‘ensuring living conditions for the entire people worthy of the 
era of socialism’.7 
In July 1965, the ninth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) 
elected the members of the Permanent Praesidium (PP) and Nicolae Ceaușescu as 
secretary general of the Central Committee (CC). However, the new party leader-
ship did not differ much from the previous one as most of its members, Ceaușescu 
included, had held high party and state positions during the previous leadership of 
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. Therefore, the general stance of the national economic 
strategy did not change much either, and neither did Romania’s foreign policy line 
in general. Instead, what the new leadership proposed was better management of 
all economic sectors and an increase in their efficiency. 8 The foreign trade sec-
tor was given special attention in the process, as it was seen as a field of ‘vital 
importance’ in the country’s economic development. 9 To secure industrialisation 
of the country, machinery and technology had to be imported and the leadership 
gave directives to ‘create supplementary currency means in order to cover the 
imports necessary for the long-term development of our economy’.10 The Minis-
try of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were called on not only 
to take measures to diversify and enlarge the country’s relations with the Western 
European states but also to study possible membership of the GATT, the IMF and 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) for Roma-
nia. More specifically, they were to establish whether participation in the GATT
would help overcome various export barriers and whether membership of the IMF 
and the IBRD would secure credits to pay for Western imports of machinery and 
technology. 11 
Confirming the party’s commitment to industrialisation, the 1965 congress 
envisioned an increase of 40% in the volume of the country’s foreign trade by 
1970 together with improvement in the quality of exported goods and changes in 
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product exports.12 According to Ceaușescu, foreign trade was ‘one of the prob-
lems of vital importance for the economic and social development of our country’
because ‘most new enterprises are built with imported machinery, installations 
and licences’. Observing that Romania’s imports exceeded its exports and that 
its commerce was insufficiently developed – lagging not only behind Western 
European states but behind all the other Eastern European states too – Ceaușescu 
stressed that ‘evidently, things cannot continue like this’ and a reform of the entire 
sector was needed.13 
Publicly, the leadership always stressed that Romania’s central foreign policy 
objective was friendship and collaboration with the Soviet Union and the socialist 
states, and criticism of the capitalist system was constant. At the same time, how-
ever, it stated that Romania was in favour of expanding its economic, technical, 
scientific, cultural and political relations with Western European states specifically 
and all the states in the world in general.14 Observing the emergence of a new 
global economy – a system that in the Romanian conception should be free from 
protectionist or discriminatory policies – the Romanian leadership considered that 
extending cooperation with countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America 
regardless of their social systems was an objective necessity in order to obtain 
products and raw materials Romania could not produce domestically. To raise 
profitability, Ceaușescu further argued, Romania had to export more highly manu-
factured industrial products to both capitalist and socialist states capable of provid-
ing the country with the foreign currency needed to pay for necessary imports.15 
Behind the scenes, however, the Romanian authorities defined their commer-
cial interest in the Western European states in more concrete terms, and especially 
their interest in the EEC members, which were seen as a main source of machin-
ery, installations and licences and major importers of Romanian agricultural prod-
ucts and raw materials, and therefore sources of foreign currency. 
Assessing the impact of the EEC’s increased protectionism 
The decision to improve the foreign trade sector coincided with a deepening 
of integration in the EEC, the protectionist policies of which were expected to 
negatively impact Romania’s commercial interests and economic development. 
A group of experts from the Institute for Economic Research, the Institute for 
the Study of the International Economic Situation, the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
(MFT), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Finance, the 
State Planning Committee, and the Government Commission on Economic and 
Technical-Scientific Cooperation was called on to draw up solutions. In January 
1968, this group of specialists issued a joint study titled ‘The Common Market’
on Romania’s future position regarding the EEC. 16 
Its recommendations were based on two types of assessment. On the one hand, 
it observed that the EEC members were ‘the most important European export-
ers of machinery, equipment, installations and modern technology’ and that these 
countries ‘are and will continue to be suppliers of first importance for our coun-
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EEC, and 51% of these imports were investment goods and means of transport. 
Moreover, at the time Romania’s exchanges with the EEC represented 20% of 
its total foreign trade and 51.5% of its trade with capitalist states. On the other 
hand, the study argued that due to the forthcoming implementation of the EEC’s 
Common Commercial Policy (CCP), ‘the negative effects of the discriminatory 
policy of the Common Market on non-members, including on those with devel-
oped economies, will become increasingly bigger’, creating barriers and discrimi-
nation against Romania’s exports to the Western European states. Looking at how 
other countries prepared to respond to further EEC integration, the joint study 
observed that Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia were using their member-
ship of GATT to ‘decrease discrimination by the Common Market’. 17 
Arguing that increasing economic and technical-scientific relations with the 
EEC member states was mandatory for Romania’s economic development, the 
study formulated a series of proposals structured at three main levels. The first 
level envisioned direct contacts with EEC institutions in parallel with bilateral 
negotiations with each EEC member state. However, direct contacts with the EEC 
might imply diplomatic recognition, which was seen as a delicate political matter, 
since ‘until now, the socialist states have formally declared that they do not recog-
nise the Common Market’. This led to the second level of how the CMEA would 
affect Romania’s EEC-related interests and how Romania’s approach to the EEC 
would affect its relations with the other socialist states, and especially with the 
Soviet Union. The third level envisioned using other international organisations 
and particularly the GATT to obtain better conditions for Romania’s trade with 
capitalist states.18 
The study also proposed concrete measures to secure the country’s commercial 
interests in the EEC. Observing that 85% of Romania’s exports to the EEC con-
sisted in raw materials, fuels, foodstuffs and non-manufactured goods, it recom-
mended an increase in exports of industrial products and manufactured goods. 
However, a handwritten annotation by the State Planning Committee emphasised 
that these products were not qualitatively fit for the EEC market.19 Exporting 
more industrial goods to Western states (or even to other CMEA states) was a 
task often mentioned by Romanian officials, 20 but given the inferior quality of 
these products the results of Romania’s intensified industrialisation were mainly 
exported to “third-world” developing countries and not to industrialised capitalist 
countries. 
Other measures envisioned establishing official technical contacts with EEC 
institutions following the examples of Poland and Yugoslavia, agreements on agri-
cultural products and sending Romanian experts to Brussels to gather information 
on how the EEC worked and how other third countries were dealing with it.21 
Following the guidelines drawn up in the 1968 joint study, the MFA, the MFT, 
the Ministry of Finance and the State Planning Committee recommended Romania 
participating in the GATT on the ground that it would facilitate exports of ‘Roma-
nian products to the capitalist developed countries, especially to those partici-
pating in economic groupings’.22 The PP approved this recommendation on 26 
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appointed Andrei Șerban as delegate to the Romanian commercial agency in Brus-
sels and instructed him to ‘carry out frequent unofficial contacts of a technical-
informative character with officials in various competent bodies of the Executive 
Commission of the Common Market’.24 
Furthermore, in connection with a series of proposals advanced by the Romanian 
embassy in Rome, the MFA tackled and solved the problem of whether establish-
ing direct contacts with EEC institutions would imply official recognition of the 
EEC and what the political implications would be for Romania. In a note to the 
MFA in June 1968, Romania’s ambassador in Rome, Cornel Burtică,25 observed 
that given the way the EEC worked, concluding bilateral agreements with EEC 
members would no longer be possible. Burtică further argued that a solution for 
Romania could be to conclude technical agreements on products with the EEC 
Commission, as Poland and Bulgaria had already done.26 In response to Burtică’s
suggestion, the MFT studied the agreement that Poland had concluded on 24 
April 1968 with the EEC Commission regarding the non-fixing of an additional 
amount of imports of live swine and pig carcasses from Poland. Worrying that 
concluding this type of agreement with the EEC Commission could have political 
implications and could involve official recognition of the EEC, the MFT asked 
the MFA for its opinion on the matter. 27 Responding, the MFA provided the main 
arguments that Romania would use during the next decades to explain its deci-
sion to carry out direct contacts with the EEC to its CMEA partners. Observ-
ing that the Common Market was ‘an entity, an objective reality’ with specific 
competences in terms of foreign trade, the MFA argued that ‘establishing rela-
tions with the institutions of the Common Market only targets the commercial 
field and not the political field and even less so the ideological one’. Considering 
the imminent implementation of the EEC Common Commercial Policy, the MFA
further argued that ‘third countries cannot avoid contacts with the institutions 
of the Common Market’ – where contacts were defined in terms of commercial 
relations – unless they were willing to risk stopping their trade with the EEC 
zone completely. Therefore, the MFA recommended concluding agreements with 
the EEC on various agricultural products following the Polish example.28 The 
proposal was approved by the PP and agreements on eggs, swine, pork, cheese, 
beef, sunflower oil and wine were discussed and concluded.29 These agreements 
followed the examples set by Poland and Hungary and took the form of exchanges 
of letters. They were concluded by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and 
the Ministry of the Food Industry, not by the MFT or the local embassy, in order 
to keep them at the level of ‘technical unofficial contacts’. 30 
In preparing its approach to the EEC, Romania paid special attention to the 
position of the CMEA. In 1963, the CMEA member states had agreed that estab-
lishing contacts with the EEC was not timely and that the question of recognising 
the EEC could be re-analysed in the future if necessary. 31 The Romanian authori-
ties now questioned whether this position would prevent them from establish-
ing direct contacts with the EEC institutions. The Government Commission on 
Economic and Technical-Scientific Cooperation argued that the CMEA’s position 
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an obstacle of a juridical nature able to prevent Romania from adopting whatever 
approach it considered appropriate to the EEC.32 
Formulated in November 1970, the approach drew heavily on Romania’s gen-
eral strategy for economic development and foreign trade. The tenth Congress of 
the RCP (6–12 August 1969) stated that socialist industrialisation and particularly 
the development of heavy industry remained the basis for the general progress 
of society and the welfare of the people. Romania planned to reach production 
of 10 million tons of steel and 2.4 million tons of chemical fertilisers by 1975. 
Improving foreign trade was conceived as a condition for achieving industrialisa-
tion, while the development of relations between countries with different social 
systems was seen as an expression of the economic and social reality of the time, 
in which ‘the world is in full transformation’.33 
These party directives were followed by new legislation, procedures and rules 
aimed at securing Romania’s transformation into an advanced industrialised 
country with an efficient foreign trade sector able to provide imports of West-
ern machinery and technology without creating a deficit in the country’s balance 
of payments. Exporting more Romanian products to foreign (including Western) 
markets and obtaining foreign credits were two key pillars of Romania’s eco-
nomic strategy at the time.34 However, by the end of 1969, Romania saw all these 
plans potentially jeopardised by the imminent implementation of the EEC Com-
mon Commercial Policy and EEC enlargement. 
Romania’s strategy towards the EEC: expectations 
Romania’s strategy towards the EEC was officially adopted in February 1971. 
The EEC allowed its member states to negotiate bilateral agreements valid 
until 31 December 1974 with third countries before the end of 1972. Romania 
responded to the EEC policy in three main steps. First, it designed a strategy that 
encompassed practical measures to deal with the EEC and its member states until 
31 December 1972. Then, it adopted a policy that dealt with Romania-EEC rela-
tions until 31 December 1974. Finally, in late 1974 it defined its stance towards 
the EEC for the period after 1 January 1975. The differences between these three 
stages lay in some very pragmatic actions taken in response to EEC policies. What 
gave them consistency was that they all derived from the same general conception 
of Romania’s approach to the EEC. 
The 1970 to 1972 period 
In early 1970, the MFT asked the Romanian embassy in Brussels and its Eco-
nomic Agency to draft a note on the negative effects of EEC policy on Romania’s 
trade and to propose solutions. Drawn up by Ștefan Niță, the chief of the agency, 
and Șerban Andrei, the economic secretary, the note reflected ‘the point of view 
of the entire operative staff of the embassy and agency’. 35 In fact, it was a very 
detailed study on the matter. It observed that the EEC member states had lost 
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concluding with the EEC association agreements (Greece and Turkey), partial 
association agreements (Morocco and Tunisia), preferential commercial agree-
ments (Spain and Israel) and agreements on products or commercial agreements 
(Yugoslavia). Therefore, it argued that Romania’s foreign trade was affected not 
only by EEC protectionist measures but also by the network of agreements and 
arrangements it had established with other third countries which now benefited 
in one way or another from preferential treatment. The EEC enlargement to the 
UK, Ireland and Denmark was also perceived as a threat to Romania’s interests. 36 
The study suggested a series of practical measures to secure the export of 
Romanian goods, such as adapting to EEC demands, improving the quality of 
goods, establishing joint production units with EEC-based firms, increasing tech-
nical and industrial cooperation with EEC countries, searching for other markets 
for Romanian products that were not in demand in the EEC, establishing produc-
tion units in countries that had association agreements with the EEC, conclud-
ing new agreements on agricultural products (particularly beef) and studying the 
possibility of concluding a government agreement with the EEC and its politi-
cal implications. These measures, the study contended, could reduce the negative 
impact of EEC policies on Romania’s trade to some extent but would not elimi-
nate it completely. 37
 As Ceaușescu publicly and repeatedly admitted, Romania had taken measures 
to reduce its balance of payments deficit, but despite some improvements the value 
of imports still surpassed the value of exports.38 Therefore, Romania began taking 
credits from the West. Visiting Moscow in May 1970, the Romanian leadership 
was harshly criticised for ‘reorienting Romania’s economic relations towards the 
West’, as Ceaușescu narrated it. Brezhnev tried to convince Ceaușescu to revise 
his foreign trade policy, to limit imports from capitalist states and to be more care-
ful about taking Western loans. The Soviet leader reasoned that Romania would 
not be able to pay back its loans, would suffer an increase in the deficit of its 
balance of payments and would end up asking the Soviet Union for financial 
and economic support. Ceaușescu rejected such pessimistic interpretations and 
remained committed to the idea of increasing commercial and financial relations 
with the Western states. 39 The same year, the General Secretariat of the Council 
of Ministers asked the MFA, the MFT and the National Bank to study possible 
Romanian adherence to the IMF and the IBRD.40 
In July 1970, another study on the EEC by the embassy in Brussels signed by 
Niță, Andrei and ambassador Alexandru Lăzăreanu observed that most third coun-
tries were not focusing on whether the EEC should be diplomatically recognised 
but on convincing the EEC to accept commercial negotiations and grant export 
concessions. It suggested that Romania should follow the same path. Analysing 
the CMEA dimension, it stressed that the socialist states were not affected equally 
by EEC protectionism. Regarding Romania’s possible juridical framework for 
relations, the study argued that concluding technical agreements on products was 
a limited solution, as they could only address a limited number of products which 
was almost exhausted and that a non-preferential agreement like the one con-
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tends to evolve towards consolidation and not towards weakening’ and that its 
protectionist measures had ‘an irreversible character’, the Romanian embassy in 
Brussels argued that Romania should approach the EEC at two levels: through 
bilateral contacts with EEC member states and through direct contacts with its 
institutions.42 
Synthesising information, reports and studies gathered through different chan-
nels during the previous years, in November 1970 the MFT and the MFA drew up 
an eight-page joint document on ‘Our Country’s Strategy in its Economic Rela-
tions with the Common Market’.43 The document was signed by Cornel Burtică, 
now minister of foreign trade, Corneliu Mănescu, minister of foreign affairs, 44 
and Ion Pățan, vice president of the Council of Ministers.45 
Romania’s strategy towards the EEC derived from the party’s general concep-
tion of its national economic development. Aiming to increase commercial rela-
tions between Romania and the Western states, the strategy envisioned three main 
points: direct relations with the EEC institutions in parallel with bilateral relations 
with EEC member states; using other international organisations to support Roma-
nia’s EEC-related objectives; and preventing the CMEA from having a negative 
impact on Romania’s objectives regarding the EEC. Thus the strategy was that 
establishing contacts with the EEC institutions did not require recognition of the 
organisation; that Romania should use the GATT and the UNCTAD to obtain bet-
ter trade conditions with the EEC member states; and that Romania needed to 
inform the CMEA of its approach to the EEC (as previously agreed at the CMEA
level) and to abstain in the future from accepting any CMEA policy that might 
affect Romania’s EEC-related interests, such as agreeing not to conclude commer-
cial agreements with the EEC or not to recognise the EEC. The practical measures 
identified in the 1970 strategy envisioned bilateral consultation with EEC member 
states and institutions; unofficial visits by EEC officials to Romania; authorising 
Romanian diplomats in Brussels to establish unofficial contacts with representa-
tives of the EEC Commission; increasing the quality of the goods exported to the 
EEC; creating joint production units with EEC-based firms; adapting exports to 
EEC demand; concluding agreements on agricultural products; acting within the 
UNCTAD to obtain customs preferences from the EEC; and drawing up studies on 
the EEC and recommendations on Romania’s approach to it. 46 
After being approved by the Permanent Praesidium of the party on 22 Febru-
ary 1971, the strategy was rapidly put into practice.47 Unofficial bilateral con-
sultations with representatives of the EEC Commission were organised both in 
Romania and in Brussels to discuss better conditions for Romania’s exports. 48 
One of the questions addressed during these talks was Romania’s admission to the 
EEC’s Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP). 49 The MFA continued to ask its 
representatives abroad to gather information and report on EEC evolution and its 
relations with third countries ‘in order to substantiate possible actions that might 
be taken’ by the Romanian side. 50 The MFA argued that the EEC had become ‘the 
first commercial power and the second economic power’ in the world. As other 
states were likely to join the EEC, its influence and role as a world power were 
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In a study in July 1971, the MFT identified concrete problems that Romania 
needed to solve: obtaining better trade conditions and being accepted in the EEC’s 
GSP; designing a programme of cooperation with the EEC; and creating a joint 
Romania-EEC commission to address problems of mutual interest. The study 
concluded that Romania needed to start negotiating with the EEC as an entity. 52 
Measures were also taken to prevent the CMEA from frustrating Romania’s 
EEC-related goals. Therefore, Romania blocked a proposal to include a stipula-
tion regarding official non-recognition of the EEC in the CMEA’s ‘Comprehen-
sive Programme’ adopted in July 1971. 53 Its opposition was grounded on the fact 
that the ‘Comprehensive Programme’ ‘is long-term and it is not excluded that in 
the future our interests will require another tactic’.54 In October 1971, Romania 
put the problem of CMEA-EEC relations on the Council’s agenda. Contending 
that the commercial aspects of relations could no longer be addressed bilaterally 
and that EEC protectionism was negatively impacting the commercial interests 
of the socialist states, Gheorghe (Gogu) Rădulescu, Romania’s permanent repre-
sentative at the CMEA, argued that the EEC as an entity had to be approached at 
two levels: by each individual CMEA member state on the one hand and by the 
Secretariat of the Council on the other. The latter should address general aspects 
of relations in order to create a favourable framework for the improvement of 
relations between the CMEA member states and the EEC institutions. 55 
As Suvi Kansikas has demonstrated, this proposal resulted in considerable 
contradictory debates at the CMEA level. The problem was even referred to the 
Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact in January 1972, but there 
were no results.56 As the controversy continued, Romania’s representative insisted 
that contacts with the EEC institutions would not imply official recognition of 
the EEC as they only occurred at the level of economic-commercial relations. 
Romania insisted that exchanges between the CMEA member states and the EEC 
should be increased.57 Instead, the Soviet Union proposed reducing them, arguing 
that in this way the economic vulnerability of the socialist states to EEC protec-
tionism would decrease.58 
Being committed to the national objective of increasing foreign trade in general, 
and observing that ‘the Common Market is a reality’, following previous recom-
mendations by specialists and diplomats the Romanian leadership decided that 
‘some problems, such as that regarding generalised customs preferences, should 
be discussed with the [EEC] institutions that can make a decision on the matter’ – 
as Ceaușescu publicly acknowledged.59 According to the Romanian leader, ‘we 
consider it necessary to develop commercial contacts with the EEC in order to 
favour an increase in exchanges and cooperation with all countries that are mem-
bers of this organisation’. 60 
On 31 January 1972, in a letter addressed by Foreign Trade Minister Cornel 
Burtică to Gaston Thorn, the president of the EEC Council of Ministers, Roma-
nia requested admittance to the EEC’s GSP. 61 To support its request, Romania 
presented statistical data regarding its economic development.62 Initially, France 
opposed, arguing that Romania was not a developing country and that granting it 
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France reviewed its position.64 Moreover, Romanian officials intended to use the 
GATT framework to obtain better trade relations with the EEC members and com-
pensation for the damage that EEC enlargement did to its trade interests. Romania 
had been a member of the GATT since October 1971, a mandatory preliminary 
condition for qualifying for the EEC’s GSP. 65 According to Ion Gheorghe Mau-
rer, Romania’s prime minister, 66 benefiting from the EEC’s GSP ‘with the same 
conditions as the other developing countries in the Group of 77’ was ‘one of the 
major problems for the future orientation of Romania’s commercial exchanges’
and had ‘major political-economic importance’.67 In November 1971, the MFA
was instructed to take diplomatic actions to secure Romania’s membership of the 
G-77, the largest intergovernmental organisation of developing countries in the 
UN.68 
Romanian adherence to the IMF and the World Bank was further explored 
as another route to solving foreign trade and economic development problems. 
According to the Ministry of Finance, the foreign currency collected from exports 
was mostly used to pay for the amortisation of loans contracted in the West for 
buying Western equipment and installations on credit, ‘which restricts our import 
possibilities, forcing us to take new credits’. The reimbursement difficulties origi-
nated in the fact that Romania had contracted mostly short-term loans. Contract-
ing long-term loans from the IMF and the IBRD was thought to be the solution.69 
In December 1972, Romania joined the IMF and the IBRD, from which the 
Romanian authorities hoped to obtain advantageous loans to support imports of 
Western machinery and technologies. 70 
Brezhnev continued to warn Ceaușescu that importing and taking credits from 
the West would create major economic problems for Romania: ‘I want to tell 
you as a friend, so you will pay attention. You will have to pay a lot of inter-
est for this money’. Ceaușescu argued that ‘we will manage because we took 
measures’. At the same time, Brezhnev insisted that the USSR could no longer 
supply the increasing quantities of raw materials and fuels requested by the East-
ern European states. Ceaușescu reiterated that Romania would find them in other 
countries.71 Needing large quantities of oil (especially for its chemical industry), 
Romania had started to import from Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Iran.72 According 
to Ceaușescu, the shortage of energy resources was a fundamental problem for 
Romania’s economic and social development not only in the short term but also in 
the long term.73 In the aftermath of the October 1973 oil crisis, Romania adopted 
legislation designed to rationalise the consumption of fuels and primary energy 
resources. Industry and particularly the chemical industry were given priority, 
while all economic sectors (industry, agriculture, transportation and construction) 
were requested to use all energy sources more judiciously. However, the popula-
tion was the most affected. 74 
The 1973–74 period 
In 1973, in another study on the Common Market, MFT experts identified 
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preferences; to obtain the elimination of the quantitative restrictions applied to its 
exports; to be granted concessions for its exports of agricultural products; and to 
be compensated for the losses it incurred after the enlargement of the EEC. 75 On 
the basis of this study, the MFA and the MFT elaborated a concise ‘Note on Pro-
posals Regarding Romania’s Strategy in Its Relations with the Common Market 
(EEC)’, which was signed by Ion Pățan, vice president of the Council of Minis-
ters and minister of foreign trade, and George Macovescu, 76 minister of foreign 
affairs. 77 The note confirmed previous Romanian analyses and argued that, with 
a 36% share of world commerce, the EEC was ‘the biggest commercial entity’
and an increasing number of third countries adopted active policies towards it, 
either by concluding association agreements, commercial agreements or free 
trade agreements or by asking for generalised preferences. Thus, ‘an enlarged 
system of preferential relations’ was created, from which only the developed capi-
talist states (the US, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) 
and the socialist states with the exception of Yugoslavia were excluded. It was 
expected that new EEC common policies would produce even greater negative 
effects on Romania’s trade interests. New solutions were needed to secure gen-
eralised preferences and a juridical framework to allow commercial exchanges 
between Romania and the EEC members after 31 December 1974, when the 
existing bilateral agreements expired. The note recommended continuing diplo-
matic actions to obtain generalised preferences, asking for preferences from other 
donating countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland), obtaining better 
trade conditions for products excluded from the GSP (i.e. chemical fertilisers, 
footwear, textiles, clothing, petroleum and steel products), obtaining through the 
GATT compensation for losses suffered as a result of EEC enlargement and acting 
to attract more advantageous credits.78 
The Permanent Praesidium approved this proposed strategy with two indica-
tions: ‘to act’ and ‘to insist’ on obtaining generalised preferences and to conclude 
long-term commercial agreements with the EEC member states with the possibil-
ity of prolonging them.79 In accordance, the Romanian representatives abroad 
approached representatives of the EEC member states and proposed long-term 
bilateral agreements on economic, industrial and scientific collaboration on the 
one hand, and bilateral commercial protocols regarding Romania’s exports for the 
year 1974 on the other. This approach was based on the observation that agree-
ments on economic cooperation were still in the competence of the EEC member 
states. It was hoped that commercial stipulations could be included in long-term 
agreements on economic, scientific and technical cooperation, thus bypassing the 
authority of the EEC,80 an approach common to that of other Eastern European 
states. 
The Romanian officials in Brussels, and especially the group responsible for 
EEC problems, were instructed to draw up monthly and quarterly analyses of the 
EEC’s evolution, procedures, policies, relations with third countries and positions 
in different international organisations such as the GATT, the UNCTAD and the 
IMF, and also on ‘the experience of other countries’ in dealing with the EEC. They 
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necessary to achieve our programmes regarding the development of commercial 
exchanges and economic cooperation with the member countries of the Common 
Market’.81 
The 1973 strategy did not propose a new general conception of EEC relations 
but only new concrete actions. In an interview with a group of British journalists 
in November 1973 which was also published in Romania, Ceaușescu presented 
Romania’s approach to the EEC as follows: 
We start from the fact that the existence of the Common Market is a reality 
and, therefore, we develop relations with its countries. We also try to solve 
some problems directly with the Common Market, especially regarding 
obtaining tariff preferences and the elimination of some restrictions that are 
established and applied by the Common Market in its relations with other 
states. . . . We would like the Common Market to practise an open policy, 
to lift the barriers and restrictions that prevent free collaboration, at least in 
Europe. Romania has reached some agreements [with the Common Market] 
and we hope that they will be applied with the best conditions, especially 
with regard to granting generalised tariff preferences, which will contribute 
to the broadening of economic collaboration with the countries of the Com-
mon Market.82 
The March 1973 strategy guided Romania’s relations with the EEC until the end of
1974. It derived from the observation that commercial relations with Western Euro-
pean states – deemed absolutely necessary for Romania’s general development – 
could only be established through direct contacts with the EEC Commission. 
Therefore, a remarkable diplomatic effort was made to convince the EEC member
states to support Romania’s request to be included in the GSP. 83 These efforts paid 
off. On 4 July 1973, the EEC Council of Ministers decided to grant Romania gen-
eralised preferences.84 This led to the creation in July 1973 of a ‘Party and State 
Commission Regarding Problems in Economic Relations between Romania and 
the Common Market’ under the leadership of Ion Pățan, the new minister of for-
eign trade, and George Macovescu, minister of foreign affairs. 85 In the following 
months, technical discussions between experts from the two sides confirmed that 
products such as chemical fertilisers, footwear, textiles and clothing, petroleum 
and steel products would not be included in the GSP. The EEC Commission argued 
that special arrangements regarding exports of Romanian textiles, oil and steel 
products could be addressed separately. 86 According to estimations in Bucharest, 
if such ‘sensitive’ products were left out of the GSP, then only 11% of Romania’s 
exports to the EEC would benefit from customs preferences, which meant that the 
facilitations thus received would be ‘insignificant’.87 Although the country was 
included in the GSP as of 1 January 1974, the agreement was only applied to a 
limited number of agricultural products. During the next years, Romania would try 
in vain to obtain the inclusion of new products in the scheme.88 
Romania also tried to receive tariff compensation for losses due to EEC 
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negotiating on this matter with the EEC in the GATT framework. 89 In December 
1973, the EEC delegation made a global offer of tariff reductions, which Romania 
accepted in April 1974. Moreover, as a result of negotiations with the EEC mem-
ber states, it obtained prorogation of the 1973 commercial protocols for another 
year. It also signed long-term agreements on economic, industrial and technical 
cooperation with Italy and France.90 
The March 1973 note also suggested that Romania should not agree with 
the idea that the problem of the juridical framework for commercial exchanges 
between the CMEA member states and the EEC should be solved through a 
CMEA-EEC agreement. Romania wanted to solve its problems through direct 
contacts with the EEC.91 
At the CMEA level, the Romanian officials took two approaches: first, they 
acted to prevent the adoption of any EEC-related policies that might prevent 
Romania from acting as it saw fit in its relations with the EEC; second, they 
tried to use the CMEA to create a more favourable general framework for direct 
contacts between the CMEA member states and the EEC as an entity. Romania’s 
representatives argued that, in parallel with CMEA-EEC contacts, each CMEA
state had the right to contact the EEC independently and to negotiate and conclude 
agreements with it, that the CMEA could only address matters in its competence 
with the EEC and not matters in the competence of its member states, and that a 
CMEA common commercial policy towards the EEC could not be adopted as the 
CMEA member states had different national conditions and different trade inter-
ests.92 These positions were also made clear to the EEC members, emphasising 
that any CMEA-EEC agreement that might be reached could not affect relations 
that Romania might decide to have with the Community. 93 
The strategy for after 1 January 1975 
All the measures Romania took to improve its commercial relations with the 
EEC produced positive results, but the overall impact was not what the Roma-
nian authorities had hoped for. Romania continued to export mainly agricultural 
products, foodstuffs and light industry products to the EEC, which increased its 
vulnerability to EEC protectionist policies. The GSP was applied to a reduced 
list of goods. Negotiations carried out with France, Benelux and the UK exposed 
their reluctance to include commercial stipulations in long-term agreements on 
economic, scientific and technical cooperation.94 
Thus, as the date of 31 December 1974 was approaching, the MFA and the MFT
drew up yet another document regarding strategy towards the EEC on the basis 
of a June 1974 study by the MFT called ‘New Forms of Romania’s Commercial 
Relations with the Countries of the Common Market’. The previous general line 
was maintained, but more careful attention was paid to the CMEA’s attitude to the 
EEC, observing that the EEC’s proposal regarding the conclusion of trade agree-
ments between the Community as an entity and each CMEA member state had 
been rejected, and that despite Romania’s different position the CMEA member 








Romania Turns West 203 
a commercial agreement with the EEC. Instead, Romania wanted to be able to 
address its commercial problems directly with the EEC. The 1975 policy towards 
the EEC was a confirmation of the previous strategy. It proposed exploratory talks 
with experts from the EEC Commission in parallel with bilateral consultations 
with the EEC member states and using GATT to promote Romania’s interests in 
the EEC, a special emphasis being placed on negotiating a textile agreement with 
the EEC within the multi-fibre GATT agreement. 95 This strategy was to guide 
Romania’s relations with the EEC until the end of the 1970s and beyond. 
It was also consistent with the directives that the 11th Congress of the RCP of 
25 November 1974 drew up for Romania’s economic development in the next 
five-year plan (1976–80) and the next fifteen-year prospects program (1976–90). 
At the centre of the RCP’s economic policy remained the development of indus-
try, and especially of the machine-building and chemical industries, two sectors 
that were required to produce half of the country’s global industrial production by 
1980. In the party’s conception, the economic development of the country would 
raise the living standard of the whole population and was based on accomplishing 
socialist industrialisation on the one hand and on developing economic relations 
with other states on the other. It contended that Romania’s ‘external economic 
relations and its cooperation with other states represent a significant factor in the 
economic progress of the country’. Moreover: 
In the development of its foreign trade and international economic coopera-
tion, Romania starts from the imperative of its participation as actively as 
possible in the world economic circuit as an objective necessity of the accel-
erated increase in the national economy for the progress of Romanian society. 
The 1976–1980 plan will target an increase in foreign trade, an improve-
ment of its structure and an enlargement of international cooperation in pro-
duction, technology and science. We will act with determination so that, in 
parallel with increasing the volume of foreign trade, an equilibrated balance 
of payments can be realised, simultaneously increasing the foreign currency 
reserves of the country. 96 
Special attention was paid to the country’s relations with capitalist developed 
states. By 1980, exports of the products of the machine-building and chemical 
industries had to increase to 50% of the country’s total exports. Romania was 
still interested in importing fuel, raw materials, machines, equipment and instal-
lations. The measures envisioned to achieve these goals involved increasing the 
quality of the goods produced for export to make them competitive in foreign 
markets, concluding long-term contracts with foreign partners, adapting exports 
to the demand in foreign markets and reducing the volume of imports to what 
was ‘strictly necessary, on the basis of judicious use of foreign currency funds’. 
Economic units and ministries were instructed to take measures to secure from 
their exports the foreign currency funds necessary to cover their import needs.97 
The general conception was that the economic and social progress of the coun-

















204 Elena Dragomir 
of its economic exchanges and cooperation with other states, including Western 
states.98 However, the EEC’s exclusive competence in relation to trade with third 
countries and the CMEA attempt to adopt a common commercial policy towards 
the EEC were seen in Bucharest as threats to Romania’s trade interests and eco-
nomic development in general. 
In June 1975, at the 44th session of the CMEA’s Foreign Trade Permanent 
Commission, all the members except Romania proposed to conclude a com-
mercial agreement between the CMEA and the EEC as entities. 99 The Romanian 
authorities considered that the proposal was unacceptable for two main reasons: it 
was based on an ‘intention to prove’ that CMEA integration ‘was a reality’, and it 
aimed to ‘give the CMEA – deviating from the CMEA statute – competences in the 
commercial field similar to those given to the Common Market through the Treaty 
of Rome’.100 The RCP confirmed Romania’s ‘position of principle’ towards the 
conclusion of a CMEA-EEC agreement as previously defined. Ceaușescu insisted 
that the Romanian delegates at the CMEA should inform the other participants of 
Romania’s intention to establish immediate and direct contacts with the EEC insti-
tutions.101 A similar declaration had already been made by the Romanian delega-
tion at the CMEA meeting mentioned earlier, when the other participants had been 
informed that Romania would contact the EEC institutions ‘in the next period’ to 
‘analyse concrete ways to eliminate discrimination and other obstacles against 
Romanian exports, and problems regarding the juridical framework for commer-
cial exchanges’.102 The CMEA’s Executive Committee was also notified in writ-
ing of Romania’s intention to establish contacts with the EEC institutions. 103 
During the next years, Romania continued to hold its position vis-à-vis the
CMEA.104 Throughout the 1970s, Romania acted to prevent the adoption of any 
CMEA decision or any CMEA-EEC agreement that had the potential to affect
the national trade competences of CMEA member states regarding the EEC. The 
Romanian authorities did not trust the CMEA allies or the CMEA as an entity 
to made decisions on their behalf. They feared that a CMEA-EEC agreement
would secure the interests of the great powers to the detriment of the interests
of the small states. Therefore, Romania put much effort into solving its EEC-
related problems through direct negotiations with the EEC institutions. In 1979, 
Ceaușescu publicly confirmed Romania’s interest in concluding direct agree-
ments with the EEC.105 
Key achievements and failures 
From 1975 onwards, trade between the Eastern European states and the EEC 
states took place within a juridical framework consisting of three main sets of 
rules: those stipulated in international and bilateral agreements; those adopted 
unilaterally by the EEC; and those included in bilateral cooperation agreements. 
While not being commercial in themselves, these arrangements were used to some 
extent to circumvent EEC trade policy, stipulating, for instance, the lifting of 
quantitative restrictions on specific goods, preferential arrangements for imports 
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this general framework, Romania’s relations with the EEC followed the position 
established in the previous years along three main lines: conducting direct nego-
tiations with the EEC institutions on matters in its competence in parallel with 
bilateral relations with the EEC member states; using various international organ-
isations (such as the IMF, the IBRD, the UNCTAD and especially the GATT) to 
obtain better trade conditions and loans; and preventing the CMEA from having a 
negative impact on its EEC-related objectives. 
As bilateral trade agreements with EEC states expired and could not be renewed,
from 1975 onwards Romania signed long-term cooperation agreements on eco-
nomic, scientific, industrial and technical cooperation. In some cases, such as those
with Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands and the Belgium-Luxembourg Eco-
nomic Union, these agreements granted Romania most favoured nation status.107 
In matters that were in the EEC’s competence, the Romanian authorities con-
tinued to deepen their contacts with the EEC institutions. The EEC member 
states were still considered an important source of industrial imports, technology 
and foreign loans, and an outlet for Romania’s exports of agricultural products, 
foodstuffs and raw materials. 108 Romania continued to export foodstuffs under 
provisions in the technical agreements negotiated with the EEC Commission on 
products such as pork, beef, cheese and wine, and annually asked for improved 
export conditions, which were often granted.109 Participation in the EEC’s GSP
also had a positive impact on Romania’s exports. In 1975, the EEC had a share of 
71.7% in the exports that Romania made via the preferential system. The remain-
ing 28.3% represented exports to other developed capitalist states that had granted 
Romania customs preferences prior to 1975.110 A 1978 MFA and MFT joint note 
appreciated that being granted customs preferences ‘had a favourable influence 
on Romania’s exports, resulting first of all in additional foreign currency for 
our country’. As a member of the G-77 since 1976, Romania asked the EEC for 
the same type of trade concessions that were granted to any other developing 
countries and the extension of customs preferences to a series of Romanian prod-
ucts that were excluded from the GSP (textiles, chemicals and furniture). These 
requests were denied, mostly due to opposition from the UK, France and Italy. 111 
During ‘official exploratory talks’ with representatives of the EEC Commis-
sion in July 1977, Romania proposed concluding sectoral agreements regarding 
its exports of industrial products (including steel) and agricultural products, an 
agreement on fishing and another on access to loans from the European Invest-
ment Bank. The EEC representatives responded that agreements on fishing and 
agricultural products were not possible, and neither was Romanian access to 
loans. Contending that ‘sectoral agreements would not solve all the problems of 
mutual interest in a unitary way’, they argued in favour of a general commer-
cial agreement as in the EEC’s 1974 proposal. 112 However, Ceaușescu was of the 
opinion that ‘there is no question now of a general agreement’ with the EEC. 113 
Negotiations with the EEC were unsuccessful with regard to sectoral agree-
ments on agricultural products and arrangements for fishing, transport and finan-
cial cooperation, but successful with regard to sectoral agreements on textiles, 









  Table 8.1 The evolution of Romania-EEC commercial exchanges, 1970–1984 (in million 
US dollars) 
 Year  Total Exports Imports  Trade balance 
1970 938 449 487 −38 
1971 1084 513 551 −38 
1972 1334 630 704 −74 
1973 1797 842 955 −113 
1974 2369 1026 1343 −317 
1975 2330 1060 1270 −210 
1976 2546 1286 1278 +8 
1977  2611 1204 1407 −203 
1978 3315 1441 1874 −433 
1979 4654 2214 2440 −226 
1980 4838 2460 2378 +82 
1981 3937 2041 1896 +145 
1982 2773 1734 1039 +695 
1983 2410 1621 789 +832 
 1984 (9 months) 2702 2129 573 +1556 
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country to conclude an agreement with the EEC regarding its exports of textiles 
on the basis of the GATT multi-fibre agreement. This one-year sectoral agreement 
was followed in 1978 by another long-term arrangement covering the period up to 
1982.114 On 31 May 1978, an agreement on Romania’s exports of steel products 
to the EEC market entered into force. Renewed annually, it provided the condi-
tions on which Romanian steel products had access to the EEC market in terms of 
prices and quantities. According to a joint MFT and MFA note in December 1978, 
concluding sectoral agreements with the EEC was Romania’s solution to the prob-
lem of the juridical framework for its commercial relations with the EEC member 
states.115 In July 1978, Romania proposed to conclude an agreement on industrial 
products (other than textiles and steel) with the EEC and another regarding the 
creation of a Joint Romania-EEC Commission to address the problems of trade 
relations. The two proposed agreements were signed on 28 July 1980 and entered 
into force on 1 January 1981.116 Until the end of the decade, Romania remained 
the only Eastern European country with an industrial agreement and a Joint Com-
mission with the EEC. 
In this context, the value of Romania’s commercial exchanges with the EEC 
constantly increased throughout the 1970s, with a slight decrease in 1975 when 
the CCP entered into force ( Table 8.1 ). 117 In 1976, the main group of imported 
goods was machinery and equipment. Fuels, raw materials, metals, industrial con-
sumer goods and agricultural raw materials represented 84% of Romania’s total 
exports to the EEC.118 Exporting petroleum products to the EEC member states 
was important in the 1970s ( Table 8.2 ). 119 However, these exports depended on 
imports of crude oil. From 1976, Romania was a net importer of oil and by the 
end of the decade it relied heavily on Middle Eastern oil, especially from Iran.120












 Year  Total  Exports of  Exports of  Share of exports  Share of exports 
exports petroleum non-petroleum of non-petroleum of petroleum 
products products products in total products in total 
trade (%) exports (%)
1973 842 52 790 93.8 6.2 
1974 1026 191 832 81.0 19.0 
1975 1060 198 862 71.1 28.9 
1976 1286 307 979 76.1 23.9 
1977 1204 203 1001 83.1 16.9 
1978 1441 281  1160 80.4 19.6 
1979 2214 850 1364 61.6 39.4 
1980 2460 1030 1430 58.1 41.9 
1981 2041 929  1112 54.4 45.6 
1982 1734 637 1097 63.2 36.8 
1983 1621 633 988 60.9 39.1 
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 Table 8.2 The evolution of Romania’s exports to the EEC, 1973–1983 (in million US 
dollars and percentages) 
Source: ANIC, CC of RCP, Economic Section, File 387/1984, 16. 
Despite the increase in the value of commercial exchanges, Romania’s trade 
balance with the EEC remained negative throughout the 1970s ( Table 8.1 ). 121 
According to Ceaușescu, the trade deficit was mostly explained by the protectionist 
policies of the EEC against the socialist states. To secure the country’s ‘equilibrium 
in the balance of payments’, Ceaușescu envisioned ‘not a reduction of economic 
exchanges’ with the Western European states but ‘an intensification of Romanian 
exports’.122 The Romanian authorities believed that increasing exports would 
provide the foreign currency necessary to pay for previous and future Western 
imports.123 
In December 1977, the National Conference of the RCP established the main 
lines of the next five-year plan (1980–85). Industrialisation was still acknowl-
edged as a major national objective. However, it stressed that the process of indus-
trialisation and Romania’s economic development in general had entered a new 
phase, moving from the stage of quantitative accumulation to the stage of qualita-
tive improvement. Special attention was paid to foreign trade, and all the institu-
tions and cadres involved in foreign exchanges were instructed to ‘strictly respect 
the equilibrium of the balance of trade and the balance of foreign payments’. 
Ceaușescu appreciated Romania’s commercial relations with the capitalist devel-
oped states but considered that better results could still be obtained if ‘a series of 
obstacles’ in the way of free international trade were overcome. 124 
In December 1978, Ceaușescu expressed concern with regard to the ‘world 
crisis of raw materials and energy’, which would create ‘increasing difficulties’
for all countries, Romania included. All responsible institutions and cadres were 
asked to take measures to reduce consumption and imports to what was strictly 
necessary. 125 The first measure, Ceaușescu stated, was to secure raw materials and 
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made for a 50% increase in the volume of foreign trade, with a more accentuated 
increase in exports to ‘secure the necessary means for imports and amortisation of 
due payments for credits taken in the past in order to achieve an equilibrated bal-
ance of foreign payments’ and ‘the consolidation of currency reserves’. 126 
Towards the end of the decade Romania’s imports from the EEC decreased 
while exports increased, with the balance of trade improving significantly. For 
the first time since 1961, in 1980 Romania had a positive balance of trade with 
the EEC as a whole, a trend that continued in the next years too ( Table 8.1 ). 127 
However, the impact of the oil crisis was worrisome. According to Ceaușescu, in 
1979 Romania was importing more oil than it produced domestically. Facing the 
rapid growth in oil prices, Romania responded with new measures reducing oil 
imports and domestic consumption, and by developing coal-fuelled industries and 
technologies.128 The Romanian authorities were also increasingly worried that the 
country’s access to foreign loans might soon be limited. 129 An excessive increase 
in the cost of foreign loans was another source of concern, which prompted dis-
cussions with Western bankers, but the situation did not look promising. 130 In 
October 1979, the US Federal Reserve Bank adopted new policy procedures lead-
ing to a rise in interest rates and in the cost of energy supplies, creating a macro-
economic context in which Romania and Poland were no longer able to meet their 
hard-currency obligations.131 
By 31 October 1979, Romania had contracted from Western developed states 
(France, the UK, Italy, Belgium, West Germany, Norway, Spain, Austria, Finland, 
Switzerland, the US, Canada and Japan) lines of credits for over 9.7 billion lei 
valută, which were to be used exclusively to finance imports of machinery, equip-
ment and installations from the respective countries. The interest rate ranged from
4.5% (Switzerland) to 9.5% (West Germany), while the terms varied from five 
years (France, Finland, Belgium, the FRG and Italy) to eight years (the US, Nor-
way and Austria) and even twenty-eight years (Canada). 132 Not all these lines of 
credits were used, however, as between 1980 and 1984 Romania’s decision to pay 
back its foreign debt resulted in a 70% decrease in its imports of machinery and 
equipment.133 A significant decrease in the foreign debt also occurred in Romania’s 
relations with the EEC Ten, Portugal and Spain, from 4735.6 million US dollars 
in 1981 to 2734.5 million US dollars in 1984. However, the interest payments
remained considerably high, increasing from 296.5 million US dollars in 1981 to 
about 350 million US dollars in 1982 and 1983 and 366.4 million US dollars in 
1984.134 Despite the improvements in Romania’s balance of trade, Ceaușescu was 
constantly dissatisfied with the overall results, asking for an increase in exports 
and for continual improvement of the trade balance and the balance of payments.135 
However, neither ministries nor production and trade managers could comply with
Ceaușescu’s unrealistic indications and they could not meet the objectives set in 
the country’s export plan. 136
 Conclusion 
Romania’s approach to Western Europe in the long 1970s derived from the coun-
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perceptions of the EEC’s impact on its commercial interests, and by extension on 
its economic development. Industrialisation was conceived as a mandatory base 
for building a socialist (and ultimately a communist) society and was to provide 
the people with a high standard of living. In Romania’s striving for industrialisa-
tion, the West was seen as an important source of technology and know-how as 
well as credits to pay for these imports. Besides loans, another source of hard 
currency was Romania’s exports of raw materials and foodstuffs. Despite Roma-
nia’s efforts to increase exports of highly manufactured goods, raw materials and 
foodstuffs represented the largest share of its exports to the Western European 
market throughout the period discussed. From the late 1960s onwards, the EEC 
was seen in Bucharest as a threat to Romania’s interests but also as a fact of life, 
an economic reality that needed to be dealt with pragmatically so that its negative 
impact on Romania’s commercial interests and national economic development in 
general would be limited as much as possible. 
This chapter has confirmed that decisions were made by Secretary General 
Nicolae Ceaușescu and a handful of his closest collaborators who were mem-
bers of the executive bodies of the Central Committee and held high-level posi-
tions in the state apparatus. However, in addressing Romania’s stance towards the 
EEC, the study has evidenced that the decisions of the leadership were greatly 
influenced by input provided by officials at different party and state levels, such 
as ministers, deputy ministers, experts in different fields, researchers in research 
institutes, diplomats abroad and economists. These officials were explicitly 
invited to identify problems and propose solutions in their areas of work and 
expertise. As opposed to the Hungarian case, however, in Romania there were no 
contradictory debates with regard to the country’s approach to the EEC, the West 
in general or its economic development at large. Within the general economic 
conception of the party leadership, professionals advanced proposals, which were 
then submitted for approval to the leadership, which in many cases accepted them. 
Romania’s approach to the EEC was at two main levels. At the base was a 
general conception, a position of principle decided in 1971 that did not change 
in the subsequent years. This position encompassed three main elements: direct 
relations with the EEC institutions in parallel with bilateral relations with the 
EEC member states; using various international trade or financial organisations 
to reach its EEC-related goals; and preventing the CMEA from impacting the 
country’s policy towards the EEC in a way that was incompatible with Romania’s 
interests. The second level of the approach consisted in very pragmatic measures 
in response to EEC policies, which were therefore continually adjusted. Each time 
the EEC finalised or adopted new regulations or measures impacting third coun-
tries, the Romanian authorities responded with their own set of actions designed 
to reduce the expected negative impact. 
This chapter has also found that in Romania’s case ideology did not over-
ride national interests, as happened in Hungary, for instance. Theoretically and 
publicly, Romania’s openness to the West was mainly explained with arguments 
related to the peaceful coexistence doctrine, international détente or increasing 
globalisation. Behind the scenes, however, reasons involving very pragmatic 
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provides us with another example of its ability to oppose its allies and the Soviet 
Union. Nevertheless, its political disloyalty to Moscow could only go so far and 
the Romanian leadership avoided taunting the Soviets more than was absolutely 
necessary. To avoid Soviet susceptibility and anger, and despite numerous Roma-
nian studies on the matter (and EEC prompting), the 1970s ended without Roma-
nia making the decision to start talks on a general agreement with the EEC. 
In the end, Romania’s approach to the West and the EEC in particular proved to 
be a double-edged sword: a success in the short run and a failure in the long run. 
Romania-EEC exchanges constantly increased throughout the 1970s, giving the 
country access to Western technology, machinery and loans and an outlet for its 
exports of raw materials and foodstuffs, which provided the country with a flow 
of hard currency. The end of the decade brought Romania a positive trade balance, 
and it remained the only Eastern European state with a joint commission and an 
industrial agreement with the EEC. 
However, in the long run, Romania’s strategy for economic development failed 
and its openness to the West created additional problems. Industrialisation had 
been deemed the foundation for building a better society and for raising the peo-
ple’s living standard, while foreign economic relations were called on to contribute 
to reaching this ultimate goal. However, lacking the necessary domestic resources, 
the country’s forced industrialisation was to a great extent based on imports of 
technology and raw materials and on foreign loans – which made the country very 
vulnerable to the global energy and debt crises in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Romania’s failure to fulfil its debt obligations and its request for debt resched-
uling were followed in 1982 by a cessation of export credits guarantees to Roma-
nia by EEC governments.137 In June 1982 and May 1983, Romania concluded 
rescheduling agreements with the Paris Club. Rescheduling agreements with indi-
vidual Western states followed, but Romania’s financial situation remained very 
difficult and it could not fully meet its rescheduling obligations. 138 
In closed meetings, Ceaușescu admitted that Romania’s import and credit poli-
cies in the 1970s had negatively impacted the country’s economy and foreign 
indebtedness, but he denied any personal or party responsibility – not that any-
body dared to blame him or the party. The culprits were, he held, the Ministry of 
Finance and the National Bank, which had contracted credits to support imports 
without the approval of the party leadership and against its directives.139 
At the National Conference of the RCP in December 1982, Ceaușescu 
announced the decision to pay back the country’s foreign debt by the end of the 
decade and to adopt severe measures to reduce consumption in general and the 
consumption of energy resources in particular. Ceaușescu held that Romania 
should react to the world economic crisis not by diminishing but by ‘intensify-
ing and developing the exchanges, collaboration and cooperation in production’
with all countries – capitalist countries included – which translated into increasing 
Romanian exports and decreasing imports. Publicly, Ceaușescu argued that the 
decision to pay back the foreign debt was driven by the world economic crisis.140 
However, the decision was also greatly influenced by his refusal to bargain on 
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In March 1989, Bucharest announced that Romania’s foreign debt had been 
paid back in full. However, in taking measures to reach this end, the Romanian 
leadership, and particularly Ceaușescu himself, had lost sight of the primary goal 
of the national economic development strategy (i.e. the welfare of the people), 
and this was one of the main factors that by the end of the year brought his regime 
to its end. 
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 9 From Liberalism to 
Underdevelopment 
The Yugoslav elites facing Western 
European economic integration in the 
“long 1970s” 
 Benedetto Zaccaria 
During the 1970s, Yugoslavia’s stance towards the process of Western European 
economic integration, and the EEC (European Economic Community) in particu-
lar, was affected by the country’s sui generis internal and international stance. 
Despite retaining a one-party communist political regime, the Yugoslav federa-
tion distinguished itself from the Soviet bloc countries by virtue of its autono-
mous course grounded on a self-management system1 and a non-aligned foreign 
policy. 2 However, Yugoslavia was not immune from the political dynamics of 
the Soviet bloc due to the unresolved relationship with Moscow after the Tito-
Stalin split (1948)3 and solid economic ties with the CMEA (Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance). At the same time, Yugoslavia nurtured a realistic attitude 
towards the EEC. Unlike the Soviet bloc countries, which regarded the Com-
mon Market as an imperialist enterprise, Belgrade established direct diplomatic 
relations with the Community in 1968. These would lead to the conclusion of 
two trade agreements (in 1970 and 1973) and a cooperation agreement in 1980.4 
During the decade under consideration, Yugoslavia was therefore at the edge of 
European regional economic integration processes. This specificity was further 
complicated by its internal configuration. Yugoslavia’s status as a federal union 
of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro 
and Macedonia) and two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo) with 
different levels of economic development and dynamics of regional integration 
with the Common Market area resulted in a gradual process of decentralisation of 
political and economic competences, which was sanctioned by the adoption of a 
confederal constitution in 1974. 
The aim of this chapter is to address the Yugoslav elites’ views and predicaments 
regarding economic integration in Western Europe against this multi-faceted 
background. Overall, scholarly works on Yugoslavia’s internal and international 
dynamics have largely neglected the Western European integration question. 
Famously, historians have focused on the country’s early opening to the West 
in the immediate aftermath of the Tito-Stalin split 5 and the successive deteriora-
tion of relations with the USSR and the Soviet bloc countries.6 Historical analy-
sis has also broadly focused on the 1950s, when the self-management system, 
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and in parallel with this the country’s economy started its early integration with 
the international economic system.7 As is highlighted in recent literature, during 
the early 1960s the Yugoslav political leadership was divided between conserva-
tives and so-called liberals, who pushed for Yugoslavia’s further integration in the 
world market and a closer relationship with its Western European partners. 8 The 
eventual adoption of economic reforms in 1965 meant a success of the party’s 
liberal reformers and resulted in a consequent acceleration of economic ties with 
the West. 9 While literature on Yugoslavia during the 1960s has broadly illustrated 
the rationale and internal debates leading to this reform process, the effects of the 
process in the following decade are still to be systematically explored.10 Several 
reports and studies on Yugoslavia and the EEC, quoted in this study, were pub-
lished in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. However, they were not based on archival 
research and did not dig into the internal debates on how to deal with the European 
integration question, which is what makes this study new. Archive-based studies 
focusing on EEC-Yugoslav relations during the 1970s have mainly focused on 
the EEC’s viewpoint. 11 The few historical accounts of Yugoslavia’s stance in the 
international economy of the 1970s have addressed the federation’s early rela-
tions with international financial institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank and the rising dependence of the country on Western 
credits leading up to the debt-service crisis of 1982.12 In general, agreement exists 
among historians that relations with the West were crucial in the evolution of 
Yugoslavia’s internal and external balance during the decade under consideration: 
the unresolved questions of the trade deficit and international debt after the energy 
crises of 1973 and 1979 were to affect the stability of the federation and the politi-
cal leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Savez Komunista 
Jugoslavije [SKJ], or the League).13 
However the West, towards which Yugoslavia leaned during the 1970s, has 
been only vaguely addressed. It has sometimes been considered to be the interna-
tional financial institutions14 or Yugoslavia’s main Western partners, namely the 
US,15 West Germany, 16 and Italy. 17 But the picture of Yugoslavia’s stance within 
the international political economy of the 1970s is still blurred and vague. While 
limited attention has been devoted to its relationship with the Organisation for 
European Economic Co-operation (OEEC)18 and the Council of Europe,19 the 
historical understanding of Belgrade’s relations with its Western partners suffers 
from an overall neglect of its relationship with the EEC, which during the 1970s 
accounted for more than 40% of the country’s foreign trade. Common Market 
countries were also the principal recipients of the Yugoslav migrant force and 
the main source of workers’ remittances and foreign tourism. 20 Finally, the EEC 
has only been considered within the context of the disintegration of the Yugoslav 
federation in the early 1990s, as if Yugoslavia had only passively dealt with the 
European integration question in previous years.21 
This chapter re-assesses the political and economic rationale for Yugoslavia’s 
relations with the EEC during the long 1970s, illustrating the internal debates 
among the country’s elite at all levels (political, economic, academic) on the Euro-
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and external developments. The chapter’s argument is that internal debates on 
the EEC were profoundly shaped by the internal evolution of the Yugoslav fed-
eration during the 1970s. The marked process of confederalisation that was initi-
ated after the adoption of the 1974 constitution resulted in diverging economic 
interests between the individual republics and autonomous provinces. Internal 
contradictions within the federation, amplified by the centrifugal tendencies of 
the northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia, affected the elaboration of a com-
prehensive federal strategy towards the Community. This chapter illustrates the 
divergence between a political-diplomatic interpretation of the EEC by the federal 
centre (in particular the SKJ and the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs) and 
an economic view of the Common Market as a source of hard currency, industrial 
technology and know-how, particularly among the republican leaderships. This 
divergence developed against a background of international economic recession 
and energy crises (1973 and 1979), which exposed the Yugoslav federation to 
unrestrained external borrowing and to the rise of a balance of trade deficit. The 
chapter considers how elite debates and inter-republican confrontation – a direct 
consequence of the 1974 reform – developed at the federal level. The internal 
policymaking of each individual republic and autonomous province is beyond the 
scope of this study. 22 
This work is structured in three chronological sections. The first explores 
Yugoslavia’s internal debates on the EEC from the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the parties (1968) to the signing of the first trade agreement 
in 1970. The second section addresses Yugoslav views of the EEC against the 
background of a rapidly evolving internal framework, characterised by the end 
of the liberal reforms launched in the mid-1960s and the adoption of the 1974 
constitution. In this section, the economic consequences of the 1973 oil shock and 
the suspension of the trade provisions in Yugoslavia’s agreement with the EEC 
are considered. Finally, the chapter focuses on the period 1975–80, addressing the 
deterioration in the balance of trade, centrifugal economic tendencies, the rise in 
foreign borrowing and the internal debates over the economic orientation of the 
country. In conclusion, this chapter depicts a declining trajectory from the enthu-
siastic prospects of an ‘industrial’ future in the 1960s to the disillusion of the late 
1970s, when the country’s elites focused on the ‘underdevelopment question’ to 
cover both the shortcomings of the self-management system and the centrifugal 
tendencies at the federal level. 
A terminological disclaimer is needed. In this chapter, the ‘republican’ affilia-
tions of the leading actors involved in internal debates on the EEC are highlighted. 
This is not to offer a post-1989 reading of the political dynamics of socialist Yugo-
slavia. The author is aware that the disintegration of the federation was the out-
come of complex internal and international dynamics which will not be dealt with 
here. He is also aware that republican leanings were in most cases blended with 
ideological adhesion to the ‘brotherhood and unity’ principle – which the SKJ 
had espoused since 1945 to overcome the troubled legacy of the ‘first’Yugoslavia 
(1918–41) and World War II – and that labels when applied to human beings by 
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economic competences of the individual republics – the clear-cut economic pre-
rogatives of which were discussed at the federal level throughout the 1970s, as 
is shown in minutes of federal government meetings quoted in this chapter – and 
how they shaped the way Western European economic integration was perceived 
in Yugoslavia, republican inputs at the federal level are deliberately emphasised. 
It is argued that, especially after the adoption of the 1974 constitution, dealing 
with Yugoslavia’s foreign economic policy without considering the republican 
factor would overlook a constitutive element of Yugoslavia as it was in the late 
Cold War years. 
A liberal opening towards the EEC 
In September 1968, Yugoslavia became the first socialist country to enter into 
official diplomatic relations with the EEC. 23 The decision to establish direct rela-
tions with the Community was the result of a foreign policy orientation which 
went back to the mid-1950s. Due to its dependence on Western technology and 
industrial equipment, Yugoslavia had manifested profound interest in early West-
ern European post-war integration efforts and had therefore applied to the OEEC 
for observer status in December 1954, becoming an associate member of the 
organisation the following year. The Yugoslav authorities expected that associat-
ing with the OEEC would enhance exports to Western markets and integrate the 
country in intra-European trade. Indeed, already in the mid-1950s, the Yugoslav 
leadership regarded the country’s external commercial imbalance as a pressing 
concern.24 The same economic rationale shaped Yugoslavia’s early approaches 
to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the EEC. The goal 
was to preserve economic ties with the six founding members of the Community 
(the Six) and avoid economic isolation between the two regional economic blocs. 
Indeed, Yugoslavia did not ignore the economic weaknesses of the federation and 
its entanglement between the two European blocs. Its active participation in the 
official establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (Belgrade, 1961) went hand 
in hand with a careful diplomatic balance between the Soviet Union and the West-
ern partners. 
As for the former, after the death of Stalin (1953) relations between Tito and the 
new Soviet leadership led by Nikita Khrushchev had fluctuated between moments 
of ‘reconciliation, comradeship and confrontation’.25 The normalisation of dip-
lomatic relations favoured the development of economic ties after Yugoslavia’s 
post-1948 isolation. Economic relations with the CMEA area were grounded on 
a clearing system based on agreements on the exchange of goods and bilateral 
cooperation in the industrial field.26 The development of economic ties with the 
Soviet bloc countries, which represented the privileged market for Yugoslavia’s 
industrial output, resulted in Belgrade’s association with the CMEA in 1964. 27 
From the late 1950s, Yugoslavia’s relationship with its Western European part-
ners and the newly established EEC also followed a clear-cut economic rationale 
which reflected contemporary debates within the SKJ on the process of internal 
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with a rise of internal divergences within the country’s political leadership about 
the integration of Yugoslavia in the international economy. The party’s liberal 
wing – which advocated an introduction of market mechanisms in the eco-
nomic system and opening to the international market through attracting foreign 
investments – prevailed over the resistance of the party conservatives, who feared 
the political consequences of economic liberalisation. Famously, in December
1964 the League’s Central Committee approved a first set of liberal economic 
reforms (which began to be implemented in 1965) with the goal of strengthening 
the technological basis of Yugoslav industry and increasing the country’s par-
ticipation in the ‘international division of labour’. 28 The introduction of liberal 
reforms was paralleled by enhanced relations with the EEC. The leading actors 
in the 1965 economic reforms were indeed deeply interested in rising to the com-
mercial challenge stemming from the constitution of the customs union and the 
launch of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the early 1960s. The first 
official exploratory talks with representatives of the European Commission took 
place in Brussels in 1965 and led to an official request for the conclusion of a 
trade agreement with the Community. Between 1967 and 1968, the goal of Yugosla-
via’s political leadership – led by the president of the Federal Executive Council 
(Savezno izvršno veće [SIV]); the Croatian Mika Špiljak, the secretary for foreign
affairs; the Serb Marko Nikezić;29 and the Serb Milentije Popović, the president 
of the Federal Assembly 30 – was to secure access for its external output to the 
Common Market in order to strengthen the process of internal economic reform. 
All in all, during the early and mid-1960s, the Yugoslav leadership followed 
a cautious and pragmatic course which resulted in a balanced relationship with 
the two leading regional economic blocs.31 This attitude reflected the structure of 
Yugoslavia’s external trade, which was based on importing technology and indus-
trial equipment from the Western European market and exporting industrial goods 
to the CMEA area. However, this equilibrium was precarious and uncertain, as it 
depended on the delicate balance of relations with Moscow. This balance started 
to change after the appointment of Leonid Brezhnev as secretary general of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1964. With an orthodox turn impressed 
on Soviet foreign policy, ideological controversies with Yugoslavia resurfaced, 
and they exploded after the Warsaw Pact intervention in Prague in August 1968. 
Yugoslavia’s open condemnation of the military intervention in Czechoslovakia 
and the brutal suppression of the Prague Spring marked a deterioration in relations 
with Moscow. 32 The Yugoslav leadership feared that the Soviet decision to invade 
Czechoslovakia could herald a new phase of aggressive foreign policy which 
would soon involve the Yugoslav ‘heresy’. The consequences of the Czecho-
slovak crisis primarily concerned fear of renewed economic isolation from the 
Soviet bloc area.33 In Moscow, Yugoslav diplomatic representatives were blamed 
for playing a ‘double game’ between the CMEA and the EEC. 34 
The Prague events marked a first step towards the politicisation of relations with 
the Community. On the commercial dimension, they acquired a broader political 
meaning which was openly manifested by Yugoslav representatives in Brussels 
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the EEC from September 1968) and the capitals of the EEC member states. The 
Czechoslovak crisis was indeed a leitmotiv during the preparatory phases of trade 
talks on a commercial agreement with the EEC, which opened in October 1968.35 
An overall agreement emerged on a deepening of relations with the Community, 
and no opposition arose in this regard within the League or the SIV. Indeed, the 
Czechoslovak events were only one of multiple factors determining the choice to 
accelerate negotiations with the Community; they were used as a political tool to 
convince the EEC member states to respond to commercial requests which had 
been made well before August 1968. The launch of the market-oriented reforms 
indeed resulted in massive imports of Western industrial equipment. At the same 
time, Yugoslavia’s exports to the EEC (mostly agricultural products) had stag-
nated as a consequence of the CAP regulations. 36 This resulted in an increase 
in the country’s trade deficit (from 58 million US dollars in 1965 to 364 million 
US dollars in 1969), and a continual search for import credits from its Western 
European partners, particularly West Germany, Italy and France. 37 Within this 
framework, republic-level banks played a prominent role in investment finance 
operations.38 Yugoslavia’s economic reforms were also followed by a search for 
increased economic autonomy of the republics and autonomous provinces vis-à-vis 
the federal centre. This was particularly the case of Slovenia and Croatia, whose 
business elites advocated an expansion of relations with the Common Market 
countries, in particular West Germany (which in the late 1960s included Yugosla-
via in its Neue Ostpolitik) and Italy. 39 
The opening towards the EEC was therefore a combination of liberal and 
republican interests. It was not by chance that the leading actor in commercial 
negotiations was the Slovenian Toma Granfil, a member of the SIV who had been 
in charge of relations with the EEC since 1968. Granfil was assisted by Boriš 
Šnuderl, also a Slovenian and a deputy secretary at the Federal Secretariat for 
External Trade (Savezni Sekretarijat za Spoljnu Trgovinu [SSST]). Both Granfil 
and Šnuderl were in close contact with Yugoslav industrial enterprises (particularly 
in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia) and acted as links between them and the fed-
eral centre. What these enterprises requested through the republican chambers 
of commerce was an expansion of commercial and industrial relations with Italy 
and West Germany, an improvement of industrial relations with firms in Italy’s 
northern regions (Lombardy, Veneto and Friuli-Venezia Giulia) 40 and an expan-
sion of technical cooperation and joint investments with West German firms. 41 
The idea that Yugoslavia’s enterprises should benefit from closer contacts with 
the Common Market was widespread among liberal reformers in the country, 
among whom were Špiljak and Granfil. Within the SIV, the prevalent opinion was 
that Yugoslavia’s first need was to resolve its trade deficit and expand exports of 
agricultural products (beef in particular), which accounted for about 40% of the 
country’s total exports to Western Europe. 42 Accordingly, during the negotiations 
with the European Commission representatives, Yugoslavia insisted on including 
an agricultural chapter in the future commercial agreement.43 
The negotiations led to the conclusion of a three-year trade agreement in 
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a non-preferential approach, as Belgrade deemed that a discriminatory agreement 
with the Community would affect the federation’s political stance within the Non-
Aligned Movement.44 The Yugoslav negotiators linked this treaty to the success 
of the market-oriented reform process. The public discourse developed in the 
League’s official newspaper,  Borba, and the bulletin of the Chamber of Com-
merce of Yugoslavia,  Export Journal, focused on the economic and commercial 
aspects of the negotiations and the need to overcome the EEC commercial bar-
riers to favour the development of the country’s industrial base and agricultural 
production.45 The link between the liberal reforms and the Western European 
integration question was also constantly underlined by Granfil to his Community 
counterparts, who he urged to respond to Yugoslavia’s requests to defend its par-
ticular path to socialism and resist alleged pressure from Moscow. During a meet-
ing in November 1968 with Jean-François Deniau, the European commissioner in 
charge of external economic relations, Granfil argued: ‘It is important for recipro-
cal economic relations for Yugoslavia to be treated like other market-economy 
countries, to eliminate any [commercial] clause identifying Yugoslavia as a state 
economy, which would be wrong and politically and economically unjustified’. 46 
The end of the liberal narrative 
The liberal narrative which had characterised Yugoslavia’s policy towards the 
EEC started to change when the post-1965 economic reforms were followed by 
a gradual crisis. Famously, between 1970 and 1971 an economic recession was 
followed by an uncontrolled rise in investment and inter-republican acrimony 
over the allocation of federal resources and contributions to the federal budget.47 
What followed was a move from economic to political confrontation among the 
republics. The emergence of nationalist and separatist trends, especially in Croa-
tia, seemed to indicate that the process of economic liberalisation was the agent 
responsible for centrifugal tendencies in the federation. Purges started in Croatia 
in December 1971 and widened to all the republics, taking in a broad spectrum of 
party leaders in Slovenia and Serbia who were accused of liberalism, ‘managerial-
ism’ and ‘technocratic bureaucratism’. 48 Within this context, the party’s leading 
ideologue, the Slovenian Edvard Kardelj, launched an anti-liberal and anti-reform 
discourse reaffirming that self-management and democratic centralism were the 
cornerstones of Yugoslavia. 49 
In July 1971, some of the leading actors involved in negotiating the first trade 
agreement with the EEC were replaced with the setting up of a new Federal Execu-
tive Council led by Bosnian Džemal Bijedić. Šnuderl, Granfil’s successor, con-
firmed Belgrade’s interest in carrying out negotiations to renew the 1970 trade 
agreement (which was to expire in 1973). He was in close contact with the Executive 
Council of Slovenia and was always receptive to input from Ljubljana.50 Šnuderl 
followed the path previously set by Granfil, insisting on the need for Yugoslavia 
to develop relations with the Community according to a twofold logic: economic, 
given the EEC’s commercial importance for Yugoslavia; and political, as the Com-










228 Benedetto Zaccaria 
Šnuderl’s activism was facilitated by Tito’s views on the Western European 
integration question, which had been clearly manifested during a diplomatic tour 
of Western European capitals (Paris, Bonn, Brussels and Rome) between 1970 
and 1971. These diplomatic missions were conceived as the Yugoslav response 
to the process of international détente between the superpowers and the parallel 
proposal for a pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) by the Warsaw Pact countries in March 1969. Tito nurtured ambivalent 
feelings towards the unfolding of international détente. On the one hand, he was 
in favour of a relaxation of international tension which would result in expanded 
possibilities for Yugoslavia’s economic relations with both regional blocs. On the 
other hand, he feared that the bloc-to-bloc dialogue, which seemed to be con-
firmed by the CMEA’s early attempts to enter into direct relations with the Euro-
pean Community, 52 would result in economic isolation of Yugoslavia. 53 
After an intergovernmental summit held at The Hague in December 1969, the 
EEC underwent its first enlargement with three new member states and launched 
a programme of deepening and completion which, among other goals, aimed to 
make the Community an international actor able to speak ‘with one voice’ in the 
international arena.54 To avoid isolation from the enlarging EEC, Yugoslav diplo-
macy reframed its approach to the Community, insisting on the developing status 
of the federation. This was a propitious juncture, as the EEC was looking for a 
new relationship with the members of the Group of 77 (G-77) developing coun-
tries through its launch of the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) in July 
1971, and at the same time the Non-Aligned Movement was becoming increas-
ingly interested in the issue of economic progress for underdeveloped countries, 
as emerged during the Lusaka conference in September of the same year. 55 Yugo-
slavia successfully requested to be included in the list of the GSP beneficiaries by 
stressing its economic underdevelopment and its need to benefit from the same 
trade preferences as the other members of the G-77. The “development” discourse 
also originated from a widespread awareness within the League that the post-1945 
bipolar equilibrium was being challenged by the political weight of the develop-
ing countries.56 
Linked to this development issue was renewed propaganda on self-management
in Western Europe. Although the re-launch of self-management was based on
strict criticism of the alleged negative effects of the liberal reforms (i.e. bureau-
cratisation and marketisation of the economy) and on internal economic dynamics 
(which will not be addressed here), self-management was nevertheless depicted 
in SKJ international propaganda as an innovative system able to overcome the 
contradictions of both capitalism and socialism. A clear-cut political nexus 
linked non-alignment, underdevelopment and self-management. These labels 
were all intended to attract the attention of progressive Catholic, socialist and 
social-democratic political leaderships, intellectuals and trade unions in Western 
Europe. Indeed, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the issue of industrial democ-
racy acquired new momentum in Western European public discourse after the 
rapid decline of the les trentes glorieuses.57 The SKJ was aware of this and tried 
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scientific symposia and international conferences with the participation of leading 
politicians and intellectuals from Western Europe. 58 
A close link was also established between self-management and non-alignment 
in propaganda, and the northern republics made parallel calls for further economic 
relations with the Common Market. This was particularly the case on the occa-
sion of a visit by the president of the European Commission, Sicco Mansholt, to 
Belgrade in December 1972. Mansholt, a Dutch social-democrat who had been 
deeply involved in the Community’s relations with the developing world, 59 was 
an ideal interlocutor for Yugoslavia. Indeed, Šnuderl, who had planned the Euro-
pean Commission president’s visit, 60 openly advised Tito’s head of cabinet, his 
Slovenian comrade Marko Vrhunec, that self-management should be at the very 
core of Tito’s conversation with Mansholt, given the latter’s interest as a social-
democratic leader in Yugoslavia’s self-managed economy. 61 Šnuderl’s suggestion 
was accepted, and both Tito and Kardelj discussed the issue of Yugoslavia’s 
‘modernity label’ of self-management during Mansholt’s visit. 62 
As the SIV member in charge of relations with the EEC, Šnuderl was also in 
direct contact with the SSST, the senior officials of which – in particular deputy 
federal secretary Milica Žiberna – represented a continuity factor in Belgrade’s 
stance towards the EEC (she had been involved in the negotiations on the 1970
agreement with the Community). Šnuderl and Žiberna were aware of increasing 
pressures from the republican chambers of commerce and individual enterprises, 
in particular in the federal republics of Slovenia and Croatia, for closer links with
the Western European markets to be established. Žiberna was in direct contact 
with the directors of enterprises and constantly informed them about the export/ 
import regime with the Community and the working of the GSP. She and her 
deputy, Petar Tomić, were veritable links between the business world and the state 
apparatus.63 Together with a number of officials from the SSST, Žiberna authored 
one of the first major publications explicitly dealing with the issue of Western 
European economic integration.64 In this book, the authors underlined Yugosla-
via’s dependency on Western European technology and know-how and related 
problems concerning the country’s balance of payments. The book, as its authors 
explicitly stated, was intended to be a guide for Yugoslav enterprises, chambers 
of commerce and regional banks to better integrate with the Western European 
economic system. 
The volume had symbolic importance as it inaugurated a series of contribu-
tions from the Yugoslav academic world on the question of European integration 
that paid prominent attention to individual policies and initiatives of the EEC, 
such as the CAP, the development of regional policy and monetary integration. 65 
However, given their specialised nature these studies did not develop into a true 
public debate.66 Yugoslavia’s academic elite’s contribution on the country’s stance 
towards Western European integration during the 1970s was therefore limited. 
Unlike what had happened during the 1960s, when studies on the EEC had con-
tributed to political decision-making in dealing with the Community, political-
economic analyses concerning economic integration in Western Europe during the 
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official policymaking towards the EEC, or who collaborated with state-led organ-
isations and agencies, such as the Institut za Medjunarodnu Politiku i Privredu 
(Institute for International Politics and Economy). This was particularly the case 
of articles published during the 1970s in Medjunarodna Politika (International 
Politics).67 As Ljubiša Adamović, chair of international economic relations at the 
University of Belgrade between 1972 and 1992, retrospectively argued, only in 
the late 1980s did Yugoslav scientific circles resume interest in the European inte-
gration question by virtue of the deep interest of Yugoslav society and the eco-
nomic and political elite in the single market project.68 
The prominent role of the state apparatus in dealing with the question of Western 
European economic integration confirmed the SIV as the main forum of debate. 
As the minutes of its meetings between 1972 and 1973 reveal, confrontation on
this issue involved two alternative views. Šnuderl and his fellow representa-
tives from Slovenia (Anton Vratuša and Janko Smole) advocated a qualitative 
step towards expanding commercial and economic cooperation relations with 
the Community. 69 Šnuderl favoured direct relations with the European Commis-
sion, which had proved to prefer a more comprehensive approach to Yugoslavia 
according to an extensive interpretation of the Community’s common commercial 
policy. However, Slovenia’s proactive stance was not welcomed within the SIV, 
and in June 1972 Vratuša complained of an absence of a definite federal plat-
form for enhancing relations with the EEC and of the ambivalent attitude of the 
Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (Savezni Sekretarijat za Inostrane Poslove 
[SSIP]) on this matter. 70 Indeed, a more conservative faction, headed by Bijedić, 
was sceptical about strengthening the supranational dimension of European inte-
gration and favoured the preservation of Yugoslavia’s balance between the Com-
munity and the CMEA.71 Bijedić’s stance was also linked to a parallel reshuffling 
of Yugoslavia’s relations with the Soviet Union, sanctioned by a visit by Brezhnev 
to Belgrade in September 1971, against the backdrop of centrifugal tendencies in 
the federation and the purge of Croatia’s leadership. 72 
However, the importance of the Common Market for Yugoslavia’s external 
commerce was not questioned. In late 1973, Western European countries (the EEC 
plus the EFTA) represented Yugoslavia’s main partner (accounting for 47% of its 
exports and 54% of its imports). Conversely, commerce with the CMEA countries 
lagged behind (34% of its exports and 25% of its imports).73 The confrontation 
between Šnuderl and Bijedić did not result in an overt clash, and in the following
months no clear-cut opposition to Šnuderl’s initiatives emerged within the SIV. 
The Slovenian representative successfully insisted on including economic coop-
eration provisions in the fields of industry and agriculture in the new commercial 
agreement with the EEC, which was signed in June 1973. In parallel, on 18 April 
1973 a non-preferential agreement on textile exports from Yugoslavia to the Com-
mon Market was also concluded. Prominent input in this direction had come from 
Yugoslav textile producers, mostly based in Slovenia. 74 
The period 1971–73 was marked by overall continuity in terms of Yugoslavia’s 
relations with Western Europe and the EEC in particular. When the trade agreement 
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that the SIV had succeeded in securing the Community’s support for the country’s 
internal and international status. However, beyond the official propaganda, the 
making of the 1973 agreement manifested profound differences from the previous 
one. The liberal discourse on the modernisation drive which had accompanied the 
negotiations on the 1970 agreement had faded, and with it efforts by Yugoslavia’s 
leadership to enhance the country’s competitiveness in the international market. 
As a consequence, the development discourse was promoted. It emphasised the 
need for Yugoslavia to be assisted economically through commercial concessions 
and the GSP. Moreover, the preparation of the 1973 trade agreement highlighted 
the emergence of specific republican interests in the EEC. However, contradic-
tions in Yugoslavia’s approach to the Community were to surface rapidly in the 
aftermath of the post-1973 economic recession in Western Europe. 
Playing the underdevelopment card 
The year 1974 marked the approval of a new constitution which confirmed the 
self-management system, later strengthened by the Associated Labour Act of 1976, 
as the cornerstone of the country’s economic organisation. This reform process 
attributed a high degree of independence to the newly established ‘organisations 
of associated labour’ in all their business dealings and transactions with foreign 
partners. Enterprises were free to engage in operations involving the transfer of 
goods and capital and involving production and financial cooperation with for-
eign firms. Self-management provisions also assigned greater room for manoeu-
vre to the federal republics, which were now given broad exclusive competences 
in the fields of income distribution, taxation, employment, welfare policy and for-
eign trade. Instead, foreign policy and relations with international organisations, 
including the EEC, remained within the federal domain. However, according to 
the newly approved constitution, decision-making was based on negotiation and 
agreement among the republics and autonomous provinces.75 After 1974, the SIV
became a clearing house for inter-republican confrontation and the major task of 
preserving the unity of the Yugoslav market (Art. 381 of the 1974 constitution) 
was subject to such confrontation. 
The growing weakness of the SIV coincided with the explosion of a global 
economic recession in the aftermath of the 1973 oil shock. On a proposal by Italy 
and France, the EEC issued protectionist measures suspending the provisions 
of the 1973 trade agreement to face competition from Yugoslavia’s agricultural 
exports.76 At the same time, the rising cost of oil made imports from Western 
Europe more expensive. From 1968 to 1972, imports of mineral fuels accounted 
for about 5.5% of the country’s total imports. In 1974, this percentage rose to 
12.6%, heralding a growing trend which would culminate at 23.5% in 1980 in 
the immediate aftermath of the second oil shock.77 At the same time, a decrease 
in internal demand in the Community meant restrictions in the labour market. 
A massive return of Yugoslav guest workers from West Germany exacerbated 
the balance of payments problems. After the oil shock, the country was also hit 
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countries in Eastern Europe, it was ‘kissed’ by debt. 78 Aiming to expand domestic 
credit, Yugoslav banks started the practice of borrowing abroad and converting 
the credits into dinars. Constitutional provisions limited the capacity of the SIV
to manage the balance of payment problems, impose any kind of strategic pat-
tern on the flood of foreign borrowing and foster a homogeneous import policy. 
Successive reforms in the foreign trade system, later sanctioned by a 1977 Law 
on the Turnover of Goods and Services with Other Countries, 79 created a com-
plex interest network, based on self-management planning of foreign economic 
relations, which put workers in organisations of associated labour in the focus of 
economic decision-making in the sphere of foreign exchange operations.80 This 
had a clear impact on the country’s export policy and, in turn, on relations with 
the EEC. 
The individual republics – Slovenia and Croatia in particular – stepped up pressure 
to get the maximum advantage from negotiations with the European Commis-
sion to improve access to the Common Market (in particular to West Germany 
and Italy).81 The Republican Secretariat for Agriculture and Forests in Ljubljana 
in particular manifested attention to the development of agricultural relations 
with the Common Market,82 whereas the decorative fabrics factory in Ljubljana 
(Tovarna Dekorativnih Tkanin) 83 and the Textil company based in Zagreb insisted 
on broader concessions for the textile industry. 84 At the business association 
level, the Association of Yugoslav Iron Workers in Belgrade (Udruženje Jugo-
slovenskih Železara) paid particular attention to the EEC’s preferential scheme, 85 
openly insisting on closer cooperation between Yugoslavia and the Community in 
the industrial domain.86 These calls were results of the industrialisation process 
which, to face international competition during the 1960s, had turned Yugosla-
via from an agricultural into an industrial country. The agricultural population 
had decreased from 51% to 38% of Yugoslav workers between 1961 and 1971, 
and over the same period the share of agriculture in Yugoslavia’s total exports 
had fallen from 38.1% to 19.6%.87 This process would characterise the Yugoslav 
federation’s patterns of trade throughout the 1970s: in 1980 agricultural exports 
would only represent 11.39% of the country’s exports. 88 
The huge impetus for increased relations with the EEC was confirmed by the 
pressure exerted by the Slovenian and Croatian economic elites for settlement of 
the border issue with Italy. The two republics’ chambers of commerce promoted 
a joint action which called for increased border cooperation with Italy’s north-
eastern region as a doorway into the Common Market. In direct contacts with the
Slovenian leadership, Šnuderl himself conducted secret negotiations which were 
to lead to the Osimo agreements between Rome and Belgrade signed in Novem-
ber 1975.89 This agreement solved the border problem between the two countries, 
a troubled legacy of World War II. It envisaged the creation of a cross-border 
industrial zone between Italy and Yugoslavia from which Slovenian and Croatian 
industrial produce could enter the Community without tariff restrictions. After the 
signing of the Osimo agreements, and on the basis of the confederal provisions 
in the 1974 constitution, Slovenia and Croatia fostered bilateral cooperation with 
bordering regions. In November 1978, this led to the constitution of the Alps-
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(Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Veneto) and Austria (Carinthia, Upper Austria and 
Styria) in the fields of culture, science, transport and tourism.90 
Given the pressure from the northern republics and the parallel crisis in com-
mercial relations with the EEC, debates on the Western European integration 
question acquired new momentum. Yugoslavia’s unbalanced dependency on the 
Common Market was highlighted within the SIV. While the Federal Secretary 
for Finance, Montenegrin Momčilo Čemović, openly accused Italy (which had 
first proposed the Community ban on beef imports from Yugoslavia) of ‘stabbing 
Yugoslavia in the back’, Šnuderl insisted on a less emotional approach to their 
Western European partners and on the need to expand cooperation well beyond 
the commercial sphere to avoid dependence on the nine members of the EEC 
(the Nine).91 Conversely, the political side of relations with the EEC was under-
lined by the League’s leadership (particularly Tito and Kardelj) and the SSIP, 
which after the 1972 purges of the liberals in Serbia was led by Serb Miloš Minić, 
a veteran member of the League and one of Tito’s closest comrades. The party 
elite was mostly interested in the EEC’s role in foreign policy as an international 
actor and how it could match the country’s non-aligned stance. The launch of an 
intergovernmental scheme for foreign policy cooperation (EPC) among the EEC 
member states in 1970 and the Nine’s proactive stance during the CSCE prepara-
tory phase confirmed the Community’s ambitions in the international arena. 92 In 
addition, the SSIP closely monitored the development of direct relations between 
the EEC and the People’s Republic of China, depicting them as a demonstration 
of the Community’s increasing international weight. 93 At the same time, the SKJ 
and the SSIP were concerned about the effects of the balance of trade disequi-
librium on the financial stability of the federation. In this regard, they were also 
supported by Bijedić, who strove to balance competing republican interests. The 
Slovenian and Croatian activism towards the EEC, which had clearly emerged 
during the negotiations on the Osimo agreements, indeed arose the concerns of 
the Federal Secretariat for the Economy, led by the Serb Boško Dimitrijević, that 
a privileged border regime with Italy – based on finished products drawing on raw 
materials or semi-finished goods coming from the central or southern republics 
which could not, in turn, enjoy the economic advantages of the northern republics 
– would enhance economic disparities within the federation.94
 Minić advanced requests for the relaunch of commercial relations with the 
Community during an official visit to Brussels in November 1974. Once back in 
Belgrade, Minić reported his personal apprehensions during a meeting of the SIV
on 30 December 1974. He underlined the payment problems which Yugoslavia 
would face should the deterioration of the trade balance in relations with West-
ern Europe continue.95 For his part, Bijedić agreed on the importance of closely 
examining the evolution of the balance of payments.96 In the following weeks, 
appeals for enhanced cooperation with the EEC partners were also issued by Ivo 
Kuštrak, the president of the Federal Committee for Agriculture and formerly 
the vice president of the Chamber of Commerce of Croatia. In January 1975, he 
argued: ‘The ratio between imports and exports is 1 to 3. This is not negligible. I 
am saying this because we are severely hit in the agricultural sector and we must 
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Kuštrak’s inputs were supported by the Federal Secretary for External Com-
merce, the Croatian Emil Ludviger, who insisted on a pragmatic approach towards 
the Community based on a step-by-step policy. He was against an overall strategy 
encompassing ‘economy, finance, social policy, monetary policy. . . . this would 
be pretentious on our part. . . . We must be realistic about what to expect from this 
[European] Community’.98 Following Ludviger’s appeal, a pragmatic initiative 
started to develop to enlarge financial cooperation with the European Investment 
Bank (EIB). 
This initiative was once again an outcome of lobbying by Slovenia. Indeed, 
already in 1973 the Federal Secretariat for Finance under the leadership of Sec-
retary Janko Smole had explored the possibility of Yugoslavia having access to 
EIB loans.99 Smole had been fully supported by his Slovenian comrade Šnuderl as 
both regarded financial cooperation with the Community on infrastructure proj-
ects as a fundamental means for further integrating the Yugoslav federation, and 
Slovenia in particular, with the Common Market. 100 Appeals for financial coop-
eration were reiterated during a ministerial meeting of the EEC-Yugoslavia Mixed 
Commission in July 1975.101 In this instance, the initiative was taken by Smole
himself, who had meanwhile replaced Šnuderl, due to the latter’s divergences 
with Bijedić over the EEC question,102 as the SIV member in charge of relations 
between Yugoslavia and the Community. 
After the aforementioned preliminary approaches in the financial field, Smole 
realised that a broader political mandate from the SIV was needed to foster his 
initiative. On 23 October 1975, he clearly stated to his peers that a federal strat-
egy should be inaugurated to convey an external image of Yugoslavia as a reli-
able partner. 103 ‘The EEC member states’, Smole argued, ‘believe that the issue 
of commercial deficit only depends on us, that this is a question of Yugoslavia’s 
political economy’.104 Smole therefore did not present financial cooperation as 
a Slovenian project but, being aware that the political aspect of the EEC ques-
tion was of primary importance for the SIV presidency and the SKJ, he argued 
that Yugoslavia should demonstrate its interest in taking initiatives to overcome 
the present impasse. The political battle for financial cooperation was to be the
starting point for extended collaboration in the field of commerce, tourism and
joint ventures. Čemović argued that Smole’s initiative should be followed up and 
that concrete proposals for financing joint projects should be made. Čemović also 
claimed during the debate that increasing republican competences in the field of 
logistics investment were hindering the creation of genuinely federal infrastructure 
networks. He stressed that Yugoslavia’s major aim was to get financing for the 
creation of a highway linking Slovenia (Ljubljana) to Macedonia (Djevdjelija). 
Such financial support would have a political meaning. By investing in the unity 
of the country as a whole, Yugoslavia (as a federal and homogeneous entity) could 
be recognised as a strategic partner by the EEC member states as a bridge towards 
Greece and the Arab world. Thanks to Čemović’s support, based on a federal per-
spective which, however, did not challenge the Slovenian requests, Smole’s pro-
posal for enhanced financial cooperation with the Community was approved by 
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cooperation were finally accepted by the Council of Ministers of the EEC in Janu-
ary 1976, paving the way for the launch of projects of joint interest from 1977 
onwards, including the financing of five sections of the future trans-Yugoslavia 
motorway. 105 
Beyond the financial sphere, a political initiative to face the question of trade 
relations with Western Europe was reappraised by Bijedić during a meeting of the 
SIV on 3 December 1975. The SIV met to review the state of the federal balance 
of payments, as the dreadful situation depicted by Minić the previous year had 
not improved. The growing trade deficit was threatening Yugoslavia’s economic 
links with the West, a situation which, in Bijedić’s words, could not be passively 
accepted: ‘We cannot detach from the West so easily. Neither will we have to 
because this is our traditional market for imports and exports and we need to plan 
an organised economic strategy’. 106 Bijedić therefore called for increased diplo-
matic pressure on Western European partners to invest in Yugoslavia. He insisted, 
however, that such assistance should be based on direct pressure from the direc-
tors of Yugoslavia’s major enterprises. Western partners should be literally urged 
to buy Yugoslav goods. This was the case, for example, of relations with Italy. 
Bijedić stated that, by virtue of traditional links in the automobile sector estab-
lished by FIAT and ZASTAVA in Kragujevac, the influential president of FIAT, 
Giovanni Agnelli, should urge the Italian government to adopt a more liberalised 
commercial stance towards Yugoslavia: ‘Let’s make Agnelli help us sell 20,000 
tons of meat and that would already be a good deal. Let’s make him fight with the 
Italian government in order to make it buy [meat]’.107 According to the president 
of the SIV, Yugoslavia could hardly compete on economic grounds: ‘It is capital-
ism: they tend to preserve their own interests’.108 
The relationship with the Community was therefore increasingly intertwining 
with the trade deficit problem. During a meeting of the SIV in early January 1976, 
Minić defined the country’s commercial imbalance as Yugoslavia’s ‘most impor-
tant foreign policy issue’. At the same time, he noted a stark increase in trade 
relations with Eastern Europe: ‘The question arises as to where we are actually 
going’.109 Minić’s attitude was marked by profound pessimism, which echoed 
Bijedić’s previous statements: ‘In our economy . . . there is not the capacity to 
compete within the markets of developing countries, whereas all our weaknesses 
can be sold in the East’. He defined the CMEA area as a second-ranking market 
which was ready to accept low-quality technology, ‘something which the West-
ern market cannot tolerate’. ‘We must import’, Minić continued: ‘This is the real 
state of our economy and we must find ways . . . to increase exports. . . . This 
issue is linked to our political independence, to our position in the international 
political scene. The state of our exports to the Western market is unbearable’. 110 
Minić therefore called for new diplomatic initiatives towards the Western Euro-
pean partners and the European Community to overcome commercial barriers. 
Similar concerns were echoed by Milorad Birovljev, a Serb from Vojvodina who 
chaired the Federal Committee for Social Planning. Birovljev expressed his alarm 
at the federal weakness in managing import and export strategies due to the direct 
competence of the republics and autonomous provinces in this field. At the same 
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time, he underlined a need for a political action towards Western European gov-
ernments. The Serb Berislav Šefer, a vice president of the SIV, spoke of the bad 
situation of the balance of payments and the ‘politically dangerous’ reflection of 
this situation on the country’s international image. He agreed with Minić that the 
penetration of Yugoslavia’s exports in the Common Market should be increased. 
However, beyond general statements on the need to foster exports, this debate 
was characterised by an overall disillusionment about the possibility of chang-
ing the course of Yugoslavia’s economic policy. This was explicitly manifested 
by Bosnian Gojko Ubiparip, who argued: ‘We are debating about exports . . . to
the Western markets. . . . we are debating and finding reasons for our economic 
recession. However, we are not considering our internal disorganisation and the 
lack of planning. There are no plans in the country and we do not know what our 
strategy is’. Šefer agreed with Ubiparip and underlined the need for the federal 
authorities to find a way to manage the uncontrolled flow of financial credits to 
finance imports.111 
After this disconsolate debate, the SIV paid increasing attention to the evolution of 
a federal posture towards the Common Market. In February 1976, Bijedić made 
a diplomatic tour to Paris, Luxembourg and Brussels. During the visits, he spoke 
of the political importance of relations with the Community and the need to solve 
the trade deficit question. The decision to make the EEC a political partner to 
face the question of the country’s internal stability led to the conceptualisation 
of a joint declaration to be signed by Yugoslavia and the EEC. As the archival 
sources reveal, negotiations on this were entirely dealt with at the federal level 
and were strongly supported by Bijedić. The tightly knit inter-ministerial group 
which was set up to prepare the draft text to be submitted to the Community 
counterparts was made up of members of the SSIP (Božidar Frangeš), the SSST
(Milica Žiberna) and two diplomats in the Yugoslav mission to the EEC in Brus-
sels (Žarko Tomašević and Časlav Djermanović).112 The declaration was signed 
on 2 December 1976 by Bijedić and Max Van der Stoel, the Dutch foreign min-
ister and president of the Council of Ministers of the EEC.113 The 1976 Joint 
Declaration affirmed Yugoslavia’s non-alignment and developing status as the 
cornerstone of bilateral relations between the two parties. This was a clear input 
coming from the SSIP. 114 Publicly, the 1976 declaration was presented as a suc-
cess for the Yugoslav federation, as it reaffirmed the principles and character of its 
foreign policy and particularly the country’s standing as a ‘non-aligned, socialist 
and developing country with a distinctive socio-economic system based on the 
principles of self-management socialism’.115 
The rationale behind the Yugoslav stance towards the EEC after the signing 
of the joint declaration confirmed the foreign policy dimension of Yugoslavia’s 
opening towards the Community. Yugoslav representatives from the SKJ and the 
SIV – which was now led by the Montenegrin Veselin Djuranović after the pre-
mature death of Bijedić in January 1977 – were increasingly aware that the high 
investment rate which had characterised the country throughout the 1970s was not 
sustainable. A sort of ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ was emerging within the federation, 
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of the federal balance of trade. In fact, a ‘Resolution on the Realisation of Yugo-
slavia’s Social Plan for 1978’, which was approved by the parliament on 28 
December 1977, provided that import substitution programmes should be adopted 
in the course of 1978. However, unfavourable market conditions in the Western 
countries and the orientation of domestic producers towards the internal market, 
in which high prices in comparison with the world market could be obtained, 
compromised this effort. To face the trade deficit, a change in Yugoslavia’s policy 
towards the Community was agreed and the traditional non-preferential commer-
cial approach had therefore to be overcome. This policy change was manifested 
by Djuranović during a meeting in Belgrade with the vice president of the Euro-
pean Commission, Wilhelm Haferkamp, in June 1978. 116 On this occasion, the 
SIV president stated that the Nine should defend Yugoslavia’s non-aligned status, 
and that to do so a new sui generis commercial regime should be set up to assist 
the federation with unilateral trade concessions well beyond the GSP. 117 This pol-
icy change modified the non-discriminatory approach endorsed by the Yugoslav 
leadership since the negotiations for the 1970 agreement. All in all, this was the 
consequence of the incapacity of the SIV to impose a working import substitution 
policy. 118 The aforementioned 1977 foreign trade reform had even deteriorated the 
coordinating role of the SIV. Retrospectively, improving relations with the EEC 
was a way to solve the trade deficit situation while avoiding internal reforms. 
Djuranović’s move was openly sponsored by the SKJ leadership. In Decem-
ber 1978, Tito explicitly declared his country’s weakness and dependency on the 
West while meeting with the secretary general of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), Emiel van Lennep. In 1977 the OECD 
countries represented 51% of Yugoslavia’s total trade, 77% of its commercial def-
icit and 87% of its foreign debt. Tito therefore made an appeal for economic assis-
tance on the basis of Yugoslavia’s status as a developing country. In particular, 
he made it clear that in the long run Yugoslavia could not stand a policy of high 
investment and foreign indebtedness. He therefore asked for Western understand-
ing of Yugoslavia’s precarious state. Referring to the debt question, Tito argued, 
‘We are continuing to buy goods in Western Europe which are necessary for our 
development. I do not know for how long this may go on’.119 Tito’s statements 
were frequently raised by senior representatives of the SKJ, particularly Vladimir 
Bakarić, in bilateral contacts with West German representatives. 120 According to 
Bakarić, relations between the EEC and Yugoslavia should mainly comprise and 
be understood within the broader context of north-south relations and the EEC’s 
development policy. 121 It was not by chance that at the level of the League’s Inter-
national Commission, discussions centred on topics such as the new international 
economic order and the critical role of Western Europe in it – indeed, criticism of 
EEC protectionism had been clearly made in the final conclusions of the Fourth 
Non-aligned Summit in Algiers in September 1973 122 – rather than on the actual 
dimension of economic relations between the Community and Yugoslavia or the 
federation’s internal plans to face the rising commercial deficit. 123 This attitude 
also reflected the stance adopted by SKJ representatives during the preparatory 
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1976. On an initiative of the Italian Communist Party, representatives of sev-
eral Western and Eastern European communist parties had gathered in Rome on 
19–20 April 1975 to review the ‘contemporary status, possibilities and prospects 
for economic cooperation in Europe’. While the representatives of the Eastern 
European parties limited themselves to blaming the discriminatory nature of the 
Common Market, Milan Aleksić, a member of the SKJ Presidency and director 
of the Belgrade-based Institute for Foreign Trade (Institut za Spoljnu Trgovinu), 
stated that economic cooperation in Europe should not neglect the broader neces-
sity of reforming the international division of labour and relations with develop-
ing countries.124 
However, the north-south issue and the coordination among developing coun-
tries had less impact on Yugoslavia’s relations with Western Europe than the 
continual deterioration of the trade balance and the increasing foreign indebted-
ness. The lack of a federal economic strategy was even emphasised by the sheer 
absence of communication between the SIV and the republics and autonomous 
provinces of statistics on the actual flow of financial credits from the West, as 
emerged during a meeting of the SIV on 19 March 1979. 125 Macedonian Stojan 
Andov, who replaced Smole as the person in charge of the SIV Commission for 
Relations with the EEC in May 1978, worked towards a politicisation of rela-
tions with the Community. During a meeting of the SIV on 10 May 1979 he 
argued, ‘It is important to regulate our relations with the EEC for the economic 
stability of the country, as the economic stability of the country is important for 
its overall position in international relations’.126 Negotiations between Belgrade 
and the European Commission concerned the conclusion of a sui generis coop-
eration agreement. On the Yugoslav side, they were carried out by Andov on the 
basis of this clear-cut political rationale, which was later underlined by the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the rapid deterioration of Tito’s 
health in January 1980.127 Croatian Josip Vrhovec, who had replaced Minić as 
foreign minister in 1978, was instead de facto excluded from the negotiations 
between Belgrade and Brussels. The SIV as a whole was only consulted when 
the guidelines for the platform for negotiations were discussed in spring 1979 and 
when the treaty was ready to be signed in February 1980. Communication with 
the members of the federal government was therefore kept to a minimum level 
and the question was treated as a state secret. During the final negotiating phases, 
many of the SIV members, including Vrhovec, lamented the overall lack of infor-
mation about the whole process.128 All in all, the conclusion of the 1980 agree-
ment developed without comprehensive economic and political debate within the 
federation and the republics. 
The 1980 cooperation agreement with the EEC was finally signed on 2 April, a 
few weeks before the death of Tito on 4 May 1980. Belgrade was granted unilateral 
and non-reciprocal commercial concessions in both the agricultural and industrial 
fields.129 Provisions on economic cooperation in the fields of tourism, environ-
ment, finance and industrial cooperation were also included. However, beyond 
the commercial sphere, the provisions of the agreement were general and indica-
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to the Community was primarily linked to the country’s status as a developing 
country which had to depend on Western European commercial concessions. 130 
The rise in the trade deficit and the growth of Yugoslav overall foreign indebted-
ness (from 3.5 billion US dollars in 1972 to 18.4 billion US dollars in 1980)131 
against a backdrop of sky-high oil prices and rapidly escalating rates of interest on 
international credit bore witness to such dependency. However, relying on a pol-
icy of assistance and concessions was exposing Yugoslavia to increasing depen-
dency on the Common Market and the goodwill of Western European leaders. It 
seems that the Yugoslav leadership artificially separated the European integration 
question from its internal economic dimension. The preconditions for the link 
between Yugoslavia’s performance at home and abroad, which hugely impacted 
the country’s economic balance at the end of the decade, were definitively set, as 
was its entry into the financial spiral which would lead to the debt-service crisis 
and successive IMF restructuring programmes from 1982 onwards.132
 Conclusions 
During the long 1970s, Yugoslavia’s policy towards the EEC was the result of a 
complex set of diverging dynamics. The establishment of relations with the Com-
munity and the making of the first trade agreement in 1970 were outcomes of a 
process of liberal reforms. The “realistic” opening towards the EEC, which dis-
tinguished Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc countries, was therefore grounded on 
economic considerations which pointed at the need to avoid the negative conse-
quences of the customs union established by the Six and foster economic relations 
with the Common Market. While the Warsaw Pact intervention in Prague and its 
international repercussions highlighted the political dimension of EEC-Yugoslav 
relations, the liberal rationale of the commercial negotiations which officially 
opened after October 1968 did not change. However, also as a consequence of 
the market-oriented reforms and political opening to the Community – which 
was then experiencing a triple process of enlargement, deepening and comple-
tion – during the negotiations on the first trade agreement (1968–1970), specific 
economic interests of the economic elites of Slovenia and Croatia began to take 
shape. As was highlighted in the second section of this chapter, the crisis resulting 
from the liberal reforms also involved the course of Yugoslavia’s opening towards 
the EEC. This opening was conditioned by the emergence of inter-republican 
competition and the successive confederalisation of the country with the adop-
tion of the 1974 constitution. Within this framework, competing views between 
the federal approach adopted by the SKJ and the SIV presidency and the repub-
lican prerogatives of Slovenia and Croatia emerged. While the former advocated 
a political reading of relations with the EEC – based on Yugoslavia’s status as a 
non-aligned and developing country and the rising international role of the Com-
munity within the framework of the CSCE – the latter were instead interested in 
the economic advantages which the republics would draw from closer ties with 
the Common Market. The two views became irreconcilable after the economic 
recession which hit Western Europe in the aftermath of the 1973 oil shock and the 
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adoption of the 1974 constitution. While the commercial and economic dimen-
sion of relations with the EEC was sponsored by the republican leadership, the 
political view of relations with the Community endorsed by the SKJ, SSIP and 
SIV presidency (Bijedić and from 1977 onwards Djuranović) gradually prevailed. 
The view of the EEC as a political rather than economic partner suited the foreign 
policy orientation of the League’s leadership – as it focused on the Western Euro-
pean attempt to prevent a superpower condominium in Europe – and was func-
tional in maximising the strategic value of a united Yugoslavia in Western eyes. 
Overall, the opening to the EEC, which had started within the framework of the 
reformist policies of the 1960s in order to integrate Yugoslavia in the international 
economy, turned into a conservative policy to preserve the federation’s internal 
and external status quo. From the viewpoint of the Yugoslav federal leadership, 
the EEC member states had to assist Yugoslavia’s policy of high investment and 
exports to the Common Market. The short-term aims were to get convertible cur-
rency from the West, solve the trade deficit and sustain the confidence of Western 
creditors. To justify this policy internally and abroad, Yugoslavia’s official nar-
rative was that of an underdeveloped country assisted by developed economies. 
Indeed, the negotiation of the 1980 cooperation agreement with the EEC was the 
outcome of a pessimistic outlook on the capacity of the country to stand integra-
tion in the international economy and balance internal investment with foreign 
exports. Once the political aspect of the negotiation prevailed over its economic 
rationale, Yugoslavia condemned itself to a policy of dependency on Western 
Europe, confirming its isolation at the periphery of the Common Market. At the 
turn of the decade from the late 1960s to the late 1970s, the Yugoslav federal 
elite had thus moved from the illusion of an industrial future to an apologetic 
description of the federation as an underdeveloped country which hid its growing 
structural disparities. 
While this study has not addressed the origins of the collapse of Yugoslavia 
in the early 1990s, which took place in a different international context, it has 
addressed the lack of a veritable federal strategy vis-à-vis the EEC, and the impos-
sibility for the federal government to shape the country’s foreign economic policy, 
which was considered an object, rather than a subject, of the globalised economy 
of the 1970s. We can see here the long-term roots of Yugoslavia’s uncontrolled 
spiral of commercial and credit imports and the ever-declining role of the federal 
government vis-à-vis the federal republics, which Ante Marković’s reforms in the 
late 1980s were not able to correct. 
Comparatively, the sui generis character of Yugoslavia’s relations with the EEC 
proved to be nominal rather than substantial. Yugoslavia’s official recognition of 
the Community and the conclusion of official agreements with it – a unicum in 
relations between the Community and the socialist world which would only be 
followed by the People’s Republic of China in the late 1970s – did not mean the 
country was actually included in the integration path of Western Europe, nor 
did it imply a process of EEC-inspired political and economic liberalisation in 
the country. Internal political dynamics shaped the rapprochement to the EEC 
rather than vice versa. Instead, the story told in this chapter shows the impressive 
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similarity of the Yugoslav case with those of the other socialist states addressed 
in this book, in that unbalanced trade relations, determined by an import hunger 
for high-quality machinery and equipment in the absence of an endogenous drive 
for exports, and a chronic deficit of the balance of payments were concerned (as 
in the case of Bulgaria in the late 1970s and Poland, Romania and the GDR at 
the beginning of the 1980s).133 Equally similar to the dynamics experienced by 
the CMEA member states were Yugoslavia’s attempts to move to less centralised 
market socialism (Hungary), to play the development card to obtain commercial 
concessions (Romania) and to rely on Western financial credits to foster internal 
investment (in particular, the GDR, Hungary, Poland and Romania). Finally, this 
work has highlighted the internal effects of Yugoslavia’s inclusion in the global 
economy in terms of import-based investment, uncontrolled access to foreign 
credits after the 1973 oil shock and dependency on fluctuations in interest rates, 
which made the country part of the broader group of underdeveloped countries 
in Eastern Europe and Latin America which later underwent the global debt crisis 
of the 1980s.134
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 10 Conclusions 
Angela Romano and Federico Romero 
This book has focused on a particular historical moment when the socialist regimes 
of Europe banked their hopes for prosperity and stability on enhanced relations 
with the West, and more specifically Western Europe. Our specific intent was 
to explore, and hence reveal, the debate in each country among and within the 
elites involved in policymaking as they elaborated this strategic view and coped 
with shortcomings and unexpected turns. A comparative analysis of national cases 
reveals a shared logic and common patterns, together with national variations and 
a plurality of views on the desirability of exchanges with the capitalist neighbours 
and the ways to promote them. 
Our first interest was to investigate the European socialist regimes’ expecta-
tions with regard to East-West relations in the 1970s. Our findings confirm that
all the socialist regimes read European détente and the ensuing emergence of
a pan-European space for cooperation as an opportunity to quickly and effec-
tively modernise their economies, catch up with the capitalist West and hope-
fully leap forward, ultimately achieving better living standards for their people.
Party leaders and officials did not abandon notions of socialism as a more pro-
gressive system, inherently different from and opposed to capitalism. Neither
did they subscribe to reformist views of a liberalised and democratised social-
ism. Instead, they aimed at consolidating their single-party domestic rule and
making socialism stronger and more influential on a global scale. To achieve
these goals, the socialist economies had to become more productive, efficient,
internationally competitive and more responsive to the material needs of their
citizens. Among them, the Polish leadership stands out for its ambition and con-
fidence, which was epitomised in the regime’s slogan ‘Poland, the 10th global
industrial power’. 1 
The policy all the socialist regimes pursued at the time was one of import-led 
growth, which relied on increased imports of advanced technology and invest-
ment goods from advanced capitalist economies, particularly those of Western 
Europe, in order to upgrade their industrial structures. These massive purchases 
required substantial loans, which Western banks and governments were eager to 
provide at cheap rates for most of the 1970s. The assumption was that the new 
investments would spur economic growth and expand export capacities. Interna-
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from this virtuous cycle. In short, a modernised industrial structure would reduce 
the gap that separated the socialist countries from the most advanced economies 
and provide socialism with the means to take the best advantage of a fast-growing 
global economy. 
Some regimes also planned to import consumer goods from Western Europe in
order to raise living standards before this could be done via domestic production.
Yugoslavia stands out for its policies of openness in this respect. In the socialist
bloc, the most impressive case was Poland, whose political elite was confident
that the country’s quality of life could soon equal that of the capitalist European
countries. The Hungarian elite was also thinking along these lines but was less 
bold in its rhetoric. By contrast, the governments of Czechoslovakia and the GDR 
were more cautious. They tackled the problem of popular satisfaction not only
with imports from the West but primarily by means of social policy (e.g. hous-
ing, services, holiday programmes). The Bulgarian leadership pursued increased
consumption through domestic economic reforms, and imports of consumer goods
remained negligible until 1989. Although improvement of the standard of living
was considered the ultimate goal of socialism in Romania, the ruling elite gave pre-
dominant emphasis to investments in new plants and infrastructure for fully fledged
industrialisation.
Appraisal of the opportunities offered by détente was not limited to economic 
aspects. The prominence of security and foreign policy motivations was apparent 
in Yugoslavia’s cautious yet steady path towards closer relations with Western 
Europe and the EEC in particular. In Yugoslavia, Western Europe and the US, the 
question of safely anchoring socialist Yugoslavia to the West, or at least of pro-
tecting it from any possible direct or indirect Soviet takeover and meddling after 
Tito’s death, was high on the political agenda. For the GDR and Poland, the most 
important aspects of détente were the securing of borders and the international 
political recognition of East Germany. As Europe increasingly became a space 
for rapprochement, recombination and convergence, the socialist bloc countries 
also viewed connections with Western Europe as levers for reconfiguring hierar-
chies within the socialist bloc and vis-à-vis Moscow. In two cases, this policy was 
pursued with determination and a distinctive streak of nationalism. The new Polish 
leadership in the early 1970s believed that their country should (and had the right 
to) play a central role in European affairs and aimed to be the second most influ-
ential socialist country after the Soviet Union. Romania boldly asserted its political 
autonomy from the 1960s onwards, earning the label of “maverick” of the socialist 
bloc. Our research shows the fundamental importance that the conceptualisation of 
national sovereignty had in shaping the Romanian ruling elite’s economic visions 
and strategy, and its determination to go against CMEA common positions and 
Soviet advice alike on a series of issues. Romanian nationalism went hand in hand 
with serious distrust of the willingness of the other socialist countries to consider 
Romanian interests. The most interesting case, though, is Bulgaria, the elite of 
which conceived of trade as an instrument to open political relations with West-
ern European states and hence to overcome the long-term peripheral condition of 


















socialist doctrine of peaceful coexistence and hence caused no serious discords 
with the USSR. 
The chapters in this book show the limited extent of Soviet control over the 
other socialist bloc countries’ pursuit of their Western strategies. On several occa-
sions, the Soviets tried to reverse their allies’ foreign trade policies. Brezhnev 
personally, and sometimes harshly, warned his allies of the perils of becoming too 
dependent on Western markets and loans, but to little avail. Both Honecker and 
Ceausescu, for instance, actually blamed the Soviets for not satisfying their allies’
needs and presented increased exchanges with the West as unavoidable. The Pol-
ish leadership avoided confrontation but covered up statistics to prove to the Sovi-
ets that the country was not so dependent on the West as they claimed. In Hungary, 
Kádár and his older generation comrades restrained bolder moves suggested by 
experts and some ministerial officials for fear that Moscow might withdraw its 
energy supplies or even decide on political intervention. Nonetheless, Hungary 
gradually supplemented the idea of socialist integration with rapprochement to 
Western Europe. 
Indeed, a further conclusion that the research behind these chapters vali-
dates is that in pursuing their Western strategies, the European socialist
regimes developed increasingly national outlooks and goals. Romania openly
challenged bloc discipline, to the point of internationally presenting itself as
a developing country in order to extract preferential treatment on trade and
credit. Although less outspoken, most of the other regimes were no less keen
to carve out for themselves a more advantageous position in international rela-
tions, and often tried to out-compete their socialist partners. Above all, they
pinned their hopes on expanding their trade outside the socialist bloc and on
multiplying their partners and options. Even the GDR, which was the most
committed to improving CMEA cooperation, viewed trade with capitalist
countries as a necessity so as to compensate for the shortcomings of intra-
CMEA trade. As a result, the bloc was not undone but certainly loosened, and
became an even less cohesive coalition.
This is particularly evident when it came to how to deal with the EEC. Its 
policies, tariffs and expanding membership badly hit the export component of 
the socialist countries’ strategies. No regime considered the Soviet proposal that 
they should reduce trade with Western Europe so as to diminish their economic 
vulnerability vis-à-vis EEC protectionism. All, however, bowed to bloc unity by 
respecting the policy of non-recognition and supporting the idea of EEC-CMEA
negotiations. However, what they understood by this varied greatly. Romania 
constantly refused to release foreign trade policy up to the CMEA level. While 
Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria initially supported negotiations 
with the EEC as a group so as to have a stronger bargaining position, they did not 
give up the possibility of also dealing bilaterally with the EEC. Pending recogni-
tion, they devised various strategies to cope with EEC protectionist policies. All 
tried to insist on bilateral trade relations with EEC member states. With the sole 
exception of the GDR, European socialist regimes also tried to use international 
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also the UNCTAD in the case of Bulgaria and the G-77 for Romania. This strategy 
of bypassing the EEC, however, often reached a dead end. With the exception 
of the GDR, direct contacts with the EEC Commission became inevitable. The 
socialist countries upgraded their embassy staff in Brussels with officials specifi-
cally responsible for Community contacts. In this process, emulation played an 
important role. Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria explicitly looked at the Polish 
example when deciding to enter into technical contacts and agreement with the 
EEC on agricultural exports. Bulgaria imitated Hungary in turning to GATT and 
Romania in requesting access to the EEC’s preferential scheme for developing 
countries. In this case, both Bulgaria and Romania had the Yugoslav example in 
mind. 
In the first half of the 1970s, all the European socialist countries pursued new 
trade arrangements, signed license agreements with Western partners and took up 
loans to finance technology imports. The noticeable exception was Czechoslova-
kia, where the political normalisation process went hand in hand with economic 
consolidation and fiscal prudence. The initial results were encouraging for all. 
In the early 1970s, Poland and Romania experienced record economic growth; 
Bulgaria, the GDR and Hungary also performed very well. The planners’ expecta-
tions of a stronger and more prosperous socialism therefore seemed to be borne 
out, thus stimulating further loans and investments. 
Ironically, the import-led growth strategy to prompt socialist modernisation 
and prosperity relied, at least in the short to medium term, on the dynamism of 
the capitalist economies. Western Europe’s recession in the mid-1970s was a 
serious blow to the socialist regimes’ economic strategies because it led to pro-
tectionist measures to preserve the worst-hit sectors of the economy. Moreover, 
they faced growing competition from newly rampant East Asian economies and 
from African countries that had privileged access to the EEC market. The limited 
possibility of exporting, and hence gaining hard currency to repay debts com-
bined with the availability of cheaper loans – thanks to the petrodollars flooding 
Western banks – to create the preconditions for the debt trap. The West’s trium-
phalist narrative has long depicted the socialist ruling elites as unable to under-
stand finance and therefore blindly walking into spiralling indebtedness. Our 
research proves this to be a misconceived view. For starters, the peril of getting 
into heavy debt was known and accurately understood. The Czechoslovak elites, 
for instance, were highly sensitive to the risk of indebtedness and took very cau-
tious decisions. The Bulgarian government was also less risk-prone. Even in the 
GDR the dilemma of import needs and growing indebtedness was omnipresent. 
More crucially, the problem of the countries that got into the debt trap was that 
the party leadership chose not to listen to warnings by experts, central bankers, 
branches of the state apparatus and Moscow. In Hungary, Romania and Poland 
(at least initially), the leadership had faith in the strategy adopted and was opti-
mistic about the country’s capacity to repay debts through exports. In Poland and 
the GDR, Gierek and Honecker personally silenced internal opposition (notably 






existence rested on popular satisfaction and hence considered a U-turn too politi-
cally costly. 
Indeed, another important conclusion that our research brings to the fore is 
the plurality of voices in the policymaking process in the socialist countries
in the 1970s. With the single exception of the GDR, where foreign trade and 
finance remained under the strict control of the top political leadership, national 
strategies towards the West opened room for the agency and even some auton-
omy of ministries and government organisations, the experts they employed or 
consulted, trade associations and their officials, and managers in key sectors. In 
Ceausescu’s Romania, most surprisingly, ministerial staff, experts and diplomats 
in Brussels were constantly asked by the party leadership to provide information 
and solutions, which were then approved in most cases. With the exception of 
Hungary, where the party was involved throughout, the top leadership usually 
signed up to the broad guidelines of the strategy and was occasionally involved at 
the level of crucial symbolic decisions, but the definition and implementation of 
the strategy’s tenets, the actual pursuit of agreements and the search for new ven-
ues and means was in the hands of mid- to high-level government officials, man-
agers and experts. Thus, the party’s grip became looser and the internal structure 
of the regimes less cohesive (a process most apparent in Yugoslavia’s creeping 
confederalisation of economic decisions), new areas of expertise were cultivated 
in the extended networking with international institutions and Western firms, and 
the socialist elite grew more differentiated by task, training and exposure to for-
eign experiences. Notably, academics and foreign trade organisation managers 
had better knowledge and understanding of international economic dynamics 
together with a direct stake in more contacts with the West, and were usually 
keen advocates of the Western strategy and of direct relations with the EEC. As 
the cases of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary reveal, the generational shift 
was also a key factor in the growing support for these policy lines. In Hungary, 
the party’s young reformist wing even called for a demonstrative  political agree-
ment with the EEC to prove Hungary’s commitment to its most important Euro-
pean commercial partners. Indeed, in some cases, like Hungary, the EEC question 
caused sharp debates among the elites; in others, like Romania, there were almost 
unanimous views on how the country should approach the EEC (and the CMEA). 
Overall, the chapters in this book shed light on how the socialist elites envisioned 
and debated the coexistence and interaction between adjacent and overlapping 
spaces shaped by contrasting logics: the socialist bloc and Western European inte-
gration; ideological rivalry and a new cooperative stance; important bilateral rela-
tions; and emerging multilateral frameworks. 
Taken together, this book’s chapters give us a detailed historical catalogue of 
the various factors that contributed both to the early achievements and to the 
subsequent setbacks and failures of socialism’s Western strategy. The insertion 
of new technologies and procedures without substantial alterations to the over-
all planning system did not kick the entire economy into higher gear. Slow and 
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prevented or hindered the deep restructuring that was common practice in Western 
factories, thus forestalling the expected productivity boom. Investments decisions 
often remained hostage to political lobbying by the well-connected traditional 
heavy industry sectors. By the middle of the decade the balance of trade turned 
negative for Poland, Yugoslavia, the GDR and even Hungary (see Tables A.1 and 
A.2). In spite of new technology inputs, socialist manufactured goods made few 
inroads in world markets. On both quality and price, they were most often out-
competed by Western products and, most crucially, by the aggressive competition 
from fast-rising East Asian economies. 
However, the impact of external factors was of great importance in determin-
ing the failure of the socialist countries. Their domestic difficulties were crucially 
compounded by a rapidly evolving international environment. The Western eco-
nomic crisis deeply changed the premises on which the socialist regimes’ import-led 
strategies were founded. No less relevant was the protected nature of their most 
obvious export markets, those regulated by the EEC agricultural and tariff poli-
cies. Overcoming the EEC protectionist structure would have been hard in any 
case but was made extremely difficult by adherence to the socialist bloc policy of 
non-recognition of the EEC, which prevented the negotiation of comprehensive 
trade agreements. The socialist regimes had to make do with ad hoc sectoral trade 
arrangements with the EEC. Even a government like Hungary’s, despite being 
very keen to penetrate EEC markets, felt restrained by its strategic and energy 
dependency on the USSR. And even “maverick” Romania, which obtained access 
to the EEC’s preferential scheme for developing countries – and in 1980 discussed 
a larger agreement with the EEC Commission – stopped short of granting official 
recognition to the Community. 
The result was that the hard-currency gains the socialist regimes envisioned in 
order to balance their increasing financial exposure to the West never acquired 
sufficient mass. The inevitable consequence was a steep rise in debt to West-
ern banks and governments, a dynamic further deepened by ongoing transforma-
tions in the international context. The ascending cost of energy supplies and other 
raw materials exacerbated inflationary pressures. Larger and freer capital flows 
pressured governments to impose fiscal discipline on their societies and spurred 
firms towards more flexible modes of production and distribution. Adaptation 
to these new conditions of tighter interdependence was problematic for Western 
countries – as was evidenced by the financial crises experienced by the UK and 
Italy in 1976 and the deep restructuring of the steel industry in Europe and North 
America – but positively painful, if not impossible, for the socialist ones. Socialist 
firms could not keep pace with the Western move towards leaner and more flex-
ible industrial practices. When the Polish government tried to contain consumers’
expectations of rising prosperity in 1976, social protests forced the authorities to 
privilege consumption at the expense of investment, thus further deepening the 
country’s long-term financial predicament. 
By 1979, when energy prices rose steeply and a new US monetary policy 







unsustainable. The burden of foreign debt skyrocketed (see Appendix , Table A.5 ), 
and most of central-eastern Europe (even though with substantial national vari-
ations) joined the ranks of economies that, like in Latin America, precipitated 
into a most serious debt crisis. Poland experienced a systemic convulsion, with 
economic grievances sparking an outright social and political challenge to the 
regime. The other socialist countries had to devise defensive strategies pivoted 
on a variable mix of domestic austerity, a reduction in investments and renegotia-
tions of their debts. Economic growth faltered and dependence on the West did 
not altogether diminish, but the previous delusions of an upgraded participation in 
the international economy faded away. 
Overall, by the early 1980s the Western strategy of the socialist regimes was 
far from the projected success and instead mired in a deep crisis of indebtedness, 
deteriorating socio-economic conditions and, more crucially, lack of prospects. 
Rather than reviving socialism in a modernising and competitive fashion, this 
Western strategy eventually magnified the limitations and shortcomings of the 
system, evidencing its subordinate and increasingly feeble position in the interna-
tional economy. Quite revealingly, the proportion of manufactured goods among 
the socialist countries’ total exports declined by the early 1980s (see Appendix , 
Table A.4 ). European socialism’s attempt to climb up in the transformative whirl-
wind of incipient globalisation had not worked. Rather than sustained progress, 
it had brought to the fore an entrenched subordinate dependency on the most 
advanced Western economies. Steeped in a far more adverse economic and fiscal 
environment and financially burdened by their own failures, the socialist regimes 
had to settle for the more peripheral and dependent position that their early 1970s 
Western strategies had boldly tried to transcend. 
Our research also casts a rather oblique light on notions of alternative non-
Western paths to globalism and particularly on the kind of engagement socialism 
looked for in, and with, the global South. Socialist economic strategies came to 
rely less and less on global exchanges and focused instead on Western capital, 
technologies and markets, with a particular emphasis on a privileged space for 
interaction between Eastern and Western Europe. While not abandoning discourses 
(and occasionally strategic options) of alternative globalism, socialist regimes did 
not really see trade with the South as the solution to their predicaments. Markets 
in the developing world were not rich, deep and dynamic enough to attract many 
exports. Moreover, competition from the West and from East Asia was fierce and 
most often victorious. In addition, trade expansion would usually require substantial 
financing via long-term credit, aid and subsidies. In short, it required capital, the 
most precious resource that the socialist countries lacked and were borrowing in 
large quantities from the West. Here, once again, the area’s condition of depen-
dency comes to the fore and explains the limited options the socialist regimes 
could select among on their chosen path towards industrial modernisation. In the 
rapidly evolving global division of labour, the scarce resources of their economies, 
and the political and institutional constraints they operated in, made the Western 
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dependency determined not only by growing financial exposure but also by the 
fading away of other imagined paths and the corresponding strengthening of a 
single conception of the future. 
In their increasingly composite assortment, the socialist elites – be they of 
a technocratic persuasion, modernisers, mildly or more radically reformist, or 
gradually even in opposition roles, as in Poland – discarded notions of alternative 
global alignments pivoted on anti-imperial positions. Instead, they came to see 
their path towards Europe and the West, which had meanwhile grown far more 
familiar by means of multiple and persistent international networking, first as 
the most preferable and then as their only conceivable horizon. The decisions of 
Hungary, Poland and Romania to apply for membership of the IMF proves that 
their socialist elites were left in no doubt that the remedy to their predicaments 
lay in the West. The same applies to the GDR: while IMF membership was never 
an option, its avoidance of bankruptcy in 1982 owed much more to West German
loans than to scarce Soviet support, prompting some economic experts in the 
government to argue that the future existence of the GDR ‘depended solely on 
the West’. 2 Our research therefore highlights a long-term path – which started 
well before the fall of socialist regimes – towards the recombination of Europe 
according to Western institutions and influence. By 1989, even the core com-
munist party leaderships could no longer envision, much less credibly propose, 
a different prospect. 
Of course, several other factors that have remained at the margins of our 
enquiry contributed to this ending. By the late 1970s, a language of human rights 
focused on their civic and individual dimension had become predominant in 
international discourse. It was sustained by an odd but very influential combina-
tion of the conservative liberalism preached by Ronald Reagan and Margaret 
Thatcher on the one hand and the progressive transnationalism of human rights 
non-governmental organisations on the other. It eclipsed notions of collective 
socio-economic improvement; it delegitimised the state as an agent of progress; 
and it erected freedom of choice as the paragon of (post-)modernity. While it 
affected politics and culture in the West and put Western social democrats on 
the defensive, it had a far more potent impact on socialist regimes, which were 
cornered into a very difficult position – first, because it turned their Helsinki 
commitments against them, and second, because it joined the ongoing discussion 
on market mechanisms to the notion of democracy and freedom as prerequisites 
for economic growth. 
Whether these transformative influences could have been withstood, rejected 
or even suppressed by the communist leaderships in the absence of the Gorbachev 
factor remains a purely speculative question. It certainly mattered, though, that 
the regimes’ economic strategies had internalised an assumption of Western supe-
riority, had opened their societies up to unfavourable comparisons with Western 
goods and technologies, had linked the assessment of socialism’s effectiveness 
to the metrics of productivity and consumption, and had nurtured a diffused 
familiarity with the West among key elements in the economic technocracy. This 




indebtedness eroded the foundations of the regimes’ self-confidence, fractured 
their solidity, and facilitated the peoples’ revolutions. The dynamics analysed in 
this book were at the roots of the 1989 collapse. 
Notes 
1 See Chapter 4 by Aleksandra Komornicka in this book. 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table A.2 European centrally planned economies’ trade with the EEC (without the USSR, 
in billion US dollars) 
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 
Export  2.444  3.330  6.120  6.511  8.172 18.922  19.710  19.549 
Import  2.395  3.650  7.730  8.251  9.937 12.735  8.127   7.311 
Balance −0.049 −0.320 −1.610 −1.740 −1.765 +6.187 +11.583 +12.238 
Appendix 1 259 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations 1975. New York: United Nations, 1976, 439, 441; 
Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations 1979/1980. New York: United Nations, 1981, 449, 453; 
Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations 1983/1984. New York: United Nations, 1986, 905–6. 
Note: The European centrally planned economies included here are Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. The EEC’s membership expanded 
in 1973 to the UK, Ireland and Denmark and in 1981 to Greece. The quick rise of the export numbers 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  Table A.4 Export structure of European centrally planned economies (including the USSR,
in percentages) 
European CMEA countries 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 
Food, live animals, beverages 10.1 9.4 9.6 7.5 6.6 6.2 5.7 5.0 
and tobacco 
Crude materials, oils and fats, 10.0 9.1 9.9 8.3 7.3 7.2 5.6 5.2 
fuel excluded 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and 9.6 9.8 14.5 19.6 20.2 27.2 31.3 32.9 
related material 
Chemicals 5.0 5.2 5.4 4.9 4.6 5.0 5.5 5.7 
Machinery and transport 31.6 34.0 30.4 31.9 33.0 29.7 27.7 27.7 
equipment 
Other manufactured goods 25.3 25.2 22.7 20.8 19.9 18.2 14.1 14.3 
Appendix 1 261 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations 1977. New York: United Nations, 1978, 510; 
Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations 1979/1980, New York: United Nations, 1981, 480; 
Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations 1983/1984, New York: United Nations, 1986, 937. 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.6 Average annual growth of GDP in selected countries 
1970–75 1975–80 1980–83 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
Growth of GDP 
Growth per capita of GDP 











Growth per capita of GDP 










Growth per capita of GDP 
Growth of GDP 
Growth per capita of GDP 














Growth per capita of GDP 








Growth per capita of GDP 
Growth of GDP 
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Sources: Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations 1983/1984. New York: United Nations, 1986, 95–9. 
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List of Archival Collections 
Bulgaria 
AMVnR Arhiv na Ministerstvoto na Vanshnite Raboti (Archives of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Sofia, Bulgaria 
TsDA Tsentralen Darzhaven Arhiv (Central State Archives), Sofia, 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
AČNB Archiv České národní banky (Archive of the Czech National 
Bank), Prague, Czech Republic 
AMZV  Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí (Archive of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Prague, Czech Republic 
APF Česká televize, Archiv a programové fondy Praha (Czech 
Television, Archive and Program Funds Prague), Prague, 
Czech Republic 
NAČR Národní archiv (National Archives), Prague, Czech Republic 
SNA Slovenský národný archív (Slovak National Archives), 
Bratislava, Slovakia 
Germany 
BArch Bundesarchiv (Federal Archives), Koblenz, Germany 
BArch-DDR Bundesarchiv, Abteilung DDR (Federal Archives, Department 
GDR), Berlin – Lichterfelde, Germany 
BStU  Archiv des Bundesbeauftragten für die Unterlagen des 
Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik (Archives of the Federal 
Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of 
the former German Democratic Republic), Berlin, Germany 
HABUBA Historisches Archiv der Deutschen Bundesbank (Historical 
Archive of the German Federal Bank), Frankfurt/Main, 
Germany 
PA/AA Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (Political Archive 
of the German Foreign Office), Berlin, Germany 
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PA/AA-MfAA Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Bestand 
Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik (Political Archive of the German 
Foreign Office, Holdings of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
of the German Democratic Republic), Berlin, Germany 
 RWWA  Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv zu Köln 
(Foundation Economic Archive of Reinhland-Westfalen in 
Cologne) Cologne, Germany 
SAPMO-BArch Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisation der 
ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv Berlin (Foundation 
Archive of Parties and Mass Organisations of the former GDR 
in the Federal Archives), Berlin – Lichterfelde, Germany 
Hungary 
BFL Budapest Föváros Levéltára (Budapest City Archives), 
Budapest, Hungary 
MNL OL Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár (National Archive of Hungary), 
Budapest, Hungary 
Poland 
AAN Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie (Central Archives of 
Modern Records), Warsaw, Poland 
AMSZ Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (Archive of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Warsaw, Poland 
Romania 
AMAE  Arhiva diplomatică – Ministerul Afacerilor Externe 
(Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 
Bucharest, Romania 
ANIC  Arhivele Naționale ale României (National Historical Central 
Archives), Bucharest, Romania 
 Yugoslavia 
AJ Arhiv Jugoslavije (Archives of Yugoslavia), Belgrade, Serbia 
AMIP Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike 
Srbije (Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Serbia), Belgrade, Serbia 
Other
AEI Archive on European Integration, University of Pittsburgh 
DNA Rigsarkivets (Danish National Archives), Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
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HAEU Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence, Italy 
OSA The Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archives at 
Central European University, Budapest, Hungary 
TNA The National Archives, London, UK 
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